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The thesis analyses the Federal Republic's motives for backing the NATO Dual- 
Track decision. The purposes are twofold: First, explanation will be given for 
the inconsistencies which are involved in the controversial and heatedly 
debated NATO-Dual Track decision by pointing to the Federal Republic's 
responsibility for its realisation. It will be brought out that during the seventies 
the Federal Republic opted for land-based intermediate-range theatre nuclear 
forces in NATO and requested the preservation of the option of long-range 
cruise missiles in the SALT consultations.
Secondly, in their adherence to flexible response German strategic doctrines 
will be presented basically as independent of party memberships and will be 
compared with U.S. strategic doctrines as a coherent and national entity. The 
contradictory nature of the strategy of flexible response will serve as a starting 
point for elaborating its divergent U.S. and German interpretations. The focus 
on German strategic doctrines shall serve to demonstrate that land-deployed 
long-range theatre nuclear weapons have been regarded as an optimal means 
for implementing the German interpretation of flexible response. As the 
methodological approach a documentary analysis has been chosen.
Generally, West German nuclear policy has been interpreted to a considerable 
extent as a reaction to U.S. hegemonic policy. This interpretation pattern will be 
drawn into question. The thesis wants to serve as a stimulus for further 
research to pay more attention to German contributions to NATO's decisions 
concerning nuclear issues than has been done so far.
1.1. The Nature o f the Problem
On December 12, 1979 at a special meeting in Brussels NATO's Foreign and 
Defence Ministers agreed on the following decision:
"... Ministers have decided to modernise NATO’s LRTNF by the deployment 
in Europe of U.S. ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II 
launchers, which would replace existing U.S. Pershing I-A and 464 ground- 
launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads.”'
1 "Communique issued at a special meeting of the NATO Foreign and Defense 
Ministers in Brussels on 12 December 1979" in John Cartwright, Julian Critchley,
2The deployment of these 572 nuclear systems would be distributed among five 
European countries: all 108 Pershing n  and 96 ground-launched cruise missiles 
would be deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany, 160 cruise missiles in 
the United Kingdom, 112 in Italy and 48 each in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
All systems would be under U.S. command and control.
At the same time, arms control negotiations on U.S. and Soviet long-range 
theatre nuclear systems were offered to the Soviet Union in order to achieve a 
"more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both 
sides"2. This particular combination of two rather different elements became 
known as the famous "Dual-Track" decision.
Since the debate on general rearmament in West Germany in the early fifties 
and the concomitant deployment of tactical nuclear weapons with the 
Bundeswehr, no military decision had been discussed so vehemently and had 
caused such controversy in the Federal Republic.
The deployment of nuclear weapons on European soil capable of reaching 
Soviet territory within several minutes was criticised on many grounds. First of 
all the missiles were regarded as a new incentive to continue the arms race 
between the superpowers. Further criticism focused on the "decoupling" effects 
of the missiles by raising the notion of the increased probability of a limited 
nuclear war in Europe. It was suspected that the United States were casting 
Europe, and in particularly West Germany, for the role of battlefield of a future 
war by making the employment of U.S. strategic weapons for Europe's defence 
far less likely.
The NATO Communique indicated two rationales for the NATO Dual-Track 
decision: the Soviets' extensive deployment of the SS-20 and the necessity of 
concrete actions if NATO's strategy of flexible response were to remain 
credible. The main justification behind the decision, the imbalance of 
intermediate-range nuclear forces, generated by the Soviets' deployment of SS- 
20, raised some doubts. First, because the improvement from the Pershing 1A to 
Pershing II and the development of the cruise missile had been planned before
Cruise. Pershing and SS-20. The Search for Consensus: Nuclear Weapons in 
Europe (London etc.: A North Atlantic Assembly Report, Brassey’s Defense 
Publishers, 1985) pp.151-153, here p.152
2 ibid
3NATO learned about the SS-20 and secondly, because the Western missiles 
were explicitly proclaimed not to be technically or quantitatively equivalent. A 
majority of the German peace movement as well as a part of the left wing of the 
German Social Democrats and the Green party interpreted the deployment of 
the U.S. missiles on European soil as an expression of a new U.S. strategy for 
fighting and winning a nuclear war. Since the Federal Republic was the only 
country which undertook deployment of the Pershing n, opponents of the 
deployment decision in the Federal Republic concentrated on an analysis of the 
implications of the Pershing's technical characteristics. With its accurate low- 
yield warhead and short pre-attack warning time, the Pershing II seemed to be 
the perfect means to implement the U.S. counterforce and countervailing 
strategy. Thus, the Pershing II and cruise missile were seen—at least by a part of 
the peace movement-as first, fully achieved elements of a U.S. first strike 
capability intended to disarm the Soviet Union.
Even if based on different assumptions and political goals, all these criticisms 
aimed at demonstrating one crucial point: whereas the deployment of long- 
range theatre nuclear missiles on European soil impaired Europe's security in 
an irresponsible fashion, it strengthened U.S. hegemony in the world by 
offering effective new military options.
Accordingly, the Federal Republic's compliance with the deployment part of 
the 1979 NATO Dual-Track decision was interpreted as a German appeasement 
policy toward the hegemony of the United States. This interpretation was based 
on the premise that the pattern of U.S. dominance in NATO and its competence 
in nuclear strategic decisions would remain unbroken. The Federal Republic's 
lack of sovereignty, its non-nuclear status and most of all its dependence on the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella supported interpretations of the West German, and in 
particular the Sodal-Liberal, defence policy of the seventies as being merely a 
submitting to or even anticipating U.S. requests, but not as representing an 
independent policy line. Although the Federal Republic gained considerable 
economic power during the 70s, its room for manoeuver was generally 
regarded as being very narrow in the international field and in particular in 
disputes with the U.S. superpower concerning NATO issues.
However, the fact could not be ignored that it was the German Chancellor 
Schmidt who, with his famed October 1977 speech at the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies in London, provided the main legitimation for the
deployment of the missiles by pointing to the imbalance between the Soviet and 
U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces. Schmidt's speech, together with several 
other indications that the Europeans had requested the deployment of long- 
range theatre nuclear weapons, was the first crudal hint that there were flaws 
in the interpretation of the missile issue on the part of missile opponents in the 
left-wing camp of the Federal Republic.
These analyses were further called in question when on December 8, 1987, 
almost exactly eight years after NATO's Dual-Track decision, the superpowers 
signed the INF treaty which envisages the scrapping of all the U.S. and Soviet 
land-based intermediate and shorter-range nuclear missiles. Also, even if one 
included the explanation that the treaty was due to Reagan's objective to crown 
the end of his office term with an arms control treaty, the question remains, 
why precisely those weapons which had only recently been produced-* and 
which had been regarded as indispensable for the implementation of a new U.S. 
strategy were now to be sacrificed on the arms control altar. The ultimate and 
most evident indication that the interpretation of the missiles deployment as an 
expression of U.S. hegemonic power lacked plausibility is that it was precisely 
the government of the Federal Republic which tried, during the Summer of 
1987, to hinder the accomplishment of the INF treaty by insisting on the 
maintenance of the Pershing 1-A missiles.
The present thesis aims to clarify these inconsistencies by focusing on the 
Federal Republic's motives for backing the 1979 NATO decision. The following 
question can be formulated: which were the political and strategic 
considerations that induced West German politicians to support the 
deployment of new long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) in the Federal 
Republic within the framework of the NATO Dual-Track decision? These 
inconsistencies will be explained by arguing that among the Federal Republic's 
strategic experts there was and remains a longstanding consensus that LRTNF 
deployed on European soil would be the best means to guarantee that the 
German interpretation of NATO flexible response strategy would prevail over 
the U.S. interpretation.
The analysis will focus on the contradictions produced by NATO's flexible 
response strategy and its resulting different interpretations. It will be argued
3 The Pershing II had entered the production phase only in June 1982.
5that there exist two, fundamentally incompatible, first use concepts within 
NATO: a German and a U.S. concept. Since for the Federal Republic any use of 
nuclear weapons implies intolerable damage, the Germans request a first use of 
nuclear weapons to be aimed at Soviet territory in order to signal to the Soviet 
Union the necessity for war termination. For the United States, however, 
flexible response would imply precisely the opposite: first use of nuclear 
weapons as late as possible and, to be employed in a geographically limited 
theatre. As a consequence, these different first use concepts led to different 
employment options which the United States and the Federal Republic assigned 
to the LRTNF: while the U.S. would envisage their follow- on use, the Federal 
Republic would preferably contemplate them for executing NATO's first use.
12. State o f the debate
At the beginning of the eighties, the NATO Dual-Track decision was criticised 
extensively by peace researchers in the Federal Republic because of its 
destabilising effects on European security, and in particular for the dangers 
implied for the Federal Republic as a front-line state. The dispute on the merits 
of the new weapons provoked an enormous amount of analyses on the issue of 
the NATO Dual-Track decision. Thus there exist various explicit positions taken 
by previous writers concerning the leading question of the present thesis which 
have to presented.
The effect of U.S. hegemony on the Federal Republic's security policy was a 
dominant interpretation pattern for answering the question who initiated the 
NATO-Dual track decision and why. This pattern of interpretation is based on 
the notion of the Federal Republic's total dependence on the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella and therefore on U.S. benevolence. It is usually invoked to explain 
why West German politicians had to yield to U.S. requests to deploy the 
missiles even if they were acting against their increasing conviction that the 
decision was wrong. In particular, in the beginning of the eighties German 
military journalists and left-wing Social Democratic politicians identified the 
United States as the ally who imposed the missiles on its European NATO 
partners.4
4 Anton-Andreas Guha, journalist of the Frankfurter Rundschau, Der Tod in der 
Grauzone. Ist Europa noch zu verteidigen? (Frankfiut/M: Fischer Verlag) 1980; 
Wilhelm Bittorf, journalist of Der Spiegel, Nachrüstung. Der Atomkrieg rückt 
näher. (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Spiegel-Buch, 1981); Wolf Perdelwitz / Heiner
Also the contrary interpretation of the LRTNFs deployment is possible: that the 
weapons are an expression of growing German or European economic and 
political power, quasi as a military equivalent to this gain of power.* However, 
since the Federal Government was opposed to shared control with regard to the 
Pershing II and the Ground-launched Cruise Missile, and in favour of exclusive 
U.S. control, this explanation will not be given further attention to in the 
present analysis.
The willingness of the European governments to deploy missiles on their soil 
can also be regarded as an act of "burdensharing". As a NATO ally, the Federal 
Republic has to share in the burden of defending the NATO area and especially 
of protecting the central front. Walter Süß contends that the aspect of the 
European governments' ''burdensharing" has also to be considered in a broader 
context. For pursuing their geopolitical interests in the Third World the 
Europeans are dependent on the United States. As a price for this they might 
have accepted the missiles' deployment on their soil:
"Dieser Service hat seinen Preis: Treue zur ’atlantischen Gemeinschaft’, der 
Schutz des europäischen Frontabschnitts, die Übernahme von 
’Verteidigungslasten’. Die Stationierung der neuen Mittelstreckenraketen ist 
ein Teil dieser Bündnisverpflichtungen."0
This explanation of the missiles' deployment as an act of burdensharing on the 
part of the Europeans is not based on the assumption that the Federal Republic 
is the "victim" and the United States is the "delinquent", and will therefore serve 
as one of the underlying hypotheses of the present thesis.
Bremer, journalists of Der Stem, Geisel Europa. (Berlin: Olle und Wolter 1981); 
and Peter Koch, journalist of Der Stem, Wahnsinn Rüstung. Ist der 3. Weltkrieg 
noch zu vermeiden? (Hamburg: Grüner + Jahr AG & Co, 1981); Erhard Eppler, Die 
tödliche Utopie der Sicherheit. (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983)
s For this approach see Mohssen Massarrat, Kriegsgefahr und Friedensbewegung. 
(Kassel-Bettenhausen: Weber, Zucht & Co., 1984), p.37
6 "This service has its price: loyalty to the ’Atlantic community’, the protection of the 
European front sector, sharing the ’defence burden’. The deployment of the new 
intennediate-range weapons constitutes a part of these alliance duties." Walter Süß, 
"NATO und Warschauer Pakt zwischen ’Rüstungswahn’ und Herrschaftskalkül - 
Überlegungen zu den ’Exterminismus’-Thesen Thompsons und Bahros" Prokla. 
Zeitschrift für politische Ökonomie und sozialistische Politik, (Vol. 11, No.4,1981) 
pp.5-45, here p.20
7Many analysts who searched for a coherent and compelling rationale for the 
deployment decision complained about the inconsistencies involved.7 It was 
argued that the varied justifications of the NATO-Dual-Track decision cast 
"considerable doubt on the real purpose of the proposed deployment"* and that 
it "seemed to lack any operational rationale"9. Consequently, researchers 
identified the predominant rationale as being political rather than military.^
Correspondingly, the assumption was warranted that "the military and 
strategic aspects of the missile plan have been overlooked, both in official 
circles and in the public forum."" In this context psychological considerations 
such as the "moral question of solidarity of the Alliance"'2 and the 
demonstration of "organizing a positive Alliance decision"^ were given 
attention to. While not denying that these reasons might be an important factor 
this approach does ignore the simple fact that NATO is also a military alliance
7 "None of the principal military rationales NATO invoices publicly for deploying the 
GLCM (Ground Launched Cruise Missile, S.P.) and Pershing II can stand close 
scrutiny. None calls for weapons of their particular character or number." Leon V. 
Sigal, Nuclear Forces in Europe. Enduring dilemmas. Present prospects. 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), p.50
* McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, 
"Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance", Foreign Affairs Vol.60, No.4, 
(Spring 1982) p.753-768
9 Stanley Hoffmann, "NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and Unreason", Foreign
Affairs (1981/82), pp.327-346, p.332
10 See Christopher J. Makins, "TNF Modernisation and ’Countervailing Strategy’",
Survival Vol.23, No.4, (July/August 1981), pp.157-164
11 Kevin Lewis N., "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons" Scientific American.
Vol.243, No.6 (December 1980) pp.41-51, here p.47. See also R. Jeffrey Smith, 
"Missile Deployments Roil Europe" Science. Vol.223 (January 27, 1984) pp.371- 
376
12 " Die moralische Frage der Allianzsolidarität", Lothar Ruehl, "Der Beschluß der
NATO zur Einführung nuklearer Mittelstreckenwaffen", Europa Archiv. No.4 
(1980), pp.99-110, here p.104
13 Garthoff, 1983, op.cit.. p.197. The political context of the decision is discussed in
detail by Christine Kolmar, Sicherheitspolitik und Öffentlichkeit. Eine 
Inhaltsanalyse am Beispiel der Berichterstattung über die Einführung neuer 
Mittelstreckenraketen (LRTNF) in Europa. Dissertation am Fachbreich 
Kommunikationswissenschaften der Freien Universität Berlin, 1982, p.65 and 
p.l 15. For another political interpretation of the NATO-Dual Track decision as an 
expression of German-U.S. divergences see Emst-Otto Czempiel, "Deutschland­
USA: Kooperation und Irritationen" Außenpolitik. No.l (1982), pp. 14-29
8and considers its task to be the effective preparation of the Western countries 
for the conduct of war.
Since the NATO-Dual Track decision is first of all a military hardware decision, 
attention should be given to its strategic involvements. The new weapons 
seemed to fit perfectly in the context of the U.S. counterforce and countervailing 
strategy, in particular as voiced in the Presidential Directive No.59. This 
assumption was also supported by the argument that the Pershing II and the 
cruise missile are first strike weapons and thus indispensable elements of a new 
U.S. strategy for fighting and winning a nuclear war against the Soviet Union 
on European soil. These arguments played a central role in the decisions within 
the peace movement and will be examined carefully in the present thesis.
Meanwhile sufficient evidence has been given that also part of the German 
government pursued strategic interests by backing the deployment decision. 
Some analyses identify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the main promoter of 
the modernisation of the theatre nuclear weapons while downplaying the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, which for the period involved is 
presented by the Social Democratic partner in the coalition government. 15 The 
Ministry of Defence in cooperation with the Chancellor is interpreted as having
14 The researchers who are identified with these approaches will be introduced in
chapter 8.1.
15 Helga Haftendom and Thomas Risse-Kappen introduced the first comprehensive
analysis of the complex nature of the NATO Dual-Track decision on the basis of 
U.S. studies published by RAND analysts and U.S. participants in the decision­
making process. See Helga Haftendom, "Das doppelte Missverständnis. Zur 
Vorgeschichte des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses von 1979", Aus Politik und Zeitge­
schichte. Vol.33, No.2, 1985, pp.244-287, here p.271; Thomas Risse-Kappen, 
"Fahrplan zur Abrüstung?" Zur INF-Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1970- 
1983 (Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 
January 1985). For the U.S. studies see Michael J. Legge, Theater Nuclear 
Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible response. (Santa Monica, California: 
RAND Corporation, April 1983); Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear 
Consultation in NATO 1965-1980. (Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochell, 
Melbourne, Sidney: Cambridge University Press) 1983; James A. Thomson, "The 
LRTNF decision: evolution of the US theater nuclear policy, 1975-79", 
International Affairs. Vol.60, No.4, (Fall 1984), pp.601-614; Raymond L. Garthoff, 
"The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces", Political Science Quarterly. 
Vol.98, No.2, (Summer 1983), pp.197-214; David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear 
Dilemma. (Washington: Brookings Institution 1983); U.S. Congress: House of 
Representatives. The Modernisation of NATO’s Long Range Theater Nuclear 
Forces. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and The Middle East bv 
the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., December 31,1980; in 
the following: U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernisation, 1980, op.cit.
put forward political arguments, in that they were only concerned to decrease 
the threat against Europe by incorporating the SS-20 into SALT-II. Especially 
Helmut Schmidt's motives for his October 1977 speech are interpreted in a very 
sympathetic way: as an attempt to achieve a reduction of the Soviet missiles.7«5 
Thus the German contribution to the NATO-Dual Track decision is narrowed 
down to the realisation of the arms control track of the NATO decision:
"In der Tat wäre der Dislozierungsteil des NATO-Beschlusses nicht ohne die 
amerikanischen Initiativen und den von Washington ausgeübten Druck 
zustande gekommen, ebenso wie freilich der spezifische Doppelbeschluß, d.h. 
die Ergänzung der Modernisierung durch neue Angebote zur 
Rüstungsbegrenzung, deutlich die Handschrift der Bundesregierung trug."'7
Thomas Risse-Kappen chooses a broader approach and identifies five, partly 
incompatible objectives, which have been pursued by the German INF policy:
military strategy: implementing flexible response to ensure escalation 
control;
- Alliance policy: strengthening of the U.S. nuclear guarantee for Western 
Europe given the 'codification' of strategic parity in SALT II;
16 "Er (Helmut Schmidt, S.P.) hatte auf Rüstungskontrolle gesetzt, aus der - einmal
mehr - Aufrüstung werden wird. Die Dinge aus der Hand gleiten lassen zu haben 
werden Historiker einst als das schwerwiegenste Versäumnis seiner Kanzlerschaft 
ausmachen, das gerade ihm, dem an strategischem Horizont auf der Bonner Bühne 
niemand das Wasser reicht, nicht unterlaufen durfte."(Translation of this quotation: 
"He (Helmut Schmidt, S.P.) had gone for arms control, which turns - once again - 
into armament As the most significant error of his chancellorship, historians will 
point out that he let the leadership slip from his hands - which should not have 
happened to him, this man to whom nobody on the strategic horizon of the Bonn 
stage can hold a candle.") Reinhard Mutz, "Das Sicherheitsproblem der 
Bundesrepublik und die Bundesrepublik als Sicherheitsproblem" in Wolf-Dieter 
Eberwein and Catherine M. Kelleher, Sicherheit zu welchem Preis? Die Zukunft 
der westlichen Allianz. (München-Wien: Günter Olzog Verlag, 1983) pp.75-102, 
here p.101. See also Hartmut Soell, "Sich barfuß in die Tür der Weltpolitik 
klemmen?" Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (November 12, 1983) p.10 This 
argument was also used by academics: Ekkehart Krippendorff contended that the 
United States became the driving force in this issue and made the Federal SPD 
government look like the magicians’s apprentice who could not get rid of the ghosts 
they had called. "Die Friedensbewegung kann nicht Friedensbewegung bleiben - 
oder sie ist auch das nicht mehr", in Ulrich Albrecht etal., Stationierung - und was 
dann? Friedensbewegung gegen Apokalypse. (Berlin 1983) pp.122-129, here p.122. 
See also Hans Günter Brauch, Die Raketen kommen! Vom NATO-Doppelbeschluß 
bis zur Stationierung (Köln: Bund Verlag, 1983) p.22
17 "Indeed the deployment part of the NATO Dual-Track decision would not have been
accomplished without U.S. initiatives and the pressure exerted from Washington. 
At the same time the Dual-Track, i.e. the completion of the modernisation with new 
offers for arms control, would not have been accomplished without the Federal 
Republic." Haftendom, 1985, op.cit.. p.279, emphasis in the text
10
- defensive motives: reacting against the threat posed by the SS-20;
- arms control: including intermediate range weapons in the East-West
arms control process;
- detente policy: complementing political detente in the military area;
- domestic policy: justifying a modernisation decision by the simultaneous
offer to negotiate."'®
In the second half of the 80s several books were published which placed 
considerable emphasis on the Federal Republic's part in the dedsion-making 
process. While openly welcoming the LRTNF as being strategically 
advantageous for the Federal Republic, they interpret the German government 
as actually demanding the LRTNF from the U.S.'9
Lothar Riihl's analysis is the first comprehensive and detailed presentation of 
the West German politicians' policy line in the nuclear field. Until January 1989 
Lothar Riihl was State Secretary in the Ministry of Defence. His book was 
therefore written while he held his office and reveals considerable insider 
knowledge. As with Hoffmann, Riihl's ulterior motive is obviously to support 
the tendencies among West German politicians to continue their active 
participation in the nuclear field. His book describes the evolution of the NATO 
Dual-Track decision as being the result of a consistent policy following a 
German military rationale and which is supported by a broad consensus 
derived from the doctrines of the relevant persons involved in the decision. 
Riihl and Hoffmann, however, downplay and even ignore U.S. strategic 
defence policy and the role of the U.S. superpower.20
'* Thomas Risse-Kappen, The Zero Option. INF. West Germany, and Arms Control. 
(Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988) p.57, emphasis in the text
19 Hubertus Hoffmann, Die Atompartner Washington - Bonn und die Modernisierung
der taktischen Kernwaffen. Vorgeschichte und Management der Neutronenwaffe 
und des Doppelbeschlußes der NATO. (Koblenz,Bernard & Graefe: 1986); Lothar
Rühl, Mittelstreckenwaffen__in Europa: Ihre Bedeutung in Strategie.
Rüstungskontrolle und Bündnispolitik (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1987) 
Hubertus Hoffmann’s title "The nuclear Partners Washington-Bonn and the 
Modernisation of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons" expresses the book’s position that 
the Federal Republic should become aware of its strength in the nuclear field. In 
particular the years 1969-1974 of Willy Brandt’s chancellorship are interpreted as a 
phase of "nuclear agony" which changed dramatically when Helmut Schmidt who 
is interpreted as the father of the nuclear awakening of the Federal Republic took 
over, see p.488
20 An analysis with the same emphasis on the Federal Republic’s part in the decision
making process without ignoring that the LRTNF are also a product of doctrinal
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The thesis will consider both U.S. and German strategic interests and activities 
to explain the inconsistencies of the NATO Dual-Track decision.2'
13. Approach and purpose of research
The strategic doctrines of West German and U.S. decision makers will be 
clarified in a documentary analysis. These strategic doctrines to be analysed are 
part of a complex of security policy doctrines, various components of which 
might be incompatible and clash with each other. Edward A. Kolodziej 
identifies nine levels of decision and action which comprise the key 
components of the security policy of any state and which must be integrated by 
governments in order to develop and maintain coherent national security 
policies.22 Four aspects of security policy will be considered in the thesis since 
they are crucial in the analyses of the NATO-Dual-Track decision:
developments in U.S. nuclear strategy is provided by Emst-Christoph Meier. While 
on the one hand he stresses the two interpretations inherent in NATO strategy of 
flexible response he on the other hand elaborates mainly the compatibility of the 
U.S. and German doctrines which led to the NATO-Dual track decision. See Emst- 
Christoph Meier, Deutsch-amerikanische Sicherheitsbeziehungen und der NATO- 
Doppelbeschluß. Die Auswirkungen NATO-intemer Interessendivergenzen auf die 
Nuklearpolitik des Bündnisses. (Rheinfelden: Historische Forschungen im 
Schäuble Verlag, 1986)
21 As early as 1981 Gert Krell, while pointing out the different interpretations of flexible
response, identifies the Federal Republic as the main initiator of the LRTNF 
decision. See Gen Krell, Plädoyer fur Rüstungskontrolle. Zur Kontroverse um die 
’Nachrüstung’. (Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und
Konfliktforschung, HSFK-Report (September 1981)) p.14. Also Milton Leitenberg 
explains the Federal Republic’s active role in terms of strategic motives. He 
emphatically accuses the peace movements in Great Britain, the Netherlands and 
the Federal Republic of having mobilised public opinion only on the basis of using 
the United States as a "scapegoat" and of disregarding the political responsibility of 
their own European countries. Milton Leitenberg, Rüstung und Sicherheitspolitik. 
Sechs Studien über verhängnisvolle Entscheidungen. (Baden-Baden:Nomos 1986) 
p. 181/182
22 Thus the following components of a security policy will not be considered since they
played only a marginal role in the evolution of the NATO Dual-Track decision: 1. 
the creation of political incentives and controls to direct the military establishment 
to support defined objectives; 2. the marshalling of public opinion, political parties, 
and interest groups to support regime and national objectives and policies; 3. the 
human and material resources, including advanced technology, needed to respond 
to security imperatives while addressing internal socioeconomic demands; 4. the 
announced strategies to communicate with, or to conceal policies from, allies, 
adversaries, and neutrals as well as from subordinates (military elites, 
functionaries); 5. the definition of military (and non-military) threats to the regime 
or nation or both, and the national and regime objectives to be supported by the use 
or threat of force. Edward A. Kolodziej, "Military Policy: The Use, Threat, and
iZ
1. The assumptions about the character of the international system and 
relations, and the Federal Republic's position within this system.
2. The attitude of West Germany's alignment strategies with the object of 
maximising security objectives, including arms control and 
disarmament measures.
3. The military doctrinal response to threats against the regime or nation 
or both, requiring the use or threat of force.
4. The force levels and weapon systems organised to respond to these 
functions.
The present study will ignore the fact that as a component of a security policy 
any state has to define the military and non-military threats to the regime or 
nation. Thus the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation will be considered only insofar as the evolution of the NATO 
Dual-Track decision was influenced directly by very concrete Soviet armament 
steps. This omission is first due to the complexity of the East-West conflict and 
the arms race, and also to the fact that the focus of the present analysis is on the 
interplay of the members in an alliance and not on the international system as 
such. If as a result of these omissions the impression arises that the LRTNF 
modernisation decision has been induced to a considerable extent by the 
internal dynamics of an alliance and its institutional organisations, this would 
not be entirely unintentional. However, arms control considerations and the 
Federal Republic's emphasis on detente with the Soviet Union will be included.
In order to understand the motives behind the West German support for the 
Dual-Track decision the following questions must be answered:
1. Was the Federal Republic's support of the NATO-Dual Track decision 
primarily based on a strategic and military rationale?
2. Or was the West German politicians' agreement to the deployment of 
the LRTNF based first of all on a political rationale, namely the 
obligation to carry an alliance burden, imposed on the Federal Republic 
by the United States?.
Control of Force" in Stuart Nagel (ed); Encyclopedia of Policy Studies (New 
York/Basel, 1983) pp.299-330, here p.316
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An analysis of the motives of West German decision makers to support the 
NATO-Dual Track decision shows that the Federal Republic in NATO 
requested weapons with this particular long range, even against initial 
resistance in the U.S. administration. An effective arms control policy with a 
view to obviating the deployment of LRTNF was not pursued. Instead West 
German politicians pursued a policy line of maintaining the option of long- 
range theatre nuclear weapons in SALT.
After having achieved these results the conclusion is warranted that the Federal 
Republic's support for the NATO Dual-Track decision was not due to political 
obligations as a NATO ally. Thus the following questions arise:
- which strategic doctrines induced the West German politicians and 
strategic experts to request the option of long-range theatre nuclear 
weapons? what role do LRTNF play in the Federal Republic's strategic 
doctrine?
- which details of the programme to modernise the theatre nuclear 
weapons, e.g. the basing mode and the type of weapons, were 
requested by German politicians, and which originated in force 
development, employment and operational plans of the U.S. 
administration?
- to what extent was the LRTNF deployment decision a compromise 
between U.S. and West German strategic doctrines?
- or did the deployment of the LRTNF predominantly express the 
doctrines of one nation, and if so, of which one? Where is the point of 
fracture in these two strategic doctrines?
The thesis is an individual study, intended as a contribution to the field of 
international relations and provides evidence for theories that claim a decline in 
U.S. hegemonic power during the seventies. Until far into the eighties analyses of 
the Western alliance were based on the premise that U.S. hegemony dominated 
NATO. During the 80s an intellectual debate was initiated whether and how U.S. 
hegemony declined. While Keohane focused on the economic effects of the 
decline, Calleo expanded on the debate in the political and the security fie lds
23 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton University Press, 1984. See David Calleo, Beyond American 
Hegemony. The Future of the Western Alliance. (New York: Basic Books, 1987) 
See also Dieter Senghaas, Die Zukunft Europas. Probleme der Friedens Gestaltung. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986)
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The thesis aims to serve as a further stimulus to examine the effects of the decline 
of U.S. hegemony on NATO and its power structure. However, these theories are 
only implicit in the thesis as the debates on the decline of U.S. hegemonic power 
encouraged me to adhere to my findings, which did not seem to fit in the 
traditional pattern of international relations.
The question arises whether the thesis can be regarded as a contribution to 
"peace research."2* Generally the term is used in a very broad sense, since several 
disciplines claim to do research on peace. Narrowing down the term by referring 
to the discipline of "critical peace research" gives a more precise definition of 
peace research. Critical peace research is a school whose aim is to change the 
structural conditions of force and war beyond "system-inherent" limits. With 
respect to critical peace research, the ultimate political aim has not just been the 
absence of war, but the complete absence of social and national violence. The 
causes of violence and war as well as the means to eliminate them are central 
concerns of peace research. According to this definition, the thesis cannot claim 
to contribute to these aims. Moreover, it focuses on what politicians and strategic 
experts think and not on a criticism of the ideology underlying the dominant 
views, albeit they are sometimes briefly included. However, the thesis's attempt 
to elucidate the dilemma of NATO strategy is meant as a contribution to the
24 In the Federal Republic "Peace research” developed against the background of the 
Second World War and the Cold War in the fifties. Peace researchers recognised 
the need to analyse the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and by the 
Cold War beyond the scope of the methods and content of the conventional 
sciences of international law and international relations. They demanded that in this 
Held science be interdisciplinary and experts should cooperate internationally. They 
understood their task as promoting the idea of peace and basically worked for the 
abolition, instead of the mere limitation, of force. The notion of war as a form of 
"communication" between states was strongly rejected by them. During the 1970s 
and 1980s peace researchers criticised, inter alia the strategic doctrine of 
deterrence, the U.S. "Military Industrial Complex", etc. They pointed out that war- 
fighting characteristics, which have always been implied in the U.S strategy, gained 
new emphasis in the seventies. At the beginning of the eighties, peace researchers 
fundamentally criticised the NATO Dual-Track decision. Although the peace 
movement in the Federal Republic used peace research in its campaign against the 
weapons' deployment, peace research has always held a position of critical 
solidarity with respect to the peace movement, and has avoided to act as its agent. 
See Gert Krell, Die Diskussion über die Modernisierung der Mittelstreckenwaffen 
(Frankfun: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, September 1981a) 
p.6-7. For the history of peace research see Dieter S. Lutz, "Friedens- und 
Konfliktforschung" in: Dieter S. Lutz (ed.), Lexikon Rüstung. Frieden. Sicherheit. 
(München: C.H. Beck, 1987), pp. 124-130. For a review of peace research in 
particular in the Federal Republic and up-to-date, comprehensive bibliography, see 
Bernhard Moltmann, Perspektiven der Friedensforschung. Information Unit Peace 
Research Bonn, (December 1978)
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debate whether or not to abandon that strategy: "Die Überwindung des 
Sicherheitsdilemmas setzt die Metakommunikation über diese Struktur 
voraus."25 In this sense I would like the thesis to be also understood as a 
contribution to peace research.
The NATO debate during spring 1989 on the modernisation of short-range 
nuclear weapons and the air- and sea-based compensations in the INF-ranges at 
first sight seems to disprove entirely the findings of the present thesis. As in the
1979 LRTNF debate, it seems that due to its hegemonic position the United States 
imposes weapons on the Europeans and in particular on the Federal Republic. 
While there is no doubt that domestic considerations cause West German 
politicians to hope for a postponement of these unpopular decisions until the 
elections, the Federal Government, nevertheless, pursues its own strategic 
interests in these modernisation and compensation decisions. It has to be noted, 
for example, that the Chancellor's October 1983 directive for the implementation 
of the Montebello decision recommended to put emphasis on longer-range 
nuclear capable systems and to request the modernisation of the Lance missile 
including an increased range, and stand-off weapons of a greater range.20 The 
thesis will explain the strategic background to the Chancellor's recommendation 
and to the Federal Government's welcoming of the equipment of additional F-
111 with stand-off weapons. It will be shown that these strategic views 
requesting these particular weapons do not depend on party considerations, but 
simply on the adherence to flexible response.
The decision-makers, identified in this analysis, are not only politicians, but also 
a group of "strategic experts", who were in a position to give direct or indirect 
advice to German ministers via consulting the organs, sections and 
departments involved. The term "strategic experts" includes office holders 
involved in a specific decision at a specific time as well as civilian advisers who 
influenced the decision, such as analysts of the Ebenhausen Institute. The 
expert group in the Federal Republic, which was occupied with the
25 "Metacommunication about this structure is a precondition for overcoming the 
security dilemma." Gert Krell, in his interesting attempt to relate peace research, 
security research and international relations with each other. "Fricndcnsforschung - 
Sicherheitsforschung - Internationale Beziehungen". February 16, 1989. Lecture at 
the congress of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. 
February 17-19,1989.
26 Katrin Fuchs, floor debate, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 11/16, June 4, 
1987, p.949
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modernisation plans, was small. It included experts from NATO organs and 
members of the respective sections in the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Chancellery and the Ebenhausen Institute.27 Outside this 
group, it seems that the plan with its ulterior strategic considerations was 
unknown.
Although the impression might arise, the present thesis does not claim to be an 
analysis of security policy decision making according to the model of 
"bureaucratic politics." This approach interprets governmental behaviour as an 
outcome of bargaining games among players positioned hierarchically within 
the government.2* The present analysis, however, can neither identify the 
majority of different governmental officials who played their games in form of 
compromises, coalitions, competitions and confusions, nor can it maintain the 
distinction between executive and consultant throughout the analysis. 
Moreover, no evidence will be provided for the direct influence of civilian 
analysts on the decision, although much attention will be given to their studies. 
Their influence is going to be deduced from other information and data, e.g. the 
institutionalised contact between the Ebenhausen Institute and German 
politicians. This does not imply that information which helps to understand the 
issue will be excluded. In any case a clear distinction between politicians and 
researchers would be difficult in this context because U.S. analysts frequently 
change their status. A famous U.S. example is Defense Secretary Schlesinger 
who was a former RAND analyst. A German example is Lothar Riihl who 
advised Helmut Schmidt in the seventies and who served as deputy spokesman 
and State Secretary.
It will be demonstrated that Chancellor Schmidt was not involved in the 
decision to the extent that one would expect and that his doctrine is distinct 
from that of the German strategic expert group. Defence Minister Leber 
participated and gave the main impulses for the modernisation of the long- 
range nuclear missiles. When Minister Apel, who seemed to be quite 
inexperienced in strategic nuclear matters, succeeded Leber in February 1978,
27 Hoffmann contends that this group consisted of less than a dozen people. 1986,
oppitr, p.21
28 See for the model of bureaucratic politics Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models
and the Cuban Missile Crisis" in Richard G. Head/Ervin J. Rokke, American 
Defense Policy (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1973, first 
edition 1965) pp.273-300
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the course for modernisation was already set. In a NPG meeting he complained 
about the great influence of military and defence experts, but did not change 
the course.
Lothar Riihl played an important role in the campaign to install the weapons by 
participating in numerous conferences and contributing many articles and 
books to the strategic debate. Therefore Lothar Riihl will be quoted much more 
frequently than others. Secondly, among strategists he is the one who spelt out 
some plain truths. He was adviser to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and 
contributed to Schmidt's famed 1977 London speech.29 In January 1981, he 
acquired the position of deputy spokesman of the Sodal-Liberal government 
upon the recommendation of the Liberal Party.•» In October 1982, as a result of 
the fall of the Social-Liberal government and the rise of the Christian-Liberal 
Coalition, Lothar Riihl became State Secretary in the Ministry of Defence.^
My analysis will focus on "strategic doctrines" presented by strategic experts. 
Neither the definition of the terms "strategy" and "doctrine" nor the difference 
between them are by any means clear within the strategic debate. The term 
"doctrine" has been applied to a wide range from broad policies and 
generalisations of U.S. defence policy-*2 down to the level of the "doctrine" of a 
specific service. The term "strategy" has been used in a military sense, as well as 
in reference to the state "strategy" of using military force for a broad range of 
political aims, called "grand strategy". In the present context the term strategy 
will refer to the compromise formula of all NATO allies, the "NATO strategy",
29 Helga Haftendom, Sicherheit und Stabilität. AtißenbeZiehungen der Bundesrepublik
zwischen Ölkrise und NATO-Doppelbeschluß. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 1985, p.15
30 His 1987 book "Mittelstreckenwaffen in Europa: Ihre Bedeutung in Strategie,
Rüstungskontrolle und Bündnispolitik" ("Intermediate-range weapons in Europe: 
Their meaning in strategy, arms control and Alliance policy") op.cit. which makes 
few references to other resources, reveals his insider position in the NATO organs 
during the seventies. Rühl who spent 15 years of his life in France where he 
acquired an insight into the strategic thinking of de Gaulle, was employed by the 
Second German television (ZDF) as their correspondent from 1973-1980. August 
Graf Kageneck, "Freunde auch an der Seine".Dic Welt. November 25,1980
31 "Lothar Rühl, Deutscher Journalist, Dr. sc. pol., Staatssekretär", Munzinger Archiv.
Internationales Biographisches Archiv. Ravensburg, March 5, 1983
32 John W. Taylor quoted in Julian Lider, Military Theory. Concept Structure.
Problems. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1983 p.308
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although, as it will be seen, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between what is 
official NATO strategy and what is U.S. national strategy.
In contrast to this use of the term "strategy", Fritz Ermath offered a definition of 
strategic doctrine which is useful in this context on an intermediate level 
between doctrines of particular services and grand strategy. Strategic doctrine 
is a
"set of operative beliefs, values, and assertions that in a significant way guide 
official behavior with respect to strategic research and development (R&D), 
weapons choice, forces, operational plans, arms control, etc."«
Thus "doctrine" in this study is always used in a way subordinate to "strategy". 
Since the doctrines to be analysed refer to the actual nuclear strategy of the 
nations involved, the term "strategic" doctrine instead of "military" doctrine is 
preferred here. Julian rider's summary of the variety of interpretations of 
military or strategic doctrine in Western writings helps to supplement Ermath's 
definition by elaborating for whom and at which level the term "doctrine" is 
used.* The term "doctrine" has been systematised in this context as expressing 
not only the official military policy of one state, but also the consensus of 
opinion among a large number of professionals who represent a common 
experience, which is conceived on a national level. Thus, application of the term 
"doctrine" assumes the existence of a national doctrine to which governmental 
parties feel committed as a coherent concept of security and strategic policy. 
The doctrines which will be analysed on a governmental, departmental, 
institutional and individual level and the resulting differences will be pointed 
out. However, since the doctrines of German and U.S. politicians and strategic 
experts will also be analysed with respect to their national characteristics, the 
focus of attention is less on the variety than on the consensus of the national 
doctrines. For stylistic reasons "doctrine", "guideline" or "view" are used 
interchangeably.
Related to this problem of defining "doctrine" and "strategy" is the distinction 
between the different levels of a war. The decision to label a weapon "strategic". 
"tactical" or "operational" depends largely on the weapon's assigned role in war. 
The labels ’Tactical Nuclear Weapons" and, more recently, "Theatre Nuclear
33 Fritz W. Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought", in 
International Security. (Vol.3, No.2, Fall 1978) pp.138-155, p.183
34 Lider, 1988, op.cit.. p.309
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Weapon" are defined largely by process of elimination and by setting them 
aside from the category "strategic weapons". More than other terms in the 
strategic debate the labels "strategic" and "tactical" create confusion and contain 
ambiguities. It seems that there are no absolute criteria for distinguishing 
between these two categories of weapons and if one examines weapon yield, 
weapon range, location of delivery system, location of target and alert status 
one discovers a continuous range of values, with much overlap.^5
Even though defining a tactical nuclear weapon is a thankless task and in spite 
of the arbitrariness of their distinction, these terms can be understood as two 
poles of a continuum:
"The word "strategic" may refer to (1) attack by US or Soviet forces on 
opposing homelands; (2) attack on population (and/or industry) as distinct from 
military targets; (3) attack on missiles in silos and other long-range forces 
versus attack on general-purpose forces; (4) attack on "deep" targets; (5) 
nuclear as opposed to nonnuclear attacks; (6) attacks using long-range vehicles 
against any target; or (7) any attack launched from outside the theater. The 
word "tactical" may mean (1) avoiding superpower homelands, fighting in 
allied territory only; (2) attack only on military targets; (3) attack only on 
general-purpose forces; (4) nonnuclear attack or perhaps nuclear attack only on 
the battlefield; (5) attack using short-range vehicles.
With the introduction of the U.S. Army doctrine Air Land Battle in 1982 the level 
of an "operational" war as distinguished from and subordinate to a "tactical" 
war was introduced:
"The operational level of war uses available military resources to attain 
strategic goals within a theater of war. Most simply, it is the theory of larger 
unit operations. It also involves planning and conducting campaigns. 
Campaigns are sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a 
specified space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles. ... Tactics 
are the specific techniques smaller units use to win battles and engagements 
which support operational objectives."*7
35 For the definition of ’operational’, ’tactical’, ’strategic’ see also Milton Leitenberg,
"Background materials in tactical nuclear weapons (primarily in the European 
context)" in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Tactical 
Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives (London: Taylor and Francis, 1978), 
pp.3-136, p.4
36 Henry S. Rowen and Albert Wohlstetter, "Varying Response with Circumstance" in:
Holst, Johan J. / Nerlich, Uwe (eds.). Beyond nuclear Deterrence. New aims. New 
Arms. (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1977), pp225-238, p.234, 
emphasis by S.P.
37 U.S. Department of the Army, Operations Field Manual 100-5. Washington D.C., 
August 20 1982, p.2-3, emphasis by S.P.
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Both "tactical" and "operational" are applied to the war "theatre" which is 
defined as follows:
"The geographical area outside continental United States for which a 
commander of a unified or specified command has been assigned military 
responsibility."*«
Since the present analysis also deals with a concrete U.S. armament 
programme, it is necessary to scrutinise U.S. strategic nuclear policy. For 
analytical purposes it is helpful to delineate several facets, into which U.S. 
nuclear policy can be usefully divided:
Declaratory policy gives guidance to American officials on what they 
should say publicly about U.S. employment and acquisition policies. In 
the Defense Secretary's annual report and in other official rationales of 
budgetary and other decisions the official policy is outlined.
The force employment or action policy describes the targets and how the 
United States plans to use the nuclear weapons in the nuclear war.
The force development policy guides decisions on size, capabilities, and 
deployment mode of the weapons.
Arms control policy has been developed which provides "bargaining 
chips” and helps to manage arms control negotiations.
The operational policy rules activities such as the alert rates.*9
While the analysis deals with all these categories put forward by the U.S. 
defense analyst Desmond Ball, it focuses on the force development and actual 
employment policy of long-range theatre nuclear weapons systems.
Strategic discussion is full of terms which are not defined and which do not 
experience any clarification although they represent quite important notions. 
These ambiguities in language, which allow a wide spectrum of interpretation, 
might be intended, since recommendations of German analysts in nuclear
38 U.S. Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., September 3,1974, p.333
39 See Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces. How would they be used?" in
International Security. Vol.7,No.3, (Winter 1982/83), pp.31-60, here pp.32. See 
also the categories Lynn Etheridge Davis, "Limited Nuclear Options. Deterrence 
and the New American Doctrine" Adelphi Papers, No. 121 (London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1975/76) p.l
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issues could easily be misunderstood as interference with concerns which are 
not theirs.
These ambiguities are provoked by the nature of deterrence theory itself and by 
the endeavours to hide the destructive aspects of nuclear war behind 
euphemism.'*0 Green pointed out that deterrence theorists prefer the term 
"countervalue warfare" to describe "what is after all counterpeople warfare 
(thus using the word 'value' in its economic rather than ethical sense.)"4' 
Schelling confirms our need for "a richer menu of contingencies and 
strategies."*2, and Kahn concedes that "destruction is likely to be greatly 
intensified at the upper end of the escalation ladder", which simply means that 
he does not dare to guarantee that his escalation model will function as a 
deterrent so that a catastrophic war which would kill millions of people can be 
positively excluded.** After having given these illustrative examples, Green 
concludes:
"More than any other aspect of the thought of deteirence theorists, perhaps, this 
reliance on euphemism reveals the deep problem of ethical justification which 
is central to their writings."*
The term "limited war" is an expressive example of this sometimes even casual 
language. If this term is used, it is often not defined what kind of limited war is 
referred to: limited to geographical areas, periods of time, means of 
employment, or to all three criteria? The arbitrariness in the use of this term 
becomes prominent when Schelling suggests that it is always possible to find
40 Philip Green. Deadly Logic. The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence.(New York:
Schocken Books, 1968), p.222
41 Emphasis in the text, ibid
*2 T. C. Schelling "Comment" in : Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read (eds). Limited 
Strategic War. (New York: Praeger, 1962), p.253
43 Green, 1968, op.cit.. p.222
44 Green, 1968, op.cit: As early as 1962 Charles E. Osgood hinted to the abstract terms
used in talks about nuclear war. These terms would get their meaning only 
indirectly by association with other words, not directly from real objects which 
belong to our world, such as ’blood’, ’bread’ and ’mother’. Charles E. Osgood, An 
Alternative to War or Surrender. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962) pp.22-
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limits to a war: "War was limited in Korea, and gas was not used in World 
War H"*5 Thus World War II also can be placed in the category of limited war.
When compatible with their intentions, strategic analysts complain about the 
euphemistic language used by their colleagues on the deterrence issue. When 
Fred Ikle argues in favour of a no-first use policy and thus against the risk of 
escalation into an all-out nuclear war, he complains that the potentially most 
painful event in history is dealt with by disguising it behind the pretty name 
"'nuclear exchange', as if it were a mere transaction in foreign trade."*6 And if 
strategists talk about things which are very important to them, their language is 
dramatic and unfactual: in context of the neutron bomb debacle they tend to 
speak of a "traumatic controversy".*7
Another methodological problem in the thesis is the imprecise but unavoidable 
distinction between "European" and "German" doctrines and policy. In many 
analyses of the evolution of the NATO Dual- Track decision U.S. policy is 
contrasted with "European" doctrines. If these analyses refer to the European 
view, it will not only be presupposed that the German national doctrine was 
included, but also that the "European” view is dominated by the British and 
German views. The description of the Nuclear Planning Group in Section I will 
demonstrate that the Federal Republic and Great Britain are the leading 
European nations concerning nuclear issues. A supplement of a specific British 
view would have certainly contributed to greater precision in the analysis, but 
is outside the scope of this study. Still we shall attempt to distinguish between 
the British and German view as clearly as possible.
Although I would have preferred to avoid the use of the term "coupling" 
because of its imprecise and predominantly political definition, any analysis of 
U.S. - European security relations cannot help dealing with it. "Coupling" in a 
general sense is used to convey the broader political or diplomatic concept of a 
linkage between European and American views of security. "Coupling" refers to 
the Europeans' dependence —and above all those of the non-nuclear states— on
45 Thomas C. Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University, 1960,4th printing 1970), p.75
46 Charles Fred Ikle. "NATO’s ’First Nuclear Use’: A Deepening Trap?" Strategic
Review. Vol.8, No.l, (1980), pp. 18-23, p.22
47 K.-Peter Stratmann. NATO-Strateeie in der Krise? Militärische Optionen von NATO
und Warschauer Pakt in Mitteleuropa. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1981), p.18.
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the U.S. nuclear umbrella and thus on the permanent commitment of the 
United States to use its strategic arms in order to deter Soviet aggression against 
Europe. Thus the term can be used interchangeably with "extended deterrence" 
or "nuclear umbrella". European anxieties about "decoupling" from the U.S. 
strategic forces have emerged every so often since the Soviet development of 
delivery systems for a second strike in 1957. The suspicion does not seem to be 
far fetched that the term "coupling" is used frequently in the strategic debate in 
order to avoid getting too precise about the intentions of the speaker. The 
attempt will be undertaken to break up "coupling" into its military equivalents 
and thus to "demythologise" it.
The sources used for the analysis of U.S. nuclear policy can be categorised into 
five groups:
1. reports of the U.S. administration to Congress, in particular the annual 
budget reports of the Department of Defense to Congress, and the 
annual report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
of the State Department;
2. Investigations and reports of the committees and research service 
agencies of the United States;
3. declassified, but still censored Congressional Hearings;
4. publications of the U.S. strategic community in numerous periodicals;
5. secondary literature on the history of the decision and its strategic and 
political background.
As far as U.S. sources on U.S. policy are concerned there is so much material 
freely available going into so much detail and in so many corroborative ways 
that it does not seem to be too ambitious to expect reliable results. The Boston 
Study group which analysed U.S. defence policy concluded: "Of course there 
are material gaps in published information: though in detail significant, they 
are in no way major.”*« The "true barrier"*» to a reliable analysis of U.S. nuclear 
policy is the complexity of U.S. organisations which deal with these questions.
46 For the same evaluation see The Boston Study Group, Winding Down. The Price of 
Defense (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979) p.xvii
49 ibid
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The questions raised above will be answered by a documentary analysis, 
involving for the German doctrines:
1. official declarations and reports of the German government, i.e. the 
White Papers, the Bulletin of the Government, special material for the 
legitimation of the NATO-Dual Track decision;
2. biographies and interviews of politicians involved;
3. contributions by politicians to the strategic debate;
4. publications of the strategic community, such as researchers of the 
Ebenhausen Institute, the Ebenhausen Institute's internal reports;
5. reports of the conferences of the strategic community;
6. newspaper articles.
This analysis is not supplemented by interviews with these members of the 
strategic community for the same reason that only public sources were used 
(apart from few exceptions): only with a certain degree of public exposure does 
the speaker feel committed to his statement and obliged to maintain consistency 
between the public statements and the pursued policy. Another reason for the 
omission of interviews was the fact that the present thesis refers to a decision 
which was accomplished a decade ago. Therefore almost all politicians 
involved have already been asked, some even several times, about these events, 
and it does not seem likely that one would get any new information. The 
material already provided in previous interviews by the major actors has been 
effectively utilised in my study. But many talks with military men at SHAPE, 
AFC ENT, AFNORTH and AFSOUTH and civilian researchers at the 
International Secretariat of the North Atlantic Assembly during a traineeship, 
provided the opportunity for a continuous examination of the hypotheses and a 
better understanding of the results.
1.4. Organisation of the thesis
The thesis is organised in three sections. Section I deals with the consistent 
dilemma of NATO, produced by the flexible response strategy. Chapter 2 
describes the evolution of flexible response by focusing on the two functions 
inherent in nuclear deterrence: deterrence by denial or war-fighting and 
deterrence by punishment or retaliation. It will be pointed out that the 
refinement of war-fighting deterrence was a result of the endeavours to 
transform nuclear weapons into feasible instruments of foreign policy. Since
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NATO strategy is dominated by U.S. strategy, a brief description of its evolution 
is necessary. It will be demonstrated that in contrast to U.S. declaratory policy, 
U.S. war plans also consisted of no-cities or counterforce options from the very 
outset of nuclear strategy. This part will also serve to introduce and define 
several key terms of strategic analysis. The description of the elaboration of war- 
fighting options shall be continued with PD 59 and completed with the 1988 U.S. 
report, called "Discriminate Deterrence". Attention then shifts from NATO 
strategy to U.S. strategy. The process of NATO's retreat from the strategy of 
massive retaliation to the adoption of flexible response will also be described 
under the aspect of the transformation of nuclear weapons into feasible 
instruments of foreign policy. We will concentrate on McNamara's Athens 
speech in which he announced his revision of U.S. strategy toward a 
strengthening of the conventional component and its shift to counterforce 
targeting. A brief description of the TNF in Europe will serve as a background to 
elaborate the parallels between both the 1979 LRTNF decision and the LRTNF 
deployments during the sixties and the plans for a Multilateral Force. The 
problems discussed at that time were similar to those of the 1979 discussion: 
doubts in the military rationale, strong arguments for sea- instead of land-basing, 
and the European concern about the U.S. umbrella.
In Chapter 3 I intend to elaborate the U.S. and the German interpretation of 
flexible response, originated by the different geographical positions of both allies. 
While Europeans have been more concerned with the retaliation function of 
deterrence and the escalating character of the strategy, the United States put 
stronger emphasis on the usability, i.e. the war-fighting character of the strategy. 
While the United States would like to postpone the use of nuclear weapons 
against Soviet territory as long as possible, the Europeans do not feel comfortable 
with the idea of battlefield use of nuclear weapons since the battlefield would 
most likely be Europe itself. After the description of flexible response the 
different reactions within the German parties upon its introduction shall be 
compared. In this context it will also be emphasised that at the same time 
research on strategic matters was institutionalised in the Federal Republic. The 
divergent U.S. and German national doctrines will be set against each other by 
analysing their different perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons derived from 
their different geography: while the United States prefers an emphasis of the 
conventional component on a tactical level yielding military results, the German 
guidelines contemplate a nuclear emphasis on a strategic level meant primarily 
as a political signal. The different guidelines on the role of nuclear weapons
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result in two, principally incompatible first use concepts. While the U.S. prefers 
first use on a theatre level at as late a stage as possible which should be 
accomplished with military effectiveness, the German interpretation of flexible 
response suggests first use as early as possible, on a strategic level and only to 
serve as a signal to the Soviet Union. The ambiguity of flexible response on the 
level of military procurement will be exemplified by presenting the varied 
history of the INF. This ambiguity will also be shown as far as the operational 
target planning of nuclear weapons is concerned. In this context evidence will be 
submitted for the fact that - a t  least theoretically- there exists a dual command 
structure for U.S. forces in Europe which is designed to allow for unilateral U.S. 
control over nuclear weapons. This provides the background for my line of 
argument that German strategic analysts could not expect that in case of war 
German security interests would be considered.
Section II analyses the evolution of the NATO-Dual Track decision in the context 
of NATO and the SALT process. Special attention will be given to the fact that 
the LRTNF modernisation was planned as a solution to reconcile the 
contradictions within flexible response. The discussions held in the Nuclear 
Planning Group on the guidelines of first and follow-on use of nuclear weapons 
convey a considerable influence of European doctrines. However, these 
guidelines are in no way obliging. The beginning of the restructuring of NATO 
TNF in the early seventies will be discussed with regard to the impact that U.S. 
Secretary Schlesinger's revision of the TNF posture made. Then the influence 
through technological developments and the German guidelines for the 
modernisation of the TNF shall be considered.
Chapter 5 will describe U.S.-European conflicts over SALT, generated by the 
Europeans' concern for maintaining and consolidating the options for long-range 
theatre nuclear forces and the U.S. reluctance to yield to these European, in 
particular German, requests. In SALT-I German strategic experts requested that 
the United States exclude the FBS from the negotiations. The FBS issue will be 
discussed in detail in order to show that a wrong treatment of the grey-area 
problem would have obviated the whole roundabout process by which the 
superpowers deployed and then dismantled the Pershing II and the cruise 
missiles. In this context an interpretation of Schmidt's 1977 speech as well as a 
discussion of his strategic beliefs will be delivered.
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The political reasons for overcoming the Carter administrations' reluctance and 
the emergence of the transatlantic consensus of deployment will be the subject of 
Chapter 6. It will be argued that German political views dominated in respect to 
non-singularity, land-deployment and the link to arms control.
Section HI aims at giving an answer to the question of whose interpretation of 
flexible response dominated in the request for intermediate-range, land-based 
and, therefore highly vulnerable nuclear- tipped ballistic and cruise missiles: 
the German or the U.S. interpretation. For the clarification of this problem 
different employment options shall be discussed.
Chapter 7 will be headed by a brief discussion on the role that the SS-20 played 
for the evolution of the LRTNF decision. It will be argued that the final 
compromise can be presented as a joint U.S. and German acceptance of 
providing means for escalation control. The ambiguous data of the Pershing II 
seemed to have helped that U.S. and German strategic experts were able to 
compromise on the LRTNF, since the ambiguous data impeded a clear-cut 
determination of the LRTNF's employment options.
The Pershing II and cruise missile's role as spearheads for a U.S. first strike 
strategy will be one U.S. employment option to be analysed in Chapter 8. The 
Schlesinger doctrine with its implied revision of TNF shall be analysed with 
regard to what extent the weapons have originated in U.S. defence programs. 
While the weapons are certainly contemplated for counterforce and shifting 
targets, the warranted complaints in the U.S. strategic community on the 
weapons' vulnerability suggest the Pershings' and cruise missiles' role as 
means for follow-on use.
The German first use concept, elaborated in an ideal typical way by an analyst 
of the Ebenhausen Institute, will serve to clarify the employment options of the 
LRTNF in German doctrines in Chapter 9. One of the main documents will be 
Karl-Peter Stratmann's "NATO in der Krise" ("NATO in crisis"), published in 
1981, which explained the 1979 decision from a German point of view. He 
advocated deployment of military means necessary to attack Soviet territory 
with a single restrained nuclear strike. It will be pointed out that the basic 
elements of Stratmann's theory of controlled nuclear strategic war can be 
interpreted as the refinement and elaboration of German strategic doctrines, 
also advocated on a governmental level and in NATO. German strategic
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doctrines which envisage the new LRTNF also for follow-on use, in case first 
use should fail, will be considered as well. It will be demonstrated that German 
doctrines dominated the outlining of the hardware decision in respect to the 
range and the missiles' land deployment. The weapons' vulnerable deployment 
mode will also be discussed in detail. Based on the results of the thesis the 
summary attempts to explain the INF treaty.
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Section I: The contradictory nature of the strategy of Flexible Response
This section focuses on the contradictions produced by NATO's strategy of 
flexible response. While chapter 2 describes the evolution of flexible response in 
context of the process of transforming nuclear weapons into feasible weapons 
for foreign policy objectives, chapter 3 elaborates the different U.S. and German 
interpretations of flexible response and the two resulting incompatible first use 
concepts.
2. The evolution of flexible response
In the beginning flexible response as a refinement of the original concept of 
nuclear deterrence will be in the focus of attention. Nuclear deterrence implies 
two functions: it means threatening the opponent with severe punishment as 
well as to deny the control of territory and population. The function of 
deterrence in contesting the opponent's control of territory has been subject to a 
continuous refinement and elaboration. While the "original" strategy of nuclear 
deterrence by retaliation contemplated to target the opponent's cities and 
industry, intended as a threat as terrifying as possible, the process of 
elaborating nuclear deterrence led to U.S. war plans of targeting also and 
primarily the opponent's forces, the so-called "counterforce targeting". In 
NATO strategy the refinement of denial or war-fighting options was expressed 
in the retreat from massive retaliation together with the simultaneous 
acceptance of a strategy implying flexible options. The repetitive character of 
problems in NATO's hardware decisions will be described by referring to the 
deployment of theatre nuclear forces (TNF) in Europe and the plans to establish 
a Multilateral Force (MLF). The problems of the LRTNF modernisation in 1979 
will be set against those of the hardware decisions in the fifties and sixties.
2,1. The nature o f nuclear deterrence
Almost immediately at the beginning of the nuclear age in 1945 the notion of 
nuclear deterrence by threat of retaliation was put forward as the dominant 
military strategy for the defence of the United States. From the huge destruction 
power of nuclear weapons Bernard Brodie, one of the classical writers on 
nuclear deterrence, concluded that from now on the most decisive purpose of
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the U.S. military establishment would not be to win wars any more, but to avert 
them. War prevention by threat of "retaliation" was the basic principle of 
Brodie's concept. Therefore the most vital step in any U.S. security programme 
in the age of nuclear weapons should be therefore to take measures which 
guarantee in case of an attack the possibility of "retaliation in kind".7
Almost 30 years later an official definition of "deterrence" by the U.S. 
Department of Defense suggests that nuclear deterrence is still identified with 
the principle of retaliation and punishment:
"The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state 
of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable 
counter action."2
However, during the elaboration of nuclear strategy a second function of 
deterrence emerged: the aspect of denial or, as it is also called, war-fighting 
function of deterrence.
As early as 1969 Dieter Senghaas in his noted book "Abschreckung und Frieden. 
Studien zur Kritik organisierter Gewaltlosigkeit" explains convincingly why the 
concept of deterrence by retaliation was necessarily supplemented by the 
elaboration of war-fighting options. According to Senghaas the separation line 
between war and peace in our society and political life no longer exists. This 
state of society is called "organised peacelessness". Deterrence policy is the most 
evident manifestation of this link* between peace and war. While deterrence 
policy is supposed to eliminate open war, deterrence at the same time 
necessitates a permanent preparation for war:
"Das Ergebnis ist eine Praxis, die gewissermaßen den potentiellen Krieg 
laufend antizipiert, um ihn in seinen möglichen manifesten Formen 
einzudämmen."*
1 Brodie, Bernard, The Absolute Weapon. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1946)
p.76
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary, op.cit.. 1974, p.107
* Dieter Senghaas speaks of "Verklammerung". Dieter Senghaas, Abschreckung und
Frieden, Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit. (Frankfurt: Fischer 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1969,1972), p.18
* "The result is a practice which as it were continuously anticipates potential war in
order to stem its possible manifest form." Senghaas concludes that peace will 
therefore only be established after the system of deterrence has been overcome. 
ibid. p. 19
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Deterrence is aimed at preventing an open international conflict, which would 
signify catastrophe, but by means of rational manipulation of force rather than 
by its elimination. Since policy in its traditional manifestation is dependent on 
force as an instrument readily available, the rational use of weapons cannot be 
renounced in the nuclear age. Military strategists are concerned with finding 
solutions to make nuclear weapons usable for the reestablishment of this 
relation between policy and force, that Senghaas calls a "cost-benefit analysis of 
foreign policy action".5
For almost 40 years, deterrence policy and theory has been subject to 
elaborations and modifications.0 Publications discussing the rational use of 
military power resulted in demanding that also nuclear weapons should be 
transformed into feasible instruments. Due do their huge destructive power 
nuclear weapons were inadequate means for politicians in times of crisis, since 
they would only leave open the decision between suidde and surrender. 
Accordingly, more "flexible" and "graduated" military options, put into effect a 
process of "conventionalising" and "miniaturising" nuclear weapons. The 
NATO strategy of flexible response expresses one of those attempts to 
reestablish the traditional pre-nudear role of weapons as instruments for 
foreign policy:
"Abschreckungsdoktrinen sind nicht Ausdruck praxisfemer, nur intellektueler 
Analyse, sondern praktisches Handeln bestimmende Programme. Bei allen 
Unterschieden, die sie im einzelnen kennzeichnen, sind sie doch insgesamt auf 
die geschichtsmächtige und wohl folgenschwerste Entwicklung der 
Nachkriegszeit bezogen: auf Hii» wilcressiv geglückte, erneute Zuordnung von 
Politik und Gewalt. Strategischer Analyse gelang es nämlich, jene (...) 
Erstarrung und Lähmung von Gewaltpolitik durch die Formulierung von 
diversen Doktrinen vom abgestuften Gebrauch der Gewalt zu überwinden."7
5 "Kosten-Gewinn-Kalkül außenpolitischen Handelns", ibid. p.62
6 While there are innumerable analyses justifying deterrence policy, critical views of
deterrence arc an exception. See for example: Carl Friedrich von Weizäcker (ed.), 
Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung. (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1971); Horst 
Afheldt, Verteidigung und Frieden. Politik mit militärischen Mitteln. (München, 
Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1976); Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience. (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1964); Green, 1968 op.ciL
7 "Doctrines of deterrence are not an expression of a purely and theoretical analysis, but
programs which determine practical action. In spite of all their specific differences 
they all refer to the historically most important development in the post-war era: the 
renewed, gradually successful new integration of politics and force. Strategic 
analysis succeeded in surmounting precisely this paralysis and ossification of the 
power policy by formulating diverse doctrines of a graduated use of force." 
Senghaas, 1972, op.cit. p.64. Emphasis in the text
32
However, in this context Senghaas warns us not to forget that these modem 
war scenarios, whether realised either technically or in doctrines, are produced 
in order to demonstrate their effectiveness to the opponent:
"So frustrierend auf lange Sicht gesehen eine Zurschaustellung derartiger 
Kapazitäten und die ständige Propagierung eines möglichen, angezielten 
Kriegsverlaufs ist, so wollen solche Bilder doch zunächst nur stumme 
Schlachtordnungen aufzeigen."*
Thus, deterrence theory has always implied the following two types: 
"deterrence by punishment or retaliation" versus "deterrence by denial or war- 
fighting", or, "punishment" versus "defeat". In this analysis the first type will be 
referred to simply as "deterrence", since within the strategic debate it is usually 
identified with the original or "pure" notion of deterrence. The difference 
between these two poles can be reduced to one question: could nuclear 
weapons be useful in the same way as war weapons have been throughout 
history? Those who answered "no" stress the purely deterrent function of 
nuclear weapons and the inability of nuclear weapons to be used like 
conventional weapons. Therefore nuclear weapons can only be employed to 
punish the attacker and it is sufficient to maintain their survivability as 
retaliatory forces.
Consequently, those who answered "yes", have to be concerned with 
elaborating the circumstances, objectives and kind of nuclear weapons which 
are necessary for implementing such a strategy. If nuclear weapons can be used 
in a traditional way then they will be employed in order to decide the battle, to 
defeat the enemy and to win the war.
This "defeat" and "denial" aspect of deterrence is described by Paul H. Nitze:
"The alternative position was that deterrence would be greatly strengthened by 
the ability to face an enemy with military capabilities and a strategy that would 
deny him the ability or perception that he might successfully prosecute a war- 
winning strategy, and emerge from a war in a predominant military position".9
9 "However frustrating a demonstration of these capacities and permanent propagation 
of a possible, calculated course of the war might be in the long run, these scenarios 
aim only to serve as a demonstration of tacit battle array." ibid. p.67 emphasis in 
the text
9 Emphasis by S.P., Paul H. Nitze, "The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture", Survival 
Vol.27, No.3 (May/June 1985) p.98-107, here p. 100. See also Dieter Senghaas’ 
helpful review of the evolution of deterrence: "Rückblick und Ausblick auf
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Nitze's remark indicates the crudal difference between "war-fighters" and those 
who believe in the primacy of the political signal, thus the punishing function 
of deterrence: adherents of the "war-fighting school" are characterised by their 
thinking in terms of military success. They argue:
"that once NATO has been driven to the point of using nuclear weapons ... then 
the primary objective of such use should be to gain an immediate military 
victory, at least at the local level."70
Michael Legge, a RAND analyst, points out that the term "nuclear war-fighting" 
is imprecise in that all forms of use of theatre nuclear weapons, apart from 
demonstrative use, involve an element of war-fighting. He suggests instead 
using "nudear war-winning", as a more accurate term. In this study still the 
term "war-fighting" is adopted, since it is the more common expression within 
the strategic debate.
However, an absolutely dear distinction between the retaliation and war- 
fighting functions of deterrence cannot be made, "nor can either function be 
attributed exdusively to any particular kind of military force."77
Before starting with the discussion on the different interpretations of flexible 
response resulting from these two types inherent in deterrence policy, it will be 
shown how little both of these aspects are distinguishable in real war 
contingendes and operational plans. The refinement of nudear war-fighting 
deterrence was expressed in setting up counterforce options on the operational 
level of U.S. war plans and in NATO's retreat from the strategy of massive 
retaliation.
Abschreckungspolitik", in: Franz Böckle and Gert Krell (eds.), Politik und Ethik
der Abschreckung. Theologische und sozialwissenschaftliche Beiträge zur
Herausforderung der Nuklearwaffen (Mainz, München: Grünewald und Kaiser,
1984) p.98-132
10 Legge, 1983, op.cit, p.20
77 Glenn H. Snyder: "Deterrence by Denial and Punishment" in: Bobrow, Davis B. (ed.), 
Components of Defense Policy. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965) 
pp.209-237, p.209
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22. Refinement o f war-fighting deterrence
From the outset, i.e. from the establishment of the NATO alliance, it has been 
American strategic thinking that has dominated NATO strategy. Only against 
the background of the evolution of U.S. strategy and its operational plans the 
elaboration of NATO strategy is understandable, and thus also the U.S.- 
European conflicts over the interpretation of NATO's flexible response. The 
dominant characteristic in the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy is its consistent 
refinement of nuclear war-fighting options.
22.1. Counterforce options as consistent elements in U.S. strategy
By the threat of mutual annihilation, which was supposed to keep either nation 
from striking first, the NATO strategy of massive retaliation and the U.S. 
doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) strategy corresponded in the 
most direct and understandable way to the original concept of deterrence by 
punishment.72 The MAD doctrine was accused by many in the U.S. strategic 
community of foregoing U.S. military superiority. A definition of MAD by an 
opponent reads as follows:
"Both sides accordingly would have merely enough forces to survive a surprise 
first strike and still be able to retaliate massively against the enemy’s cities, 
presumably with the better hidden - but relatively small and inaccurate - 
submarine-launched missiles. The theory, of course, depends on both sides 
playing the game".7*
It is, however, obvious that at least the United States, as it is proven today, did 
not play the MAD game. Today, after more than 25 years, it is widely 
recognised that while U.S. declaratory nuclear strategy in the 1960s emphasised 
assured destruction and the threat of inflicting unacceptable damage on Soviet 
cities and industry should the Soviet Union dare to attack, the U.S. operational 
plan contained significant options against Soviet forces, the so-called 
counterforce options. Counterforce is defined as follows:
72 D.A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill. Nuclear Weapons and American strategy 
1945-1960” in International Security. Vol.7, No.7 (1983) pp.3-71. Aaron L. 
Friedberg, "A History of the U.S. Strategic ’Doctrine’ - 1945-1980" in Journal of 
Strategic Studies. Vol.3, No.3, (December 1980), pp.37-71
13 W. Scott Thompson, "Introduction" in: W. Scott Thompson (ed.), National Strategy 
in the 1980s. From Weakness to Strength (New Brunswick, London: Transaction 
Books, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, California, 1980), p.6-7
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"As a nuclear strategy, counterforce means aiming attack missiles at military 
targets. The word means to counter the enemy’s military forces which 
includes missile silos, command posts, nuclear storage depots, strategic air 
bases, communications centers, and submarine pens. Many of these targets are 
called ’hard’ because they are buried deep in bunkers or silos and are 
reinforced with steel and concrete".7*
U.S. researchers revealed that "counterforce" has been the Pentagon's military 
doctrine at least since the mid 1950's.75
A second widely recognised fact is the gap between U.S. declaratory and actual 
employment policy76. Paul Nitze was the first to identify a gap between U.S. 
declaratory policy and its action policy:
"... (T)he word ’policy’ is used in two related but different senses. In one sense, 
the action sense, it refers to the general guide lines which we believe should 
and will in fact govern our actions in various contingencies. In the other sense, 
the declaratory sense, it refers to policy statements which have as their aim 
political and psychological effects."77
This gap between the governmental posture and what would actually happen 
in the event of implementation of the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan), 
which is a national U.S. plan and assigns weapons to parts of the U.S. national
14 Robert C. Aldridge, First Strike! The Pentagon’s Strategy for Nuclear War (Boston, 
MA: South End Press, 1983) p.24, emphasis in the text
75 Aldridge, 1983, op.cit.. p.22
76 Lynn Etheridge Davis distinguishes the following elements of American nuclear
policy: employment, acquisition, declaratory and deployment policy: "Employment 
policy describes the targets and how the United States plans to use the nuclear 
weapons which it possesses today. Acquisition policy establishes criteria for 
developing and procuring nuclear weapons systems for the future. Declaratory 
policy gives guidance to American officials on what they say publicly about the 
employment and acquisition policies. Deployment policy designates where nuclear 
weapons are to be stationed". Lynn E. Davis, 1975/76, op.cit.. p.l
77 Paul H. Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy" in Foreign Affairs. Vol.34 (January
1956), p. 187-198, here p. 187
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Strategic Target List (NSTL)7*, is dated back by Pringle and Arkin even to "the 
beginning of the nuclear age"79.
Although it seems at first sight more humane to target missiles and forces of the 
enemy instead of his population, the counterforce strategy has been criticised 
for its destabilising character. Counterforce violates the basic principle of 
deterrence: in a deterrence theory the guarantee is implicit that the strategic 
forces are invulnerable to an opponent strike in order to be able to retaliate after 
an attack. Therefore a rational deterrence strategy must avoid offering the 
opponent a situation in which he even finds a military option for his weapons. 
In short, deterrence is based on the principle of not providing targets which 
might be militarily rewarding.20 The result of counterforce is that the Soviets 
might think that the U.S. is preparing a first strike against them, since there 
would be no point in launching missiles targeted at the enemy's empty silos. If 
one party is subject to the threat of substantially losing its retaliatory second 
strike capability, an indispensable principle of deterrence is violated. Thus, the 
Soviets would be provoked to initiate preemptive strikes in a crisis in order to 
avoid damage to and loss of their second strike capability. The destabilising 
nature of a counterforce strategy is described in a Congressional Budget Office 
background paper as follows:
"’There may be an inescapable dilemma involved in the procurement of second 
strike counterforce capability: a US arsenal large enough to attack Soviet 
ICBMs after having absorbed a Soviet first strike would be large enough to 
threaten the Soviet ICBM force in a US first strike. Moreover, the Soviet 
Union, looking at capabilities rather than intentions, might see a US second 
strike capability in this light. Faced with a threat to their ICBM force. Soviet 
leaders facing an international crisis might have an incentive to use their 
missiles in a preemptive strike before they could be destroyed by the United 
States. (Emphasis added)’"27
7iThe SIOP is supposed to coordinate the weapons for the general nuclear war as well
as the forces which are assigned to NATO in case of war, such as the Poseidon.
SIOP consists of Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) which are preplanned in order to
support regional operations. See the detailed discussion in chapter 3.6.1.
79 Peter Pringle / William Arkin. SIOP. Nuclear War from the Inside. (London: Sphere
Books Ltd., 1983), p. 18
20 Afheldt, 1976, op.cit.. p.99
27 Counterforce Issues for the US Strategic Nuclear Forces. Congressional Budget 
Office Background Paper (January 1978), p.32, quoted in Aldridge, 1983, op.cit.. 
p.38/39
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Robert C. Aldridge, a former Polaris and Trident missile design engineer at 
Lockheed, points out that counterforce is not necessarily equated with first 
strike because there are degrees of counterforce. Aldridge concludes: "Although 
counterforce does not necessarily mean first strike, first strike is counterforce in 
its maximum sense".22 Counterforce strategy and war-fighting can be regarded 
as synonyms23.
One of the key influences on the early Kennedy- McNamara strategic postures 
was a series of studies on the counterforce and "no-dties" strategy, made by the 
RAND corporation in 1959-60 under the auspices of William Kaufmann. 
McNamara, who was briefed by Kaufmann, reviewed U.S. nuclear policy in the 
direction of a counterforce strategy. The Single Integrated Operational Plan 
(SIOP) was revised substantially by McNamara and completed by the summer 
of 1961. The new U.S. SIOP was given five "options" plus various sub-options, 
in order to attack along the line of the following spectrum:
"1.Soviet strategic retaliatory forces-e.g., missile sites, bomber bases, 
submarine tenders. 2.Soviet air defenses away from cities- for example, those 
covering U.S. bomber routes. 3.Soviet air defenses near cities. 4.Soviet 
command and control centers and systems. 5.1f necessary, all-out ’spasm’ 
attack."2*
In accordance with the U.S. targeting plans, the U.S. strategic posture was also 
revised to make it compatible with the new nudear war-fighting strategy, 
which also implied a gigantic armament programme for the United States 
strategic forces.25
22 Aldridge, 1983, op.cit.. p.25. See also Earl C. Ravenal "Europe without America: The
Erosion of NATO" in: Foreign Affairs Vol.63 (Summer 1985) pp. 1020-1035, 
p. 1025
23 According to General Bernard Davis, Commander of the Strategic Air Command,
quoted in William M. Arkin, "Why SIOP-6?" in: The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists (April 1983), pp.9-10
24 see Desmond Ball, Deja vu: The return to counterforce in the Nixon Administration.
(California: California Seminar on Aims Control and Foreign Policy, 1975), p. 12
25 Between 1961 and 1967 McNamara had increased the number of ICBMs from 28 to
1054. The SLBM Polaris force was expanded from 96 missiles on 6 submarines to 
656 missiles on 41 submarines. The number of nuclear weapons in the alert force 
increased over threefold. See Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security. 
Reflections in Office. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968) pp.73-74. See also 
Lothar Ruehl, Machtpolitik und Friedensstrategie. (Hamburg: Hoffmann und 
Kampe, 1974), p.270. When he left office as U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara 
published a very critical assessment of his years at duty. He conceded that the 
numerical superiority of U.S. nuclear warheads exceeded the original planning and
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's famous Ann Arbor speech on June 
16, 1962 was the first public admission of the existence of a full-fledged 
counterforce strategy:
"The U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military 
strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the 
same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the 
past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war 
stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the 
enemy’s military forces, not of his civilian population.’"26
However, almost immediately following his Ann Arbor speech McNamara 
began retreating from his position on counterforce.27 The main reasons for 
McNamara's withdrawal were - apart from the criticism of counterforce from 
within the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe28 - bureaucratic motives: 
the Air Force was using his counterforce policy for requesting virtually open- 
ended strategic weapons programmes that bore no resemblance to second strike 
deterrents. In a memo to Kennedy in 1962 McNamara wrote:
"’It has become clear to me that the air force proposals ... are based on the 
objective of achieving a first strike capability.’"29
even the real requirements. According to him this mismanagement was due to the 
dynamics of the arms race and lack of precise information. See McNamara, 1968, 
Qp.ciL, pp.57-58
26 Cited in William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York, Evanston and
London: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964) p. 116. It was generally accepted that 
this address represented an abbreviated version of the speech at the May 1962 
Athens meeting of NATO foreign and defence ministers, ibid.
27 It is quite odd that the first phase of a full-fledged U.S. counterforce strategy should
have been campaigned for by a man who obviously had some suspicion concerning 
the military function of nuclear weapons and consulted Kennedy and Johnson 
accordingly: "(N)uclcar weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever. They are 
totally useless - except only to deter one’s opponent from using them. This is my 
view today. It was my view in the early 1960s. At that time, in long private 
conversations with successive Presidents - Kennedy and Johnson - 1 recommended, 
without qualification, that they never initiate, under any circumstances, the use of 
nuclear weapons. I believe they accepted my recommendation." Robert
S.McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and 
Misperceptions." in Foreign Affairs Vol.62, No.l (Fall 1983), p.59-80, p.79, 
emphasis in text
28 It is also possible that McNamara was changing his mind due to his experience during
the 1961- Berlin crisis and the 1962 missile crisis. See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards 
of Armageddon. This is their untold story. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 
pp.291-306
29 quoted in Pringle/Arkin, 1983, op.cit. p.91
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The result was a plan which mixed Soviet urban targets with counterforce 
options. It became known as the "damage limitation strategy" because it aimed 
at limiting damage to American dties in a nudear war by destroying that 
portion of the Soviet missile force which might have been held back from a first 
strike. A description of "damage limitation" is given by Aldridge:
"Damage limitation is a tranquilizing term introduced by the Pentagon to mean 
counterforce. While ’damage limitation’ sounds like a restrained approach to 
nuclear strategy it actually means limiting damage to American cities. That, of 
course, requires the destruction of the opponent’s assault forces before they can 
be used. For referring to a counterforce capability on the part of the Soviets the 
Pentagon has coined the more aggressive-sounding term, war fighting. Both 
damage limitation and war fighting, however, mean the same: counterforce."*0
While McNamara's offidal Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine 
invoked "doomsday images of blowing the enemy population off the face of the 
earth; yet his war plans in the mid-1960s actually called for hitting the enemy's 
military forces first, dties second."*7
During the Nixon administration counterforce made significant progress. A 
number of advanced weapons technology programmes were pursued which 
permitted greater nudear war-fighting capability, such as a MIRV (Multiple 
Individual-Targeted Reentry Vehide) and increased accuracy.*2 During his 
annual foreign policy report to Congress in 1970 Nixon introduced what was 
later called the doctrine of "flexibility and selectivity":
"’Should the President in the event of nuclear attack be left with the single 
option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians in the face of the 
certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? 
Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be 
the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we might face?''**
Richard Nixon's Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, is identified with U.S. 
attempts at counterforce options in the seventies. Sworn in in July 1973, he 
started immediately approving work on a more accurate missile guidance
*° Aldridge, 1983, op.cit. p.28, emphasis in the text
31 Pringle/Aridn, 1983, op.cit.. p. 134
32 For details see Ball, 1975, op.cit.. pp. 19-22
** US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A new Strategy for Peace, a report to Congress by 
President Richard M. Nixon, (February 18, 1970) p. 122; quoted in Aldridge, 1983, 
op.cit.. p. 30
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system and funds for nuclear research and development projects in his new 
counterforce budget. Schlesinger confirmed publicly that assured destruction 
had already been outdated for a long time:
"Although several targeting options, including military only and military plus 
urban/industrial variations, have been a part of U.S. strategic doctrine for quite 
some time, the concept that has dominated our rhetoric for most of the era 
since World War II has been massive retaliation against cities, or what is called 
assured destruction"**
Thus his merit in the context of the evolution of U.S. strategy certainly lies in 
what he did to change American declaratory policy, since all officials had 
learned to talk in public only about deterrence and dty attacks.**
During a Senate Hearing, U.S. Chief of Staff General Jones stated:
"General Jones: I have been involved with strategic forces since the early 
1950s. We have always targeted military targets...(I)n Washington you would 
hear a lot of rhetoric about different strategies. We followed orders, but 
basically, the strategy stayed the same in implementation and targeting.
Senator Tower Unfortunately, I am not sure that your opinion was always 
shared by your civilian superiors.
General Jones: I agree there have been some, including some in government, 
who have felt that all that we required is a mutual assured destruction 
capability. I am separating that from our targeting instructions to the field, 
approved by dvilian authorities, which always included targeting military 
targets."*6
In view of the long U.S. tradition of searching for counterforce options 
Desmond Ball, a researcher, asks:
"Why has it been necessary to reiterate so frequently over some two decades 
now that the objective of American strategic policy in the event of a strategic
34 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report Fiscal Year 1975.
(James Schlesinger), Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., March 4 1974, p.33
35 Schlesinger’s counterforce strategy will be discussed in detail in another context, see
chapter 8.2.
36 Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and
Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty). Hearings before the Committee on Armed 
Services United States Senate, 96th-Congress, Part 1, Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O. 
(July 23,24,25,26, 1979) Part 1, p. 170; in the following: U.S. Senate Hearings, 
Military Implications, 1979
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nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union is being transformed from the 
destruction of Soviet cities to the destruction of Soviet military assets?"*7
Dieter Senghaas also observes a continuous trend towards refinement of 
nuclear war-fighting deterrence from the very outset of the nuclear age. The 
answer to the question why these facts have not been realised earlier by a wider 
public and only in the early eighties would constitute a research topic of its own 
according to Senghaas*®.
22.2. The continuation in PD 59 and Discriminate Deterrence
The next figure to address in context of the refinement of counterforce options 
was U.S. President Carter, who at the beginning of his presidency preferred a 
minimum deterrent with a submarine fleet of only 200 missiles. However, 
Carter "quickly shed his nuclear innocence."59 He examined the SIOP and 
requested a guidance for nuclear weapons which provided capabilities to fight 
and to endure a limited nuclear war. The strategy was dubbed "countervailing" 
strategy.*0 Carter's modification of the U.S. nuclear strategy and the most 
explicit expression of its intentions is the famed Presidential Directive 59 
(PD 59) which was regarded by the peace movement as the most telling 
statement of the United States' aggressive and offensive policy in the beginning 
of the eighties. According to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown the 
countervailing strategy or PD 59 called for:
"We must have forces, contingency plans, and command and control 
capabilities that will convince the Soviet leadership that no war and no course 
of aggression by them that led to use of nuclear weapons - on any scale of 
attack and at any stage of conflict - could lead to victory, however they my 
define victory ...It is our policy - and we have increasingly the means and the 
detailed plans to cany out this policy - to insure that the Soviet leadership 
knows that if they chose some intermediate level of aggression, we could, by 
selective, large (but still less than maximum) nuclear attacks, exact an 
unacceptably high price in the things the Soviet leaders appear to value most -
57 Ball, 1982/83 op.ciL. p.32
38 Dieter Senghaas, "Noch einmal: Nachdenken über Nachrüstung", in: Leviathan. No. 1
(1984a), pp 1-27, p.6.
39 Pringle/Aririn, 1983, op.cit.. p.132
*0 For a description of the development of the countervailing strategy see Walter
Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy" in International Security. Vol.5, No.4
(Spring 1981) pp. 18-27
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political and military control, military force both nuclear and conventional, and 
the industrial capability to sustain a war."*7
While the media insisted that PD 59 was a new strategy, Brown pointed out that 
it was "not a radical departure from US strategic policy over the past decade or 
so" and that it was only "a refinement, a codification of previous statements of 
our strategic policy."«
On the operational level Carter shifted Schlesinger's SIOP in respect of three 
aspects:
1. some of the emphasis shifted from economic targets to military targets, 
particularly Soviet political and leadership targets and military 
command and control targets;
2. it abolished Schlesinger's objective of being able to destroy 70% of the 
Soviet industrial base, and it required
3. that the U.S. forces be able to endure a protracted nuclear war, in 
dimensions of months instead of a few days.**
The aim of fighting a prolonged nuclear war required high survivability of the 
U.S. Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence systems (C^I). This 
meant that computers, satellites, radar and communication links suddenly had 
equal priority with missiles, submarines and airplanes.
The Reagan administration willingly inherited PD 59 and marked the evolution 
of the U.S. strategy by requiring that American forces had to be able not only to 
fight a prolonged nuclear war; they had to be prepared to prevail.
The Reagan administration continued within the tradition of U.S. nuclear 
strategy, but they introduced one new element: "They were saying what no one 
else had dared to mention for more than two decades, that no nation had 
contingency plans to lose wars, even nuclear ones."** The concept of winning a
Harold Brown, "The Objective of U.S. Strategic Forces", Address by U.S. Secretary 
of Defense, Harold Brown, August 20, 1980, reprinted in Survival (Vol. 22, No.6, 
November/December 1980) p.267-269, p.268
42 ibid. p.268
** Pringle/Aririn, 1983, op.cit.. p. 142
44 ibid. p. 192
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nuclear war was intellectually portrayed by Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne's
1980 article "Victory is possible"** and militarily implemented in the 1982 
Pentagon Defense Guidance for a protracted nuclear war and ideas for 
decapitation strikes at Soviet political and military leadership and 
communication lines.*6
The recent request of the U.S. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy 
"Discriminate Deterrence" will be regarded as the next crucial step in the 
history of the U.S. nuclear strategy.*7 The high-level composition of the 
commission suggests** that these ideas will prevail in the long run. The 
consistent element of the U.S. nuclear strategy is outlined in the 1988 report as 
follows:
"The Alliance should threaten to use nuclear weapons not as a link to a wider 
and more devastating war - although the risk of further escalation would still 
be there - but mainly as an instrument for denying success to the invading 
Soviet forces."*9
Another element of the U.S. strategy is reflected in the emphasis on a "wider 
range of contingencies than the two extreme threats that have long dominated 
our alliance policy and force planning: the massive Warsaw Pact attack on 
Central Europe and an all-out Soviet nuclear attack."50 This wider range of 
contingencies will be provided by a "capability for conventional counter­
offensive operations deep into enemy territory."*7
** Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne "Victory is possible", in: Foreign Policy. (Summer 
1980) p. 14-27
46 New York Times. May 30, 1982, p.l and 2. The chief authors of this document were
Andrew Marshall, the RAND veteran who had worked on counterforce since the 
early 1950s and Fred Ikle, another former RAND strategist, as well as Richard 
Perle, in: Kaplan, 1983, op.cit.. p.387
47 For an evaluation see Helga Haftendom, ’Transatlantische Dissonanzen. Der Bericht
über ’Selektive Abschreckung1 und die Strategiediskussion in den USA." Europa- 
Archiv. No.8, April 1988, pp.213-222
** Anne L. Armstrong, Zbigniew Brzezinski, William P. Clark, W.Graham Gaytor, Jr., 
Andrew J. Goodpaster, James Holloway, HI, Samuel P. Huntington, Henry A. 
Kissinger, Joshua Lederberg, Bernard A. Schriever, John W. Vessey
49 Fred Glide and Albert Wohlstetter(Co-chainnan), Discriminate Deterrence. Report of





The new element in U.S. nuclear policy is that counterforce options have to be 
combined with active and passive defence. Gray and Payne explained why a 
dear strategic objective, fancy targeting options and accurate nuclear strikes 
make no difference unless they are combined with defence:
"(I)t would not be in the interest of the United States actually to implement an 
offensive nuclear strategy no matter how frightening in Soviet perspective, if 
the U.S. homeland were totally naked to Soviet retaliation."52
The ambitious plans of the SDI-project are regarded as a remedy to the 
problems caused by the Soviet Union's capability to retaliate. The panel report 
stated:
"In a war with the Soviet Union we cannot count on space being a sanctuary; 
more likely, it would be a critical battlefield. "5J
With the SDI project the traditional idea of mutual vulnerability, as 
incorporated in the MAD doctrine, is finally undermined.
This refinement of nuclear war-fighting deterrence was hidden behind a stream 
of "befuddling terms even to those familiar with military jargon"5* - terms such 
as first strike, counterforce, countervalue and damage limitation, limited war 
options, flexibility and selectivity. These terms have shown consistency ever 
since the beginning. However, all these expressions were catchwords for 
concepts of basically the same idea: the transformation of nuclear weapons into 
feasible instruments of U.S. foreign policy goals.
223 . Retreat from massive retaliation
In 1957 NATO approved the details of NATO's declared strategy of massive 
retaliation. The document, adopted by the Military Committee and called MC 
14/2, was entitled "Overall Strategic Concept for the NATO Area.” Little is 
known about the first guidelines on how to use theatre nuclear weapons. It is 
assumed that MC 14/2 called for limited ground forces equipped with nuclear 
weapons and tasked to hold a potential attack until the retaliatory forces were
52 Gray/Payne, 1980, op.cit., p.24
53 Discriminate Deterrence, 1988, op.cit.. p.53 
** Pringle/Arkin, 1983, op.cit.. p. 190
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fully alerted." NATO also approved MC 70, a long-term defence plan for arms 
requirements including those for tactical nuclear delivery systems.56
As early as 1956 the abandonment of the dogma of massive retaliation was 
demanded by General Maxwell D. Taylor, then Army Chief of Staff under 
Eisenhower.57 His 1959 book "The Uncertain Trumpet" and Kissinger's 1957 
book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" can be regarded as paving the way 
intellectually for a reversal of massive retaliation towards flexible response. 
They stimulated the so-called "limited war" school with strategic analysts such 
as Robert Endicott Osgood who in his book "Limited War. The Challenge to 
American Strategy" formulated the decisive question which innumerable 
strategic analysts have been concerned with ever since the beginning of the 
nuclear age:
"How can the United States employ military power as a rational instrument of 
foreign policy when the destructive potentialities of war exceed any rational 
purpose?"5*
Osgood campaigned for the concept of "limited war" as an answer to the 
"supreme task of American foreign policy"59. Kissinger starts out from the 
premise of the U.S. losses in foreign policy during the fifties which could not be 
prevented:
"Our capacity for massive retaliation did not avert the Korean war, the loss of 
northern Indo-China, the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, or the Suez crisis."60
Kissinger suggested that power should be used subtly and with discrimination 
and only in accordance with specific policy objectives. Control should be
55 see Robert de Wijk, Hexibilitv in Response? Attempts to construct a plausible
strategy for NATO 1959-1989. Leiden, June 1989, pp.48-50
56 James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. The Interaction of Strategy
and Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) p.49
57 Lothar Riihl, 1974, op.cit. p.404
»  Robert E. Osgood, Limited War The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, Fifth Impression 1970, 1957); p.l. Other 
representatives of the limited-war school: ScheUing, 1960, op.cit: Knorr, Klaus, 
(ed.) NATO and American Security. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959)
59 Osgood, 1970, op.cit. p.l
60 Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1957,1984) p. 134
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exercised and political considerations remain paramount, even in general 
nuclear war:
"Simply because we are strongest in strategic striking power, we cannot base 
all our plans on the assumption that war, if it comes, will be inevitably all-out.
We must strive for strategic doctrine which gives our diplomacy the greatest 
freedom of action."67.
In order to resist Soviet challenges, a spectrum of capabilities which "should 
enable us to confront the opponent with contingencies from which he can 
extricate himself only by all-out war, while deterring him from this step by a 
superior retaliatory capacity" must be devised.62 The implementation of 
superior retaliatory capacity is envisaged by Kissinger as follows:
"In the nuclear age, flexibility depends on the ability to meet the whole 
spectrum of possible challenges and not only the most absolute one. To be 
sure, the first charge on our resources must be the capability for waging all-out 
war, because without it we would be at the mercy of the Soviet rulers. But, 
while our strategic striking power represents the condition which makes 
possible all other measures, it cannot be the exclusive preoccupation of our 
military planning. Given the power of modem weapons, it should be the task of 
our strategic doctrine to create alternatives less cataclysmic than a 
thermonuclear holocaust.
General Taylor who was selected as "Presidential Military Advisor" by 
President Kennedy, completely rejected the concept of massive retaliation. 
Upon taking office in July 1962 Kennedy appointed him Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.« Kennedy who planned a complete reappraisal of NATO 
strategy, was supported by his Secretary of Defense McNamara. The basic 
direction of Kennedy's reappraisal was to strengthen the nuclear deterrent by 
increasing the options on the strategic level, creating more options for 
conventional weapons and enhancing civilian control over nuclear weapons.65
61 ibid. p.20
62 ibid. p. 144
65 ibid. p.18-19
64 Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels. The Strategic Missile Program of the
Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press, 1980) p.81
65 For a detailed description of origins of Kennedy’s reappraisal of NATO strategy see
Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response. NATO’s Debate over 
Strategy in the 1960s. (London and Oxford: Macmillan Press, 1988) pp.26-42
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During the spring Ministerial Session of the NATO Council in Athens from 4 to
6 May 1962, McNamara introduced to his allies a few basic postulates of what 
came to be known as the strategy of "flexible response." Central to this strategy 
was the need to give decision makers military options of considerable flexibility 
in their response to aggression at all levels.«
One major part of his speech consisted of his explanation of the no-cities or 
counterforce doctrine, which he repeated publicly in his Ann Arbor speech in 
June 1962. In his Athens speech Mcnamara indicated that he wanted to reduce 
NATO's dependence on first use. He clarified that he did not favour a situation 
in which NATO's conventional deficiencies would be compensated by the 
Western use of nuclear weapons:
"’It would be less than candid if I pretended to you that the United States ... 
believes that the Alliance should depend solely on our nuclear power to deter 
the Soviet Union from actions not involving a massive commitment of Soviet 
force. Surely an Alliance with the wealth, talent, and experience that we 
possess can find a better way than this to meet our common threat’"«57
McNamara's preference for a no-first use policy of nuclear weapons is 
expressed in his stress on the implicit dangers of tactical nuclear weapons. But 
at the same time he stated that " 'a very limited use of nuclear weapons, 
primarily for purposes for demonstrating our will and intent to employ such 
weapons, might bring Soviet aggression to halt without substantial retaliation, 
and without escalation.'"« Still the emphasis on no-first use was conceived as 
dominant in his strategy.
Accordingly, for the conventional level he required a force capable of 
establishing a serious nonnuclear defence in Europe without necessarily having 
to resort to nuclear weapons.
The features of McNamara's strategy of flexible response laid the foundation 
for NATO's strategy which was approved in 1967 with the same label: flexible 
response.
66 For a historical description see David N. Schwartz, "A Historical Perspective."
(1983a) in: John D. Steinbruner / Leon V. Sigal (eds.), Alliance Security: NATO 
and the No-First-Use Question. (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1983), pp.5-21
67 Quoted in ibid. 1983, pp. 14
«  Quoted in Stromseth, 1988, op.cit. p.45
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23. Consistent problems in NATO's hardware decisions
A brief description of the introduction of the TNF in Europe in the fifties will 
serve as background to elaborate the parallels between the 1979 LRTNF 
decision and MRBMs deployments in Europe as well as between the plans for a 
Multilateral Force in the beginning of the sixties. The aim is to demonstrate the 
repetitive character of problems in the alliance. It will be pointed out that the 
Pershing-II and ground-launched cruise missile were not the first long-range 
nuclear theatre weapons to be deployed on European soil and in particular in 
the Federal Republic.
23.1. The introduction o f TNF
NATO first deployed Theatre Nuclear Weapons with the Seventh Army Corps 
in Europe in October 1953.69 But it was not until December 1954 that the NATO 
Council formally approved the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into 
Europe in order to compensate for Soviet conventional superiority and to signal 
its intention to use tactical nuclear weapons from the very outset of any war 
according to the strategy of massive retaliation.70 At the meeting of the NATO 
Council held in December 1956, the governments of Britain, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Turkey requested that the tactical nuclear weapons be 
made available to European forces.77 On April 12, 1957 it was announced that
69 It was the 280 mm atomic cannon, followed a year later by the introduction of the
Honest John and the Matador ground-launched cruise missile. See Jeffrey Record, 
NATO’s Theater Nuclear Force Modernisation Program: The Real Issues. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 
November 1981) p.13
70 The New York Tunes generally reports the NATO meetings in detail, and in the
following footnotes I use the abbreviation NYT. For this NATO Council see NYT, 
December 11, 1954, p.L5. NYT. December 16, 1954, p.l and 10. "The Western Big
Three seemed to be moving toward agreement on some major points. These
included the use of atomic weapons by the North Atlantic alliance’s forces in
Europe..", NYT. December 17, 1954, p.l. NYT. December 18, 1954, pp.1-2. See
also Dieter Mahncke, Nnk-I^rr Mitwirkung. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in
der atlantischen Allianz 1954-1970. (Berlin und New York: Walter de Gruyter
1972), p.l 1, and Richardson, 1966, op.cit. p.39
77 Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1962), pp. 129,217 and Richardson, 1966, op.cit.. p.50
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the U.S. would put "advanced weapons", including Honest John, Matador and 
Nike, at the disposal of certain allies.72
These tactical nuclear weapons were deployed with both U.S. and European 
forces. There are two systems under which U.S. weapons are deployed in 
Europe. One system envisages exclusive U.S. control as in the case of the 
Pershing II and the Ground-launched Cruise Missile. In the case of the second 
system, the United States deploys and controls the warheads of those delivery 
systems which are owned and operated by the European allies. Such custody is 
referred to as "dual-key system" or more precisely the "Program of 
Cooperation" (POC).
The Bundeswehr's acquisition and deployment of delivery systems for tactical 
nuclear weapons caused a vehement reaction among the public and in the SPD 
opposition, but nonetheless the Adenauer government succeeded in carrying 
through the decision using its majority in the Bundestag.7*
72 Richardson, 1966, op. ci t.. p.50. Honest John is an unguided surface-to-surface rocket; 
it has a range of more than 19 kms and a nuclear warhead of up to 5 kilotons, the 
warhead can also be used with conventional munitions; Matador is a surface-to- 
surface missile, with a range of 480-800 kms; it is not clear whether it is dual- 
capable; Nike (Ajax) has a range of 40 kms with a conventional warhead; Nike 
(Herkules) is a surface-to-air missile with a range of 120 km, which replaces Nike 
Ajax and has a nuclear or a conventional warhead.; see Helmut Schmidt, Defense
or Retaliation. A German contribution to the consideration of NATO’s Strategic 
Problem (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1962) pp.222-225
73 Richardson, 1966, op.cit.. p.48-62
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23.2. The deployment oflRBM s in the 50s and 60s
Shortly afterwards, in December 1957, NATO decided that intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles (IRBM)7* should also be put at the disposal of the Supreme 
Allied Commander (SACEUR).7i
Some European governments were not enthusiastic about having intermediate- 
range ballistic missiles which would be seen as first-priority targets in the event 
of war.7« The Federal Government was never formally asked by General 
Norstad to participate in the IRBMs deployments, since Norstad anticipated its 
rejection. The German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer did not seem to welcome 
the decision to deploy IRBMs in Europe; one reason might have been that he 
hesitated to provoke the Soviet Union by deploying nuclear weapons on West 
German soil.77 On the other hand the Federal Government did not doubt the 
military requirement of IRBMs to counter the Soviet MRBMs.7® During 1959 and 
1960 the "Thors" and "Jupiters" were deployed under dual-key operation in 
Italy, England and Turkey with sufficient range to hit the Soviet Union.7® The
7* According to the superpowers’ agreement in SALT-I, intermediate-range missiles 
have a range of up to 5500 kms, while intercontinental missiles exceed the range of 
more than 5,500 kms, see Walther Stützle, Politik und Kräfteverhältnis. (Mittler & 
Sohn: Herford 1983) p.l 13. For the shift in terminology from LRTNF to INF, and 
all other issues concerning the NATO Dual-Track decision, see Hans-Jürgen 
Neuman, Kernwaffen in Europa. NATO-Doppelbcschluß - Rüstungskontrolle - 
Glossar (Bonn: Osang Verlag, 1982) p.107
75 The NATO defence area is divided into three separate regional commands: the
Atlantic Ocean Command, European Command and the Channel Command plus a 
regional group for the North American area
76 see Richardson, 1966, op.cit. p.50. Britain, Italy and Turkey expressed willingness to
accept the deployment of the missiles on their soil, but France, Greece, Belgium 
and the Netherlands refused to commit themselves, while Norway and Denmark 
expressed the hope that they would not be asked to accept the missiles, and 
Germany maintained silence. Osgood, 1962, op.cit.. p.222
77 For this episode see Meier, 1986, op.cit.. pp. 150-166
78 Uwe Nerlich, "Die nuklearen Dilemmas der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", Europa-
Archiv. No. 17, 1965, pp.637-652, here p.646
79 see Communique of the meeting of the Heads of Government in December, 16-19,
1957, in NATO. Texts of Final Communiques 1949-1974. Issued bv Ministerial 
Sessions of the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee and the 
Nuclear Planning Group (Brussels: NATO Information Service) p. 113. Both 
missiles were liquid-fueled, had 2,400 km range and were stationed above ground; 
see Schwartz, 1983, op.cit.. p.63
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deployment of the "Jupiters" and "Thors", i.e. of the deployment of land-based 
ERBMs with range to hit the Soviet Union, was a difficult topic in the fifties and 
sixties: it was one factor which caused the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.
In 1963, 60 U.S. Polaris sea-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as 
Britain's nuclear V-bomber and Polaris force were assigned to SACEUR. Thus 
the obsolescent Thors and Jupiters were replaced, which were phased out in 
that same year due to their technological deficiencies.80
In 1967, when NATO officially approved the strategy of flexible response, the 
United States began to deploy F -lll medium-range all-weather strike aircraft in 
Great Britain*7 as part of the Forward Based Systems (FBS). The term FBS refers 
to American forward-based nuclear delivery systems in Europe capable of 
striking the Soviet Union.*2
A long-range cruise missile, the Mace B, was deployed on German territory 
from 1962 to '69. 96 Mace missiles were deployed in hardened and dispersed 
sites, with a range of 2,500 kilometres and a high yield warhead. They were 
targeted by the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) and deployed exclusively on 
German soil.« In 1969 Mace missiles were withdrawn from European territory. 
Thus until 1969 ground-launched IRBMs were deployed in Europe. In 1962 the
80 see Cartwright/Critchlcy, 1985, op.cit.. pp.5-6. The withdrawal might also be
interpreted as a result of the agreement between Khrushchev and Kennedy in the 
aftermath of the Cuba crisis. However, Osgood’s description gives clear indication 
that technical deficiencies played the main role for the missiles: "However, these 
missiles suffered the great military and political liability of being so vulnerable and 
slow-firing as to be virtually useless for anything except a first strike. Partly for this 
reason, the United States announced, in October, 1959, that it would not establish 
any more liquid-fuel missile bases in Europe." Osgood, 1962, op.cit.. p.222 For the 
technical reasons see also Rtihl, 1987, op.cit. p.94
81 see Cartwright/Critchley, 1985, op.cit. p.6
*2 Raymond L.Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation. American Soviet Relations from 
Nixon to Reagan. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985) p.446. A 
more specified definition of FBS will be given in chapter 5.2.2.
83 see Uwe Nerlich, "NATO: The next 30 years: Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe. Is 
NATO Running Out of Options?" The Washington Quarterly, vol.3. No.l (Winter 
1980), pp.100-125, p. 121 and Lothar Ruehl, "Belastungen des Amerikanisch- 
Europäischen Verhältnisses," in Wolfgang Wagner etal., Die internationale Politik 
1979-1980. (München/Wien: R.Oldenbourg, 1983), pp.42-69, p.47
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Pershing 1 was deployed in the Federal Republic, with a range insufficient to 
target the Soviet Union.**
The allies increasingly sought to enhance their participation and control in 
nuclear affairs. In particular the German government pursued a policy line of 
nuclear participation, because on the one hand this was regarded as essential 
for strengthening its role in the Alliance. And on the other hand, because 
nuclear participation was believed to give some control to German politicians 
over the circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be employed so that 
they might be useful in protecting German interests.
Therefore, in the beginning of the sixties, a plan appeared which aimed at 
increasing the participation of the European allies in nuclear issues: the idea of 
creating a multilaterally owned and operational force of nuclear weapons 
within NATO.
2-33. Parallels between the Plan for Multilateral Forces and the LRTNF 
decision
In 1959, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Norstad, advocated a 
force of IRBMs in addition to the Thors and Jupiters and began to speak of the 
need to extend the nuclear authority of NATO. This military pressure for the 
deployment of a separate European-based nuclear force in which the Europeans 
would have a greater say, coincided with the pressure from other areas. In 
addition to their diminishing confidence in the American strategic commitment, 
some Europeans were growing increasingly reluctant to accept their lack of 
participation in Alliance nuclear strategy and were eager to find a formula that 
would change this situation.
Various schemes that emerged between 1959 and 1963 aimed at extending 
European control of nuclear weapons and finding an arrangement which would 
not imply independent nuclear production and ownership but which would be 
more effective than the "dual-key systems".*5
84 Christopher Paine, "Pershing II: the Army’s strategic weapon" in The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists. 1980, pp.25-31. See also Record, 1981 op.cit. p.21
85 See Mahncke, 1972, op.cit. p.72-86, Osgood, 1962, op.cit. pp.229-234 and Catherine
Me Andie Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons. (New York, 
London: Columbia Press, 1975) pp. 178-202
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Despite the variety of ideas put forward in support of these schemes, none, 
except the Multilateral Force (MLF) made any significant progress. The MLF 
concept envisaged 25 surface ships, each ship carrying eight Polaris A-l 
missiles50 and staffed by multinational crews. The fleet would be assigned to 
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
While the German Government was mostly interested in the project as a means 
for improving its status in the alliance and "in obtaining a bigger say in nuclear 
strategy and targeting"®7, the U.S. administration regarded it as a way of 
strengthening the alliance against the disintegration policy represented by de 
Gaulle and to impede the development of independent European nuclear 
forces. Thus the MLF proposal was aimed at solving the U.S. dilemma of 
retaining operational control over nuclear weapons systems while 
simultaneously enabling European allies to participate in the management of 
the Western nuclear deterrent assigned to NATO. For various reasons the 
project failed.®* First of all there were important political forces in the Federal 
Republic which opposed the MLF plan. Defence Minister Strauß campaigned 
for the build-up of an independent European nuclear force. France was not 
enthusiastic about the plan because it strongly rejected the Federal Republic's 
participation. In the course of the debates the U.S. Johnson administration came 
to the conclusion that neither the European allies nor the U.S. Senate backed the 
project. Thus, realisation of the MLF did not have top priority for the United 
States any more.
86 Polaris missiles are intermediate ballistic missiles with a warhead of 1 megaton and a
range of 2,000 kms which can be fired from mobile launchers, and in particular 
from submerged submarines; they were first deployed in 1961. See Schmidt, 1962, 
op.cit.
87 Kai-Uwe von Hassel, "The search for Consensus. Organizing Western Defense."
Foreign Affairs. Vol.43, No.2, (January 1965), pp.209-216, here p.212
88 Alastair Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective". Adelphi
Papers, No. 13, (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1964), pp.3- 
14; David Schwartz, 1983, op.cit.. p.82-136; Heray A. Kissinger, The Troubled 
Partnership. A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. (New York, London, Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill, 1965) pp. 127-159. For the political background of the MLF project 
see Roger Morgan, Tlic United States and West Germany 1945-1973. A Study in 
Alliance Politics. (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) pp. 122-142. See also 
Mahncke, 1972, op.cit.. pp. 129-202
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There are some characteristics of this episode which are of direct relevance to 
the LRTNF debate 20 years later:
1. The military rationale for the MLF and LRTNF was legitimised with the 
need to counter the increasing number of Soviet medium-range ballistic 
missiles capable of striking Europe. However, these concerns were 
more a result of an anticipated U.S. inferiority caused by a prospective 
build-up of Soviet long- and medium range forces than a reaction to 
already existing capacities.
2. At a time when European-based nuclear strike aircraft were phased 
out«», Europeans started to be concerned again about the U.S. 
commitment to their defence.
3. Many U.S. analysts doubted the military rationale of the MLF and 
considered the existing U.S.-based strategic systems as sufficient to 
cover Soviet targets.
4. In both cases strong arguments for sea- instead of land-basing were 
brought forward for discussion.90
In contrast to the LRTNF case, political frustration over exclusive U.S. control of 
nuclear affairs played an important role in the European discussions about the 
MLF plans. While with its MLF offer the United States pursued the political 
objective of forestalling German pressures to achieve nuclear status, there is no 
indication that these questions of control of nuclear weapons and German 
desires to become a nuclear state also played a role in the LRTNF decision. 
However, these debates involved in the proposal for a MLF and the LRBM 
decision already convey some of the consistent problems which all NATO 
hardware decisions have to deal with: doubts in the military rationale, no 
consistent argument in favour for either sea- or land-basing and European 
concern about the U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, with NATO's adoption of 
flexible response these problems were rather fixed than substantially solved.
Before NATO could approve the flexible response strategy in December 1967, 
the allies had to be convinced of its value, SACEUR General Lemnitzer had to
89 In 1965/66 the withdrawal of the medium-range bombers B-47 was completed. They
were deployed in Spain, Great Britain and Morocco. See Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit.. 
p.92
90 U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit.. pp.9-10
be persuaded and the withdrawal of the French from the NATO Military 
Structure had to be accomplished.^
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91 See for the period from McNamara’s Athens Speech to NATO’s adoption of the 
strategy Stromseth, 1988, op.cit
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3. Flexible Response and its Divergent U.S. and German Interpretations
The U.S. endeavours to introduce the flexible strategy into NATO in the 
beginning of the sixties, as expressed in McNamara's Athens speech in 1962, 
caused the first significant disputes between Europe and the United States on 
the role of nuclear weapons. The nuclear dilemma in European-American 
relations is rooted in the alliance's
"fundamental paradox of geography: most of NATO’s ultimate deterrent,
American strategic nuclear forces, resides an ocean away from the likely point
of attack."'
Thus, the reason for these conflicts and the preference for one or other 
interpretation as between the superpower and its allies is based on the different 
geographical position of the interpreter: while apart from Norway the Federal 
Republic is the only NATO member who shares a common frontier with the 
Warsaw Pact, the United States is thousands of kilometres distant from NATO's 
main opponent and from its European allies who are assured to be protected by 
the nuclear umbrella of the United States. Their different geographical positions 
caused diverging interpretations of the role of nuclear weapons through the 
United States and the Europeans. These different interpretations were not only 
subject to an intellectual debate within the strategic community, but were 
largely responsible for long-standing conflicts between Europe and the United 
States concerning the character of NATO strategy.
While Europeans, have been more concerned with the nuclear weapons' 
function of deterrence by retaliation and the escalating character of the strategy, 
the United States stresses more the usability, the war-fighting character of the 
flexible response strategy. The European "interpretation" asks for an early 
commitment of U.S. strategic forces and would like to make the United States 
commit itself to use its strategic forces as early as possible, while the United 
States must be interested in postponing the use of nuclear weapons against 
Soviet territory as long as possible, since employment of nuclear weapons 
would make a Soviet retaliatory strike against U.S. territory probable and result 
in the destruction of the United States. Contrary to the Americans, the 
Europeans are not interested overmuch in the battlefield use of nuclear
1 Gregory F. Treverton. "Managing NATO’s Nuclear Dilemma." International Security. 
(Vol.7, No.4, Spring 1983), pp.93-115, p.93
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weapons, since the battlefield would most likely be Europe itself. This dash of 
interests caused by the two continents' different geography is so obvious that 
strategic studies start from this dilemma as a premise. In official NATO 
language it is expressed in the following way:
"As the nuclear ’provider’ for the Alliance, the United States has been required 
to consider what would happen if deterrence failed. This has led to the 
development of a range of options that make the threatened use of nuclear 
weapons believable and that provide possibilities other than the unthinkable, 
and therefore incredible, option of an all-out nuclear response. Credibility and 
usability have become inseparable elements of nuclear deterrence... As the 
’protected’, the Europeans have not always felt the same urge to look beyond 
deterrence to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war. They have been 
concerned more with absolute deterrence - the threatened use of nuclear 
weapons - than with what could happen if deterrence were to fail."2
Since then, Europe and the United States have always been obliged to find a 
compromise in NATO between these —partly incompatible— interpretations of 
nudear weapons' role.-* Those divergent U.S. and European interpretations of 
flexible response have been responsible for long-standing disputes in the 
Nudear Planning Group on the first and follow-on use of the TNF. For the 
United States the employment of TNF only makes sense if they reduce the 
threat of a general escalation and the danger of destruction of American 
territory - thus, if they provide war-fighting capabilities. They prefer concepts 
of TNF as an adjunct to conventional weapons in an "integrated battlefield." The 
Europeans and in particular the Germans can only pray that the war will be 
terminated merely by the threat to use nudear weapons before Europe is 
destroyed. Still, it is assumed in NATO that these different interpretations can 
be recondled. Peter Stratmann is optimistic and denies any incompatibility of 
the interpretations:
"Es bleibt festzuhalten: die unterschiedlichen Präferenzen, die die NATO- 
Staaten in der Debatte um die Auslegung und Weiterentwicklung der 
Bündnisdoktrin verfolgen, setzten sich nicht - wie häufig behauptet • in 
unvereinbare nationale Strategien um. Die Frage ist also weniger, wessen 
nationales Interesse sich durchsetzen würde. Entscheidend ist vielmehr, wie die 
amerikanische Führung und die westeuropäischen Regierungen angesichts der
2 Cartwright/Critchley, 198S, op.cit.. p.6, emphasis in the text Similar sections can be
found in almost every work on flexible response and the evolution of U.S. and 
NATO strategy. Here are only a few examples: Sigal, 1984, op.cit. p. 14-19., U.S. 
House of Representatives Report Modernization, 1980, op.tit.. p. 11/12. Afheldt 
1976, op.cit pp. 164-208
3 For an early critical evaluation of flexible response that emphasises its contradictions,
see Erhard Rosenkranz / Rüdiger Jütte, Abschreckung contra Sicherheit (München: 
R. Piper & Co., 1974) pp.36-77
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Ziel- und Ziel/Mittel- Konflikte, mit denen im Ernstfall jede für sich 
konfrontiert wäre, ihr strategisches Interesse definieren würden. Vieles spricht 
dafür, daß es dabei unter dem Zwang der Umstände zu einer viel 
weitergehenden Annäherung der Auffassungen käme, als die durchwegs 
skepdschen Darstellungen westlicher Analytiker erwarten lassen."*
Since NATO is able to come up with mutually agreed hardware decisions, it is 
obviously possible to reconcile these different interpretations. Thus the point of 
fracture has to be determined, where these different, but compatible strategies 
turn into incompatible concepts.
After the description of flexible response the reaction in the Federal Republic on 
its introduction will be described with special attention to the foundation of the 
Ebenhausen Institute. Subsequently the different levels will be analysed in 
which these different guidelines are manifested: a) two incompatible first use 
concepts on an operational level and b) an incoherent NATO TNF posture on 
the level of military programmes. A detailed description of NATO's 
employment system for nuclear weapons clarifies that these inconsistencies are 
not even clarified on the level of actual employment planning.
3.1. Description of Flexible Response
The most important shift in the replacement of massive retaliation with 
Mcnamara's "flexible response" was its dear postulation of an initial response to 
a significantly broader range of aggressions with conventional weapons. But, 
"not only was flexible response a U.S.-developed doctrine, it was largely a U.S.- 
imposed doctrine."5 Thus is took fully six years until NATO officially approved 
the strategic revision which McNamara and Kennedy had envisaged in 1961.
* "The following must be bome in mind: the different preferences pursued by the 
NATO nations in the debate on the interpretation and development of the Alliance 
doctrine do not result, as often maintained, in incompatible national strategies. Thus 
the question as to whose national interest would prevail is of little relevance - 
rather, the decisive factor is how the U.S. leadership and the Western European 
governments would define their strategic interests in view of the aim and the 
aim/means conflicts where both strategies were confronted within a case of 
emergency: There are many reasons to believe that under the force of 
circumstances there will be a much greater convergence of interpretations as the 
consistently sceptical presentations of Western analysis would lead us to expect." 
Stratmann, 1981, op.cit.. p.71/72
5 Emphasis in the text: Richard Hart Sinnreich, "NATO’s Doctrinal Dilemma", Qrbis. 
No. 19,1975, pp.461-476, here p.462
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The actual text of the still valid 1967 document, known as MC 14/3 (Military 
Committee) has never been made public. The vagueness of flexible response 
has existed from the day the doctrine was adapted. However, there has been 
consensus that this ambiguity was necessary in order to allow the American 
and European allies "sufficient scope"6 to interpret the strategy according to 
national preferences.
According to the West German White Paper flexible response embodies three 
types of response:
"Direct Defence is to prevent the aggressor - at the level of military conflict 
chosen by him - from achieving the objective. This may include the use of 
nuclear weapons. As a result, either the aggression fails or the aggressor is 
confronted with the threat of escalation. Deliberate Escalation is intended to 
repulse an attack by persuading the aggressor to take the political decision to 
cease hostilities, since his prospects of success and the risk he is running are no 
longer in an acceptable ratio. As a potential means of convincing him of such 
fact, the Alliance preserves the options of the politically controlled, selective 
use of nuclear weapons. General Nuclear Response is directed mainly against 
the aggressor’s strategic potential, and means using the Alliance’s strategic 
nuclear weapons. This threat is the most powerful deterrent; its use would be 
the most powerful of NATO’s possible responses.7
Flexible Response incorporates some indispensable elements. One essential 
element is forward defense: "Forward defense is defined as a coherent defence 
conducted close to the intra-German border with the aim of losing as little 
ground as possible and confining damage to a minimum."*
A second element refers to the NATO triad which means that there exists an 
interlocking combination between conventional forces, short-range, 
intermediate-range and strategic forces: "The three elements are
complementary, but none of them can substitute for another."9 Flexible 
Response is also based on the principle of incalculability, which means that the 
strategy deliberately leaves the question open "of when what response is to be
6 Legge, 1983,QiLCiL, p.9
7 Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper 1983. The Security of the Federal Republic
of Germany (Bonn: Federal Minister of Defence, 1983), pp. 145-146, emphasis by
S.P
8 Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper 1979. The Security of the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces (Bonn: Federal 
Minister of Defence, 1979) p. 126
9 White Paper 1983, op.cit. p. 146
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expected ...so as to confront an enemy, in the eventuality of aggression, with a 
risk he cannot afford to run".'0
However, this incalculable response should be at a level appropriate to the 
nature and the scale of the attack. In order to avoid defeat, NATO declares its 
willingness to escalate the level of violence, incorporated in the concept of 
"deliberate escalation." This willingness to escalate the conflict deliberately 
included a provision that NATO reserved all rights to be the first party in a 
conflict to fall back upon the use of nuclear weapon, called NATO's "first use" 
concept:
"The answer offered by flexible response is that security against any sort of 
military blackmail is provided by a capacity to respond militarily at a level 
appropriate to the nature and scale of the threat offered; and, if necessary to 
avoid defeat, to escalate the level of violence. This, it has always been 
understood in NATO (if not always willingly faced) includes the possibility of 
initiating the use of nuclear weapons."'7
Thus the concept of "deliberate escalation" will be implemented by NATO's 
first use of nuclear weapons.
Since its official adoption the flexible response strategy has been the target of 
numerous and varied criticisms. Among the analysts of the strategic 
community it is a commonplace to complain about the strategy's vagueness and 
to regard it more as a political compromise than a consistent military strategy. 
Lawrence Freedman identifies the scope it gives decision makers for avoiding 
difficult hardware choices as the strategy's main function:
"Flexible response has allowed this system to continue because its prime 
political attribute - that it can mean all things to all men - is a serious military 
failing. ... The attempt to deter conventional aggression in Europe with a 
nuclear arsenal controlled by a non-European power that is itself subject to 
nuclear retaliation has never appeared to be an example of political or military 
rationality..."'2
A German analyst describes the European and U.S. perceptions of flexible 
response as follows:
10 ibid
"  Paul Buteux, Strategy, Doctrine, and the Politics of Alliance. Theater Nuclear Force 
Modernisation in NATO (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983a) p.74
12 Lawrence Freedman," NATO Myths" in: Foreign Policy (Winter 1981/82) pp.48-69, 
pp.50,64
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"Die Europäer glaubten, die USA dazu überredet zu haben, eine frühen Einsatz 
von Atomwaffen gegen einen konventionellen Angriff nicht ganz 
auszuschließen; die USA gaben sich damit zufrieden, daß sie den Europäern 
ihre Zurückhaltung in der atomaren Frage unmißverständlich dargelegt hatten 
und bauten im übrigen darauf, daß sie das Heft gegenüber der NATO in der 
Hand behalten würden, falls es zur atomaren Eskalation käme."'-7
The Europeans' reaction towards the introduction of the flexible response 
strategy certainly cannot be described as enthusiastic. Brodie describes the 
ulterior motives for NATO's settling of the conflict
"What ended most of this debate was not at all the triumph of pure reason but, 
first, the sit-down strike of our NATO allies, who after many painful meetings 
with Secretary McNamara and his representatives rediscovered the utility of 
giving lip service to ideas with which they had no intention of conforming, and 
second, the increasing absorption of the United States in Vietnam."'*
32. Reactions in the Federal Republic
The^ announcement of flexible response stimulated a strategic debate in the 
Federal Republic which resulted in establishing institutionalised forms for 
research and for an exchange of views on strategic matters.
32.1. German parties
The two major political parties in the Federal Republic, the Social Democrats 
and the Christian Democrats, reacted quite differently to these changes in the 
U.S. strategy. While the SPD opposition welcomed the shift in U.S. strategy, the 
governing Christian Democrats and Social Christians were strongly opposed to 
the "McNamara strategy". Their opposition to a strategy with a more
13 "The Europeans thought they had convinced the United States not to exclude
completely the early use of nuclear weapons against a conventional attack; the 
United States were content to have pointed out unmistakably to the Europeans that 
they would exercise restraint in this respect and counted on holding the reins in 
NATO in the event of nuclear escalation." in: Christian Krause, Kann die NATO 
auf den Erstgebrauch von Atomwaffen verzichten? Anmerkungen zur 
sicherheitspolitischen Debatte in der Bundesrepublik und in den USA (Bonn: 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, November 1985) p.17. See also Gregory Treverton, 
Nuclear Weapons in Europe (London: International Institute for Strategie Studies, 
Adelphi Papers No. 168, 1981)
14 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (London: Cassell and Collier Macmillan Publishers,
1973) p.405
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conventional emphasis must also be considered in the context of a second 
intertwined issue which produced considerable strains on American-German 
relations in this period: the question of access to nuclear decision-making and 
physical control-sharing. The government's opposition was headed by Franz- 
Josef Strauß, who was appointed as the head of the newly created Ministry of 
"Atomic Affairs" by October 1955. By October 1956 he took office of the Minister 
of Defense, which he headed for the next six years.'5 His personal investment 
and "outspoken pursuit of a major nuclear role for Germany"'6 certainly had to 
be seen in context of his simultaneous advocacy of an important defense role 
for tactical nuclear weapons. Thus Strauß and many of his partisans strongly 
opposed the tendencies in the Kennedy administration, to modify the strategy 
towards a conventional emphasis and thus to renounce the first use of nuclear 
weapons.'7 Strauss argued that NATO was too weak conventionally to maintain 
a forward defense at the inner border. The existence of IN F and the threat to 
use them early would be a necessary deterrent.
Chancellor Adenauer had only reluctantly accepted NATO's strategy of 
massive retaliation and some years later he was again requested to rhange 
position. A sober reception on the part of the German government was certain!v 
also impeded by the ignorance of German officers who did not have the bas. 
knowledge to understand the American proposals or did not study the 
documents on which McNamaras documents were based.'® The change in the 
attitude within the Christian Democratic government came with Kai-Uwe von 
Hassel, who succeeded Strauß as Defence Minister and with Ludwig Erhard, 
Adenauer's replacement as Chancellor. The new cabinet members belonged to 
the "Atlantidsts" in the party and looked for a close cooperation with President 
Johnson and McNamara.
15 sec Kellcher, 1975, op.cit.. p.65. In German, Strauß* title was that of "Bundesminister
für Atomfragen". Strauß left the Adenauer cabinet on November 19, 1962 as a 
result of the famous "Spiegel-Affäre” and joined the government again on 
December 1, 1966 as Minister for Financial Affairs. See Datenhandbuch zur 
Gcschichtc des Deutschen Bundestages 1949-1982. (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1984), 
pp.306, 397, pp. 1060-1967
16 Kelleher, 1975, op.cit.. p.200
' 7 For a detailed discussion of Franz-Josef Strauß* strategic views and nuclear policy 
see also Richardson, 1966, op.cit.. p.75-83 and Thomas Enders, Franz Josef Strauß
- Helmut Schmidt und die Doktrin der Abschreckung (Koblenz: Bernard and 
Graefe, 1984)
18 sec Kelleher, 1975, op.cit.. p.174
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As opposed to the CDU, the SPD "once again"'» immediately adopted American 
strategic arguments; SPD as well as FDP spokesmen accepted the American 
view that strengthening conventional forces was of mutual interest to both the 
Federal Republic and the United States. The SPD's approval, in particular of the 
strong emphasis on conventional forces within flexible response, has to be 
viewed in the context of the party's vehement opposition to nuclear weapons 
demonstrated in its "Kampf dem Atomtod” (Fight Atomic Death) campaign 
during the fifties. Authoritative SPD politicians such as Fritz Erler and Helmut 
Schmidt adopted the criticism of massive retaliation strategy and looked for a 
solution to the alternative between "'suicide or capitulation.'"20
The SPD' experts rejected any nuclear automation, advancing the more than 
suitable metaphor that it was not realistic for the Europeans to believe "'that 
they were the tail which the American Atom dog is wagging.'"2' The Social 
Democratic politicians' adoption of the new U.S. strategy was due to their dose 
contact with intellectuals of the Kennedy administration. Close contacts 
between Fritz Erler and Paul Nitze guaranteed a direct exchange of ideas. 
Helmut Schmidt was obviously influenced by protagonists of the flexible 
response strategy such as Maxwell Taylor and Henry Kissinger. Thus 
Kissinger's and Taylor's pioneering studies for the introduction of the flexible 
response strategy were well known to the SPD's security experts and 
interpreted by means of first hand information. Helmut Schmidt's book 
"Defense and Retaliation" expressed the SPD's expectations with regard to the 
strategy in a most explidt manner. The book, which is regarded as a plea for the 
introduction of flexible response and its first presentation to the German public, 
was published in spring 1961, i.e. some months before McNamara presented the 
new strategy in his Ann Arbor speech.
19 sec Kellehcr, 1975, op.cit. p.159
20 Fritz Erler in an interview with the "Bayerischer Rundfunk", January 9,1963 quoted
in " Lothar Wilker, Die Sicherheitspolitik der SPD 1956-1966. Zwischen 
Wiedervereinigungs- und Bündnisorientierung. (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Neue 
Gesellschaft, 1977) p.169
21 "’Europa kann nicht der Schwanz sein, mit dem der amerikanische Atomhund
wedelt.’" Fritz Erler "Abschreckung muß glaubwürdig sein" in: Christ und Welt, 
December 21,1962, quoted in Wilker, 1977, op.cit.. p.176
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33.3. Institutionalising o f Research: the Ebenhausen Institute
Up to the beginning of the sixties, research and discussions on strategic issues 
were not yet institutionalised in the Federal Republic.“  This situation was 
changed in 1962 by the establishment of a German think tank called "Stiftung, 
Wissenschaft und Politik" (Science and Politics Foundation).
In 1960, Klaus Ritter, an active service officer, was urged by Henry Kissinger 
and Professor Arnold Wolfers to open an institute in order to provide a board 
of consultation for German government agencies, political parties, research 
institutes and the media and to serve as a place for contact between 
international experts on security and political matters.**
The Institute, which was set up in 1962 as a private law foundation and then as 
a research institute in 1965, is almost better known internationally than in 
Germany itself.2* It works in cooperation e.g. with the RAND Corporation in 
Santa Monica, the London Institute of Strategic Studies, the Moscow Institute 
for International Economics and Politics, and the Carnegie Foundation in the 
United States. The Ebenhausen Institute employs 110 researchers; there are 
posts for 20 to 30 guest researchers who work on questions of defence, 
economics and social science, and new technological developments. Nine- 
tenths of the institute's funds (total budget in 1987: roughly DM 11m plus DM 
1-1.5m "outside funds”), are provided from the budgets of the Office of the
22 for this period see Lothar Wilker, 1977, op.cit.. pp. 158-222, and Helga Haftendom,
Abrüstungs-und Entspannungspolitik zwischen__Sicherheitsbefriedigung und
Friedenssicherung.__ZlK__Außenpolitik der__BRD__1955-1973 (Düsseldorf:
Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1974), pp.66-68
23 Klaus Ritter, who headed the research institute until spring 1988, had set up the
department in the Wehrmacht’s Supreme Command responsible for analysing the 
strength and state of the Soviet armed forces during World War II. Afterwards he 
became a member of the German intelligence service and head of the service’s 
¡Department for Political Evaluation
24 The institute’s council comprises members of parliament representing all political
parties (excluding the Greens), and representatives of the Federal Chancellery, 
different ministries, the Bavarian State Government, researchers and leading 
personalities of the economy. Herbert Wehner participated in the first council, 
Helmut Schmidt joined it later. Georg Leber, Werner Heisenberg, Carl Friedrich 
von Weizsäcker, and Generals such as Hans Speidel and Ulrich de Maziere are 
other former members of the Council. Michael Groth, "Unabängig, doch weit ab 
von der Macht. Die ’Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik”’, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung. April 21,1987
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Federal Chancellery, the Bonn Foreign Office and the Defence MinistryM Many 
researchers work with the highest security authorisation, some even with the 
highest clearance level "Atomal”. The Institute's role has often been compared 
to that of the RAND Corporation in the United States26, since its main task lies 
in the field of policy consulting. Nevertheless, the Institute's independence is 
praised in the media27. The Institute's self-proclaimed goal is to identify 
relevant questions and to be able to provide politicians with answers when the 
questions do become relevant. An ideal example for this procedure exists in the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty; the Ebenhausen researchers were able to provide the 
relevant questions when the new Socialist Liberal government was confronted 
with the treaty's first draft28.
The Bonn administration and the Institute contact each other through a "coope­
ration office" in Bonn. Colloquies in Ebenhausen offer an occasion for meetings 
between members of the Federal Chancellery, the Foreign Office and the 
Ministry of Defence, who are otherwise subject to institutional barriers which 
hinder contact between them. Members of the ministries consider the SWP 
reports as policy advice. Politicians of the Social Democratic Party, in particular, 
maintain intensive contact with Ebenhausen.*»
Contemporarily to the foundation of Ebenhausen it was again the 
Sodaldemocratic politician Helmut Schmidt who stimulated the idea of regular 
conferences and meetings in all the main NATO countries among members of 
the international defence community. He suggested that officers on duty, dvil
25 Theo Sommer, "Think-tank’s 25 years of ’opening intellectual doors’." German
Tribune. October 11, 1987, p.5. Translation of Theo Sommer’s Article, 
"Politikberatung in Deutschland", Die Zeit. (Vol.25, October 2,1987)
26 "Mittlerin zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Die Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in
Ebenhausen aus Schweizer Sicht". Neue Züricher Zeitung. March 24,1988
27 see Josef Joffe: "Weltweit anerkannte Forschungsstätte. Die Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik feiert ihr 25jähriges Bestehen". Süddeutsche Zeitung. October 3,1987
28 Günther Gillessen, "Über den Umgang mit Planungsstäben und Gedanken-Fabriken".
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. January 10,1988, (supplement No.8)
29 e.g. Dietrich Stobbe, Johannes Rau, Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski and Karsten Voigt see
Groth, 1987, op.cit.. For the statute of the foundation see Ulrich Lohmar, 
Wissenschaftsförderung und Politikberatung. (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann Universitäts­
verlag, 1968) p.202-205
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servants and journalists should be included as well.# Since Helmut Schmidt 
gave birth to these meetings, he can be regarded as a pioneer of the German 
"strategic community".
The expression "strategic community" was coined by Weseley W. Posvar, a 
researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to describe the 
continuous process of discussion among the U.S. strategic specialists as well as 
a wider scientifically oriented public.-»' An important centre of these U.S. 
strategic specialists or defence intellectualls is the RAND Corporation as the 
birthplace of the strategic community in the late fifties*2.
The term "strategic community" is usually not only applied to researchers of 
think tanks such as RAND but also to bureaucrats and civil servants in ministries 
and governmental administrations as well as military men who participate in the 
intellectual debate by attending conferences or by their contributions to the 
innumerable periodicals and magazines which discuss these issues. In this thesis 
the term "strategic community" is used according to this broader sense. Part of 
this German "strategic community" considered as its duty to operationalise the 
guidelines following from the German interpretation of flexible response.
30 Helmut Schmidt, "Probleme der militärischen Strategie", Die Neue Gesellschaft.
(Vol. 12, No.2, March/April 1965) pp.616-628, here p.628
31 Gerhard Brandt and Ludwig von Friedeburg, Aufgaben der Militärpublizistik in der
modernen Gesellschaft. (Frankfurt, 1966) p.15 quoted in Reinhard Mutz, 
Sicherheitspolitik und demokratische öffendichkeit in der BRD. Probleme der 
Analyse. Kritik und Kontrolle militärischer Macht (München, Wien: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1978) p.126
32 "The whole conception of modern warfare, the nature of international relations, the
question of world order, the function of weaponry had to be thought through again. 
Nobody knew the answers; initially, not many had even the right questions. From 
these ashes an entire intellectual community would create itself, a new elite that 
would eventually emerge as a power elite, and whose power would come not from 
wealth or family or brass stripes, but from their having conceived and elaborated a 
set of ideas. It was, at the outset a small and exceptionally inbred collection of men
- mosdy economists and mathematicians, a few political scientists - who devoted 
nearly every moment of their workaday thoughts to thinking about the bomb: how 
to prevent nuclear war, how to fight nuclear war if it cannot be deterred." Fred 
Kaplan, 1983, op.cit.. p. 10
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33. Divergent national doctrines (U.SJFRG)
Due to the different geography the strategy of flexible response calls for very 
different national interpretations. These different interpretations of the United 
States and Europe will be set against each other. The result of these 
interpretations are divergent national guidelines which shape each nation's 
specific strategic nuclear policy and influence decisions on force development, 
composition, size and basing mode of nuclear weapons and arms control 
policy. Also the U.S. force employment or action policy, i.e. how the United 
States would actually use its strategic forces as well as U.S. operational policy, 
derive from these doctrines that have originated in the interpretation of flexible 
response. The focus of these different doctrines is the role of nuclear weapons 
and thus the everlasting disputable question among the NATO allies of when, 
how and with what to cross the nuclear threshold. The different perception of 
the nuclear weapons' role result in the following guidelines:
While the United States stresses the conventional component of the 
strategy, the Europeans prefer a nuclearisation of the strategy.
For the Germans nuclear weapons have a strategic value, while the U.S.
stresses the tactical and battlefield character of nuclear weapons.
The Germans envisage a "political" use of nuclear weapons in order to 
demonstrate to the Soviet Union NATO's willingness to escalate, while 
the United States prefers to employ nuclear weapons with a military 
purpose, as a last resort.
These different notions of the role of nuclear weapons result in two different, 
incompatible first use concepts which will be explained in detail.
33.1. Nuclear versus Conventional
There is consensus in the transatlantic strategic community that the U.S. should 
pursue a policy line of raising the nuclear threshold and, if possible, to 
regionalise and conventionalise a war in Europe. The Federal Republic, 
however, prefers to lower the threshold as much as possible precisely in order 
to prevent a protracted conventional war on European soil.**
** "Die USA sind daran interessiert, einen Krieg in Europa, wenn er sich nicht 
vermeiden läßt, zu regionalisieren und zu konventionalisieren, weil alles andere,
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The basic clash of interests between the two nations, due to the Alliance's 
fundamental paradox of geography and the resulting different risks for both 
nations concerned are also pointed out by the White Paper 1975/76:
"Die mit der NATO-Strategie verbundenen Risiken sind für die europäischen 
und die transatlantischen Bündnispartner unterschiedlich. Mit dem Einsatz 
nuklear-strategischer Mittel bringen sich die USA in Gefahr, ihr eigenes 
Territorium einer korrespondierenden Waffenwirkung der Gegenseite 
auszusetzen. Westeuropa hingegen, vor allem die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
würde schon vor einer Eskalation bis zur nuklear-strategischen Stufe 
Schlachtfeld eines Krieges sein, der mit konventionellen und womöglich auch 
mit nuklear-taktischen Mitteln geführt wird."*
The persistent dilemma, or, rather, contradiction, implied in NATO's strategy is 
that the Europeans are more deterred than the United States since the 
employment of TNF is much more probable than the use of strategic weapons. 
Thus, the Federal Republic in particular would suffer a much higher level of 
destruction than both Soviet Union and the United States. Therefore the Federal 
Republic pursues a policy of limiting the damage by an early war termination.
On a declaratory level, the Federal Republic declares its willingness to build up 
conventional forces to an extent which obviates the use of nuclear weapons.*5 In
insbesondere die Nuklearisierung des Krieges, Folgen für das amerikanische 
Mutterland nach sich ziehen könnte. Die Europäer ihrerseits bestehen darauf, diese 
Folgen geradezu automatisch eintreten zu lassen, indem sie für eine möglichst 
niedrige Atomschwelle und für einen geringen konventionellen Aufwand 
plädieren." (It would serve U.S. interests to régionalisé and conventionalise a war 
in Europe; this is inevitable because anything else, in particular a nuclearisation of 
the war, would have consequences for the American homeland. The Europeans 
insist on evoking these consequences almost automatically since they favour as low 
a nuclear threshold as possible and low conventional expenses.) Ernst Otto 
Czempiel, "Konventionell oder nuklear? Langfristige Aspekte der aktuellen 
Debatte", in: Die Neue Gesellschaft (Vol.30, No.2, February 1983), pp.150-154, 
p. 151. See also Treverton, 1983, op.cit. p.93
34 "The risks inherent in NATO strategy are different for the European and transatlantic
allies. By employing nuclear-strategic means, the United States risks to provoke a 
corresponding attack on U.S. territory by the opponent Western Europe, however, 
the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, would be the battlefield of a war 
fought by conventional and possibly tactical nuclear weapons before the strategic 
level of fighting was to be reached." Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 
1975/76. Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der 
Bundeswehr (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1976), 
pp.22-23
35 "Die Bündnispartner müssen mit starken konventionellen Kräften in Europa dafür
sorgen, daß möglichst kein Zwang zum Einsatz nuklearer Waffen entsteht." ("The
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reference to the force development level, however, this dilemma results in the 
Federal Republic's reluctance to meet U.S. requests to strengthen its 
conventional forces; an effective conventional capacity increases the danger of a 
prolonged conventional war which would be fought on the German soil as the 
battlefield.^ A relentless adherence to and strengthening of NATO's principle 
of forward defence is regarded as a way out of this predicament.*7
However, this reluctance in respect to conventionalisation of the strategy does 
not mean that the Federal Republic has neglected its NATO duties. The 
Bundeswehr provides West Europe's largest conventional army with 495.000 
soldiers and has doubled its annual conventional expenditure from 1970 to 
\ 9 7 7 .38 However, the Federal Republic's yieldings to U.S. exhortations to 
provide more conventional forces in Europe and its demonstrated willingness 
to take over a greater share of the burden are based on mainly political 
considerations. The Germans were concerned to prevent the risk of extensive 
U.S. troop reductions in Europe, the most decisive expression of the U.S. 
commitment to the defence of Europe. Considerations of U.S. tropp reductions 
were caused by the Vietnam war and proposed by the U.S. Mansfield 
Amendment. Thus, the Germans thought, they must at least demonstrate some 
efforts for the common defence in order to strengthen the hand of the 
atlanticists in the U.S. administration.*9 The fact still remains that "(a) common 
element of all the conventional force improvement initiatives launched in
allies must ensure strong conventional forces in Europe so that they will not be 
compelled to employ nuclear weapons”) ibid. p.23
36 Apart from these concerns the German reluctance towards a strengthening of its
conventional forces is due to the higher costs of conventional weapons compared to 
nuclear ones
37 For a description of the history of forward defence see Peter Barth, "Zwischen Vome-
und Vorwärtsverteidigung" in: Mediatus (Vol.4, No.7/8, August 5, 1985), p.3-6
38 Annual military expenditure has been increased from 25.8 to 50.2 billion DM in the
seven years from 1970-1977, sec "Seid umschlungen, Milliarden" in: Per Stem. 
(Vol.30, No.38, September 8,1977) p.81
39 see Roger L.L. Facer, Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible
Response. Issues and Approaches. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 
1985), p.33. A comprehensive discussion about all the reasons of the Federal 
Republic to strengthen the Bundeswehr can not be given here. Reasons based in the 
German armament industry as well as German power aspirations certainly played 
an important role. For this context see Carola Bielfeldt, Peter Schlotter, Die 
militärische Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Einführung und 
Kritik (Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 1980)
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NATO since 1970 is their American origin."*0 This fact suggests "that, during 
this period, strengthening conventional deterrence remained largely a concern 
of the United States instead of European countries."*'
Among the German government and the opposition parties there exists general 
consensus that the highly industrialised and densely populated Federal 
Republic would be destroyed to unacceptable levels by a prolonged 
conventional war. Since fully 30% of West Germany's population and 25% of its 
industrial capacity lie within 100 kilometres of the border between the two 
Germanies, the White Paper, produced under Defence Minister Leber, 
concludes:
"Die Reaktion der NATO muß verhindern, daß es zu einem länger 
andauernden Kampf auf dem Territorium der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
kommt. Denn ein solcher Kampf würde letztlich die Substanz dessen zerstören, 
was verteidigt werden soll."*2
General Steinhoff, until 1974 chairman of NATO's Military Committee, denied 
that it was a "desirable objective" to be able to execute a prolonged conventional 
defence against a massive Soviet attack.** The no-first use debate and the 
German pleading for adherence to NATO's first use policy must be considered 
in this context. In their reply to a proposal made by the so-called U.S "Gang of 
four" to renounce NATO's principle of first use**, a German counter "Gang-of- 
four", consisting of prominent members such as former Minister of Defence 
Georg Leber, explained their rejection of these plans by the destructiveness of a 
conventional war:
40 Facer, 1985, op.cit.. p.48 
*' ibid
*2 "NATO must react in such a way that a protracted war fought on the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s territory be prevented, since such a battle would eventually 
destroy the substance of that which should be defended." Weißbuch 1975/76, 
Q{2i£iL> P-87
43 "Die Forderung, nach einem Großaufmarsch eine langwährende konventionelle 
Verteidigung gegen den Massenangriff der Sowjets und des Blocks durchführen zu 
können, ist kein erstrebenswertes Ziel." ("The request, after a main deployment to 
be able to conduct a long-lasting defense against the massive attack of the Soviets 
and the bloc, is not a desirable aim.") Johannes Steinhoff, Wohin treibt die NATO? 
Probleme der Verteidigung Westeuropas (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976), 
pp.62-63
44 Bundy et.al. 1982, op.cit.
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"For the Germans and other Europeans whose memory of the catastrophe of 
conventional war is still alive and on whose densely populated territory both 
pacts would confront each other with the destructive power of modem armies, 
the thought of an ever more probable conventional war is terrifying."45
Thus, the political goal of achieving a balance between the conventional forces 
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact has always been regarded with mixed feelings 
on the part of the Federal Republic, because nuclear deterrence, expressed in 
the guarantee of employment of U.S. strategic weapons, would then be 
obviated. This situation would correspond with a "decoupling" of the Federal 
Republic's defence from the U.S. nuclear umbrella 46.
However, as early as 1975, Afheldt analysed and demonstrated convincingly 
that on an operational level the Federal Government has envisaged 
participation in what it officially argues should be prevented: the build-up of an 
option for a protracted war in Europe/7 According to the 1975/76 White Paper 
one task of German naval forces would be to protect U.S. reinforcement 
vessels/®
332 . Strategic versus tactical
The rift between the U.S. and German doctrines is also reflected in two concepts 
of escalation. Europeans tend to perceive the "threat of escalation as increasing 
the risk of a nuclear war which would be disastrous for everyone"/9 while the 
United States "has justified the threat to escalate in terms of gaining some kind 
of military or bargaining advantage which, even though it might be temporary, 
would increase the chance of exercising some kind of control over the conflict
45 Karl K aiser/G eorg Leber/Alois Mertes/Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and
the Preservation of Peace”, in: Foreign Affairs (Vol.60, No.5, Summer 1982), 
pp.l 158-1170, p.l 164
46 Hans Rattinger, "Militärdoktrinen", in: Ralf Zoll/Ekkehart Lippert/Tjarck Rössler
(ed.), Bundeswehr und Gesellschaft. Ein Wörterbuch (Opladen: Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 1977), pp. 164-169, p.l 68
47 Afheldt, 1976, op.cit.. p.179
48 White Paper 1975/76, op.cit.. pp. 103-105
49 Buteux, 1983a, op.cit. p.75
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and allow for the possibility of crisis management after armed conflict had 
occurred".50
The different concepts of "escalation" result in different perceptions of the role 
for TNF: While the Germans prefer to consider TNF as a means for a quick 
escalation to the strategic level, the U.S. prefers the operational or tactical use of 
TNF in combination with conventional weapons on an integrated battlefield:
"Europeans could emphazise TNF as a link to American central systems, while 
Americans could stress TNF as a complement to conventional defense if need 
be."5'
This different perception of the role of TNF is responsible for NATO's lack of a 
consistent TNF posture what has been often lamented in the strategic debate.52
Henry Kissinger summarised the German attitude with a statement which has 
become famous:
"The real goal of our allies - underlining the dilemma of tactical nuclear 
weapons - has been to commit the United States to the early use of strategic 
nuclear weapons, which meant a US-Soviet nuclear war fought over their 
heads".«
3 3 3 . Political versus military use
The Germans prefer a concept of a "political” or "demonstrative" use of nuclear 
weapons.* This concept corresponds to the notion of deterrence by retaliation
50 ibid.. p.74
5'  Treverton, 1981, op.cit. p.l
52 e.g. Colin S. Gray. "Theater Nuclear Weapons. Doctrines and Postures." World
Politics. (Vol.28, No.2, January 1976), pp.300-314.; Laurence Martin "Flexibility in 
Tactical Nuclear Response" in Holst/Nerlich (eds.) 1977, op.cit.. p.255-265. A 
review article on this problem is provided by Harold A. Feiveson, "The Dilemma of 
Theater Nuclear Weapons" in World Politics. (Vol.33, No.l, Oct. 1980), pp.282- 
298 *
53 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and
Michael Josef, 1979), p.219, emphasis in the text
54 See as an example Steinhoff, 1976, op.cit. p. 190. For a discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of "demonstrative use" see Paul Buteux, "Theatre Nuclear
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or punishment. The nuclear weapons' role within this concept is to 
communicate with the opponent by means of the threat of using nuclear 
weapons. Accordingly it is based on the idea that the Soviet Union, and not the 
other Warsaw Pact nations should be threatened with a strike as the main 
recipient of the communicated threat. The aim was to demonstrate NATO's 
willingness to immediately escalate the conflict to the strategic level:
"The demonstration use of TNWs would be designed to exhibit alliance 
determination to resist an attack and to warn the enemy that his actions 
inexorably increase the likelihood of a more general nuclear response."55
Accordingly there was also consensus among all German parties to object to the 
use of TNF as a means to deny the enemy military success. Instead, they 
supported the notion of confronting the aggressor with an unacceptable risk of 
nuclear escalation.5«5 The aim of hitting the Soviet Union quite early in a conflict 
is also aimed at coupling the U.S. with European theatre warfare after the 
outbreak of hostilities. Thus this concept is the most direct equivalent to the 
idea of "coupling".
In order to avoid misunderstandings it again should be bom in mind that 
nuclear weapons for "political" use are still real weapons of mass destruction:
"(A)uch ’politische Waffen’ sind Waffen und damit Instrumente der 
physischen Gewaltanwendung, die überdies... um ihrer drohstrategischen 
Funktion willen militärisch einsatzbereit sein - und den politischen Willen zum 
militärischen Einsatz einschließen - müssen."57
Weapons and European Security". Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol X:4 
(December 1977) pp.781-808.
55 Buteux, 1977, op.cit.. p.790
»  Buteux, 1983, op.cit. p.96
57 "Also ’political weapons’ are weapons and thus instruments of physical use of force, 
which moreover ... in context of their function of a strategic threat have to be 
operational and which have to include the political determination for their military 
employment" Susanne Lang, Abschreckungsthcorie - Analyse und Kritik 
ausgewShlter theoretisch-bepifflicher Grundkonzeote. Hamburg: Diplomarbeit 
Dezember 1988, p.88
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33.4. Two incompatible first use concepts
All these contradictory and mutually exclusive views culminate in both 
countries' dispute on their two, principally incompatible first use concepts. The 
Germans request a first use of nuclear weapons as early as possible and on a 
demonstrative, political and strategic level, signaling to the enemy the necessity 
of terminating the war. For the United States, however, flexible response would 
argue for precisely the opposite: first use of nuclear weapons as late as possible 
and on an operational level to achieve a military advantage. The 
implementation of the U.S. first use concept, therefore, foresees "short-range 
battlefield systems in an effort to keep the nuclear exchange limited"5®, whereas 
the German concept foresees longer- range weapons that are able to hit targets 
in the Soviet Union.
Wolfgang Heisenberg precisely summarised the two antagonistic first use 
concepts:
"While the United States seems to use nuclear weapons for land combat in 
Central Europe as late as possible and on a more massive scale, in order to 
achieve at least a temporary military advantage, West Germany is obviously 
interested in employing them earlier and in a less massive way, mainly to 
influence the will of the opponent but not to destroy enemy targets."59
Since a political use neither implies that the weapons will not be used at all nor 
that the use would not follow any military criteria, this definition creates 
difficulties. If targeting explicitly includes military objects, i.e. if employment is
58 Daniel Charles, Nuclear Planning in NATO. Pitfalls of First Use (Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger 1987) p. 125
59 Wolfgang Heisenberg, "The Alliance and Europe: Part I: Crisis Stability in Europe
and Theatre Nuclear Weapons". Adelphi Papers, No. 96 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973) p.3. See also Uwe Nerlich: "Vereinfacht 
bevorzugten die USA einen massiven Einsatz (von Nuklearwaffen, S.P.) zu einem 
möglichst späten Zeitpunkt bei möglichster Begrenzung auf das Gefechtsfeld, die 
BRD einen sparsamen Einsatz zu einem möglichst frühen Zeitpunkt bei 
möglichster Ausweitung des Einsatzraumes. "("Simply said the United States 
preferred a massive employment (of nuclear weapons, S.P.) as late as possible with 
the most possible limitation of the battlefield, while the Federal Republic preferred 
a restrained employment as early as possible with an expansion over the operational 
area as far as possible.) Uwe Nerlich, Die Verbesserung der nuklearen Fähigkeiten 
der NATO; Verteidigungs- und verhandlungspolitische Probleme. (Ebenhausen: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 1978) SWP-AP 2159, p.34
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militarily rewarding, it is more than ambiguous to call such an employment 
"political".«'
The German first use concept suggests that the modernisation of the LRTNF 
harmonises more with West German strategic doctrines than with U.S. ones. 
There are indications that the German strategic experts and politicians 
considered deploying the Pershing n  missile as the optimal weapon system for 
implementing the German first use concept and land-deployed long-range TNF 
as a means to secure a quick escalation of the war to the strategic level.
3.4. Ambiguity of flexible response: the TNF posture
The ambiguity of the flexible response strategy is demonstrated expressively in 
NATO's lack of a coherent TNF posture. This incoherence is manifested in the 
varied history of the TNF. Deployed without coherent rationale, subject to U.S. 
reduction plans but German insistence on its full maintenance, the IN F's 
evolution demonstrates that the military implementation of a strategy cannot be 
more consistent than the strategy itself.
3.4.1. Description of the TNF
Estimates of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons have ranged from 50.000 in 1966 to 
22.000 in 1975." In the strategic debate, however, the term tactical nuclear 
weapons (and this corresponds to the way in which this term is here applied) 
has always referred to the 7.000 TNFs which were deployed in Europe until the 
end of the seventies.
The Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee's (JCAE) decided to expand 
production of fissionable materials in large quantities in the late fifties. The 
reason for expanding production of nuclear weapons was attributed "to the
60 Uwe Nerlich criticises the categorisation of nuclear weapons as political ones, in
particular in view of the fact that the weapons, which could potentially be used with 
a political intention are those which run automatically after their release. Nerlich, 
1978, op.cit.. p.40
61 22,000 Tactical and 8,000 Strategic: 30,000 U.S. Nuclear Weapons, Defense Monitor.
(Vol.4, No.2, Center for Defense Information, Washington D.C. February 1975),pp. 
12, quoted in Leitenberg, 1978 op.cit.. p.7
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most parochial motivations possible"«: the members of the JCAE regarded 
consumption of relatively large amounts of fissionable materials as a way of 
expanding Atomic Energy Commission activities in their home districts. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to use all materials available, obviously 
"irrespective of any previous plan or warfare d o c trin e .W h ile  they had been 
brought to Europe in 1954 without any dear employment doctrine, the 
authorised number of TNF in Europe increased from 2,500 in 1960 to about 
7,200 in 1968 during Secretary McNamara's term of office*', in spite of his 
dandestine no-first use policy and his de-emphasis of reliance on nudear 
weapons.« David N.Schwartz commented on this contradictory policy: "There 
was, of course, a certain irony in this position."**
The following data refer to the level of 6000 TNF after 1979, since as part of the 
1979 NATO Dual-Track decision also 1000 TNF had been withdrawn. These 
theatre nudear forces are deployed in seven European countries and cover the 
full spectrum of ranges and variations, e.g. long-range missiles and bombers for 
European contingendes, tactical aircraft and bombs, short-range missiles, 
artillery, surface-to-air missiles and land m ines/7 According to Senator Sam 
Nunn 60-70% of NATO's 1980 stockpile of 6,000 TNFs are assigned to 
battlefield systems:
"’Two-thirds of NATO’s ... tactical nuclear warheads are tied to delivery
systems with ranges less than 100 miles, and most of these have ranges of IQ­
'S2 Leitenberg, 1978, op.cit.. p. 12
63 ibid..
64 ibid. p. 16
65 The interpretation of McNamara as being a clear proponent of no-first use during his
office as U.S. Defense Secretary is at least debatable. See for example statements 
such as the following: "This does not mean that the NATO forces can or should do 
without tactical nuclear weapons. On the contrary, we must continue to strengthen 
and modernize our tactical capabilities to deal with an attack where the opponent 
employs such weapons first, or any attack by conventional forces which puts 
Europe in danger of being overrun." Robert McNamara, in Hearings, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of 
Defense Appropriations for 1964, 88th Congress, Pan I, Washington D.C., 1963, 
pp. 100-102, quoted in ibid. p.32
66 Schwartz, 1983a, op.cit.. p. 14
67 See the table of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe in William M. Arkin and Richard W.
Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields. Global Links in the Arms Race (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1985), p. 102
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20 miles. The limited reach of the Alliance’s 155mm and 8-inch nuclear 
artillery and its tactical surface-to-surface missiles - including the ... Lance 
missile - would in all likelihood confine their use to targets on NATO territory. 
Knowledge that the bulk of NATO tactical nuclear weapons, if employed, 
would be confined to strikes on NATO territory is hardly likely to terrify or 
deter the Soviet Union.’"«
The majority of these weapons are concentrated in Central Europe, particularly 
in West Germany. While all of these forces are under U.S. control, about two 
thirds of the 6,000 would be delivered by allied forces/9 The yields of the TNF 
range from subkilotons up to a one megaton for air dropped bombs.70
If used, most TNFs with their short range, would detonate on German territory. 
Philipp Sonntag calculated that the employment of 10% of NATO's TNFs 
would destroy the Federal Republic as a viable society.7' In general, estimates of 
how many people would be killed in a tactical nuclear war are as follows: some 
thousands, on the assumption of an immediate stop to a war which involved 
only a minimal number of nuclear weapons; if some restraints were to be 
exercised in the use of TNF anywhere from two to twenty million would be 
killed; in the absence of restraints, 100 million lives would be lost.72
Shortly after the TNFs' introduction into NATO's stockpile, SHAPE conducted 
its first exercises in 1954 and 1955. The exercise "Carte Blanche", held on June 
20-28,1955, gained some sad glory in this context and "came as a severe shock 
to German opinion."73 Carte Blanche simulated mass dropping of atomic bombs 
over West Germany, areas of Belgium, the Netherlands and Eastern France for 
the first time. It was concluded that the dropping of 355 nuclear weapons
68 Senator Sam Nunn in the Third German-American Roundtable on NATO: The
MBFR Negotiations. A Conference Report (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute 
for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980) p. 19, quoted in Record, 1981, op.cit.. p.28.
69 ibid. p.32
to Leitenberg, 1978, op.cit.. p.l 13
71 Philipp Sonntag, Verhinderung und Linderung atomarer Katastrophen (Bonn: Osang
Verlag, 1981) p.48-49
72 Leitenberg, 1978, op.cit. p.33
73 Kissinger, 1984, op.cit. p.291
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within 48 hours would result in 1,7 million deaths and 3,5 million casualties in 
West Germany.74
3.4.2. Attempts o f the TNFs'Reduction
In the spring of 1974, a campaign was started in American newspapers, aiming 
at a substantial reduction of the 7,000 TNF stockpile. A series of articles were 
published which were - according to Leitenberg - clearly written with access to 
persons in the government, indicating that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was 
considering their reduction. Schlesinger was supposed to have argued that their 
"'original military considerations that led to the build-up of nuclear weapons in 
Europe have been overtaken by events or were based on mistaken 
assumptions.'"75
At the same time, a study was published by the Brookings Institution in 
December 1974, which suggested that U.S. TNFs in Europe could be reduced 
from 7,000 down to 2,000 and that the warhead yields could be reduced to 
between a maximum of 10 kilotons and a minimum of 0.5 kilotons. Former 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Enthoven, who served under McNamara, 
proposed that the force could be reduced to 1,000 weapons.7«5
However, no reductions in TNF were accomplished. Exactly the opposite 
happened: On November 4, 1974 Defense Secretary Schlesinger, during a visit 
to the Federal Republic announced that no changes in nuclear equipment were
74 Leitenberg considers these figures as likely to have been ridiculously low in view of
the number of weapons used and the probable high yields at that time, see 
Leitenberg, 1978, op.cit.. p.34. For a detailed description see Kissinger 1984, 
QP-CU,, pp. 291
75 D. Morgan, "Nuclear force in Europe held open to cutting" in Washington Post.
(April 5, 1974), quoted in Leitenberg, 1978, op.cit. p.38. For the series of articles 
see also ibid. For confirmation that Schlesinger planned a reduction of stockpile, 
see Anthony H. Cordesman. "Deterrence in the 1980s: Pan I . American Strategic 
Forces and Extended Deterrence". Adelphi-Papers No.175. (London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1982), p. 19
76 Alain C. Enthoven, "U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?" in Foreign
Affairs. (Vol.53, No.3, April 1975), p.513-532. Jeffrey Record, U.S. Nuclear 
Weapons in Europe. Issues and Alternatives. (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1974)
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planned, save for the programme changes which included bringing a larger 
number of Lance missiles into Germany.77
Another attempt to reduce INF was to offer part of them at the MBFR table 
under "Option HT. In December 1975 NATO tabled in Vienna the so-called 
Option ID, which included 1,000 nuclear warheads, 54 nuclear capable F-4 
aircraft and 36 Pershing missiles if the Soviets withdrew an entire tank army 
and its complement of tanks - 1,700 armored vehicles and 68,000 men from the 
GDR.7* This proposal, made by the Dutch delegation in a NATO Defence 
Minister meeting, was obviously not welcomed by the other NATO members79, 
especially not by the West German Ministry of Defence. General Ulrich de 
Maziere is quoted as having said that "'it will not be feasible to make a 
considerable change in the number of nuclear weapons stored in Europe.'"«0 
Milton Leitenberg explains why the Germans were reluctant to agree to a 
withdrawal of the TNF:
"Any reduction, no matter what its nature, and regardless of the substantive 
questions involved, were seen as upsetting to ’the perceptions’ of NATO allies 
on the degree of US ’committedness’ and US military support.
After the withdrawal of the 1,000 TNF as an integral part of the 1979 decision,«2 
the NPG meeting in Montebello in October 1983 again decided to bring another 
1,400 warheads back to the United States." German adherence to the full size of 
the stockpile with warheads of a range of yields up to that of a Poseidon missile
77 Leitenberg, 1978, op.cit. p.39
78 Reinhard Mutz (ed), Die Wiener Verhandlungen über Truppenreduzierungen in
Mitteleuropa (MBFR). Chronik. Glossar. Dokumentation. Bibliographie. 1973- 
1982 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983), p.69
79 "Schlesinger calls A-Arms Vital to Guard Europe" in New York Times (December
12,1974)
so "European Worried by Pressure on U.S. to cut Nuclear Weapons", in New York 
Times. (September 5, 1975). For confirmation of the German resistance against a 
reduction of TNF see: Gert Krell and Peter Schlotter, Zur Diskussion über die 
taktischen Nuklearwaffen in Europa. Analyse und Dokumentation (Frankfurt: 
Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung), HSFK-Report 2/1977, 
pp.1,11.
81 Leitenberg, 1978, op.ciL. p.39, emphasis in the text and by S.P.
82 The United States was reluctant to publicise the withdrawal of the 1,000 warheads for
domestic political reasons in the wake of Afghanistan, see Legge, 1983 op.cit.. p.37
83 For the Communique see Cartwright/Critchley, 1985, op.cit. p. 154-155
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has obviously changed. The remaining 4,600 weapons are a valued bargaining 
counter at arms control negotiations since even concerning the residual TNFs 
the question arose "how much redundancy in rounds and systems is needed. 
However, the German approval of the TNFs' withdrawal in the early eighties 
has to be considered in the context of the LRTNF deployment. As long as these 
weapons are deployed in Europe, they increase the chance of an early passing 
of the nuclear threshold. If, however, these weapons are withdrawn again, it is 
of highest priority to stop the process of denuclearisation of Europe. As a means 
for averting Europe's denuclearisation even battlefield nuclear weapons are 
welcome. This is expressed by the vehement German opposition to the "second 
zero" and later by the German refusal of a "third zero-option" which Gorbachev 
proposed for all nuclear systems in ranges below 500 kms.
Thus for the maintenance of a considerably high TNF stockpile as an expression 
of the U.S. commitment to Europe's defence German delegations in NATO 
opted against any reduction of these TNFs, not even in exchange for an entire 
Soviet tank army. But the Germans were lucky: while the United States 
prevailed with its TNF policy and presented Option HI in Vienna, the Soviets 
simply rejected the proposal.
Albeit the everlasting dispute in the alliance on the question of when, how and 
with what to cross the nuclear threshold and albeit the compromises between 
different national preferences on first and follow-on use which the Nuclear 
Planning Group had set up, "actual operational planning for nuclear 
employment requires clear direction."*5 However, it will now be demonstrated 
that also on the level of NATO's operational TNF target planning the 
contradictions of flexible response are not solved.
Moreover, we will deal with German apprehensions that in the test case of war 
the U.S. first use concept has much higher chances to prevail. Therefore it is 
necessary to analyse to what extent the Germans can expect to influence first 
use in case of war according to their guidelines. Against the background of a
84 Lothar Rühl, "The Nuclear Balance in the Central Region and Strategic Stability in 
Europe", in NATO’s Sixteen Nations. (August 1987a), pp. 18-32, p.22. Volker 
Rühe, Defence spokesman of the CDU/CSU group, for instance, presented such a 
proposal in The Independent (December 10,1987)
85 Ivo H. Daalder, "NATO Nuclear Targeting after INF' in The Journal of Strategic 
Studies. (Vol.ll, No.3, September 1988), pp.265-291
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detailed description of SACEUR's nuclear employment planning the existence 
of an independent national command system will be elaborated. Thus U.S. 
planners have a much higher chance to prevail with the U.S. first use concept. 
Contributions of German strategic experts will demonstrate that these details 
were considered by them. Thus precise knowledge of the INFs' operational 
employment planning might have influenced their strategic doctrine in that 
they requested land-deployed LRTNF which, due to their vulnerability, can be 
expected to induce an early employment.
3-5. German apprehensions concerning first use
Deputy Secretary of State Dr. von Biilow presented an optimistic evaluation of 
the Federal Republic's state of information in case nuclear weapons were to be 
launched from German territory. After having pointed out the Federal 
Republic's membership in all relevant NATO organs and the German 
possession of nuclear delivery systems, von Biilow concludes:
"Aus diesen Feststellungen ergibt sich, daß die Bundesregierung in allen 
wesentlichen Fragen des möglichen Einsatzes von Nuklearwaffen - politische 
Richtlinien, strategische Prinzipien, operative Konzeptionen, Ziel- und 
Einsatzplanung, Einsatzbeschränkungen, technische Fragen, politische 
Konsultation, Anforderungs- und Freigabe verfahren, Führungs-, Kontroll- und 
Verbindungsmittel - über diejenigen Erkenntnisse und Mittel verfügt, die zum 
Gesamtverständnis und zur Wahrung unserer nationalen Interessen erforderlich 
sind."*0
Only few experts seem to share von Bülows optimism that it is possible that the 
NATO consultation process could function effectively in times of crisis.*7 
Stratmann also points out that the result of these consultation procedures in
86 Emphasis by S.P., "Based on these statements it appears that in all essential questions
regarding the potential employment of nuclear weapons - political guidelines, 
strategic principles, operative conceptions, target- and employment planning, 
limitation of employment, technical questions, political consultation, request and 
release procedures, command, control and communication the Federal Republic is 
provided with all the information and means which are necessary for both a 
comprehensive understanding and the safeguarding of our national interest" Reply 
of Dr. Andreas von Bülow, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Ministry of 
Defence, to a parliamentary question of MP Dr. Friedrich Voss, CDU/CSU; Dr. 
Andreas von Bülow. Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolirik:. Presse- und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung No.l 1 (Bonn, November 1977a) p. 10
87 Cartwright/Critchley, 1985, op.cit.. p.43
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NATO Council /DPC are "not obligating" for the British Premier and the U.S. 
President.«*
3-5.1. Nuclear weapons' employment planning
For the assignment of targets and nuclear weapons there exist two 
complementary systems: a U.S. and a NATO system. The U.S. strategic Triad, 
consisting of the ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers as well as part of the 
TNF is committed to the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan). The SIOP is 
supposed to coordinate weapons for a general nuclear war as well as those 
forces which are assigned to NATO in case of war, such as the Poseidon. SIOP 
consists of limited Nuclear Options (LNO) which are preplanned in order to 
support regional operations. SIOF weapons are assigned to targets of the 
National Strategic Target List (NSTL), which is drawn up by the Joint Strategic 
Targeting Planning Staff (JSTPS) in Omaha, Nebraska, USA.«5 European officers 
from the SHAPE staff, too, participate in the nuclear weapons planning in 
Omaha.90
To fulfill NATO and SACEUR's military requirements, the Nuclear Operations 
Plan (NOP)9' has been established at SHAPE in Brussels by the Nuclear 
Activities Branch. The NATO equivalent of the JSTPS, the Nuclear Activities 
Branch of SHAPE, is thus responsible for target planning concerning the 
nuclear forces assigned to NATO. It is largely staffed by American personnel92 
and operates "under both U.S. guidance and NATO guidance"«, meaning 
participation of officers of NATO member countries.
«« Stratmann, 1981, op.cit. p.86 
»  Neriich, 1978, op.cit. pp. 10
90 Thomas C. Wiegele. "Nuclear Consultation Process in NATO." Orbis. (Vol. 16,
Summer, 1972), pp.462-487., p.484
91 The NOP is also used in its synonymous older expression "General Strike Plan"
(GSP)
92 Buteux, 1983, op.cit. p.205
93 See U.S. Congress, Senate. U.S. Security Issues in Europe: Burden sharing and
Offset MBFR and Nuclear Weapons. A Staff Report prepared for the use of the 
Subcommittee on U.S. Security agreements and commitments abroad of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., December 2, 
1973, pp. 19-22; in the following : U.S. Senate Report, Security Issues, 1973
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The nuclear forces covered by SHAPE planning are comprised of the warheads 
actually deployed in the European theatre. Analogous to the U.S. strategic 
NSTL-List SHAPE developed a target list for the Allied Command Europe 
(ACE). However, while in SIOP ail forces are assigned to the targets of the 
NSTL, in SHAPE'S Nuclear Operations Plan only certain weapons are assigned 
to the targets of the ACE. For these preplanned attacks SACEUR envisages 
nuclear capable aircraft, Pershing and Poseidon. Part of these preplanned forces 
are in a status of Quick Reaction Alert (QRA).Certain targets of the ACE list are 
covered by SIOP.
The NOP specifies a "Scheduled Program" of targets which would also be 
attacked as part of a general nuclear release. A "Priority Strike Program” (PSP), 
which is of highest priority to SACEUR, and against which the Quick Reaction 
Alert Systems (QRA) are targeted, includes targets on Allied Command 
Europe's so-called "Critical Installation List". In addition to the PSP, there exists 
a ’Tactical Strike Program” (TSP) Both programmes, the PSP and TSP, have 
been coordinated with the SIOP; thus in general nuclear release SIOP and NOP 
will be executed together. However, precisely how has never been clarified. The 
most precise statement was made in the 1973 Senate Hearing:
"All PSP and TSP strikes have been coordinated, or ’deconflicted’, with the
U.S. SIOP target list maintained by the Joint Strategic Targeting Center at
Omaha."9*
These details of nuclear employment planning already convey the limitations 
for German politicians to influence it. First, due to its link to SIOP, the NOP 
must respond to changes in U.S. policy and strategic doctrine. Secondly, a large 
part of NATO planning is in the hands of American officers "who, whatever 
their relationship to the U.S. Command structure, naturally were sensitive to 
changes in the direction of American military policy respecting nuclear 
weapons."95
Traditionally the actual employment of TNF has been devised into two types: 
selective use and general nuclear response.«« The objectives of the general 
nuclear response are
94 U.S. Security Issues, 1973,, op.cit.. p.22
95 Buteux, 1983, op.cit. p. 127
96 U.S. Senate Report, Security Issues, 1973, op.cit. p.21
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"’to conduct, in concert with external forces, operations to neutralize enemy 
nuclear capability, destroy his ability and will to wage war, disrupt his 
capability to exercise command and control, and destroy his land, naval and air 
forces, including logistic support elements."57
Accordingly, general nuclear response with TNF would occur at a much later 
stage than those selective options and would be coordinated with SIOP. The 
weapons contemplated for the NOPs mission for general nuclear response 
involves the launching of large numbers of longer-range delivery systems such 
as SLBM, Pershing and tactical aircraft.9®
352. The selective use of TNF
"Selective use" of TNF involves many partially preplanned options, which are 
undertaken "on a controlled or limited scale either for demonstrative or tactical 
purposes" with the objective ”to confront the aggressor with the risk of 
escalation with the aim of making him halt the attack or withdraw."99 Thus 
these Selective Employment Plans (SEP) correspond to the first use within 
flexible response's principle of deliberate escalation.
As already indicated by the linguistic proximity, the Selective Employment 
Plans, incorporated in NOP, are based on the same principles as SIOFs Limited 
Nuclear Options. The difference is the level, to which the terms are applied: 
while Selective Employment Plans, which comprise NOP, refer to the theatre 
level and were agreed to by NATO Limited Nuclear Options are developed by 
the U.S. SIOP and are designed for strategic weapons.'00
97 Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington DC: U.S.G.P.O., 1979), quoted 
in Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence. Adelphi Paper 185. London: 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983, p. 16
98 U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office. Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces:
The Theater Nuclear Forces. Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., January 1977, p.19
99 U.S. Senate Report, Security Issues, 1973, op.cit. p.21
io o  Nerlich, 1978, op.cit. p. 16
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These selective options can be distinguished according to their main objective 
and the target area.: (1) demonstrative, (2) limited defensive use (3) restricted 
battle area use, (4) extended battle area use, (5) theatrewide use.'0'
The key concept concept of TNF selective use involves the preplanning of 
"packages" of nuclear weapons.'02 The packages provide operational plans for 
the employment of battlefield TNF which are ruled by the U.S. Army. 
Developed at the level of the army corps, a preplanned "Selective Employment 
Package"
"is a group of nuclear weapons of specific yields for use in a specific area and 
within a limited time to support a specific tactical goal. Each package must 
contain nuclear weapons sufficient to alter the tactical situation decisively and 
to accomplish the mission."'0*
The number of weapons in a corps package consists of between
"100 to 200, depending on the threat, the mission, the terrain, and population 
characteristics. A brigade might find as many as 20 to 30 weapons employed in 
its area or as few as 0 to 5, depending on the threat in its area relative to the 
rest of the corps area. The time parameter consists of a fixed 12 to 24 hour 
’timeframe’ and a movable 45 to 90 minute ’timespan’ is foreseen. The area 
for a corps package extends from just behind an assumed line of contact to the 
range of delivery systems or intelligence gathering systems available to the 
corps and all across the corps front. Constraints may preclude employment 
across political boundaries."'0*
The objective in employing a package of nuclear weapons is "to quickly and 
decisively influence the immediate military situation by destroying enemy 
military forces."'05 These packages can range from relatively few tactical nuclear 
bombs to shorter-range and longer-range TNF.'0*
101 These are the five employment options, identified in the US Army policy paper.
"The Deployment and Employment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons" approved on 
May 7, 1973, cited in John P. de Rose, The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear 
Doctrine. 1945-1980 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980) p. 170
102 Daalder, 1988, op.cit.. p.274
103 "Operations Field Manual 100-5", op.cit.. 1982, pp.7-12
104 U.S. Army, "Reference Book Conventional-Nuclear Operations". Vol.l (Fort
Leavenworth, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Reference Book 
100-30, Vol.l. Conventional-Nuclear Operation, August 6,1976), p.25
¡os Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces, 1977, op.cit. p. 19
1Q6 ibid.
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Ivo H. Daalder concludes from this description of the operational targeting 
planning:
"(O)perational plans exist both for early and for late use, for limited and for 
massive use, and for extended geographical as well as for battlefield use."'07
Since battlefield TNFs imply operational imperatives due to the danger of being 
captured during W Ps invasion, a battlefield commander might be induced to 
request at a very early stage release of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it has often 
been assumed that first use will be the response of a request of a battlefield 
commander.'0®
Uwe Nerlich criticises that preplanned use of TNF in order to maintain the 
threat of escalation and employment of battlefield TNF are not coordinated 
within NOP:
"Aber die militärischen Zweckmäßigkeiten von programmierten 
Kemwaffeneinsätzen, die auf wirksame Erhaltung der Eskalationsdrohung 
angelegt sind, und von wirksamer nuklearer Gefechtsfeldunterstützung, die 
rechtzeitig vor einem Zusammenbruch der konventionellen Verteidigung noch 
eine drastische Wende herbeiführen soll, sind bisher weder innerhalb des 
amerikanischen noch innerhalb des SACEUR-Systems hinreichend 
aufeinander abgesümmt.",0<,
353 . The Supersession of NATO's command system
Various analysts exclude an early and timely first use of nuclear weapons. They 
argue with NATO's time-consuming procedures for the request and the release 
of nuclear weapons and the process of consultation among NATO 
governments."0 In particular advocates of the battlefield use of TNF are 
concerned that the political approval of nuclear firing requests will be
107 Daalder, 1988, op.cit.. p.272
108 Charles, 1987, op.cit.. p. 141
m  "But the military effectiveness first, of a programmed employment of nuclear 
weapons, which aims at an effective maintenance of the threat of escalation, and 
second of effective nuclear battlefield weapons which immediately before a
collapse of a conventional defence are supposed to change the situation 
dramatically, are not coordinated - neither within the U.S. system nor within the 
SAŒUR system". Nerlich, 1978, op.cit.. p. 18
no  Stratmann, 1981, op.cit.. pp.82
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communicated so late to the commanders that the delivery of nuclear fire in the 
battlefield will no longer be effective.'"
Nuclear release procedures are "among the most tightly held secrets in the U.S. 
military.""2 Still it is possible to give a general description based on available 
information.
The first decision of the nuclear powers to consult their non-nuclear allies on 
the release of nuclear weapons was made in Athens in 1962 and resulted in the 
so-called famed Athens guidelines. According to these guidelines, the nuclear 
powers would consult their allies "time and circumstances permitting."'" In 
April 1968 at the Hague NPG meeting, the Athens guidelines were expanded as 
a response to the German proposal. The guidelines confirmed that "special 
weight would be given to the views of the NATO country most directly affected
- that is, the country on, or from, whose territory nuclear weapons would be 
employed; the country or countries providing the nuclear warheads; and the 
country or countries providing or manning the contemplated means of 
delivery.""* These guidelines, which were approved for submission to the 
Defence Planning Committee in London in November 1969, are still valid 
today.
Two different levels of request are possible: one is the "top-down” release, 
which means that the initiative comes from the political authorities, thus from a 
NATO member government; the other level refers to the "bottom-up" release, 
working up from at least the corps level."5 In this case, the Corps Commander's 
request would be conveyed from the Central Army Group (CENTAG) to the 
Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) and finally to the Supreme
'"  William R. Van Cleave and S.T. Cohen, Tactical Nuclear Weapons. An examination 
of the Issues. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1978) p.58. Jeffrey Record, 1981, op.cit.. 
p.34. Laurence Martin, "Theatre Nuclear Weapons and Europe" in Survival. 
(Vol. 16, No.6, Nov.-Dez. 1974) p.268-276, here p.273. Johann Adolf Graf 
Kielmannsegg, "Probleme eines kriegerischen Konflikts, insbesondere in 
Mitteleuropa" in Karl Kaiser / Karl Markus Kreis (eds.), Sicherheitspolitik vor 
neuen Aufgaben. (Frankfurt: Metzner Verlag 1977), p.295-349.
112 Charles, 1987, op.cit„ p.134
in  Legge, 1983, op.cit. p.22
U.S. Senate Report, Security Issues, 1973, op.cit.. p.20
us Corps is the highest level of the U.S. Army, then follows Division and Brigade
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Headquarters Europe (SHAPE). Thus, the request would have to pass three 
levels of military command before SACEUR or SHAPE could communicate this 
request to the NATO governments and to the Defence Planning Committee, 
which is composed of all NATO members except France. Now, at least in 
theory, the consultation process could begin:
"The normal forum for consultation would be the Defense Planning Committee 
where member governments would be able to express their views, in particular 
on the political and military objectives of the proposed use of nuclear weapons, 
the methods of use and the possible consequences either of use or non-use. 
These views would then be communicated to the nuclear power concerned, and 
the decision of the nuclear power would be conveyed to the allied 
governments, the North Atlantic Council and the major NATO 
commanders.""*
Whereas the time which is estimated for the accomplishment of the consultation 
procedures is deleted in the Senate Hearing, the U.S. Army calculated the time 
consumed for a "bottom-up" release, thus in case of the request of a corps 
commander to release nuclear artillery for U.S. forces deployed in Germany to 
be 24 hrs. Ten hours are estimated to communicate the release to the U.S. 
President, and ten to go down the whole chain of military command levels. 
Another four hours are estimated for the arrival of the release at the delivery 
system, which is contemplated to execute the nuclear strike."7 This data, 
however, had been released more than a decade ago and, according to Charles, 
improvements have been made to speed up these procedures considerably."«
The National Command Authority, who decides on the release of the nuclear 
weapons, is the U.S. President Since he, at the same time, is the Commander in 
Chief, he is allowed to delegate this decision, once the release of nuclear 
weapons has been authorised. Thus, permission of release might as well be 
given from the U.S. President to subordinate administrators, dvil servants or 
officers,"1' or, more probable, to SACEUR, SACLANT or subordinate NATO 
commanders. Paul Buteux, a U.S. researcher, stresses that "in principle, at all
116 U.S. Security Issues, 1973, op.cit. p.20
in  Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 1977) p.10-9, quoted in Record, 1981, op.cit.. p.35
118 Charles, 1987, op.cit.. p.134
119 Dieter O.A. Wolf, "Die Entscheidung über den Einsatz von Nuklearwaffen", Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte. (Vol.27, B 18, May 5,1979) pp.29-45, p.34
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times the President can determine the scope of any delegation of authority, or 
revoke any delegation previously made."'20
Theoretically, the U.S. President can only release, but not order the use of 
nuclear weapons to SACEUR. However, since SACEUR is at the same time 
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces in Europe (CINCEUR), he could very 
well be ordered by the U.S. President to employ nuclear weapons under his 
command in this capacity. This crucial detail is appended to the report in 
brackets:
"In a technical sense, the President cannot order SACEUR (who is 
simultaneously the Allied Commander responsible to NATO’s Defense 
Planning Committee as well as the Commandeur, U.S. Forces in Europe) to 
fire a nuclear weapon; he can only release the weapon to him (although he can 
unilaterally direct the same commander, in his national capacity as commander 
of U.S. Forces in Europe, to employ nuclear weapons)."'2'
When he would receive the order to release the nuclear weapons — "although 
the release is not a command so that SACEUR would still retain discretion as to 
whether or not to fire the weapon"'22 — SACEUR would regard the President's 
decision as a "valid reflection of NATO's collective interest"'2*. SACEUR's 
interpretation of the decision as a collective one would be warranted since the 
President would have consulted the allies before he releases the nuclear 
weapon, only of course, as already mentioned, "if time and circumstances 
permit."'2*
Precisely by virtue of the existence of this second chain of communication for 
nuclear release through the national U.S. military command system, NATO's 
command system is superseded. Stratmann describes this situation in very 
friendly words:
"Dem Präsidenten steht also das eingespielte nationale militärische 
Führungssystem der USA zur Verfügung, das im nuklearen Bereich nicht nur
120 Buteux, 1983, op.cit. p.207





die amerikanischen Verbände erfaßt, sondern das Führungssystem der 
integrierten NATO-Streitkräfte insgesamt ergänzt und überlagert."'25
Thus it is theoretically possible for the U.S. President unilaterally to dedde and 
to give order to release nudear weapons and bypass NATO council and all 
agreed consultation procedures:
”(T)he U.S. National Command Authority authorizes NATO commanders to 
employ nuclear weapons but actually releases the weapons through a U.S. 
command structure terminating with a U.S. delivery unit or custodial team ...
The dual command structure for U.S. forces in Europe, in fact, is designed to 
allow for unilateral U.S. control over nuclear weapons.".'2*
The Soviets call this unambiguous position of the U.S. nudear leadership 
"nudear centralism".'27
Thus it is more than doubtful whether the Federal Republic's partidpation in 
the question of first use will be secured first, regarding the consultation 
procedures, and secondly due to the existence of the second U.S. command 
structure.
In his 1986 book "Nudear Planning in NATO - Pitfalls of First Use", Daniel 
Charles discusses the actual employment of nudear weapons and the conflict 
between centralised political control and decentralised operational command in 
detail. 128 Charles arrives at the condusion that the unilateral American use of 
nudear weapons would be a step toward "winning the battle but losing the
125 "Thus at the President’s disposal is the well-established national military command
system of the United States, that not only comprises the U.S. forces, but also 
complements and supersedes the command system of the integrated NATO forces." 
Stratmann, 1981. op.dt.. p.88
126 Charles, 1987, op.cit. p.134,127 emphasis in the text. See also the explanatory chart
of the nuclear release and authorisation command structure of William Arkin in 
ibid. p. 135
127 Stratmann, 1981, op .d t. p.87
128 His analysis is headed by a popular joke at NATO headquarters in Brussels, which
summarises his results:"one of the most difficult decisions confronting Soviet 
military planners in the event that they attack Western Europe will be whether to 
bomb the Alliance’s headquarters or not They probably won’t, say the corridor 
experts, so as to ensure a maximum degree of confusion within NATO." Charles, 
1987, op.cit.. p. 19
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war."'29 He concedes that first use of the nuclear powers without prior 
consultation would be technically possible but politically imprudent.
In the case of so-called dual-key systems, the allies would possess considerable 
physical control over the release of nuclear weapons. Although some of the 
early systems did actually depend on the simultaneous operation of "keys" held 
by both a U.S. and a host nation officer, the term "dual-key" is misleading, since 
this is no longer the case with modem systems. They are arranged under a 
"Program of Cooperation" (POC).'*° In accordance with these arrangements, the 
United States deploys warheads of delivery systems owned and operated by 
the European allies. The Pershing 1A, the Lance and the artillery are arranged 
under this PCX! system.'*' The U.S. forces which maintain direct physical 
control of the warhead at all times for the host nation's delivery system, are 
called "custodial units". In peace time, a West German, e.g. Lance unit, practices 
firing missiles with dummy warheads of the same size and weight as nuclear 
ones. They actually never handle the nuclear warheads themselves. In wartime 
the U.S. custodians are supposed to turn the warheads over to West German 
units which then fire the missiles.'*2 Thus, one possibility for a German veto 
could be either to withhold the delivery systems or to refuse firing the 
warheads.
A secret and unilateral use of nuclear weapons would most probably be 
accomplished in case of those nuclear strikes which are assigned to weapons 
that the United States would be most reluctant to release ICBMs, Poseidon 
SLBMs assigned to SACEUR, or sea-based cruise missiles.'** It would be 
impossible for the United States to hide its plans and actions from NATO 
because of "the integration of tactical command and communication networks
129 ibid. p.129
130 Legge, 1983, op.cit. p.l 1
¡31 The Nike-Hercules, which have been replaced by the conventional Patriot system 
and the Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM), which have been withdrawn, were 
also arranged under these POC systems, see Aridn / Fieldhouse, 198S, op.cit. p. 102
132 For the release of the warheads the U.S. custodial team has to receive the so-called 
Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes which are kept by the NCA. Without the 




< f  % 92
S /  /
o  i  $
and the physical proximity of military officers from the various nations
11 ' throughout the command structure."'*
Furthermore, the U.S. warhead custodians depend on the allied nations armed 
forces for provision of perimetre security for many storage locations in Europe. 
Without the cooperation of the German security forces, it would be almost 
impossible to disperse the warheads, i.e., to bring the nuclear warheads away 
from the storage sites to delivery systems units. Charles concludes:
"If these allied security forces were ordered by their commanding officers to
resist dispersal of the warheads by force, it would be impossible."'*5
Thus, the Federal Republic would not have to fear the employment of 
battlefield weapons for which it provides the delivery systems. However, one 
third of the INF, which are deployed exclusively to U.S. forces seem to have a 
high chance of being employed without allied consultation and knowledge. But 
German apprehensions do not only refer to a "wrong" first use, but also for the 
delay or omission of any first use as a consequence of a U.S. veto.
Conclusion
The different geography of the European allies and the United States results in 
stressing respectively the two opposite functions inherent in nuclear deterrence: 
the Europeans and the Germans in particular prefer the punishment function of 
deterrence, while the United States stresses its denial function. The result are 
two different interpretations of flexible response which lead to incompatible 
perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons which again on an operational level 
culminate into two incompatible first use concepts: the United States 
contemplates first use as late as possible, on a theatre level and to be 
accomplished with military effectiveness, the German envisages first use as 
early as possible, on a strategic level and as a means to signal to the opponent to 
cease hostilities. The ambiguities inherent in flexible response are also 
responsible for the incoherence of NATO's TNF posture.
The description of SACEUR's nuclear employment planning focused in the 
existence of the dual command structure for U.S. forces in Europe. Since a
134 ibid. p. 129
¡35 ibid, p.61
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unilateral U.S. release of nuclear weapons can therefore not be excluded, 
German apprehensions on a "wrong" first use are as warranted as the suspicion 
of the omission of any first use due to a U.S. veto against release. These 
considerations might also have induced German strategic experts and 
politicians to request land-deployed long-range TNF which promise to secure a 
quick escalation of war to the strategic level.
The next section will analyse NATO's search for a solution to these ambiguities 
inherent in flexible response by compromising on deploying the Pershing II and 
GLCM which were regarded as a means to reconcile these problems. The 
Federal Republic's dominant role in the evolution of the NATO-Dual Track 
decision will be in the focus of attention.
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Section II: The NATO-Dual Track as a Solution: the Federal Republic's Role 
within its Evolution
Section II analyses the evolution of the NATO-Dual Track in the context of 
NATO and the SALT process. Special attention will be given to two facts: that 
the LRTNF modernisation was planned as a solution to reconcile flexible 
response's contradictions as well as the active role the Federal Republic had in 
its evolution.
4. Evolution o f the LRTNF decision within NATO
This chapter describes how the 1979 LRTNF modernisation decision evolved in 
the relevant NATO organs as a consequence of their task to maintain the 
implementation of flexible response. It will be shown that, since the Federal 
Republic, although a non-nuclear state, is nevertheless a NATO ally in the 
Nuclear Planning Group, the German defence ministers and their staff actively 
participated and even prevailed with their guidelines for the first and follow-on 
use of nuclear weapons. The same activity and success in shaping NATO 
decisions was demonstrated by German delegates in the discussions on the 
necessity and the form of TNF modernisation. The restructuring of NATO's 
attitude towards TNF in the seventies was initiated by the TNF's revision 
proposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. These strategic 
requirements were effectively intertwined with technological developments 
offering precisely those characteristics of weapons which were needed for the 
TNF revision. On the basis of Schlesinger's proposals the German politicians 
also presented their guidelines for the TNF revision.
4,1, Evolution o f the LRTNF Decision within the Nuclear Planning Group
As a result of the failure of the MLF programme, the Nuclear Planning Group 
(NPG) was established in order to provide a forum in which the Alliance 
members could participate and influence the planning and the conduct of the 
use of nuclear weapons. The NPG is the crucial NATO body which prepared 
the LRTNF decision. The different interpretations of flexible response are 
reflected in the disputes over the NPG's guidelines for the first and follow on
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use of nuclear weapons. It will be shown that a key document for these 
guidelines shows the European hand.
4.1.1. Development of the Nuclear Planning Group (1965-67)
In January 1965, several months after the demise of the MLF, U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara proposed to a NATO meeting that a select or 
restricted nuclear committee of "four or five alliance members"' be formed, to 
serve two important functions. The first would be to improve and extend allied 
participation in any possible use of strategic forces. The Committee's second 
function would be to improve communications to ensure that agreed 
consultations concerning a decision to use nuclear forces could take place as 
promptly as possible in case of w a r.2 McNamara's use of the word "select" 
indicated that he conceived the group as consisting of the chosen few of the 15- 
nation alliance, meaning the United States, Britain, France, the Federal Republic 
and Italy.* After France's withdrawal from the military organisation these 
residual four nations plus Turkey participated in the first defence-minister level 
meeting of the NPG in Washington in February 1966/
A Special Committee consisting of 10 members, which had been established as 
an interim organ, recommended to the NATO Council in March 1966 that two 
groups be formed within the Alliance: a Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee 
(NDAC), open to all members of the Alliance which cared to participate, and a 
five-member Nuclear Planning Group. The NPG would engage in planning but 
submit its reports to the NDAC before they were sent to the Defense Policy 
Committee. The U.S. intention was that the NPG would consist of the United 
States, Britain, the Federal Republic and Italy and one small member chosen by 
random selection from the NDAC. However, the Netherlands demanded an 
expansion of the membership of the NPG to the point where at least a Benelux 
seat would be assured, as a matter of effective diplomacy on the grounds, that 
"the larger the group, the greater the influence of the smaller members".5 Thus
'N T L  June 1,1965, p.l
2ifeisLp.ll
3 For the history of the NPG see Mahncke, 1972, op.cit. pp.129-236
4 Thomas C. Wiegele, 1972, op.cit.. p.473
5 Robert W. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance in Dutch Foreign Policy". Internationale
Spectator. (Vol.23, No.13, Juli 8 1969), 1189-1208, p.1194
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the U.S. and the Netherlands were in direct confrontation over the organisation 
of NATO.«
The United States refused to yield on the assignment of extra seats to small 
members, but did permit the membership of the NPG to be expanded to seven, 
thus leaving three seats to specific small states who were interested. In reality 
this meant that at eighteen-month intervals one seat could alternate between the 
Netherlands and Belgium, another between Turkey and Greece, and a third 
between Canada and Denmark.7
In April 1968 at the ministerial session of the NPG in The Hague it was decided 
that the non-permanent members could participate in the work of the NPG at 
the ambassadorial and staff level. This organisational modification was again 
achieved by the Netherlands and Canada.* It was only as late as 1979 that 
thirteen of the fifteen member countries (excluding Iceland and France) decided 
to participate on a regular basis.9
4.1.2. Provisional Political Guidelines (1967-69)
Within the scope of flexible response it was the task of the NPG to formulate 
political guidelines for the tactical role of TNF. Accordingly in its first phase of 
meetings between 1967 and 1974 the NPG concentrated on establishing 
guidelines for the first and follow-on use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe 
as well as employment plans for singular weapons systems. In its second phase, 
it defined and reviewed the number and types of weapons necessary for 
implementing the strategy of flexible response.'0 The descriptions of debates in 
the NPG in the late sixties and early seventies demonstrate the difference 
between the European and U.S. interpretation of the joint NATO strategy of 
flexible response. The European view of flexible response even prevailed since 
a key document on nuclear planning was drafted without U.S. participation.
6 For the Dutch revolt see Wiegele, 1972, op.cit.. p.476
7 Russell, 1969, op.cit. p.l 196
* Mahncke, 1972, op.cit.. p.249
9 NATO, Facts and Figures. (Brussels, NATO-Information-Service 1981), p.50
10 For a detailed analysis of the Nuclear Planning Group see Legge, 1983, op.cit. and
Buteux, 1983, op.cit.
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The establishment of guidelines for the first use of nuclear weapons, the so- 
called "Provisional Political Guidelines", was the NPG's most long-standing and 
difficult project. Only as late as 1986 were the provisional guidelines made 
more specific and turned into the "General Political Guidelines." However, in 
view of the strategy's different interpretations there are doubts, whether the 
compromise represented by the 1986 guidelines provides more clarity in respect 
of first use than the 1969 provisional ones.
At its first official meeting in April 1967 the NPG discussed the question of 
control over nuclear land mines. Both Turkey and the Federal Republic 
complained that existing decision-making arrangements for detonating the 
mines on the Turkish-Soviet and German-German border were too slow to be 
effective." No decision was taken on this issue at that time. The meeting in 
April 1968 in The Hague marks a significant change, since Secretary of Defense 
McNamara was replaced by Clark Clifford, who did not show equal strategic 
profile. Moreover the defence debate in the United States strategic was 
dominated by questions of strategic matters and the debate on a IN F posture 
stagnated due to the Vietnam war. U.S. influence grew again when Clifford was 
replaced by Melvin Laird, but it took some time until the United States came up 
again with initiatives concerning the TNF doctrine.'2
In Bonn in 1968, at the fourth meeting, four papers were presented for 
consideration: a British paper by Defence Minister Healey examining the use of 
nuclear weapons at sea; a West German paper by Defence Minister Schroder 
dealing with the battlefield use of nuclear weapons; a Greek paper devoted to 
questions of defence on the southern flank of the Alliance, and a U.S. study on 
how nuclear weapons could be used as a demonstration to threaten potential 
aggressors." This was the first time that the Europeans took a major role in the 
presentation of strategic studies.
"  NYT. April 8,1967, p.8. West-Germany and Turkey reintroduced the issue during the 
April 1968 meeting in The Hague, see Wiegele, 1972, op.cit., p.478
'2 Robert de Wijk, Flexibility in Response? Attempts to construct a plausible strategy 
for NATO 1959-1989. Leiden, June 1989, p. 103
"  NYT. October 11, 1968, p.10
98
At this meeting the NPG also assigned to Britain and West Germany the task of 
drawing together the results of the four papers into a single document, 
containing draft guidelines for the first and follow-on use of TNF. This Anglo- 
German defence guideline, which was the central topic of discussion at the fifth 
NPG session in London in May 1969'*, dealt with the question of the first use of 
nuclear weapons. The Healey-Schroder paper, undertaken without U.S. 
participation from the outset, discussed several choices from which 
commanders could select at the moment of need. It discussed the various 
options available, such as defensive use (Atomic Demolition Munition or 
nuclear air defence), battlefield use, use in an "extended geographical area", 
maritime use, etc.'5
The paper argued against the U.S. point of view concerning TNF. The 
disputable issues in context of first use were 1. its timing, 2. its scale, 3. its target 
area and 4. the utility of "demonstrative" use or "shot-across-the-bow". A 
demonstrative use could mean a single explosion e.g. over the sea or in some 
remote location, which did not involve many casualties as a signal of the 
willingness to escalate if the warning failed. The British-German report 
suggested a rather early resort to TNF in a limited and demonstrative mode. 
According to Michael Legge, initial or first use in the Healey-Schroder concept 
was designed "to confront the enemy with the prospect of the risks of escalation 
consequent on a continuation of the conflict, with the aim of making him halt 
his attack and withdraw, thereby restoring the credibility of the deterrent."'« 
However, Legge stresses that "(t)his did not imply that initial use should not 
have a military objective as a means of achieving its political aim."'7 As 
distinguished from the European doctrine the U.S. view preferred a massive 
use at a later stage'®. A demonstrative use without any military effectiveness 
was certainly not welcome by U.S. analysts. Another essential point of dispute 
was the targeting area of first use: while the U.S. suggested locations only in 
Eastern Europe and exclusion of the Soviet Union, the Germans preferred at
« NYT. May 31,1969, p.9 
¡5 Sec Legge, 1983, op.cit.. pp.18-21
16 Legge, 1983, ibid. p. 19
'7 ibid.. emphasis by S.P.
is Buteux, 1983, op.cit.. p.91
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first to target precisely Soviet territory.'9 If NATO were to hit targets "only" in 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union would not feel the same necessity and 
pressure to react with a strategic retaliatory strike that it would feel if Soviet 
territory itself was hit.
Generally NPG guidelines were not authorised to commit the alliance in 
advance to any particular form of nuclear response, and the word "guideline" 
has to be taken literally in this context. In any case, the military situation in 
which NATO might decide on first use of nuclear weapons would imply such 
complexity that only a specific choice in time of crisis was imaginable. The 
guidelines were said to represent a compromise between the positions of many 
European nations and that of the United States. Denis Healey describes this 
compromise as follows:
"For flexible response as it finally emerged from the bruising negotiations of 
the sixties, instead of ruling out first use of nuclear weapons by NATO, sought 
to make first use more credible by envisaging a series of discrete steps on the 
ladder of nuclear escalation, starting with the demonstrative explosion of a 
single tactical weapon somewhere in Europe and ending with the obliteration 
of the Soviet Union and the United States in a general exchange of strategic 
weapons."20
Thus according to Healey's statement the guidelines incorporated precisely the 
proposal of the Healey-Schroder report to start with demonstrative use which 
corresponds to the notion of nuclear weapons as being "political". The 
guidelines' language was necessarily ambiguous so as to leave space for 
different interpretations and the original draft's specific number of weapons for 
initial use had to be dropped.
4.13. Nuclear Consultation Procedures
The Healey-Schroder paper also dealt with the consultation process between 
the allies in the case of NATO's first use of nuclear weapons. From 1966, the 
"host country veto" was an element in German policy with Defence Minister 
Schroder pressing for it in the newly formed NPG.
19 The New York Times chose a wording which suggested that the U.S. view prevailed: 
"These guidelines for a first strike are reported to concern only targets in Eastern
Europe." NYT. June 9,1970, p.9
20 Denis Healey in a Foreword of Stromseth, 1988, op.cit.. p.viii
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The first decision of the nuclear powers to consult their non-nudear allies on 
the release of nuclear weapons was made in Athens in 1962 and resulted in the 
so-called famed Athens guidelines. According to these guidelines, the nuclear 
powers would consult their allies "time and circumstances permitting."
The Healey-Schroder paper aimed at expanding the Athens guidelines and 
suggested giving each member a formal right to veto the use of nuclear 
weapons and in particular use of those short-range nuclear systems which 
would be launched from the members' own territory. It stated that "any 
decision to use nuclear weapons should be taken in the last resort by those 
immediately concerned."2'
Thus, the Schroder-Healey report specified NATO's original 1962 Athens 
guidelines on consultation which only obliged the United States to consult its 
allies prior to a nuclear release "time and circumstances permitting". Helmut 
Schmidt who in December 1969 attended his first meeting as the German 
representative, welcomed the Schroder-Healey paper on consultations as giving 
the European allies of the United States substantial influence in the nuclear 
sector.22 However, the proposal of a veto was not accepted by the NPG and was 
changed in favour of one merely recommending that special weight should be 
given in the consultation process to the country involved.2*
The Healey-Schroder reports, after revision concerning the issue of 
consultation, were approved by the NATO Council in December 1969 under the 
title of "Provisional Political Guidelines for the Initial Defensive Tactical Use of 
Nuclear Weapons by NATO" (PPGs). The word "provisional" in the title might 
have been used to indicate the Ministers' concession that these guidelines were 
worthless because they were not based on any concrete agreement between the 
NATO allies.
Buteux, 1983, op.cit.. p.90
22 According to an article in the Daily Telegraph. London, November 10, 1969, used in
Buteux, 1983, op.cit.. p. 100
23 See the detailed description in chapter 3.6.3.
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4.1.4. Schmidt's success with the ADM
Another aspect of the NPG's early work merits recording, in particular because 
it was solved along the line of the doctrine of Defence Minister Schmidt got his 
way as far as the role of atomic landmines was concerned.
It was actually the result of a German initiative that Atomic Demolition 
Munitions (ADMs) was secured a top place on the NPG agenda for some 
years.2* The German Defence Minister Kai Uwe von Hassel proposed in 1965 to 
install an "atomic tripwire" by deploying "atomic demolition mines, nuclear air 
defense weapons and, if need be, nuclear battlefield weapons" at the Eastern 
frontier in order to give "a last determined warning" to the enemy "without 
involving escalation as a consequence."25 Von Hassel's proposal is based on the 
original plan of the then Federal Armed Staff General Trettner. This proposal is 
certainly the most direct equivalent of a very low nuclear threshold.2« Von 
Hassel claimed that he had discussed the idea with McNamara and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, although rejected by the no-first use 
oriented McNamara administration, the Trettner plan secured the Atomic 
Demolition Munitions attention by the NPG.
Although from the same party, the German Defence Minister Schroder changed 
the policy line of his predecessor Kai Uwe von Hassel towards the ADMs in 
line of his report on first use: that it should be executed with discretion and in a 
tactical manner. This concept of first use differed substantially from General 
Trettner's idea of starting with a massive employment of Atomic Demolition 
Munitions along the border. However, in accordance with the Trettner-von 
Hassel line, Schroder pleaded for a very low nuclear threshold in which early
»  see Rühl, 1974, op.ciL p. 129/130; Kellcher, 1975, op.cit.. 215/216 and p.303. 
"Sprengsätze aus der nuklearen Plannungsgruppe. Die neuen Gerüchte um 
’Atomminen’ entlang der Grenze zur DDR erinnern an den Trettner Plan von 
1964," in Süddeutsche Zeitung (December 7,1969) p.3
25 von Hassel, 1965, op.cit.. p.211
26 "This means, so far as concerns the defense of Europe, in contrast to other parts of the
world, that the atomic threshold must be very low”, ibid.. p.210
f tactical nuclear weapons would cause a quick escalation to strategic 
nuffear exchange.27
Helmut Schmidt was confronted with the issue of Atomic Demolition 
Munitions (ADMs) when asked by his NATO partners to allow 
"prechambering" of holes for the ADMs on likely routes for attacks of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation.2® This meant a preparatory digging of holes 
suitable for the emplacement of ADMs.29 One obvious motive for Schmidt's 
objection was the fact that the ADMs would detonate exclusively on German 
territory. He argued that although they are designed to possess extremely low 
explosive power they still had more fallout than other nuclear weapons.*0 The 
ADMs' military effectiveness depended upon being deployed far forward on 
the border with East Germany. In the event of a Soviet attack, the time available 
for a decision to detonate an ADM, before it was overrun by the advancing 
Warsaw Pact forces, was considered to be very short. As a result the nuclear 
threshold would be lowered considerably, since NATO would be forced to 
release the ADMs at a very early stage of the war. Thus, the opportunity to 
conduct sufficient consultations with countries involved in the conflict would 
be reduced to such a degree that German control of the use of TNF would be 
virtually nullified. Therefore Schmidt effectively diffused these NATO plans. 
Schmidt's refusal was interpreted as the most telling example of a shift of the 
new SPD-FDP government in TNF policy.*'
Schmidt's success in postponing "prechambering" had the effect that it has not 
been accomplished on the Central Front until 1973.*2 In the eighties, however, 
the ADMs have been slated for withdrawal**, for reasons of their
27 see Horst Mendershausen, "West Germany’s Defense Policies" in: Current History 
55, May 1968, p.268-274, quoted in Charles N. Davidson, ’Tactical Nuclear 
Defense. The West German View", Parameters. (Vol.4,1974) pp.47-57, here p.51
2* Süddeutsche Zeitung. December 7,1969, p.3
29 Buteux, 1983, op.cit.. p. 116/117
*° Second the Federal Goverment has always felt uncomfortable about NATO plans to 
target the GDR. see The Times. June 9,1970, p.4
31 Davidson, 1974, op.cit.. p.51; Buteux, 1983, op.cit.. p. 117/118
32 U.S. Senate Report, Security Issues, 1973, op.cit.. p. 15 
** Charles, 1987, op.cit.. p. 100; Legge, 1983, op.cit. p.24
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contraproductivity as operational battlefield weapons.* Since the early use of 
battlefield weapons is inconsistent with the German policy line, at least from 
Defence Minister Schroder's term of office on, Schmidt's success in this 
question cannot be overestimated.*5
4.13. Follow-on Use
The main issue in Venice in June 1970 was what to do in the event that first use 
by tactical nuclear weapons should fail to halt a Soviet invasion.*« The 
discussions of the NPG therefore moved on to the subject of the follow-on use 
of nuclear weapons. In repetition of the problem the Alliance had to face in case 
of first use, these divergent U.S. and German preferences for the target area 
were applied again to the question of NATO's follow-on use. Since the 
guidelines for first use discussed targeting of Eastern Europe, the new West 
German Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt and the other European members 
reported to have pressed for the allocation of targets on Soviet territory at least 
for a second strike.*7
The NPG went on to concentrate its attention on developing concrete 
employment and deployment plans for the TNF. The Ottawa meeting on 
October 1970 tried to provide further political guidance for NATO's nuclear 
planning, i.e. what kind of concrete weapons NATO needed and what role TNF 
would play in NATO strategy. Under the previous strategy of massive 
retaliation the role of TNF was primarily to contribute to NOP in support SIOP 
and to provide direct fire support to NATO's conventional forces. But with the 
advent of flexible response the question arose to which extent TNF should be
34 "Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs) are nuclear devices that must be manually 
emplaced and mechanically or electronically detonated. They are used to create 
barriers to retard and force the concentration of attacking enemy forces. Because 
these weapons require suitable terrain features for optimal effectiveness, and 
because they must be set in place before the arrival of enemy troops, there arc 
definite territorial and temporal limits to their usefulness in combat." Planing U.S. 
General Purpose Forces, 1977, op.cit.. p. 11
*5 In a speech at the North Atlantic Assembly in Hamburg in November 1988, Helmut 
Schmidt mentioned this event as an example for effective U.S. and German 
cooperation in NATO. Schmidt said: "Laird understood immediately". (Personal 
notes.)
*« NYT. June 9.1970, p.9
*7 ibid
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withheld for General Nuclear Release. A U.S.-German paper was tasked to find 
a solution to this problem. In this paper which was drafted by Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird and Defence Minister Schmidt the German concern on 
"decoupling" was expressed. The statements of the paper clashed with NATO 
military Authority, since the military men preferred the TNFs massive 
employment in their role for General Nuclear Release. The compromising 
paper, finally approved by the NPG and called "The Role of Theater Nuclear 
Strike Forces in Allied Command Europe", represented an important step of 
ensuring that the TNF's primary employment was contemplated for limited, 
selective release. Legge comments on the consequence of the paper:
"(T)his process was to lead eventually to the development of specific Selective
Employment Plans (SEPs) for the limited use of TNF.”*4
In the October 1971 meeting in Brussels the effective cooperation between U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Defence Minister Schmidt was 
overshadowed by dispute: Schmidt demanded from the United States much 
more frank and intimate discussions about U.S. views on the nuclear defence of 
the treaty area.*9
After the NPG's first attempt to establish guidelines on the follow-on use of 
nuclear weapons in Venice in June 1970, a series of studies were undertaken by 
groups of 3 or 4 nations. These studies were discussed in the NPG from May 
1971 to May 1973.*° In 1972 a Committee consisting of the United States, Britain 
and the Federal Republic was established in order to draw conclusions from 
these studies and to develop political guidelines for the follow-on use of the 
nuclear weapons.
After two years of debate a compromise report on follow-on use was submitted 
to the rest of the allies in July 1974. The report indicated that selective follow-on 
strikes could imply the intention of a short term military advantage and its 
essential message confirmed the "Political Provisional Guidelines" of NATO's 
first use:
38 Legge, 1983, op.ciL, p.25
39 Wiegele, 1972, op.cit. p.480/481
see communique of the NPG meeting, October 27-28, 1971, p.264 and Communique 
of the NPG meeting in May 15-16,1973 in NATO-Communiques, 1949-74, op.cit.. 
pp.288-289. See also Legge, 1983, op.cit.. pp.26-28
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"Follow-on use should have the same purpose as initial use (to persuade the 
enemy to cease his aggression and withdraw), and the nature of the use should 
therefore still be selective and be designed to meet this political 
requirement."*'
Again the language of the guidelines was vague enough to avoid NATO's 
committing itself to a particular reaction in the test case of war.
At the Ankara meeting in May 1973 the NPG confirmed its decision of 
November 1969 that even a demonstrative, thus first use, should be combined 
with military considerations.
4.1.6. German approval for military use
In the Ankara meeting of May 1973, the allies agreed to target military objects, 
also for NATO's first use. The Ankara meeting is honored by Riihl as the NPG's 
crucial and final point of return in consideration of the TNFs' value.*2 The TNF 
advanced from being considered as "only symbols of deterrence" and as a pure 
"appendix" of the strategic arsenal, to the rank of military instruments of a 
strategy "offering expedient target options."**
In this meeting, SACEUR General Goodpaster put forward a scenario to 
illustrate a particular option for the initial tactical employment of nuclear 
weapons by NATO.** He discussed NATO's current ideas on the demonstrative 
use of TNF, e.g. exploding Atomic Demolition Mines at sea, or the detonation of
*' Legge, 1983, op.cit.. p.27
*2 Daalder contradicts Riihl in this point putting forward the objection that Legge, who 
is also a very authoritative source, refers to the Ankara meeting only as dealing 
with follow-on use. And follow-on use could hardly be meant only for 
demonstrative use. Daalder’s second objective refers to the fact that the U.S. Army 
incorporated a "demonstration" employment option at exactly the same time. This, 
however, presupposes that "demonstrative use" was clearly defined along the lines 
of the European concept Buteux for example indicates that "demonstration use" 
could also mean: "However limited the demonstration use, suggested examples 
have included airbursts, use against clearly military targets with little risk of 
collateral damage, and the limiting of attacks to a prescribed territory." Paul 
Buteux, 1977, op.cit. p.791; Daalder, 1988, op.cit.. p. 285
** Riihl, 1987, op.cit. p. 146
** Final Communiques, 1974, op.cit.. p.289
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the Surface-to-Air missile Nike-Hercules at great heights in order to avoid 
collateral damage. Goodpaster argued that these concepts of demonstrative 
strikes were only feasible, if at all, with the prerequisite of U.S. strategic 
superiority. The allies in the Nuclear Planning Group apparently followed 
Goodpaster in his argument that even a demonstrative use of TNF would have 
to be targeted against military objects on WP territory in order to reinforce 
NATO's demonstration of willingness to escalate. Western deterrent credibility 
would be undermined if NATO omitted the use of TNFs against offensive 
forces and the WP's military infrastructure in the rear - at least, if such strikes 
promised to be militarily successful. This modification of the TNFs' role leads 
Riihl to the conclusion that
"Die Überlegungen zur TNF-Modemisierung waren von nun an vorbestimmt 
und mußten logischerweise zum LRTNF-Bündinsbeschluß von 1979 führen."*5
On the level of force development, these modifications in NPG guidelines were 
expressed in General Goodpaster's order for a more accurate warhead for the 
Pershing I A.46
Thus, the NPG's decision to use nuclear weapons first with consideration of 
military requirements was obviously not rejected by the German Defence 
Minister Georg Leber.
42. Restructuring NATO's TNF
In November 1973 two additional groups were established to examine the 
effects of the "new technologies" on the tactical nuclear forces. One group under 
British leadership was created in order to examine the military implications 
(MIT) of the new technologies, while a second group under German 
chairmanship analysed their political implications (PIT).
45 "The considerations for TNF modernisation were determined and consequently had to
lead to the Alliance LRTNF decision of 1979." Riihl, op.cit.. 1987, p. 146
46 Statement of Brig. Gen. Lynwood B. Lennon , USA Deputy Director, Nuclear and
Chemical Matters, in: U.S. Congress Senate, Fiscal Year 1978. Authorization for 
Military Procurement. Research and Development, and Active Duty. Selected 
Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strength. Hearings before the Committee on 
Armed Services, Part 9, Research and Development, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 
Washington D.C., March 17, 23, 29, 30, 31, 1977, p.6418; in the following: U.S. 
Senate Hearings, Authorization for Military Procurement, 1977
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In November 1976 and June 1977 the British study on the military implications 
and the German study on the political implications of the "new technologies" 
were respectively presented in NPG meetings.*7 Their results confirmed the 
scepticism about NATO's capability for fighting a limited war. Thus they 
implied a comprehensive revision of weapons which would be necessary to 
implement the flexible response strategy. According to Lothar Riihl it had been 
obvious since at least 1975 that NATO did not provide the means for 
implementation of effective "escalation control" as demanded in the ministerial 
guidelines issued by the Defence Ministers of May 23,1975. Most of the TNF 
never fulfilled the requirements for "escalation control" because they were too 
inaccurate, inflexible and vulnerable, and had a warhead which had too high an 
explosive power, causing self-deterrence and insecurity.*®
In 1974 Schlesinger took initiative in revising NATO's TNF substantially. As a 
result he requested restructuring NATO's IN F forces towards an emphasis on 
shorter-range, lower yield battlefield weapons. Accordingly longer-range 
systems as nuclear capable aircraft were reduced.*9 These strategic 
requirements were effectively intertwined with technological developments 
offering precisely those characteristics of weapons which were needed for the 
TNF's revision. The resulting debate on the merits of the mininuke and the 
neutron weapon was answered by the German Defence Minister Leber with a 
definite refusal of the mininuke. On the basis of Schlesinger7s proposals the 
German politicians also presented their guidelines for the TNF's revision in the 
NPG in 1976. With the combination of both the U.S. and the German revision 
the decision to modernise the LRTNF was clearly outlined.
42.1. U.S. Revision o f TNF
In connection with the Defense Budget for 1975 Defense, i.e. in 1974, Secretary 
Schlesinger announced his "counterforce doctrine". The doctrine of Limited 
Nuclear Options (LNO) necessitated nuclear weapons which would guarantee 
an optimal combination of low collateral damage and destructive power. These
47 Communique of the NPG meeting in Ottawa, June 8-9,1977 in NATO, Texts of Final
Communiques. Vol. II 1975-80, (Brussels Information Service), p.21
48 Ruehl, 1980, op.cit.. p. 101
*9 Paul Buteux, 1983a, op.cit.. p.65. See also Wolfgang Heisenberg, 1973, op..git-, p.2
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are nudear weapons with low yield and high accuracy, penetration capability 
and survivability.
For the European NATO allies these doctrinal developments were of high 
importance because Schlesinger's proposals also included a revision of the TNF 
posture and a request to NATO to restructure its TNF forces according to 
Schlesinger's revision.
An increase of the TNF options was foreseen via improvement of their 
capability for a selective and flexible employment. Thus also the TNF had to be 
equipped with accurate and low-yielding warheads, penetration capability and 
greater mobility in order to increase their survivability. Still the TNFs role was 
to be deemphasised in Schlesinger's counterforce strategy, in that he wanted:
- first, to reduce the huge number of 7,000 TNF systems in Europe;
- second, to reduce their role for the defence of Europe.
The modifications of the TNF in the direction of greater flexibility and 
selectivity were incorporated into Schlesinger's 1974 report to Congress, which 
accompanied the Defense Budget request for Fiscal Year 1975. The report called 
for:
1. improvements of the Pershing 1A by developing a smaller-yielding and 
more accurate warhead for the missile and upgrading its mobility, 
serviceability and firing response time;
2. the development of the Navy sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) and 
the announcement that the air-launched cruise missile would be made 
available for initial deployment in the late 1970s.
The incentive for the revision of the TNF posture was Senator Sam Nunn's 
report on ’Policy, Troops and the NATO Allies” which called into question the 
current TNF posture and campaigned for a strengthening of conventional and 
nuclear forces and the raising of the nuclear threshold.50 Senator Nunn's report 
provided the background to his amendment to Fiscal Year 1975 which was
50 U.S Congress Senate, Policy. Troops, and the NATO Alliance. Report of Senator 
Sam Nunn to the Committee on Armed Services, (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 
April 2,1974)
109
approved by Congress and became Public Law 93-365. It requested to examine 
the following issues:
1. the overall concept of employing INF in Europe;
2. the effects of these weapons on deterrence and conventional defence;
3. a possible reduction of the "INF's size and types;
4. the development of a coordinated nuclear posture by NATO that would 
be consistent with an emphasis on conventional forces.5'
The Nunn amendment gave Schlesinger the welcome opportunity to provide a 
public account of the doctrine. His report, delivered to Congress on April 1, 
1975, provided an extensive public presentation of U.S. nuclear policy. The 
general background to U.S. strategy was explained, as well as the way in which 
theatre nuclear doctrine had evolved within that strategy. However, the report 
did not include precise information about the types and amounts of weapons 
needed for this revised TNF posture. The following actions were suggested by 
Schlesinger:
1. pursuit of a more stable balance of forces in Europe through arms 
control negotiations;
2. modernisation and improvement of NATO's conventional forces;
3. restructuring of NATO's theatre nuclear forces in order to improve 
survivability, provide for greater military effectiveness in combined 
conventional-nuclear conflict, improve command and control, reduce 
collateral damage and increase the security of nuclear weapons in 
peacetime;
4. updating of doctrine and plans for theatre nuclear operations in the 
light of improved WP forces and NATO's improvements of its 
conventional forces;
5. revision of plans and doctrine for employing strategic forces in order to 
improve the deterrence of escalation in limited conflicts and to increase
5' For the text of the Nunn Amendment see U.S. Congress Senate, Fiscal Year 1976 and 
Julv-September 1976 Transition Period Authorization For Military Procurement. 
Research and Development, and Active Duty. Selected Reserve, and Civilian 
Personnel Strengths. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 94th 
Congress, First Session on S.920, Part 5, Manpower, (Washington D.C.: 
U.S.G.P.O. March 6,7,11,1975) p.2218
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the military support which strategic forces could render to NATO in a 
limited conflict.52
42.2 . New Technological Developments: mininuke and neutron weapon
In the seventies, weapons technology was evolving rapidly and the diversity of 
this change was extreme. These developments were to be applied to 
conventional as well as nuclear weapons. The most significant developments 
were taking place in the following areas: precision guidance, remote guidance 
and control; munitions improvements; target identification and acquisition; 
command, control and communications; and electronic w arfare5* New 
conventional munitions were offered and enhanced destruction capability 
combined with the reduction of unwanted blast effects 54
There is consensus in the strategic community that a miniaturisation of nuclear 
weapons blurs the psychologically important nuclear threshold and the 
distinction between a conventional and nuclear war. Critical voices warn that 
thus the pace of war would be speeded up.
Proposals for a new generation of TNF suggested a combination of 
miniaturised low yield guidance with a low collateral damage which would be 
even less than that produced by conventional weapons. A key accomplishment 
of this development was the mininuke which is characterised by a combination 
of high accuracy and a refined low-yield warhead. There never existed an 
accepted definition for these mininukes, which were produced by the Los 
Alamos laboratory. The NFG defined mininukes as '"fission weapons having a
52 Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in 
Europe. A Report to the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 
93-365. (Washington, D.C. April 1,1975)
5*The term "Precision-guided Munitions"(PGM) describes a class of bombs, missiles 
and artillery projectiles which possess a considerably increased accuracy and have 
"single-shotkilT probabilities ten to a hundred times greater than "unguided" 
munitions.
*  Discussion on the tactical and technological possibilities of mininukes and related 
conventional technologies can be found in Richard Burt*s. "New Weapons 
Technolopes. Debate and Directions". Adelphi-Papers, No. 127, (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies,Summer 1976); Cecil I. Hudson and 
Peter H. Haas, "New Technolopes: The ftospects". in Holst/Neriich (eds.), 1977, 
OjLCiL, p. 107-148;
I l l
Yield equivalent of 50 tons of TNT and the accuracy (CEP) of 1 m /"« Other 
sources referred to 10-100 tons or even 100-500 tons.5«
If used in combination with precision guided conventional weapons, strong 
advocates of the mininuke, such as Colin S. Gray from the Hudson Institute and 
the Los Alamos laboratory, considered them as a sufficient means against 
armoured units. The TNF posture was regarded as insufficient by them because 
TNF's high yield and inaccuracy made their use less than credible. In view of 
the impossibility of defending Europe conventionally the Los Alamos team 
campaigned for massive and early use of the mininukes:
"The strategy proposed in this article departs radically from present plans to try 
first to defend conventionally in Europe: it calls for immediately engaging the 
attacker with low-yield nuclear weapons for all but the most trivial 
incursion."57
The Los Alamos team represented the so-called group of "nuclearists" in the 
United States. As advocates of war-fighting concepts they are interested in a 
decoupling of the European theatre from the U.S. strategic forces. Accordingly 
the Los Alamos team advised excluding the option of hitting Soviet territory 
with U.S. forces and recommended withdrawal of U.S. forces with an 
appropriate range:
"We must exclude the planning option of using U.S. nuclear forces in Europe - 
primarily our Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft - which are capable of
55 Jorma A. Miettinen, quoted in Joachim D.C. Fesefeldt, Die nukleare Schwelle. 
Mvthos oder Wirklichkeit?. (Herford und Bonn: Mittler und Sohn, 1984), p.65
*  1000 tons TNT = 1 KT, 1000 KT = 1MT, M L
57 W.S. Bennett, R.R. Sandoval and R.G. Shreffler (three members of the Los Alamos 
Laboratory), "A credible nuclear emphasis defense for NATO", in: Orbis. (Vol. 17, 
No.2, Summer 1973), p.463-479, here p.465. The Los Alamos study group 
proposed an immediate employment of nuclear short range missiles with a range of
75 kilometres with warheads of about 0,25 kt By a computer simulation they found 
that of 24 attacking tank companies, 20 would be destroyed after 20 minutes. 
Radiation would affect an area only of 1,000 metres so that neither friendly soldiers 
nor the civilian population would be tremendously damaged. This attack would 
have to be executed 15 minutes after Soviet tanks pass the border. Release of these 
weapons could no longer be authorised by Central Command, since, in view of the 
24 hours a nuclear release would take, corps and division commanders must be 
allowed to decide on their own to release nuclear weapons, see Rühl 1974, op.cit.. 
p.418. See also Colin S.Gray, "Mini-nukes and strategy", in: International Journal. 
(Vol.29, No.2,1974a), pp.216-241.
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striking the territory of the USSR. To this end, such forces now in Europe 
should be removed. "J*
The nuclear war must be fought exclusively on the battlefield with weapons 
having a very accurate delivery system:
"We contend that a nuclear-defensive war by NATO, fought in proximity to 
the border with low-yield weapons and discriminating delivery systems, would 
result in a short conflict"59
This trend of "conventionalisation" of nuclear weapons stimulated a revival of 
the debate in the U.S. strategic community between the conventionalists and 
nudearists. The long-standing questions upon which these camps focus are 
whether (first) a conventional defence against the Warsaw Pact in Central 
Europe is generally possible and whether (second) it is possible to fight and 
control a tactical nudear war in this region within bearable limits. Mainly 
because of the lack of depth, which is regarded as indispensable for fighting a 
conventional war, nudearists do not believe in the military feasibility of 
winning a purely conventional war in the Central Region.**
While the U.S. administration was continuously seeking improved accuracy 
and reduced yield of TNF, "a mini-nuke program as such did not exist. 
Support and campaigning for the mininukes dwindled with the awareness of 
the weapons' insuffident destruction power by virtue of its low-yield 
warhead.® Another concern of arms control d rdes, namely that the distinction
5* Bennett etal., 1973, op.cit. p.471
59 ibid. p.475
60 For a detailed description of the debate between conventionalists and nudearists, see
Fesefeldt 1984, op.dt. pp.46-59; Krell/ Schlotter, 1977, op.cit
61 Evidence of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, U.S. Congress, Senate, Nuclear
Weapons and Foreign Policy. Hearings before the the Subcommittee on U.S. 
Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, and the Subcommittee on Arms 
Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session on U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe and 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Doctrines and Polides, Washington D.C., March 7, 14, 
April 4, 1974, p.208-209, in the following: U.S. Senate Hearings, Nuclear Weapons 
and Foreign Policy, 1974
62 Fesefeldt, 1984, op.dt. p.259
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between nuclear and conventional weapons would be blurred by the mininuke, 
seemed to have contributed to the renunciation of the weapons' development.«
Instead, a fusion weapon, the enhanced radiation weapon (EWR) or "neutron 
bomb" received much more support. The difference between the original fission 
weapon and a fusion weapon lies in the different effects of blast, heat and 
radiation: "(W)hereas the fission warhead relies heavily on blast and heat 
output, the dominant neutron warhead effect is in the form of an instantaneous 
burst of nuclear radiation - neutrons."* Because of its reduced collateral 
damage, the neutron-bomb was therefore also called a "dean" bomb. Thus, the 
neutron bomb was warmly welcomed; it implemented the prinaple of limiting 
collateral damage:
"The basic advantage of neutron weapons over current fission weapons would 
be a reduction in noncombatant casualties and in physical damage to their 
material assets."«5
It was planned to use the neutron weapons for the 203mm (8 inch) and 155mm 
howitzers and the Lance missile which are deployed in the Federal Republic. 
The Lance has a range of 80 miles (128 km). The 155mm and 203mm howitzers, 
in their role as classical artillery battlefield weapons, were introduced in the 
early sixties6« and the modernisation of the 155mm, which has not yet been 
completed, is subject to public debate today. The modernisation of the 203mm
63 "U.S. to renounce ’Mini’ Atom Anns", in New York Times. May 24,1974, p.l
«  S.T. Cohen, The Neutron Bomb: Political. Technological and Military Issues. 
(Cambridge, Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, November 1978) 
p.v
65 ibid. p.v and vi
«  Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit.. p. 104
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howitzer started in 1986*7. A neutron warhead has been produced for the Lance 
which is deployed in the United States.
The German Defence Minister Leber raised the issue of mininukes at the 
Ankara NPG meeting 1973. He was against the mininukes. He stressed that no 
important distinctions between the various kinds of nuclear weapons should be 
drawn:
"’The first use of nuclear weapons would mean a change in the kind of war 
being fought, and one should really not draw important distinctions between 
the various kinds of nuclear weapons.’"6*
Leber was convinced that a "single atomic hand grenade" would cause 
escalation to the most powerful nuclear weapons. Another objection against the 
mininukes was their grave problems of command and control. It was feared 
that the authority to use these weapons might be predelegated to the battlefield 
commander. This was against the Germans' principle of a political control of 
nuclear weapons.^
However, it was precisely the Europeans who requested the development of the 
neutron weapon by the United States. Leber, in his memoir, reports that in 1970 
the Europeans demanded that the United States drop production of dirty 
nuclear weapons, and, in their place, develop something easier to handle, i.e. 
the so-called neutron weapon.
"Von europäischer Seite wurde im Jahre 1970 verlangt, die USA sollten 
versuchen, anstelle der ’schmutzigen’ Nuklearwaffen etwas zu entwickeln, was
67 "Congress approved funding for production of a new 155 mm nuclear artillery shell
(the W-82). A provision of the Senate version of the spending measure removes a 
restriction, dating from 1985, which set a $1.2 billion limit on funding for the 
nuclear W-79 (203 mm) and W-82 artillery shells. The W-79 has already been 
produced, so the removal of the restriction — a move meant ’exclusively to ensure 
the safety and security of the warheads’ -  will apply solely to the W-82. The 
funding level for the W-82 is classified, but William Aririn, the author of several 
studies of nuclear weapons, estimates that the program will cost $900 million over 
a three-year period. Congressional sources calculate the cost of each shell at $4-5 
million." British American Security Information Council, The 1990 U.S. Defense 
Budget and Nato Nuclear Modernization. Washington D.C., London: October 1989
68 quoted in U.S. Senate Report, Security Issues, 1973, op.cit. p.23.
»  see de Wijk, 1989, op.cit.. p. 110
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sich für einen Verteidiger besser handhaben lasse. Die USA entwickelten die 
Nuklearwaffen weiter und nannten diese Fortentwicklung Neutronenwaffen."70
Thus there is an apparent contradiction in the German position: whereas they 
were extremely sensitive to ADMs and mini-nukes,7'  which both belong to the 
category of limited battlefield weapons, they seemed to habe been interested in 
small warheads which - at least theoretically - may be assigned to delivery 
systems with a longer range. The principle of limiting collateral damage which 
is implemented by warheads with low yields is a constant feature of German 
TNF policy since small warheads guarantee selective employment. The 
employment of weapons with an enhanced radiation warhead, however, only 
make sense in a battlefield situation. Thus these these inconsistent observations 
cannot be explained sufficiently.
Inspector General Harald Wust confirmed in an interview that the neutron 
bomb has never been criticised by the Germans in the NPG and DPC meeting.72 
Furthermore it is a fact that in 1977 the German government approved the 
deployment of the neutron bomb for the Lance missile on German soil, 
however, whether for military or arms control reasons cannot be said with 
validity.
Leber always pleaded strongly for flexible response's axiom of first use. In a 
Senate Hearing U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger asserted that the Germans 
including Georg Leber had always been interested in receiving reassurances 
from the United States that tactical and strategic weapons would be available 
for use in the event of a threat. Whether CDU or SPD dominated governments 
there had been no change in the German desire "for assurance that nuclear
70 "On the part of the Europeans it was requested in 1970 that the United States should
try to develop something else instead of the ’dirty’ nuclear weapons which would 
be more feasible for the defender. The United States proceeded with the refinement 
of nuclear weapons and called this development the neutron weapon." Georg Leber, 
Vom Frieden. (Stuttgart: Seewald-Verlag, 1979) p.287. For confirmation of the 
German request for the neutron weapon see Lothar Ruehl, "Die Nichtentscheidung 
über die ’Neutronenwaffe’. Ein Beispiel verfehlter Bündnispolitik." Europa-Archiv. 
No.5,1979, pp. 137-150.
71 U.S. Senate Report, Security Issues, 1973, op.cit.. p.26
72 communication by Harald Wust to Hubertus Hoffman, on December 6, 1984 in:
Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit.. p.213. Hoffmann describes the German participation in 
the debate on the neutron weapon, ibid. pp. 156
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weapons will be used in defence of Germany under those circumstances".7* 
Leber himself explicitly expressed the necessity for an early first use:
"Wenn der Westen mit einer konventionellen Übermacht angegriffen wird, und 
wir könnten uns mit konventionellen Waffen nicht verteidigen, dann gehöre 
ich nicht zu denen, die für einen solchen Fall sagen: Lassen wir uns halt von 
deren Übermacht überrollen und werden kommunistisch, sondern dann muß zu 
einem frühen Zeitpunkt ein atomares Signal gesetzt werden."74
This was reaffirmed in his response as part of the "gang of four" responding to 
the plea of U.S. colleagues for a no-first use policy.
Still Leber had always pursued a policy line of strengthening NATO's 
conventional arms and not regarding nuclear arms as a substitute for 
reinforcing conventional weapons.75 He pleaded for a high nuclear threshold 
and advocated the employment of precision guided conventional weapons with 
a destruction power equivalent to that of nuclear ones. In 1976 he predicted that 
the nuclear threshold would be substituted by a "technological threshold" 
which could be perceived as very low.7»
At the NPG meeting in Bergen June 1974 the allies were informed by U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger with regard to "some technological 
developments that could bear on the tactical nuclear capability of the 
Alliance."77 They were briefed on the advanced cruise missile, the enhanced 
radiation weapons and on Precision Guided Munition. European interest 
focused on the cruise missile. The interest of the British was due to their plans 
to modernise the aging U.S. long-range fighter bomber fleet, as it was unlikely 
that the planes could actually carry out their allocated war time missions74.
7* U.S. Senate Hearings, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 1974, op.cit. p. 188
74 Emphasis by S.P., "If the West is attacked with a conventional preponderance and we
cannot defend ourselves with conventional weapons, then I do not belong to those 
who say in such a case.: let us be overrun and let us become communist Rather, I 
am one who supports the creation of a nuclear signal for an early stage.” Interview 
with Defence Minister Georg Leber, Per Spiegel. (Vol.29, No.38, September 15, 
1975) p.27
75 Über, 1979,0BlciL,p.303
76 Defence Minister Leber in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. April 10,1976, p. 1,2
77 see Communique of the NPG meeting, June 11-12, 1974 in NATO-Communiques
1949-74, op.cit. p.309
78 The Sunday Times. February 6,1983, p. 17
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Bonn also demonstrated interest in the cruise missile - thus awakened before 
the specter of the SS-20 appeared on the horizon.
423 . German revision o f TNT
In reaction to these developments of the TNF's revision towards shorter-range 
systems for selective use, the German guidelines proposed land deployment of 
systems with a longer range to avert the Federal Republic's possible role as a 
battlefield.
Lothar Riihl describes the German guidelines for TNF modernisation presented 
to the Nuclear Planning Group in 1976. According to Riihl, the German 
delegation took the initiative and developed a comprehensive policy concept. 
The decisive criterion for the Germans was the compatibility of political and 
military requests.
The following German guidelines were approved by the NPG in 1976:
- compatibility of the TNF arsenal with NATO's overall strategy;
- consideration of the WP's increasing TNF capacities and the resulting
new options for the WP;
- the provision of a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons and delivery
systems for a variety of options and flexibility in the context of 
escalation;
- harmonisation of the objectives of the TNF forces with NATO's offer at
MBFR in December 1975 to unilaterally withdraw 90 long-range TNF 
delivery systems and 1,000 nuclear warheads.79
As a main task, the German TNF concept envisaged studies on the coordination 
between NOP and SIOP and the planning of options for deliberate escalation. 
TNF should be able to give a "sensible signal to the offensive forces” of the 
attacker which might have the greatest chance to induce the attacker to 
terminate hostilities. A massive use of battlefield TNF for the destruction of WP 
offensive forces was rejected by the Germans. According to WP doctrine, a 
massive employment of nuclear weapons would be inevitable in a war. The 
Germans, however, argued that this part of the WP doctrine was merely
79 Riihl, 1987, op.cit.. p. 159
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declaratory and aimed at intimidating the Western nations. It would be much 
more realistic to assume that the Soviet Union would not be interested in a 
nuclear war with the United States and, therefore, would not start any 
preemptive strikes against NATO's nuclear forces as long as it had to take into 
account nuclear strikes, not just against its nuclear forces, but also against its 
own territory.
On the basis of these guidelines, the Germans demanded NATO's 
modernisation of the TNF along these lines:
- securing TNFs survival;
- participation of all NATO members in nuclear strikes against the attacker
in Europe;
- limitation of the collateral damage;
- variety of options and flexibility;
- distribution of TNF over as wide an area as possible and with as many
NATO members involved as possible; and
- sufficient numbers for an optimal composition of the TNF, for a reserve,
for the necessary diversification of the employment means and for
repetition in order to compensate for potential losses.
The aim of the German concept was obvious - to avoid plans for fighting a war 
in which Central Europe would become a battlefield, and to avoid the Federal 
Republic assuming a unique role in nuclear issues in Europe.
As early as 1976, LRTNF modernisation was initiated by German members of 
theNPG:
"Die Bundesregierung hatte sich in Gestalt des Bundesverteidigungsministers 
Georg Leber schon im Laufe des Jahres 1976 weit auf das Feld des
Reichweite und
According to Rühl, the years 1976/77 were the most important period in respect 
of German participation in the TNF modernisation; in this respect, it was a time 
during which German influence in the NPG reached its peak. Also in SALT the 
German politicians were active along the line of their strategic doctrine.
»  Emphasis by S.P., "As early as 1976, the Federal Republic, represented by Defence 
Minister Leber, advanced the idea of land deployment of intermediate- range 
modem missiles with a capability to attack the Soviet Union." ibid, p. 167
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5. The LRTNF Decision as a Result o f U.S. -German Conflicts over SALT
The SALT agreements were of major importance for the U.S. administrations in 
the seventies and they were not willing to impair this process by provoking the 
Soviet Union or by establishing unnecessary stumbling blocks in the 
negotiations. For the Europeans, however, arms control agreements in the 
strategic field did not have a high priority on the political agenda. They 
intervened in the SALT process by articulating their strategic interests. While 
they were publicly silent about the lack of concern for their interests in the 
complete SALT process, West German politicians, above all, participated 
actively behind the scenes. In SALT-I, the German politicians requested that the 
United States exclude the FBS from the negotiations; in SALT n, they pressed 
for the preservation of the option of long-range sea- and especially of ground- 
launched cruise missile. In both cases these German security interests were 
considered by the United States: the FBS were excluded form the SALT 
negotiations and the deployment of long-range ground- and sea-launched 
cruise missile was banned only for three years, while their testing and 
developing were allowed.
In 1969 the superpowers started negotiations over their strategic offensive arms, 
which led to the signing of SALT-I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ) in 1972. 
With this treaty the superpowers agreed to freeze the number of launchers for 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and for sea-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBM) for a period of five years, until October 1977.' In the seventies
i SALT I yielded two documents, both signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the summit 
meeting of May 1972. The first was a treaty limiting the defensive capability of 
each side by restricting the superpowers’ antiballistic missile (ABM) defences. The 
second was an "Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
Soviet Union of Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" which froze the number of launchers for 
ICBMs and SLBMs. The Interim Agreement contained no figures for the number of 
ICBMs to be frozen. SALTII began six months after the signing of SALTI. 
SALT D’s objective was to replace the five-year interim agreement with a 
comprehensive treaty of indefinite agreement. At Vladivostok in November 1974 
Ford and Brezhnev issued a communique on the framework for SALT n. The key 
features of the accord were a ceiling of 2,400 for total offensive strategic launch 
vehicles and a subceiling of 1,320 launchers for multiple warheads. The Soviet 
Backfire and cruise missile were left undefined by the Vladivostok accord. Thus the 
cruise missile and the Backfire came to share the "grey area of Vladivostok" 
definition. See Strobe Talbott, Endgame. The Inside Story of SALT II. (New 
York/San Francisco/London: Harper & Row, 1979), pp.21-35. For the precise 
wording of SALT see Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Weißbuch. 1983. Zur
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negotiations were held for a follow-up agreement, the SALT II treaty, which 
was signed by General Secretary Brezhnev and U.S. President Jimmy Carter in 
1979. However, SALT II was never ratified by the U.S. Congress.
The record of European reactions to SALT since 1969 is remarkably sparse:
"Bisher hatte man es in Europa vermieden, zu den Verhandlungen über eine 
Begrenzung der strategischen Nuklearwaffensysteme (Strategie Arms 
Limitation Talks: SALT) öffentlich Stellung zu nehmen. Vorbehalte 
europäischer Regierungen wurden in der Regel nicht öffentlich vorgetragen."3
This dearth of reactions might be explained by the ambiguity which the 
European strategic community and politicians felt about SALT. On the one 
hand the Europeans felt committed to detente. They were afraid to appear 
publicly as an obstacle to the codification of a SALT agreement because it might 
have provoked a deterioration in European-Soviet relations.-* On the other hand 
they wanted a full consideration of their own security concerns. West Germany, 
in particular, was faced with the agonising problem of how it could best 
influence the SALT process without arousing deep domestic and allied concern 
over West Germany participating in nuclear policy.
These negotiations between the superpowers were accompanied by 
considerable difficulties in agreeing on the kinds of weapons to be limited by
Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt 
der Bundesregierung, 1983), p.225. For the history of SALT-I see John Newhouse, 
Cold Dawn: The Storv of SALT. (New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1973)
2 "So far in Europe a public stance with regard to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) had been avoided. Any reservations on the part of the European 
governments were not expressed publicly.” Heinrich Buch, "Die Rolle der 
Bundesrepublik bei SALT - Mitspieler oder Zuschauer?" in Haftendom et.al. (eds.),
Verwaltete___ Außenpolitik.____Sicherheits-____und___ entspann ungspolitische
Entscheidungsprozesse in Bonn. (Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1978), p.115- 
134, here p.l 15. For a similar view see also David S. Yost, European Security and 
the SALT Process. The Washington Papers, Vol.9, (Beverly Hills/London: Sage 
Publications, 1981), p.26
3 Kissinger interprets the Europeans’ dilemma concerning SALT as a result of the
pressure exerted by both superpowers: "’Each has been urged, if not pressed by the 
(U.S., S.P.) administration to express support In some cases, the Soviets have 
added their entreaties. Refusal to comply would thus risk relations with both 
superpowers over an issue that is of high technical complexity and has been under 
negotiation for seven years...They do not want to be perceived as an obstacle to 
SALT ü...’" U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The SALT II 
Treaty. Hearing, Part 3, 96th Congress. (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1979), 
p. 157-158 quoted in Yost, 1981, op.cit. p.28
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SALT and on a definition of what "strategic weapons" are. These difficulties 
applied to negotiations not only between the superpowers, but also within the 
NATO Alliance. Perceptions differed wildly as to what systems were really at 
stake in the SALT negotiations, and what kind of agreements had to be 
considered concerning these systems.
Before we will discuss these European interventions in the SALT process, the 
structure of the SALT consultations and the West Germans' room for 
manoeuver within these bilateral negotiations between the superpowers shall 
be briefly described.
5.1. Offer for an extension o f the Consultation process
The question of the extent to which the Federal Republic, as a non-nuclear and 
not completely sovereign state, had the opportunity and the room to 
manoeuver to influence bilateral negotiations like SALT certainly requires 
clarification. It will be demonstrated that in contrast to public perception, there 
was sufficient organisational infrastructure to provide a basis for intensive U.S. 
consultations with the European allies.4 Moreover, the Europeans did not react 
to an U.S. offer of direct participation in the SALT negotiations.
A routine treatment of SALT was given in the NATO Council, within the frame 
of the so-called SALT Forum. In the NATO Council the Federal Republic was 
represented by a permanent German delegate and by representatives of section 
220 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (disarmament and arms control) and the 
section FiiS-m, 5 of the Ministry of Defence (limitation of armament and arms 
control).
For bilateral U.S.-German consultations in the German embassy in the United 
States a Political Study Group (PSG) was established. The participating West 
Germans were representatives of the embassy in Washington, the Chief of the 
Planning Staff of the Armed Forces (Leiter im Planungsstab) in the Ministry of 
Defence and official consultants from the respective sections in the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence who represented the Federal
4 For a detailed description of consultations in the alliance see Meier, op.cit. 1986, 
pp. 106-128
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Republic. Occasionally the Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs joined 
thePSG.i
U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance describes the quality of consultation 
between the United States and its allies as sufficient
"Previously, consultations had been carried out by routine briefing. Now, under 
the Carter administration, no SALT issue of importance to European security 
(such as the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to our allies) was resolved 
without advance consultations with all members of the alliance. The 
consultations were not limited to those issues that were regarded as NATO 
concerns, and the discussions were not simple briefings. They included a full 
exchange of views in which the allies' opinions were sought."*
In December 1977, at the bi-annual ministerial level NATO meeting, Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance proposed consideration of multilateral arms talks between 
East and West on European LRTNF and discussed with the British, West- 
German and French Foreign Ministers to set up a new forum for consultations 
within NATO.7 But Vance's offer was met with an astonishing indifference on 
the part of the Europeans. No plausible reasons have been given as yet for the 
Europeans' failure to come up with a reaction to this offer. Garthoff writes 
about the reception of Vance's proposal:
"Regrettably, nothing further was done to develop those proposals. Secretary 
Vance had intended his initiative to allow the Europeans to decide whether 
they would prefer to participate directly in SALT HI, in which it was expected 
that LRTNF would be discussed, or that the United States continue to negotiate 
alone with close consultation. No immediate decision was needed, so none was 
taken. As a result, events moved on their own."*
While one may justifiably doubt the seriousness of Vance's proposal, the 
casualness with which German researchers touch on the Federal Republic's 
nonchalance concerning this important issue is astonishing. Haftendom just
5 Buch does not say when the PSG was founded. Buch, 1978, op.cit.. here p. 130
6 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p.67
7 Garthoff, 1983, op.cit. p.210. Vance does not mention his offer in his memoirs, he
merely mentions that "(m)ore direct participation by the allies was a necessity. We 
understood that the United States did not face, as some had tried to suggest, a 
choice between European security and SALT: The interests went hand in hand". 
Vance, 1983, op.cit. p.67
* Garthoff, 1983, QjLfiiL, p.210
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comments: "Dieser Vorschlag wird damals jedoch nicht aufgegriffen.”9 Risse- 
Kappen explains the reluctance of the West German officials to respond to this 
proposal in terms of their fear that negotiations about the INF system outside 
the framework of SALT would support a decoupling process.'0
This reaction is, however, not untypical of the Federal Republic's policy in the 
nuclear field, which could be characterised by its ambition to achieve too many 
goals at the same time. On the one hand the West Germans are continuously 
anxious about the lack of consideration of European interests in bilateral 
negotiations. On the other hand they do not want to be associated with 
weapons aggressively directed against the Soviet Union since this would 
jeopardise their detente policy with the East.
9 "However, this proposal was not taken up." Helga Haftendom, Sicherheit und
Stabilit&L Außenbeziehungen der Bundesrepublik zwischen Ölkrise und NATO- 
Doppelbeschluß. (München: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1986), p.31
10 Risse-Kappen, 1985, op.cit.. p.26. Eventually the negotiations took place without the
allies' participation and outside the framework of SALT.
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52. The Federal Republic's Interest in FBS
It will be argued here that it was mainly the Europeans, in particular the West 
German politicians, who insisted on the exclusion of the FBS from the original 
SALT-I agreement. The effect of this was the emergence of the so-called "grey 
area" problem of the "intermediate-range nuclear forces" (INF), which were 
covered neither by SALT nor by the MBFR negotiations on conventional 
weapons. The "grey-area" weapons were eventually and successfully dealt with 
within the framework of the negotiations which in December 1987 culminated 
in the INF treaty.
The 1979 NATO Dual-Track decision was accelerated and legitimised by the 
deployment of the Soviet Eur©strategic missiles in 1975, which was motivated 
in part by the inappropriate treatment of intermediate-range weapons in 
SALT I. An agreement to dismantle the U.S. FBS and Soviet medium-range 
missiles in SALT I would have - according to this logic - obviated the 
deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile in Europe, 
which prolonged the potential dangers and real costs of the arms race for 
another decade.
52.1. Another cycle o f concern about the U.S. guarantee
In NATO the European allies seem to experience cycles of concern about 
American leadership. The debate on excluding FBS from the SALT I agreement 
in the beginning of the 1970s was just one more manifestation of such anxiety, 
generated by European fears that Soviet/American efforts to limit 
intercontinental strategic arms in SALT I would be achieved at the expense of 
European defence options and would undermine the American nuclear 
guarantee.
SALT also fed European apprehensions about a "bilateralism" between the 
superpowers achieved at the cost of European security and interests. What was 
feared was an implicit understanding between the superpowers that neither 
would henceforth initiate the use of nuclear weapons except for the direct
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defence of its own territory or that they would agree to exclude any use of their 
strategic weapons and thus limit the nuclear war to Europe."
A whole system of agreements and treaties between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the beginning of the seventies, like the Renunciation of Force 
Treaty, the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear 
War and an Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War'2, contributed to 
European suspicion.
Major Heinrich Buch, a researcher at the University of the Bundeswehr, forcibly 
expresses the European concern over these agreements, as follows:
"Beide Prozesse haben die Wirkung, daß sie die Vonnachtstellung der 
Supermächte absichem. SALT ist daher ein zentrales Instrument, mit dem die 
nuklearen Hegemonialmächte ihr globales sicherheitspolitisches Kondominium 
abstecken und strukturieren."^
The codification of mutual deterrence in the SALT agreements, combined with 
the loss of U.S. nuclear superiority, was perceived by the Europeans as a further 
erosion of their nuclear guarantee and thus as a "decoupling" of Europe from 
the United States' "umbrella".
European statesmen see this "coupling" between the United States and West 
Europe as inherent in the presence of American troops in Europe, who are 
above all regarded as hostages. West Germany has been troubled by any 
American move to withdraw these forces.
The second and more decisive link to the U.S. nuclear umbrella consists, in the 
Europeans'view, of U.S. nuclear forces deployed on European soil and —most 
decisively-- well within striking range of Soviet territory.
With this as a background it is not astonishing that the U.S. FBS forces were 
also considered as indispensable for the link to the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
11 Andrew J. Pierre, "Can Europe’s Security be ’decoupled’ from America?" Foreign
Affairs. (Vol.51, July 1973), pp.761-777, here p. 761
12 Buch, 1978, op.cit. p.l 18 and Ruehl, 1974, op.cit. p.335
u  "Both processes have the effect of backing up the superpowers’ hegemony. Thus 
SALT is a central instrument with which the nuclear hegemonic powers define and 
structure their global political condominium." Buch, 1978, op.cit. p. 119
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5 2 2 . Political and Strategic Value o f the FBS
Early in the discussions about a SALT agreement, the Soviet Union indicated 
that the negotiations must deal with all strategic nuclear forces, which they 
defined as those capable of reaching the homeland of the other. Thus the FBS,
i.e. U.S. nuclear strike aircraft and land-based missiles able to reach the Soviet 
Union, would have to be included. There are no fully comparable Soviet FBS 
capable of reaching the United States.
This definition of "strategic weapons" was one of the basic problems of the 
SALT negotiations. The different geography of the superpowers, with the 
Soviet Union being encircled by the United States' allies, makes it logical that 
the Soviet Union should consider all U.S. nuclear weapons that can reach 
targets in the Soviet Union as "strategic", no matter what their origin. It may be, 
however, that this view only creates problems, since there seems to be no 
reason why Western European nations should not be just as concerned about 
nuclear weapons that can reach their countries. That means that the Soviet 
Union's tactical nuclear aircraft are as much a matter of concern to NATO 
Europe as FBS are to WP Europe." Milton Leitenberg defines FBS as follows:
"The phrase ’forward based systems’ is used to describe those longer range US 
’strike’ or ’attack’ aircraft which the US bases in Europe or on aircraft carriers, 
which are specifically designated as nuclear weapons delivery systems and 
whose range permits them to reach targets within the USSR."'5
These elements made up the U.S. FBS in the mid-seventies:
- the F - lll  aircraft based in the United Kingdom;
- F-4 aircraft in Turkey, Northern Italy and in the Federal Republic of
Germany;
- aircraft-carrier based A-6s and A-7s in the Mediterranean;
14 Leitenberg, 1986, op.cit. p. 144
a  Emphasis by S.P. Leitenberg, 1978, op.cit. p. 117. The phrase has also been used 
somewhat loosely at times to refer to all NATO aircraft capable of reaching the 
Soviet Union, but its correct meaning is in reference to U.S. aircraft only; see 
Leitenberg, 1986, op.cit.. p. 142. Leitenberg is referring here to NATO committed 
F-4 squadrons on call in the United States.
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In contrast to Leitenberg Uwe Nerlich considers it as debatable whether also the 
Pershing 1 missiles could be categorised as FBS systems.'*
A 1979 U.S. Senate Hearing indicated the number of U.S. tactical aircraft to be 
over 1,000. They were composed of 800 F-4,300 F -lll, 67 FB-111 aircraft and 12 
carrier air wings which included a total of 400 planes with nuclear delivery 
capability (120 A-6 and 280 A-7 aircraft).'7
Now it is difficult to define which of these more 1,000 tactical aircraft belong to 
the "Forward Based Systems". Among the military experts there seems to be 
agreement only on one criterion: the aircraft has to be capable of delivering 
nuclear weapons. The other criteria appear to be very debatable:
1. a deployment area from which the aircraft can strike targets in the 
Soviet Union;
2. a two-way mission capability of the aircraft; which means that the 
aircraft is technically able to return to its home base after its mission.
However, under extreme conditions it is certainly also possible to find pilots for 
one-way missions.'4 Concerning the first criterion it is questionable whether 
only those systems should be counted which in peacetime are physically within 
reach of Soviet targets or whether systems should be included which can be 
brought to Europe within hours in the case of a crisis. In a U.S. Senate Hearing a 
further aspect is considered:
'<* The Pershing 1A, which will be withdrawn as a result of the INF treaty, creates 
special problems for its categorisation because of its range of 740 kilometres. 
Therefore the Pershing 1A is only included in the FBS systems under rather 
"theoretical assumptions" because "(i)n Central Europe Pershing missiles could be 
based close enough to Soviet territory to acquire FBS quality, but in fact are not 
Deployment of Pershing, e.g. to Turkey, would raise different kinds of problems." 
Uwe Nerlich, The Alliance in Europe. Part V. Nuclear Weapons and East West 
Negotiation. Adelphi-Paper, No. 120, (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Winter 1975/76), p.4 and see also Pierre for confirmation, 
1973, op.ciL. p.765, that the Pershings with a 450-mile range could strike into the 
Ukraine if they were positioned closer to the border
17 U.S. Senate Hearings, Military Implications, 1979, op.cit.. p.96
'* Concerning the two-way mission capability Pierre asks: "The unstated assumption of 
defense planners is that all missions would be two-way, capable of returning to 
friendly soil. This excludes a large number of shorter-range aircraft plus the Soviet 
medium-range bombers which might reach the United States if their return were 
abandoned. But is such exclusion a valid assumption for all conceivable crises?" 
1973, op.cit.. p.765
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"Given appropriate warning time, additional USAF (US Air Force, S.P.) 
aircraft could fly to Europe and four more carriers could be brought forward. 
This would roughly double the number of nuclear capable aircraft forward 
based in a position to strike the Soviet Union."'®
These additional forces are usually not included in the estimates. It is probably 
unnecessary to go further into technical details about the FBS. A quotation from 
the U.S. Senate Hearing demonstrates the labyrinthine complexity of this issue:
"There is a difference, however, in an aircraft having the technical capability to 
strike the Soviet Union and in having an operational mission to do so. Whether 
or not these aircraft actually would be utilized to strike the Soviet Union would 
depend on a number of factors: e.g., how they have trained and their primary 
mission tasking, mission flight profiles, the provision of external fuel tanks, 
whether a particular mission is one-way or includes a return, how far forward 
the aircraft are staged. Technically, all these aircraft can strike targets deep in 
the U.S.S.R. - if they are based far enough forward, carry external fuel tanks, 
and/or execute one-way missions. With the exception of the F -lll which in 
any case would be able to strike targets in the U.S.S.R. from its operating bases 
and return, the capability of these tactical aircraft to strike deep into - or in 
many instances, even to reach - the U.S.S.R. and return is highly dependent on 
the factors cited above."20
In view of the complexity of the issue it is astonishing that the figure of the FBS 
is usually indicated as 500-630 aircraft.2' The figure is composed of the 
following elements: of the 300 existing F -lll , 150 are deployed in Europe; of the 
800 F-4, 60 are deployed in South Korea and another 300 in Europe. Four 
aircraft carriers are usually deployed afloat in the Western Pacific and in the 
Mediterranean Sea, and their 40 A-6 and 80 A-7 aircraft could be targeted 
against the eastern part of Soviet Union.22 This, according to the 1979 U.S. 
Senate Hearing, gives a total of about 630 aircraft which are actually forward 
based and which could be directed against the Soviet Union.
From the Soviet perspective the military value of the FBS is quite unambiguous. 
For the Soviets the FBS embody their sensitive geostrategic position between
19 U.S. Senate Hearings, Military Implications, 1979, op.cit.. p.96
20 ibid.
2t The Senate Hearing indicated 630 aircraft, ibid.. while Pierre counts 565 systems, 
1973, op,git,, p.765
22 For the technical data of the aircraft see Thomas B. Cochran / William M. Arkin / 
Milton M. Hoening, Nuclear Weapons Databook. U.S. Nuclear Forces and 
Capabilities. Vol.l. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger 1984), pp.207-210, 
pp.232-233, pp.215-216
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four nuclear adversaries, three of which do not participate in SALT. To give an 
idea how the Soviets might feel about the FBS, one may be reminded of the 
United States' dramatic reaction when the Soviet Union based middle-range 
weapons in a "forward" mode on the territory of its Cuban ally. The FBS played 
a key role during the fifties and sixties, "because they could get to Russia hours 
before any bomber from Omaha could, and before those early Soviet missiles 
could be fueled with their liquid propellants."2* This means that 20% of the 
industrial capacity and population of the Soviet Union could be destroyed by 
FBS alone.24
Richard Burt also reflects on the European interest in the FBS:
"During the first round of SALT, one of the sensitive issues within the Alliance 
was the possibility that, in an agreement, the Nixon Administration might 
sacrifice its freedom to maintain or improve forces earmarked for the defense 
of NATO... Had the Administration agreed to limit FBS aircraft in the 1972 
agreements, European governments would have perceived this as an American 
decision to pursue superpower arms control at the expense of NATO 
defense."25
Due to the Europeans' interest in the FBS the United State's handling of the FBS 
issue "was seen as the one indicator of future accountability to European 
interests of American strategic power in Europe.”2*
5 2 3 . The FBS's relationship to SALT negotiations
Uwe Nerlich gives more specific evidence for the fact that the Europeans 
demanded the exclusion of the FBS from the SALT negotiations.
"Only a few years ago Western European governments were upset over the 
prospect of SALT limitations applying to long-range theatre nuclear forces.
23 Malcolm W. Hoag. Forward-Based Nuclear Systems in NATO in Historical
Perspective. Lessons for SALT III. P-6426. (Santa Monica, California: Rand 
Corporation, May 1980), p. 10
24 Pierre, 1973, op.cit. p.766
2i Richard Burt, "The Scope and Limits of SALT', Foreign Affairs. (Vol.56, No.4, July
1978), pp.751-769, here p.764/765. See also Nerlich, 1975/76, op.cit.. p.4
26 ibid.
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They did not demand the inclusion of Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 for fear that 
forward-based systems (FBS) would have to be included in SALT I."27
The reduction of the 700 Soviet intermediate and medium range nuclear 
missiles (IBM/MRBM) was a second major European interest within the SALT 
negotiations.2* They consisted of the SS-4 with a range of 1,800 kms and the SS-5 
with a range of 3,500 kms. Thus both were able to hit targets within Europe. 
Their final exclusion from SALT is closely linked to the FBS issue, insofar as the 
Soviet IR/MRBM could only have been included if negotiations on the FBS had 
been included as well.29
Raymond Garthoff, at that time Secretary of the U.S. SALT I delegation, is able 
to give further support to the understanding (of history) that the Europeans and 
not the United States were the first to insist on the exclusion of the FBS. In a 
letter Garthoff affirms that the U.S. originally wanted to reduce the Soviet 
IR/MRBMs, but later dropped this plan:
"Q.: Was the US proposal to limit Soviet IRBMs, MRBMs and SLCMs pan of 
the April 1970 approaches, or was it introduced in direct response to the Soviet 
attempt to include the US Forward Based Systems (FBS) in a SALT 
agreement?
A.: The US proposal to limit Soviet IRBMs, MRBMs and SLCMs was part of 
the April 1970 approaches, and was not introduced in response to the Soviet 
attempt to include FBS. We had, in fact, made known our preference that such 
systems be included in information exchanges even before SALT talks began 
in 1969. The Soviet side, in turn, had made very clear its view on FBS in 1969. 
After consultation with our NATO allies, we dropped the proposal to limit 
these systems as part of our effort to exclude FBS."*’
27 Nerlich, 1980, op.cit.. see also Heinrich Buch: "Der Wunsch der Europäer, die
amerikanischen Nuklearsysteme im Vorfeld der strategischen Waffen (Forward 
Based Systems: FBS) weitherhin für die eigene Sicherheitpolitik nutzen zu können, 
fühlte 1971 zur Ausklammerung der FBS aus den SALT-Verhandlungen mit der 
Sowjetunion, dem bisher wichtigsten Ergebnis von Konsultationsprozessen im 
Bündnis.” ("The desire of the Europeans to continue using the FBS for their own 
security policy, in 1971 led to the exclusion of the FBS from the SALT negotiations
• the most important result, thus far, of consultations within the Alliance." Buch, 
1978, op.cit.. p. 116.
28 These 700 IRBM/MRBM consisted of 100 SS-5 and 600 SS-4. After having been
already phased down considerably, the residual SS-4 missiles were included in the 
INF treaty. "INF Treaty" USIS Wireless File. Embassy of the United States of 
America. Brussels (December 8,1987)
29 Buch, 1978, op.cit.. p.125.
Jo Kakan Karlsson, SALT 1: Fttrenta statemas och Sovietuniones beteende i de fbrsta 
fdrhandlingama om be gränsing av stratcgiska vapen. (Linkoeping, Sweden:
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For Milton Leitenberg there is no doubt that NATO was mainly responsible for 
the dropping of the U.S. proposal:
"Diese Vorschläge wurden von den NATO-Verbündeten, insbesondere der 
Bundesrepublik, zurückgewiesen
In interviews West German officials offered Leitenberg a different version: Had 
the Soviet Union been willing to include its SS-4/5 missiles they claimed that 
the American FBS could have been negotiated as well. However, this version is 
not very convincing in view of the evidence of the material.
Lothar Riihl presents a chronology of these events which differs from that of 
Garthoff. He suggests that already between 1967 and 1969, the Johnson and 
Nixon administrations had decided to exclude these Soviet systems:
"Als zwischen 1967 und 1969 die erste amerikanisch-sowjetische Verhandlung 
über eine Begrenzung der strategischen Rüstungen (SALT) vorbereitet wurde, 
entschieden die Administrationen Johnson und Nixon, die sowjetischen 
Mittelstreckenraketen SS-4 und SS-5 nicht in die Verhandlungen 
einzubeziehen, obwohl die Sowjetregierung alle US-Waffensysteme, die von 
vorgeschobenen Startbasen aus sowjetisches Gebiet erreichen könnten 
(Forward Based Systems=FBS) in die Begrenzungen einzusetzen suchte.’’-H
However, Rühl also does not deny that the Europeans withdrew their demand 
because of their interest in preventing a reduction of the FBS:
"Die NATO-Partner stimmten 1969 darin überein, SALT nicht mit den SS-4/5 
zu belasten, um nicht die amerikanischen FBS in die SALT Begrenzungen 
hineinzuziehen. "3J
Department of Social Science, Linkoeping University, 1979), pp.326-328, Letter 
from Ambassador Garthoff to Kakan Karlsson
31 "Any suggestion of FBS inclusion was resisted by the NATO allies particularly by the
Federal Republic." Leitenberg, 1986, op.cit. p. 144. Riihl points out that there were 
debates on this question in the Socialist-Liberal coalition government Without 
saying precisely what position was advocated by which party Riihl affirms that 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Walter Scheel as late as 1972 demanded the inclusion 
of the Soviet IR/MRBM in the SALT negotiations. Riihl, 1987, op.cit p.211
32 "When between 1967 and 1969 the first American-Soviet negotiations on limitations
of the strategic forces started, the Johnson and Nixon administrations decided not to 
include the Soviet MRBMs SS-4 and SS-5, although the Soviet Union tried to 
include the FBS systems in the SALT reductions." Ruehl, 1983, op.cit.. p.48
33 "In 1969 the NATO allies agreed not to burden SALT with the SS4/5 missiles in 
order not to include the FBS in the SALT reductions." ibid.
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Ruhl suggests another reason why the Europeans might not have insisted on 
inclusion of the Soviet IR/MRBMs. There was no doubt about the technical 
inferiority of the SS4/5, expressed in their massive warheads, their 
unreliability, vulnerability and their lack of accuracy.* Therefore they were 
supposed to be phased out sooner or later, which actually happened step by 
step.-» This dismantling of the SS-4/5 is used by Ruhl as an argument to explain 
why the Europeans did not feel the need to insist on its inclusion. However, in 
view of the reality of arms control this argument is only of limited validity. The 
intentions of arms control negotiations are not distorted if the treaty's loopholes 
and "grey areas" are used for a modernisation of the residual weapons and a 
compensation of the loss of options. The modernisation of the SS-4/5 had been 
overdue since the early seventies. Thus the replacement of the SS-4/5 by the SS- 
20 could have been foreseen, although the extent of the modernisation 
necessitates an answer to the question of why the Soviet Union decided to 
modernise and what strategic options the SS-20 were supposed to implement.«
Also Paul Buteux finds it ironic that the Europeans pressed the United States to 
start arms control negotiations on the IN F  while they were opposed to the 
inclusion of the FBS:
"There is an irony in the fact that as the result of the politics of the 
modernization decision, the United States came under strong allied pressure to 
seek an arms control agreement covering TNF when previously these same 
allies had resisted Soviet attempts to include forward based systems in the 
SALT negotiations.
In this context it seems to be evident:
34 ibid. Fen- the same argument see Ian Smart, "Perspectives from Europe", in Mason
Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, (eds.), SALT. The Moscow Agreements and 
Beyond. (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 185-208, p.294
35 The SS-4 and SS-5 were reduced considerably during the seventies and sixties, the
SS-5 were even phased out at the end of 1983. See Der Bundesminister der 
Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1985. Zur Lage und Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, (Bonn: 
Presse und Informationsdienstamt der Bundesregierung 1980), p.55
36 see Curt Gasteyger, Searching for World Security. Understanding Global Armament
and Disarmament. (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), p.63
&  Buteux, 1983a, op.cit.. p. 111
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- that the United States preferred an inclusion of Soviet intermediate and
medium-range nuclear systems not in reaction to, but independently of 
Soviet insistence on inclusion of the FBS;
- that the Europeans preferred to neglect the Soviet ERBM/MRBM in order
not to take the risk of a renunciation of the FBS**;
- that the European allies - at least - share responsibility for the exclusion
of the FBS systems.
Corresponding to the sparse records concerning European and especially West 
German reactions to SALT, Leitenberg states that "although this was well 
known to policymakers, there was little or no written evidence for it and most 
books written on SALT slight the entire subject."*9
The FBS were a continuous obstacle for the arms control negotiations of SALT.'«’ 
In the Vladivostok agreement of 1974 Brezhnev renounced the inclusion of FBS, 
a step which paved the way for SALT Since the modernisation of the SS-20 
can be viewed, at least in part, as an answer to the FBS - according to the logic 
of the arms race - this very breakthrough and victory of the U.S. position and 
the exclusion of the FBS from SALT induced the deployment of the SS-20 with 
no controls on numbers.
Around 1977 the phrases "grey area" and "Eurostrategic weapons" began to be 
used in the West to refer to Soviet weapons targeted on Western Europe, which 
were not covered by SALT, and which might have been covered if the United 
States had not neglected them. The Soviet Union's production and deployment 
of the Backfire bomber and SS-20 served as key legitimation for the deployment
-** However, it has to be conceded that if the Soviet Union had been serious about 
obtaining reduction of the FBS systems, it would have had to offer its 
IRBM/MRBM missiles and its short-range submarine launched cruise and ballistic 
missiles, which it never did See Leitenberg, 1986, op.cit. p. 146
39 ibid.. p. 144
40 "Brezhnev said that American forward-based nuclear systems (FBS) and all medium-
range systems in Europe, British and French as well as American, must be 
discussed in SALT III." Garthoff, 1985, op.cit. p.735
41 The Soviet concession, which was considered as a victory for the U.S. position, was
compensated for by a U.S. concession: the United States had to give up its pursuit 
of a cutback in the Soviet heavy missiles, see Talbott, 1979, op.cit. p.33 and 205
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part of NATO's 1979 Dual-Track decision. Thus an appropriate treatment of the 
"grey area" problem as early as SALT I would have contributed to the 
possibilities of obviating the whole roundabout process by which the 
superpowers deployed and then dismantled the dangerous and, not least, 
expensive land-deployed ballistic and cruise missiles.
53. Disagreement over the long-range cruise m issile in SALT II
With the ratification of SALT I in 1972 and the Vladivostok accord of 1974 a 
situation which had already been foreseen and feared by NATO allies for 
several years became a reality - the change from U.S. nuclear superiority to 
strategic parity with the Soviet Union. This codification of strategic parity 
accentuated - according to some analysts in the United States and Europe - the 
imbalances between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO Europe in 
respect to conventional forces. In fact, the codification of parity was criticised 
both in the United States and in Europe.
In 1974 in Vladivostok, Ford and Brezhnev issued a communique on the 
framework for SALT II which was signed by Carter and Brezhnev in June 1979. 
The Europeans disagreed with several points of the final SALT II proposal:
- one disagreement stemmed from Article XII of the SALT II Treaty 
concerning the non-circumvention clause, which forbade a transfer of 
nuclear technology from one SALT partner to a third partner;
- the codification of symmetrical ceilings on the strategic level was 
disapproved by the Europeans because of what they saw as the 
unconstrained Soviet build-up of conventional and nuclear forces 
targeted against Western Europe.
* Article II of the Protocol forbade the deployment of land- and sea-based 
cruise missiles with a range exceeding 600 kilometres, to which the 
Europeans strongly objected. They regarded the cruise missile as a 
vitally needed option on the Eurostrategic level42.
** See Josef Joffe, "Why Germans support SALT." Survival. (Vol.21, No.5, September- 
October 1979) pp.209-212, here p.209, one of the few European articles admitting 
problems with SALT II.
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Francois de Rose, French Ambassador to NATO from 1970-75, complained as 
well that these European apprehensions had not been published, since
"(t)o this writer’s knowledge there has not been one official comment in 
Europe over the provision limiting the range of land-based cruise missiles to 
600 kilometers".4*
Corresponding to the Europeans' different evaluation of the political and 
military value of SALT, there was also a remarkable discrepancy between the 
public and private views of many European government officials.44 However, 
in spite of their ambiguous attitude, only a handful of thèse officials supported 
a rejection of SALT H Most favoured U.S. Senate resolutions or amendments to 
the treaty rather than an outright rejection. Even former Defence Minister 
Womer, who stated an unusually strong case against SALT II, said that the 
rejection of SALT II would be "inappropriate".45
53.1. Development o f the cruise missile
The cruise missile originated in the Pentagon's endeavours to circumvent 
SALT. In June 1972, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird asked for and received 
supplementary appropriations to begin work on weapons that would 
compensate for barriers built up by the newly signed SALT Ir^
"With the signing of a strategic arms limitation agreement in 1972 the 
exploitation of cruise missile technology also became intertwined with future 
negotiating strategies at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The 
disappointment that the terms of the first round accords elicited from 
conservative sectors of American opinion and the Nixon Administration's 
emphasis on negotiating from a ’position of strength’ prompted the further 
development of cruise missiles as both a ’bargaining chip’ for the next phase of 
the talks and a ’hedge’ against the possible breakdown of negotiations."47
43 Francois de Rose, "The Future of SALT and Western Security in Europe." Foreign
Affairs. (Vol.57, No.5, Summer 1979) pp.1065-1074, here p.1066
44 Yost, 1981, op.cit. p.27
45 ibid.
4<s "In a recent appearance before the House Military Appropriations subcommittee, 
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird spoke vaguely of the need for certain 
’additional hedges for the future’, in light of the terms of the Soviet-American arms 
limitation accords." William Beecher, "Major-War Plans are being revised by 
White House" New York Times. August 5,1972, p.L9
47 Richard Burt, "The Cruise Missile and Arms Control", Survival (Vol. 18, No.l, 
January/February 1976b), pp. 10-16, here p .ll
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The U.S. administration had decided to develop more accurate and powerful 
warheads for the existing Minuteman and Poseidon missiles (MIRV and MARV 
technology) and a new type of strategic weapon, the cruise missile, a small 
unmanned jet plane that in one version could be fired from a submarine along a 
very low flight path, delivering its nuclear warhead after about 1,000 miles.4* 
According to Robert J. Art and Stephen E. Ockenden the military services did 
not want cruise missiles since they threatened what they regarded as their 
respective dominant missions. Based on interviews they conclude that "(t)he 
long-range air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) was rammed down the throat of 
the Air Force" and that the Air Force got stuck with the GLCM, since the Army 
refused responsibility for them. The Navy concentrated on the mission of 
carrier-based aircraft and did not want the sea-launched cruise missile. Instead, 
the cruise missiles' development was supported by high-level political figures 
in the Pentagon, the White House, and even the U.S. Department of State:
"For individuals operating at this level in the American government, the 
driving factors were negotiations with the Soviet Union on SALT I and Q, the 
concern expressed by NATO’s European members about the reliability of 
America’s foreign policy and the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over 
them in the era of strategic parity between the superpowers, and White House 
anticipation of adverse congressional action on SALT II if this new technology 
were not developed to its fullesL..As a consequence of this dichotomy between 
service resistance and high-level political pressure, the American government 
during the SALT II negotiations from roughly 1973 until 1977 was bargaining 
hard for systems that the services did not want."49
The cruise missile as another example of the "inexorable technological 
imperative that drives the arms race"50 was started in 1972 by the U.S. Navy 
with the development of the first of the present generation of nuclear- armed 
cruise missiles - the Tomahawk" sea-launched cruise missile built by General 
Dynamics. In 1973 the U.S. Air Force followed with the development of an air- 
launched version by Boeing, although the technical difference between the air- 
and sea-launched version is marginal.5'  The Boeing design was chosen as the
** Beecher, 1972, op.ciL. p.L9
49 Robert J. Art and Stephen E. Ockenden, "The Domestic Politics of Cruise Missile
Development, 1970-1980" in: Richard K  Betts (ed.). Cruise Missile. Technology. 
Strategy. Politics. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 1981) p.359-413, here 
p.359-360
50 ibiiL p.359
st Ulrich Albrecht, Kündigt den Nachrllstunpsbeschluß! Argumente für die 
Friedensbewegung. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1982), pp.58
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model for the air-launched cruise missile. In January 1977, the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense directed the Air Force and Navy to place their cruise missile 
programmes under a single Joint Cruise Missile Project Office, with the Navy as 
the leading service.« This resulted at the same time in the Department of 
Defense decision directing the Navy to enter Full Scale Engineering 
Development of both the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile and the 
ground-launched cruise missile for the Air Force mission." The cruise missile 
was deployed in Britain, Belgium, Italy and the Federal Republic. The sea- 
launched version, which is the only dual-capable version of the cruise missile, 
has been deployed since 1984.
5 3 2 . The ban on the cruise missile
European apprehensions that the Ford (and later Carter) administration could 
put a ban on the cruise missile in order to achieve SALT II had been building up 
since the Vladivostok agreement. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pressed for 
increased funds for cruise missile development because he considered the 
missiles to be an ideal bargaining counter, which meant that the United States 
could promise to cancel development or deployment of the cruise missile in 
exchange for reductions in Soviet strategic forces development. Initially, the 
ALCM was the most prominent object, but by 1976 the SLCM and GLCM had 
developed equal visibility in the SALT negotiations. All three versions played a 
role as bargaining counters. Over the seven years of SALT negotiations (from 
1973 to 1979) the U.S. executive branch developed a seemingly endless number 
of SALT II packages to offer the Soviet Union. The bargaining started during 
the Vladivostok agreement in which the Soviets expected something valuable in 
exchange for their renunciations of the inclusion of the FBS in the agreement. In 
exchange, they requested that aU air-to-surface missiles and ground- and sea- 
launched cruise missiles with a range over 600 km should be banned. The 
Vladivostok accord could be interpreted as an agreement to the limitation on 
cruise missiles in that the United States accepted limitations on air-launched 
missiles, but without clarifying whether that term referred to cruise missiles or
52 For overviews of the cruise missile’s development see: U.S. Senate Hearings, 
Authorization for Military Procurement. 1977, op.cit. p.6380-6416. And see also 
E.H. Conrow / G.K Smith / A.A. Barbour, The Joint Cruise Missiles Project: An 
Acquisition History. Prepared for the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office. Rand
Corporation R-3039-JCMPO, (Santa Monica, California, August 1982)
SJ US. Senate Hearings, Authorization for Military Procurement, 1977, op.cit. p.6394
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ballistic missiles. A ballistic missile, as opposed to a cruise missile, is guided 
over only part of its course. The United States did at first agree to count cruise 
missiles against the 2,400 ceiling for air-to-surface missiles with a range greater 
than 600 kilometres, but later clarified the term 'air-launched-missiles' as 
meaning ballistic air-to-surface missiles.* Thus, the Vladivostok agreement - 
although initially hailed as a breakthrough in the negotiations - later proved to 
have incorporated a bone of contention with its failure to include a definition of 
"air-launched missiles". Another flying machine was not defined in the 
Vladivostok accord and thus came to occupy the "grey area" of the Vladivostok 
definitions. It was the Soviet Backfire bomber, finally excluded from the SALT 
agreement like the SS-20 and also part of the Soviet medium-range threat 
against Europe.55
The European apprehension concerning potential restrictions on the cruise 
missile was fed anew by Kissinger's January 1976 proposal which offered to 
count bombers armed with cruise missiles in the subceiling agreed to in 
Vladivostok as an exchange for 250 Backfires for a period of five years. 
Kissinger's offer included the idea that ALCMS with ranges over 2,500 
kilometres and SLCMs and GLCMs with ranges over 2,000 kms would not be 
deployed. The Soviets countered with a 600-km limit for the SLCM and GLCM 
and apparently did not oppose the 2,500 km range limit for the ALCM. But 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rums field and Fred Ode, the Director of Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, investigated Kissinger's proposal and 
rejected it because of the compromise that limited the sea-launched cruise 
missile for at least five years, if not permanentlyM The Pentagon fought also
*  Talbott, 1979, op.cit. p.35
55 The TU-26, also called Backfire, first observed in 1969, is a twin-engined, swing- 
wing supersonic airplane, see ibid.. p.33. It began to enter service in 1974 amid a 
great deal of uncertainty abroad as to what its operational capabilities and primary 
mission might be. The problem was to define what is a "heavy bomber". Ford and 
Brezhnev agreed that the Soviet MY-Bison and TU-20 Bear as well as the 
American B-52 and its follow-on, the B-l, would be all considered "heavy 
bombers" and thus included, but that medium range bombers like the American FB- 
111, F - l ll  and the Soviet TU-2 Blinder and its follow-on, the TU-26 Backfire, 
would not The problem was that while in the Soviet view the Backfire’s primary 
mission was to hit Chinese and European targets, air-fueling or forward bases in 
Cuba could render Backfire capable of attacking targets in the United States, thus 
allowing the definition of the Backfire as a strategic system. See Jane M.O. Sharp, 
"Understanding the INF Debacle: Arms Control and Alliance Cohesion" in Arms 
Control (Vol.5, No.2,1984) p.95-127, p.l 11
*  Art/Ockenden, 1981, op.cit.. p. 396 Talbott, 1979, op.cit. pp.36/37
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hard for the option of the ground-launched cruise missile, as confirmed by 
James Thomson, member of the National Security Council:
"In the course of attempts to justify within the US government the country’s 
right to deploy a long-range GLCM, Pentagon civilians posited a theatre 
nuclear mission for the system, which at that time was not even in 
development."57
In January 1977 President Carter took office in the White House showing in his 
inaugural address his well-known scepticism about nuclear weapons by his call 
for complete nuclear disarmament.5* Carter also committed himself to proceed 
rapidly to a SALT agreement.
/
In March 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was dispatched to Moscow with 
a "Comprehensive Proposal". In its treatment of the cruise missile the 
"Comprehensive Proposal" seemed almost calculated to provoke the Soviets 
with its suggestion to limit all cruise missiles to a range of 2,500 kms only. 
Applied to ground-launched cruise missiles, this range would have been 
especially upsetting to the Soviets, since it would have allowed GLCMs based 
in West Germany to reach the Soviet Union. But the Soviets insisted on 
returning to Vladivostok as the basis for negotiations, and thus the initial Carter 
negotiating position collapsed. Consequently, the administration fashioned a 
new proposal in April 1977.59
The newly conceived April 1977 proposal combined a three-tier approach: a 
treaty, a protocol and a statement of common understanding. The Soviets 
would have been asked to accept temporary constraints on the modernisation 
of their ICBMs in exchange for temporary constraints on the cruise missile. 
ALCMs would appear in the treaty with a range limit of 2,500 kilometres. 
SLCMs and GLCMs would appear in the protocol, limited in range to 600 
kilometres if they were deployed but to be tested at ranges up to 2,500 
kilometres. The United States had no plans to deploy long-range sea-launched 
and ground-launched cruise missiles within the period of the proposed 3-year 
protocol and it would therefore be relatively painless to accept such a 
temporary ban. The final SALT II accord of June 1979 was largely identical with
57 Thomson, 1984, op.cit.. p.603 
5* ibid.. p.604
59 Talbott, 1979, op.ciL. p.68-78
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the April proposal with the except that the ALCM range limits were dropped. 
European apprehensions about American SALT policy were confirmed, since 
they feared that it would be difficult after three years to free the cruise missile 
from the restrictions.40
For air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) the United States did not accept any 
restrictions because Carter had still not made up his mind whether to proceed 
with the development of the B-l supersonic bomber. In the event of a 
renunciation of the B-l's production the long-range ALCM on B-52 bombers 
were planned as a compensation for the B-l bombers. Today both the ALCM 
and the B-l bomber are in service.
\
The features of the cruise missile which worried the Soviets to the extent that 
their limitation in a SALT agreement seemed to be a condition sine qua non, are 
described by Strobe Talbott:
"Small, fixed-wing, subsonic, cheap, unmanned ... (t)his is the cruise missile, 
the latest manifestation of American technology and therefore the object of the 
latest Soviet phobia. The jet-propelled drone can be launched from sea, land or 
air, it would sneak under enemy radar, skimming the treetops, finding its way 
by retracing a preprogrammed map of the terrain below, rigging and zagging 
to avoid known antiaircraft installations, and homing in on its target with 
uncanny accuracy."*2
Richard Burt, then Assistant Director of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, was the first to analyse in detail the implications of cruise missile 
development and he concluded that the cruise missile could provide an 
attractive replacement for increasingly expensive strike aircraft. Land-based 
cruise missiles could undertake missions of interdiction" and offensive counter
«  see NYT, October 13,1977, p.A9 and Talbott, 1979, op.ciL. p. 141
6i in the end of 1987 64 B-1B bombers with 1,614 ALCM warheads and B-52G/H with 
1140 SRAM warheads were deployed. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Nuclear Weapons Patabook. START and Strategic Modernization. Working 
Papers. Summit Watch Special, Washington D.C., 1987, p.30
«  see Talbott, 1979, op.cit.. p.34/35
63 To "interdict", in the NATO definition, means "to isolate, or seal off an area by any 
means, to deny the use of a route of approach”. U.S. Department of Defense, 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, op.cit.. p. 178. Interdiction therefore 
"aims at isolating the battlefield, thus preventing additional enemy forces from 
influencing the direct (close) battle. The entire arsenal of modem warfare may be 
applied to interdiction: conventional, chemical or nuclear munitions, electronic 
warfare, deception, naval or ground operations, and so on”. Per Berg and Gunilla
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air operations and would not be vulnerable to the Soviet air defences. At sea 
they might possibly supplant the need for aircraft carriers which need large 
complements of attack aircraft.«* These characteristics of the cruise missile -  
accuracy, in-flight survivability and relatively low costs — made the Europeans 
very interested in maintaining the option of deploying the long-range cruise 
missile.
German strategic experts regarded the cruise missile as an optimal solution for 
their security interests.« The missile corresponded to a crucial principle of the 
German strategic consensus principle and could be used on very different 
missions: with its potential range of over 2,500 kms and the penetration 
capability offered by its low altitude flight, the cruise missile is able to strike the 
Soviet Union from almost all potential deployment areas. Since the cruise 
missile is dual-capable, it can accomplish two important requirements. First it 
can replace expensive and aging strike aircraft for conventional missions. 
Secondly, it fits into the German interpretation of flexible response, i.e. the 
concept of launching, very early in a war, a nuclear signal to the Soviet Union 
that NATO is willing to escalate the conflict. Thus the cruise missile was 
campaigned for by those German strategists who consider land-deployed, 
nuclear-tipped missiles within range of the Soviet Union as an appropriate 
means for the implementation of the German first use concept. The cruise 
missiles' capability to guarantee penetration of Soviet territory and to 
implement conventional missions was another factor which, among German 
strategic experts and politicians, gave momentum to the campaign for keeping 
the option of the cruise missile over 600 km, although the cruise missile with a 
conventional mission was never deployed in Europe.
5 3 3 . German insistence on the cruise missile
After the April 1977 proposal the Europeans intensified their requests for 
technical and operational American analyses of the cruise missile.«*
Herolf, "’Deep strike’: new technologies for conventional interdiction" in World
Armaments and Disarmament. SIPR1 Yearbook 1984. Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, (London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis,
1984)pp.291-31 l,pp.291-292
64 Bun, 1976b, op.cit.. p. 12
see also Haftendom, 1985, op.cit. pp.248-249
«  see Thomson, 1984, op.cit. p.604
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Richard Burt perceived such a strong European pressure that he considered the 
situation for the United States as a choice "between placing priority on 
strengthening Alliance ties and quickly obtaining a new SALT agreement."«7 
With his statement Burt suggests that the United States had to yield to these 
European requests in order to gain their support for SALT DL
Leslie Gelb describes the European reaction to the planned ban on the Cruise 
Missile:
"America’s European allies were never quite certain whether Mr. Kissinger 
was seeking to bargain the weapons away. When the Carter Administration 
acknowledged trying to do just that, they exploded. Washington was only 
looking after its own interests, they felt, and doing nothing to counter weapons 
such the Backfire bomber or SS-20 missile that could attack Europe. Cruise 
missile installation was urged as a tangible expression of the nuclear 
umbrella."6*
John F. Lehman, then Secretary of the Navy and Seymour Weiss, until 1974 
director of the State Department's Politico-Military Bureau, mentions West 
German Defence Minister Georg Leber and Minister for Foreign Affairs Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher as having participated in pursuing this policy line:
"According to senior European officials, our allies made clear that they 
preferred that cruise missile ranges would not be limited but that, if a limitation 
was impossible to avoid, the permitted range should be long enough to meet 
valid military needs. These sources indicate that West German Minister of 
Defence George Leber informed Secretary of Defense Brown that nothing less 
than a 1.500 kilometer limit would meet these criteria and that this view was 
later confirmed as West German policy in a communication from Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Hans Dietrich Genscher to Secretary of State Vance. "tf9
Lothar Riihl interprets a statement of Georg Leber which he made in an 
interview in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in April 1976, as advocating 
preservation of the cruise missile option with a range of more than 600 km as a
07 Richard Burt, "The SS-20 and the Eurostrategic balance", in The World Today
(Vol.33, No.2, February 1977) pp.43-51, here p.50
«  Leslie Gelb, "The Little Missile that Could and Therefore is", in NYT. August 30, 
1981, p.E3
69 John F. Jr. Lehman and Seymour Weiss, "SALT and our NATO Allies", in Lehman, 
Weiss (eds.), Bevond the SALT II Failure. (New York: Praeger, 1981) pp.59-66, 
here p.63
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delivery system for conventional warheads.70 There is no doubt that "(a) 
significant aspect of the United States and Allied objective was to protect 
NATO's conventional cruise missile option for possible theatre use in the post- 
Protocoi period.”7' Leber considered them as a cheap replacement for the 
expensive strike bombers.72 In December 1977 Leber insisted publicly that the 
options offered by the cruise missile technology should not be prevented by a 
SALT agreement.
It has to be pointed out again that the cruise missile covered requirements for 
nuclear and conventional missions and that therefore advocates of different 
strategic concepts campaigned for the long-range cruise missile. It is dear that 
the Federal Republic was an eager promoter of the cruise missile, but only in 
concert with its European allies like Norway, Italy, Britain and the 
Netherlands.74
Eventually, in the summer of 1977, Leslie Gelb, then Director of the State's 
Department Politico-Military Bureau, went to Europe to discuss a paper on the 
cruise missile that he had written for NATO officials. Cyrus Vance had 
instructed Gelb to present a balanced paper, but one that would also dampen 
the conviction of many in Europe that the cruise missile would solve all of 
NATO's security problems. Thomson describes the content of the paper as 
follows:
70 "Leber: Die Abschreckung wird glaubwürdiger durch neue Präzisionswaffen" in 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. April, 10, 1976, p.l and 2. In this interview he 
pleads for a replacement of nuclear weapons with conventional precision guided 
weapons. Leber considers the use of strategic weapons after the superpowers’ 
Vladivostok agreement "only imaginable with difficulties" and thus announces 
publicly his disbelief in extended deterrence. Therefore this article would be fully 
consistent with an advocacy of the reservation of long-range cruise missile for 
conventional missions, but it is not explicitly articulated in the published part of the 
interview. For Riihl’s interpretation see "Belastungen des Amerikanisch- 
Europäischen Verhältnisses" in Wagner et al. (eds.), op.cit.. 1983, p.50
?! emphasis in the text, U.S. Congress, Senate, SALT and the NATO Allies. A Staff 
Report to the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Washington D.C., U.S.G.P.O., 1979, October 1979, p.33
72 Bittorf describes the event again according to the well-known pattem: Leber had been
talked into buying the cruise missile by Washington. Wilhelm Bittorf, "Sie 
vermehren sich wie die Karnickel" in Der Spiegel (Vol.40, No.44, October 27, 
1986, Pan II) p.l 17
73 Ruehl, 1980, op.cit.. p.102 and see Talbott, 1979, op.cit.. p.187
74 Ruehl, 1983, op.cit. p.50
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"The paper suggested that cruise missiles might have negative arms control 
implications • for example, by posing verification problems - and raised the 
possibility of vigorous and negative Soviet reaction to any deployments. The 
paper went even further in implying that cruise missile deployments might be 
unwise because of a ’decoupling* effect - they would suggest a Eurostrategic 
balance independent of US strategic forces and thus reduce the credibility of 
the US strategic nuclear commitment.”75
But while these presentations were apparently "scrupulously fair"7*, the 
common assumption of many Europeans was that they were intended to 
cultivate European support of the American SALT position and thus must have 
been biased against the potential of cruise missile.77
It was not only the European suspicion about the limitation of the cruise missile 
option which caused irritations in transatlantic relations, especially during the 
summer of 1977. At the same time the Carter administration tried to inhibit the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons by putting limitations on the fuel cycle and the 
fast breeder. This policy collided with German and French interests in 
exporting nuclear technology into countries of the third world.7«
53.4. Schmidt's public interference w ith the SALT process
Examining the genesis of the LRTNF decision, the observer is reminded of the 
historical theory according to which history is made by 'great men'. In the 
literature there is a special focus on the role and importance of the then 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt which does not do justice to the genesis of the 
decision. His famed 1977 October speech is perceived as the first and at the 
same time the most important intervention of the Federal Republic in the whole
75 Thomson, 1984, op.cit.. p.604
76 see Garthoff, 1983, op.cit, p.201
77 see ibid., p.201; Fred Kaplan, "Waning over new Missiles for NATO". New York
Times Magazine (December 9, 1979), pp.46-90, p.55 and An/Ockenden, 1981, 
op.cit. p.400/401; Thomson writes about the effects of the paper: "The more the 
United States displayed its reluctance to press Cruise Missile on NATO, the more 
the allies wanted them." 1984, op.cit. p.603
78 Karl Kaiser, "The Great Nuclear Debate: German-American Disagreements" in
Foreign Policy. (Spring 1987) p.83-110. For a good overview of all political 
transatlantic irritations (also in the economic field), see Helga Haftendom, 1986, 
QjLOL, pp.20-23
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process. However, no analysis of the NATO Dual-Track decision can renounce 
an attempt to interpret this famed speech.7»
In his speech Schmidt examined the possible effect of strategic nuclear parity 
between the superpowers, as codified by SALT, would have on European 
security. His answer is probably the most frequently cited, and the most 
ambiguous, statement made by a German politician over the past ten years:
"Most of us will agree that political and military balance is the prerequisite of 
our security, and I would warn against the illusion that there may be grounds 
for neglecting that balance....Second, changed strategic conditions confront us 
with new problems. SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. To put it another way: SALT neutralizes 
their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of 
the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional 
weapons„..No one can deny that the principle of parity is a sensible one. 
However, its fulfillment must be the aim of all anns-limitation and arms- 
control negotiations and it must apply to all categories of weapons. Neither 
side can agree to diminish its security unilaterally.... We are not unaware that 
both the United States and the Soviet Union must be anxious to remove 
threatening strategic developments from their relationship. But strategic arms 
limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably 
impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-a-vis 
Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the 
disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations. So 
long as this is not the case we must maintain the balance of the full range of 
deterrence strategy. The alliance must, therefore, be ready to make available 
the means to support its present strategy, which is still the right one, and to 
prevent any developments that could undermine the basis of this strategy.”*0
79 Helga Haftendom’s background report concerning the London 1977 speech suggests 
that Schmidt was not responsible for the modernisation decision. Haftendom 
reminds the reader of the most prominent event of those days in October 1977: the 
"German Autumn" when the hi-jacking of the Lufthansa Boeing 737 on October 
13,1977 by a Palestinian Command held the whole nation breathless. These events 
did not leave much time for preparation of the speech in the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies in London. The speech was mostly identical with the draft by 
Christian Bauer, a personal adviser to Schmidt who incorporated proposals by 
Walther Stiitzle and a paper by Lothar Riihl containing proposals for the MBFR 
talks. Haftendom 1986, op.cit , p. 15. Schwartz reports that StUtzle had been 
following the debate on the European cruise missile option in some detail and had 
been impressed with the strategic rationale for LRTNF. Schwartz, 1983, op.cit.. 
p.214. Lothar Riihl criticises the Schmidt speech for its ambiguities concerning its 
arms control approach and the mode how SALT and MBFR are interlinked. Riihl 
concludes: "Diese Mehrdeutigkeit erschwerte die Interpretation von Zielsetzung 
und Tragweite der Londoner Rede Helmut Schmidts." ("This ambiguity rendered 
the interpretation of the objective and the consequences of Helmut Schmidt’s 
London speech difficult") Riihl, 1987, op.cit. pp.225-226, here p.226
90 Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture", Survival
(January/February 1978) pp.2-13, here pp.3-4
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The question arose whether Schmidt with his speech intended to call the U.S. 
strategic nuclear guarantee into question. It is beyond doubt that he demanded 
parity in tactical nuclear weapons. In London, Schmidt went even further than 
in his May 1977 speech to the North Atlantic Council, in which he called for the 
establishment of a conventional balance.*' An imbalance of Eurostrategic forces 
was pointed out by him as early as 1969:
"Das sowjetische Übergewicht im europäischen Zentralabschnin wird durch 
rund 750 Mittelstreckenraketen noch verstärkt, zu denen es keinerlei 
Entsprechung auf seiten der NATO gibt In diesem Punkt wird am deutlichsten, 
daß insgesamt und über einen längeren Zeitraum eines theoretisch kalkulierten 
militärischen Konflikts gerechnet, das Gleichgewicht im Zentralabschnitt 
Europas nur bei Einbeziehung auch der strategischen nuklearen Waffen 
gegeben ist."*2
M s October speech was subjected to various interpretations on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The deviding line of these interpretations is the crucial question 
whether Schmidt intended to establish a Eurostrategic balance exclusively 
through arms control or whether he called for the deployment of LRTNF. The 
predominating interpretation was that Schmidt advocated the establishment of 
a Eurostrategic balance through the deployment of the cruise miasilp as a 
counter to the SS 20. This interpretation was not really far-fetched in view of the 
parallel statements of his Defence Minister Leber, who publicly advocated the 
preservation of the option for a long-range cruise missile". Schmidt's remark in 
the speech that NATO "should make available the appropriate means to
tl See Helmut Schmidt, "Remarks by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt” in Survival. 
(July/August 1977), pp.177-178, here p. 178
«  "Soviet superiority in the Central Sector is further reinforced by about 750 medium 
range ballistic missiles that have no NATO counterpart This point more than any 
other drives home the lesson that looked at in general from the theoretical point of 
view of a conflict extended over a prolonged period of time, there can only be an 
overall balance in Europe’s central sector if strategic nuclear weapons are drawn 
into the equation." Helmut Schmidt, Strategie des Gleichgewichts. Deutsche 
Friedenspolitik und die Weltmächte. (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1969) p.116
83 Rühl argues that the ambiguities implied in the speech make interpretation difficult. 
To Rühl’s knowledge Schmidt was interpreted both as making a request for 
hardware and as expressing a clear preference for abolishing the imbalance by arms 
control. Rühl, 1987, op.cit. p.225. See also Hoffmann’s interpretation: "Er (Helmut 
Schmidt, S.P) ermahnte und wies auf das Problem hin, nannte aber keine 
Lösungsmöglichkeiten. In 1977 war Helmut Schmidt eher Mahner als Macher, 
Motor der Entwicklung, aber nicht Architekt der Nachrüstung." ("He (Helmut 
Schmidt S.P.) admonished and pointed out problems, but he did not mention any 
solutions. 1977 Helmut Schmidt was more a wamer, a motor of development, but 
not the architect of the armament decision.”) Hoffmann, 1986, oo.cit.. (ref. 
chap. 132) p.489
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support its present strategy", does, however, suggest only the conclusion that 
he requested a hardware solution. President Carter obviously interpreted the 
Schmidt speech in this way.« Cyrus Vance explains the effect of Schmidt's 
speech on the continuing SALT negotiations:
"In October 1977, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, whom I regard as an 
outstanding statesman and for whom I have the greatest respect, delivered a 
speech in London emphasizing the German conviction that parity in 
intercontinental strategic weapons and the prospect of further strategic 
limitations in SALT II without any constraints on the SS-20 would have a 
negative effect on what he called the ’Eurostrategic* balance of nuclear forces.
We had hoped to conduct a study of NATO nuclear requirements in the 1970s 
and beyond out of the limelight, free from the pressures generated by intense 
public interest and scrutiny. After the Schmidt speech this was no longer 
possible. "ai
Schmidt confirmed at several occasions that his most important concern was 
the establishment of a military balance, which did not necessarily have to be 
expressed in total arithmetical equivalence for all kinds of forces and weapons. 
But parity had to be established in a political way.**
Schmidt, who made every effort to start the INF arms control negotiations 
between the superpowers in the early eighties, and who supported the INF 
treaty unambiguously, said in an interview that he did not envisage the Dual- 
Track decision in his IISS speech. He stated that he and Ford had agreed in 1975 
that the SS-20 would be included in SALT II:
"In the course of 1974 and 1975, I had understood that the Russians were 
building up a new strategic threat against targets in Europe and the 
Mediterranean basin and that this would entail the potential danger of political 
blackmail against my country. And this led to a conversation between Gerry 
Ford and myself, I think it was in 1975. And he said, In my next negotiations I 
will include these weapons you call Eurostrategic."97
*  Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith. (London, Glasgow, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto, 
Johannesburg: William Collins, 1982) p.235
45 Vance, 1983, op.ciL. p.67
86 Speech of the Chancellor at the United Nations Assembly, 10th special assembly of 
the United Nations for disarmament in Bulletin der Bundesregierung. "Rede des 
Bundeskanzlers vor den Vereinten Nationen", Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt 
der Bundesregierung (No.55, May 30,1978) pp.529-535, here p.53(V531
87 Interview "With Helmut Schmidt", by Craig Whitney, New York Times Magagne 
(September 16,1984), pp.57-130, p.92
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The problem was, according to Schmidt, that the Carter administration, 
Brzezinski in particular, did not feel committed to this special Ford-Schmidt 
deal.
One week after the October speech of Chancellor Schmidt, U.S. Defense 
Secretary Brown and Secretary of State Vance argued that in view of additional 
Poseidon warheads on submarines and the numerical doubling of the F -llls  
which had been assigned to NATO in the second half of the seventies«, no 
additional sea- or air-launched cruise missiles were required. Still, in December
1977, at the annual meeting of NATO's ministers, Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown sought to reassure the Allies that SALT II would not curtail any NATO 
options, informing them that the Soviet Union had now agreed that the three- 
year protocol would not limit the testing of cruise missiles up to 2,500 kms, and 
that in any case the deployment could not be started before the expiration of the 
protocol. Thus the Germans achieved at least a partial success over the cruise 
missile question.
53.5. Schmidt's strategic doctrine
In order to give a more detailed background for the interpretation of Schmidt's 
1977 October speech, the opportunity will be taken to analyse Schmidt's 
strategic doctrine. Since Schmidt, both before coming into office in 1969 and 
after leaving office in 1982, campaigned for a no first-use policy, his doctrine 
can certainly not be lumped together with the doctrine of German strategic 
analysts who called for LRTNF.
Schmidt revealed great reluctance to resort to nuclear weapons very early in 
any conflict on the Central Front.*9 His well-known 1961 book "Defense and 
retaliation" which is regarded as a plea for the introduction of flexible response
«  Gen Krell / Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Der Rüstungswettlauf in Europa. 
Mmelstrcckcnsvstemc. konventionelle Waffen. Rüstungskontrolle. Frankfun: 
Campus, 1982, p.19. The exact dates of the decision and deployment in respect of 
additional Poseidon warheads and F- 111 are difficult to ascertain. The Aviation 
Week and Space Technology reports of the F - l l l ’ additional deployments in 
August 1, 1977. According to the NYT the assignation of "more" Poseidon missiles 
was "reviewed" at the NPG meeting in Monterey in 1975, see NYT. June 18, 1975, 
p. 10
89 Buteux, 1983, op.cit.. p. 136
149
and its first presentation to the German public, was published even some 
months before McNamara's Ann Arbor speech.
A basic feature in Schmidt's individual TNF posture is his doubt whether a 
limited nuclear war could be controlled. Thus, in 1961 he criticised Kissinger's 
theory of a "limited war", because it could not guarantee the termination of war 
at a level below an all-out nuclear war.
"Kissinger demonstrated that it is diplomacy’s task to make it clear to the 
enemy in peacetime that the initiation by the Americans of the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons would not be tantamount to the initiation of a strategic 
nuclear war of annihilation calling for retaliatory or pre-emptive action. Even 
then it was not made clear whether, in the event of war, escalation from tactical 
nuclear weapons up to thermo-nuclear bombs could be avoided."90
However, Kissinger, who in 1957 still advocated the theory of limited war, in 
1960 presented a reappraisal of his former ideas and also started to approve a 
conventional emphasis in strategy.9' Schmidt seemed to welcome the fact that 
he now was in agreement with Kissinger92. It seems, however, that in his 
enthusiasm Schmidt overemphasised Kissinger's "complete revision" of his 
previous argument.”  In his 1960 book Kissinger gives the impression that his 
abandonment of the notion of limited war is due to the realistic evaluation that 
NATO could never agree to fight a war of this kind rather than a result of his 
drawing into doubt the notion itself: "While it is feasible to design a theoretical 
model for limited nuclear war, the fact remains that fifteen years after the 
beginning of the nuclear age no such model has ever won agreement."9* His 
hope that the defence establishment's unwillingness will decrease is suggested 
implicitly.
Schmidt's credo was that any use of nuclear weapons would automatically lead 
to the decimation of Europe's civilian population and that of Germany in
90 Schmidt, 1962, op.cit. p.94
91 Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice. Prospects of American Foreign
Policy. (New Yoric: Harper and Brothers, 1960)
«  Helmut Schmidt, "Eine neue Strategie der USA" in: SPD-Pressedienst (P/XVI/51, 
March 2,1961) mentioned in Wilker, 1977, op.cit. p.291
93 "Strategische Umrüstung in USA. Helmut Schmidt über die neue 
Verteidigungspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten", Hamburger Echo. March 3,1961
94 Kissinger, 1960, op.cit. p.81
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particular. Quite starkly, he completed his argument by pointing out that "the 
peoples of Europe would not care whether it was tactical nuclear weapons or 
strategic missiles that brought about their extermination."**
He pleaded that NATO should be able to fight exclusively with conventional 
means and he envisaged NATO's employment of nuclear weapons exclusively 
as a response to the W Fs use of nuclear weapons96. Thus, his statement implies 
a renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.
In accordance with Schmidt's view, the White Paper 1970 expresses such 
scepticism in em ploym ent of tactical nuclear weapons. This demonstrates that, 
at least over this decade of participation in the strategic debate, Helmut 
Schmidt did not change his basic views on NATO's strategy:
"In Mitteleuropa wäre jedoch eine ausgedehnte taktisch-nukleare Kriegführung
gleichermaßen vernichtend wie ein strategisch-nuklearer Konflikt”97
Accordingly, Schmidt also changed Defence Minister Schroder's preference for 
a very low threshold: the 1970 White Paper representing the doctrines of the 
new Socialist-Liberal coalition, stressed Schmidt's preference for a high nuclear 
threshold and a strong conventional element in defence policy. The 1970 White 
Paper put forward the demand that tactical nuclear weapons "must not be used 
except as a last resort and even then only with restraint and on a selective
95 Schmidt 1962, op.cit. p. 103
96 ibid. p. 184
97 "In central Europe, however, a large-scale tactical nuclear war would have the same
devastating effects as a strategic nuclear conflict" Bundesminister der 
Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1970. Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und
SS.__Lage__der Bundeswehr. Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der
Bundesregierung, 1970), p.27. See also Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 
Weißbuch 1971/72. Zur Sichcriicit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur
Enttticklung_der Bundeswehr. (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der
Bundesregierung, 1971), p.18. The first White Paper, presented in 1969, was 
prepared under Schröder’s tenure in the Defence Ministry, the next two were 
prepared on Schmidt’s orders by the newly created Planungsstab, first chaired by 
Theo Sommer and later by Hans Georg Wieck, see Kelleher, 1975, op.cit. p.364
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basis. "M . The White Paper demanded strong conventional forces which should 
function as a "pause" for negotiations:
"Es kommt dabei entscheidend darauf an, daß in Westeuropa konventionelle 
Streitkräfte in einem Umfang aufrecht erhalten werden, die der NATO die 
Möglichkeit belassen, auf alles außer einen vorsätzlichen Großangriff anders 
als nuklear zu reagieren: und die, wenn ein Angriff dieses Maßstabes erfolgen 
sollte, Zeit lassen für Verhandlungen über eine Beendigung des Konflikts und 
für Konsultationen unter den Verbündeten über den Ersteinsatz von 
Kernwaffen, falls die Verhandlungen fehlschlagen sollten."
Thus, the 1970 White Paper does not reject the principle of first use (and 
certainly could not afford to do so since this was an essential factor in NATO 
strategy), but advocates that it should be considered at a very late stage of war. 
According to his scepticism towards deliberate escalation, Helmut Schmidt had 
always supported the view that "each partner should be granted the right to 
veto those nuclear attacks which would be initiated from his national territory 
or would be executed on his national territory."'«'
Schmidt proclaims the following principles for NATO's strategy:
1. build-up of conventional weapons;
2. deemphasis of nuclear weapons which are shaped to execute an early 
first use;'0'
M."Als Mittel der Verteidigung können sie wegen ihrer eskalierenden und 
zerstörerischen Wirkung jedoch nur im äußersten Falle eingesetzt werden und auch 
dann jeweils restriktiv und selektiv." Weißbuch 1970, 1970, op.cit. p.40; emphasis 
by S.P. For a further statement against "an isolated tactical nuclear employment" 
because of its doubtful value as a military means and for deterrence, see Armin 
Graf von Rothenburg, "Der nukleare Aspekt in der Militärpolitik der NATO", in 
Wehrkunde (VoL21, No.5, May 1972) pp.225-230, here p.228.
99 "It is of crucial importance to maintain conventional forces of a scale in Europe 
which enable NATO to counter any attack - except a deliberate large-scale attack - 
in other ways than by nuclear means and which - in case such an attack should 
occur - would leave time for negotiations concerning a termination of the conflict 
and for consultations among the allies about the first use of nuclear weapons, if 
negotiations were to fail." Weißbuch 1970, op.cit.. p.40
too "... jedem Partner ein Vetorecht gegenüber solchen nuklearen Einsätzen 
einzuräumen, die von seinem nationalen Territorium aus gestartet oder gegen Ziele 
auf seinem nationalen Territorium geführt werden sollen", Schmidt, 1965, op.cit. 
p.624
¡01 "For no other reason than to make them credible to the potential aggressor, the 
military forces posing the threat and the plans govering their use must as far as 
possible, be shaped so as to rule out the inevitability of escalation to nuclear war,
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3. identity of military means and strategic plans for their use with the 
military means and strategy that will actually be used in the event of 
hostilities;
4. a defence structure and strategy which does not provoke the potential 
enemy to preventive a g g re s s io n ; '®  and
5. NATO as a whole should be put in a position from where it can create 
an equilibrium at all levels of possible warfare.'0-*
*
Thus, it is striking that two essential principles of Schmidt's strategic beliefs are 
inmncistpnt with the effects and strategic implications of the deployment of 
Pershing II and cruise missiles on European soil: first, the deemphasis of 
weapons which provoke first use and secondly, a defence structure and 
strategy which does not provoke the enemy into a preventive strike. Only the 
fifth principle of the necessity of balance at all levels of war-fighting options can 
be interpreted as a strategic concept which would require these kinds of 
weapons. Schmidt interpreted this concept of balance also according to its 
qualitative aspects and thus requested a balance of options. His apprehensions 
might have referred rather to the assumed Soviet capability of political 
blackmailing, through the SS-20, than to the problem of numerical imbalance.'«
It is possible that Schmidt told the truth when he stated in several interviews 
that he was not overly involved in the decision before 1979. He claims that he 
had not been interested in the cruise missile and that he did not know anything 
about the existence of the main NATO organ which dealt with the deployment 
decision, let alone its details.'" Thus the former Chancellor, according to the
and so to expose all that constitutes European civilisation to the smallest possible 
risk of destruction." Schmidt, 1962, op.cit. p. 183
m  Schmidt, 1962, op.cit. p. 182/183
¡03 Schmidt, 1962, op.cit. p.200
104 Rede Helmut Schmidts vor der Sozialdemokratischen Bundestagsfraktion. February 
6,1979, p. 11. See also Risse-Kappen, 1988, op.cit. p.24
¡os Summary of an interview of Helmut Schmidt with Thomas Risse-Kappen, June 11, 
1985, unpublished manuscript made available to me by Thomas Risse-Kappen. 
The NATO organ which was mainly involved with preparing the LRTNF decision 
was the High Level Group, see next chapter. For confirmation of Schmidt’s 
statements see also Hoffmann’s summary of an interview with Schmidt: "Helmut 
Schmidt sagte, er habe die Beratungen der HLG, so ihre Empfehlung vom April 
1978, die LRTNF evolutionär anzupassen, nicht zur Kenntnis genommen. Er habe 
die Arbeit dieser Gruppe nicht bemerkt Sie sei nicht in sein Bewußtsein getreten. 
Es sei möglich gewesen, daß der Verteidigungsminister irgendwann einmal darüber
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information supplied by him, was detached from any military considerations 
and was only concerned with arms control. Also, in this context we have to 
consider that Helmut Schmidt was Minister of Defence only from October 1969 
until July 1972. Afterwards be obtained the Office of Minister of Finance until 
May 1974, then he became Chancellor of the Federal Repulic. Thus, he was 
occupied explicitly with strategic matters only for 21 months. It seems that 
during his chancellorship Schmidt was preoccupied with more important issues 
such as economic questions and terrorism.
Still, the interpretation that- although he is such a "brilliant strategic thinker"- 
he did not realise that his military advisers and experts aimed at Ending 
military means to secure the execution of first use is not absolutely convincing, 
either. His reputation in public is that of an "omnipotent" politician who was 
able to deal with several crudal issues at the same time. However, this might be 
the wrong approach to interpret him.'0*
In 1983, after his resignation as Chancellor, Schmidt started to campaign for the 
abandonment of NATO's sacrosanct strategic principle of first use107. During 
the INF negotiations he strongly supported the zero agreement.'04 Thus it is 
significant that Schmidt, before his tenure as Federal Defence Minister and 
Chancellor, campaigned for a no-first use policy, as well as after he left office.
Bericht erstattet hätte. Es gebe, so Schmidt, in der NATO immer mehrere 
Ausschüsse, die sich mit strategischen und Detailfragen beschäftigen.” ("Helmut 
Schmidt said he did not take notice of the HLG’s meetings and so had not been 
aware of its recommendation in April 1978 to adjust the LRTNF in an evolutionary 
manner. He did not notice the work of this group. He had been conscious of its 
existence. It could have been possible that the Minister of Defence at some point 
had reported about this. According to Schmidt, there are always several committees 
in NATO dealing with strategic issues and questions of detail.") Hoffmann, 1986, 
op.Cil,, P-447
106 See also Risse-Kappen’s interpretation of Schmidt which stresses Schmidt’s arms 
control motives. He identifies three misjudgements on the part of Helmut Schmidt: 
1. by criticising Carter’s SALT policy he "unwittingly" supported people on both 
sides of the Atlantic who were concerned with halting the SALT process itself. 2. 
His speech was interpreted as a call for the build up of Western INF. 3. He 
underestimated the domestic problems and his party’s resistance towards these 
weapons. Thus "his own scope for action was considerably limited". Risse-Kappen 
regards Schmidt's attempts to deploy the weapons on surface ships as another proof 
for the fact that "’coupling’ in the sense of visible deployment of American INF 
was not the main consideration for him." Risse-Kappen, 1988, op.cit. pp.20-25, 
here p.25
107 see for example Die Welt. October 4,1983
io» see for example La Repubblica. June 7/8,1987, p.5
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During his term of office, however, he supported the campaign to install 
weapons involving the implementation of first use. This phenomenon might be 
explained by applying Max Weber's categories of "Verantwortungsethik" and 
"Gesinnungsethik"'*», meaning that Schmidt acted in contrast to his conviction 
during his tenure when he had to bear the consequences for his acting."0
Two months before NATO ministers agreed on the NATO-Dual Track decision, 
he made one very explicit statement concerning his preference for land- 
deployed LRTNF:
"There were Western medium range ballistic missiles and intra-range 
weaponry in the late 1950s, but they were dismantled by 1963 which I think 
from hindsight was a wrong step. They should have been modernised rather 
than dismantled."'''
m  Max Weber, a German sociologist (1864-1920), started from the premise that all 
ethics-oriented action can be directed by two divergent, incompatible and opposed 
maxims: action can be oriented either HgesinnungsethischH (mind-ethically) or 
"verantwortungsethisch" (responsible-ethically). Tis is a unfathomable opposition 
between whether someone acts according to the maxim - expressed in religious 
terms : "A Christian acts righteously and the outcome is left to God" (mind-ethical) 
or whether someone acts according to the maxim that he has to bear the 
consequences of his action (responsible-ethical). Max Weber, Soziologie. 
Universalgeschichtliche Analvsen. Polidk. (Stuttgart: Krttner, 1973) p. 174-175
n° Schmidt’s strategic doctrine has also been influenced by the following political 
considerations: During the early sixties Schmidt had a very close relationship with 
U.S. politicians and strategic analysts. Accordingly, his strategic doctrine was close 
to the U.S. interpretation of nuclear deterrence. His close relations with the United 
States, however, declined in the end of the seventies as a reaction on his part to the 
unsuccessful arms control policy of the U.S. presidents Carter and Reagan. In his 
farewell address from parliament in January 1987 he expressed his disappointment 
that "there has been no disarmament agreement between the superpowers since 
1973" and strongly rejected Reagan's SDI plans. The German-U.S. relation he 
describes as follows: "The Federal Republic must be a friend and partner of the 
United States, but not a client If you give the impression that you accept the status 
of a dependent protege, you must not be surprised if that is the way you are being 
treated”. In this context it is more than consistent that he advocates closer relations 
with France if an independent Europe is to take shape. He even expresses his regret 
that during the early sixties he rejected the opportunity for closer cooperation with 
France: "General de Gaulle was right on an important point I see more clearly 
today than I did in 1963, when the Elysee treaty was signed, how much de Gaulle 
counted on the entente between France and Germany to provide the core for 
European self-assertion, and obviously he was thinking of France and of himself as 
the leading partner. At the time, we did not understand or accept this. I admit my 
own misjudgement; we watered down the preamble to the treaty and wound up on a 
sidetrack." Statements of Helmut Schmidt excerpted and translated by the 
International Herald Tribune. September 5,1986
in  Interview with Helmut Schmidt, "Schmidt's calculabilities". Economist (October 6,
1979) p.49
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But it is possible that he intended to justify this dramatic NATO decision two 
months before it was publicly announced.
While German politicians fought to preserve the option of long-range theatre 
nuclear weapons during the consultations on SALT I and SALTII, their 
delegates in NATO fought for the implementation of the option by pressing for 
a concrete decision to deploy LRTNF.
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The reluctance of the U.S. administration to yield to the German requests to 
deploy LRTNF in Europe decreased in the course of the years 1977 and 1978. 
This shift in the U.S. administration's line concerning TNF policy is the final 
result of several factors. First of all, the deputies of NATO's defence and foreign 
ministers, who continued the Nuclear Planning Group's work of revising and 
planning the modernisation of the TNF in the "High Level Group", pressed for 
modernisation of the longer-range TNF and campaigned for a quick 
deployment decision. A lack of U.S.-German cooperation concerning the 
neutron bomb issue was interpreted by public opinion as a further indication of 
the weakness of the Carter administration. As a result, the issue of TNF was 
seized on by Carter mainly in order to demonstrate his capability to lead NATO 
and to steer a controversial hardware decision. In the final shaping of the 
NATO Dual-Track decision German positions prevailed on the two crucial 
political issues: the distribution of the weapons' deployment among five NATO 
allies and the simultaneous arms control offer to the Soviet Union, i.e. the 
second track of the NATO Dual-Track decision. In this context it shall also be 
demonstrated that the final land deployment of the LRTNF was compatible 
with German doctrines. Emphasis will put on the fact that Helmut Schmidt's 
attempt to deploy the missiles at sea was aimed mainly at increasing the 
number of participating nations and not at preventing the Federal Republic 
from being turned into a target area for Soviet missiles. We will see that it was 
not the United States - as commonly assumed - that torpedoed Schmidt's 
proposal, but his European allies.
6.1. The Shifting Policy of  the U.S. adm inistration
6. The Evolution o f the Transatlantic Consensus
6.1.1. The Establishment o f the High Level Group
Another attempt by the U.S. administration to induce the West Europeans to 
take on their share of the common burden in NATO was the Long-Term- 
Defense Program (LTDP), presented at a summit of NATO leaders in May 1977 
and ratified in May 1978. The LTDP not only incorporated the aim of a three 
percent annual increase in military expenditure, but also provided the
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framework for a substantial programme of improvements in a number of 
concrete areas, including conventional forces, reinforcement capabilities and 
theatre nuclear weapons.' As part of the LTDP a number of task forces were 
established, including one to examine theatre nuclear weapons (Task Force 10).*
The United States' intention in establishing the LTDP was clearly to strengthen 
the conventional component in NATO's forces. The Europeans perceived it 
mostly as a move to pressurise them to share the burden and to increase their 
defence budgets. Since the LTDP was focused mainly on conventional arms and 
reinforcement of conventional forces, Task Force 10 had been established as a 
precautionary measure against European apprehensions that the new Carter 
administration intended to abandon nuclear deterrence:
"Die Arbeitsgruppe 10, die sich mit einer Überprüfung der taktischen 
Nuklearwaffen befassen sollte ...war eingesetzt worden, um Befürchtungen der 
Europäer entgegenzuwirken, die USA beabsichtigten eine ’Entkopplung’ der 
konventionellen von der nuklearen Dimension.
Thus the establishment of Task Force 10 resulted from European apprehensions 
that the United States might "denuclearise" NATO strategy.
For the same reason U.S. Defense Secretary Brown proposed to underscore the 
work of Task Force 10 by converting it into a "High Level Group", at an October
1977 meeting of the NPG in Bari.* This meant that the representatives of the 
group would be recruited from high-ranking deputies of the national defence 
ministers rather than from members of the NATO staff in Brussels. They were 
drawn from their countries' defence and foreign ministries with ready access to 
their ministers and so were authorised to present their governments'
'  see Garthoff, 1983, op.cit.. p. 198; see also Communique of the North Atlantic 
Council, May 10-11, Communique of the DPC, May 17-18,1977 and also its annex 
"Ministerial Guidance -1977” in Communiques, 1977, op.cit.. p. 12-20
2 see Haftendom, 1985, op.cit.. p.262 and Garthoff, 1983, op.cit.. p. 198
3 "Task Force 10, which was set up to review the theatre nuclear weapons, was
established in order to counter European apprehensions that the United States 
intended a ’decoupling’ of the conventional from the nuclear dimension." 
Haftendom, 1985, op.cit. p.262
4 Elliot points out that this decision in Bari to set up a High Level Group was made
precisely 3 days after Schmidt’s dramatic October 1977 speech. David C. Elliot 
Decision at Brussels: The Politics of Nuclear Forces (Santa Monica: California 
Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, Discussion Paper No. 97, 
August 1981), p.7
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viewpoints.5 Although the NFG had already established expert groups with 
national representatives, the formation of this group with national department 
heads was unique. The group was chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs, David E. McGiffert. The Federal Republic was 
represented by the head of the department of military policy of the operations 
staff, Maj.Gen. Peter Tandecki.*
Between 1977 and 1979 the HLG was due to examine the need for NATO to 
undertake long-range TNF modernisation and the technical, military and 
political implications of "alternative NATO TNF postures."7 Before the 
establishment of the HLG, the West German and the British delegation already 
had very clear-cut ideas. According to Lothar Rtihl, in the Nuclear Planning 
Group Defence Minister Leber had taken initiatives concerning land-deployed 
intermediate-range modem missiles with a capability to attack the Soviet 
Union. Thus, the LRTNF deployment decision was pre-shaped in the Nuclear 
Planning Group as early as 1976, representing the climax of German influence 
within the NPG.a The British ally had also anticipated the HLG's 
recommendation. In August 1977, while replying to a query from U.S. Secretary 
of Defense Brown, the British Defence Minister Fred Mulley had argued in a 
closely guarded letter in favour of replacing the aging and vulnerable V- 
bombers. He argued that for geographical reasons the British would take a 
special interest in the long-range systems of the theatre nuclear weapons. 
Another argument was that the British intended to support the Federal 
Republic by their stance on the long-range cruise missile.9
5 See John Barry, "Revealed: The Truth about Labour and Cruise" in The Sunday
Times. February 6, 1983, p. 17 and Haftendom, 1985, op.cit.. p.262
6 Tandecld’s title in German: Leiter der Abteilung Militärpolitik im Führungsstab
Streitkräfte, Brigadegeneral. Haftendom, 1985, op.cit.. p.262
7 Garthoff, 1983, op .cit, p. 198
» Rühl, 1987, op.cit. p.167. Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit. p.416
9 See Elliot 1981, op.cit. p.6. Barry picked up these events in his article. The article 
which aims at revealing Labour’s responsibility for the LRTNF decision even 
called Mulley the "progenitor" of the LRTNF decision, both in political and intel­
lectual terms. He also confirmed the Germans’ active role in the decision to deploy 
LRTNF in Europe: "Intellectually, because the letter laid out the doctrine which 
NATO as a whole later endorsed. Politically, because Britain was then a ’swing 
vote’ on the issue. The Germans had argued in NATO all through 1976 for a 
Europe based counter to the SS-20. The Americans, by contrast, believed that the 
nuclear umbrella of the Poseidons assigned to NATO remained a sufficient
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6.12i.Trjmsatlantic alliance o f the Defence Secretaries' deputies
The HLG first met in November 1977; it consisted of representatives from 11 
member states.'0 Its starting point was the IN F study by U.S. Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfield, which he had presented to the NPG in 1976." At the third 
meeting in Los Alamos, New Mexico, in February 1978, a consensus developed 
among the Alliance representatives "that a new NATO weapons deployment 
was needed."'2 The reasons for this consensus are perceived very differently by 
the various authors who analysed this crucial period.
Haftendom identifies Michael Quinlan, the British Deputy Secretary 
responsible for policy in the British Ministry of Defence, in his handling of 
nuclear affairs as the most active and pushing person on the issues in hand. 
This view is confirmed by John Barry, in whose opinion the British team of 
Quinlan and Wilberforce'i "played a key role in overcoming American efforts to 
block it"'«, i.e. to block the British initiative in favour of the missiles. James A. 
Thomson, who himself joined the HLG in spring 1978 as a representative of the 
National Security Council, describes British and West German officials as 
pushing hard "for the adoption of a consensus that there should be an 
'evolutionary upward adjustment' in the long-range portion of NATO's theatre 
nuclear forces."'5 Fred Kaplan, who interprets the evolution of the High Level 
Group's "consensus" as revealing a prevalence of U.S. defence plans, explains 
the European compliance with U.S. dominance in terms of the activism 
exhibited by the Norwegian delegate Johan Holst. Until his appointment as 
Norway's Under Secretary of State for Defence in 1976, Holst had been a
deterrent. Now Mulley was placing Britain alongside Germany, the political 
balance within NATO tilted towards new weaponry." Barry, 1983, op.cit.. p. 17
10 United States, Great Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Canada, Turkey, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, see U.S. House of Representatives 
Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit.. p. 19
"  see Haftendom, 1985, op.cit.. p.262
'2 see Garthoff, 1983, op.cit.. p.202
¡3 John Wilberforce was Head of the Defence Department of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Michael Quinlan was Deputy Secretary of the Ministry 
of Defence, handling nuclear affairs, see Barry, 1983, op.cit. p. 17
14 emphasis in the text, ibid. John Barry reports that Quinlan drafted Mulley’s famous
letter for Brown in August 1977
15 Thomson, 1984, op.cit.. p.605
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prominent member of the Euro-American workshop, a transatlantic group of 
academics who campaigned for the cruise missile. Even while in government, 
he attended the HLG's meetings strongly aiding McGiffert's campaign. 
According to Kaplan "(h)is aggressive presence helped assure some doubtful 
delegates that the plan wasn't something imposed on them against their 
interests by domineering Americans."'*
David McGiffert represented the Pentagon's position'?, which in 1975-76 started 
to show interest in the ground- and sea- launched cruise missile.'* Thus, 
McGiffert did not need to be persuaded by the Europeans and also pushed the 
idea of cruise missile deployment. In February 1978, already at the third 
meeting of the HLG, McGiffert presented a detailed proposal for the procedure 
of the "evolutionary upward adjustment". Most staff work was done in advance 
of meetings in Washington, with the "U.S. representatives providing most of the 
data on possible weapon systems for NATO deployment."'9
McGiffert's proposal at the HLG's second meeting consisted of four alternative 
ways to deal with LRTNF modernisation:
- to do nothing;
- to develop a serious battlefield nuclear capability for the theatre without
the capability to strike targets in the Soviet Union;
- to make modest improvements in long-range theatre nuclear weapons;
- to develop a theatre capability which would allow to wage a 
counterforce strategic nuclear war against the Soviet Union.20
At the third meeting in February 1978 the HLG discussed McGiffert's proposal. 
David Schwartz's description of this discussion suggests that these options had
16 sec Kaplan, 1979, op.cit. p.84
n  McGiffert was U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
if Thomson, 1984, op.cit.. p.602
19 Gaithoff, 1983, op.cit.. p.202. See also Kaplan, who contends that the American
position was pushed through "virtually untouched"; Kaplan, 1979, op.cit. pp.55-57; 
and see U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit. pp. 19-
20
20 see Schwartz, 1983, op.cit. p.218
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been weighed against each other with strong and coherent military arguments 
and with only one possible result:
"The first option was dismissed because of the perceived political need to 
respond to SS-20 deployments and to make sure that SALT II would not 
constrain the European cruise missile option. The second was dropped because 
of European reluctance to adopt a serious nuclear battlefield capability, with its 
terrible consequences for European societies, and because of general 
agreement that new weapons should be able to strike the Soviet Union... The 
fourth option was dismissed out of hand, because its creation could imply the 
decoupling of American central strategic forces from the defense of Europe.
This left the third option, which was attractive for several reasons: — It would 
not raise the specter of decoupling. •• At the same time it would be a visible 
response to Soviet SS-20 deployments. — It was the least provocative of the 
three action options and hence most acceptable to the elites in domestic 
settings that favored the pursuit of detente."2'
So by March 1978 McGiffert had led the group to the consensus that LRTNF 
modernisation was necessary and that it would include the possibility of hitting 
targets in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the consensus implied that the 
modernisation should be an "evolutionary upward adjustment"22 along the 
following guidelines:
- a radical change in NATO's defence posture should be avoided;
- it was not considered necessary to match the capability of the SS-20
directly, but merely to provide a credible response by an offsetting 
capability;
- to ease the public mind concerning the credibility of response, visibility
of the systems was demanded; this means the weapons had to be 
deployed on land;
- because of their land-based deployment the systems were vulnerable;
thus they had at least to be very mobile in order to be able to escape 
Soviet strikes;
- high accuracy and penetrability, survivability and thus mobility was
demanded;
- a mix of weapons was recommended in order to compensate for the
vulnerability of land-based systems.2-*
21 ibid.
22 ibid.. p.219
23 see U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit.. p.20
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During this period West-German officials began to present their sine qua non 
for an agreement on LRTNF modernisation which contained the following 
points:
- no participation of the Federal Republic in the decision on production of
nuclear weapons;
- integration of these weapons into arms control after a production 
decision;
- no special role for the Federal Republic. The deployment of the weapons
would only be agreed to if the Alliance reached a common decision on 
their introduction, i.e. if deployment was not to be undertaken solely on 
German territory.«
An other important German guideline was the objection to deploy the LRTNF 
under a dual-key or POC system.« David Schwartz reports that the Germans 
maintained this position throughout the talks, much to the surprise of those 
who feared that demands for control sharing would inevitably follow from the 
LRTNF modernisation and would create another kind of dilemma for the 
Alliance like that of the Multilateral Forces at the beginning of the sixties.2* 
Speculation might be allowed here that the U.S. reluctance to yield to the 
German deployment requests was partly due to U.S. apprehensions that the 
Germans were seeking to achieve more control over the release of nuclear 
weapons by means of the LRTNF deployment.
According to Haftendom four aspects played a role for the Germans' refusal to 
deploy the weapons under a POC system:
- the role of the Federal Republic as a non-nuclear state;
- the self-limitation on the use of the fuel cycle for civilian purposes into
which Bonn was pushed by the U.S. proviso;
24 These guidelines had been outlined already for the deployment of the neutron bomb. 
See Haftendom, 1985, op.ciL. p.264
23 See Haftendem, 1985, op.ciL. p.156.
26 see Schwartz, 1983, op.cit.. p.219. Lothar Riihl points out that one essential guideline 
of the German TNF policy within the Nuclear Planning Group in 1976 was "the 
participation of all non-nuclear NATO members in the possession of nuclear 
delivery systems." ("Teilnahme der nicht mit eigenen Nuklearwaffen gerüsteten 
NATO-Partner am Besitz von TNF-Trägermitteln.") However, in this context Rühl 
describes the general drafting of the German TNF guidelines and does not refer 
especially to LRTNF. Rühl, 1987, op.cit. p. 159
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- constraints on the German Ostpolitik which would arise from the Soviet
Union's probable reaction to a situation in which the Germans could 
trigger the release of weapons reaching the Soviet Union;
- higher costs to be paid by the Federal Republic in case it owned these
weapons.27
Officials of the Defense Department agreed on the HLG's consensus, but this 
was apparently the point where the National Security Council and the State 
Department felt that the Defense Department had gone too far. Carter and the 
State Department were not willing to jeopardise the ongoing SALT negotiations 
by a NATO decision to deploy long-range cruise missile or any other kind of 
long-range nuclear weapon which would be heavily opposed by the Soviet 
Union. They feared that the Defense Department, represented by McGiffert, 
had gone too far and could have committed the U.S. to an intenable position in 
the absence of an unanimous policy on cruise missiles.2*
Therefore, the National Security Council (NSC) dispatched its own 
representative, James Thomson, to the HLG. According to Thomson, the NSC 
staff were directed to "water down" the consensus. But another transatlantic 
irritation changed the U.S. administrations' reluctant attitude towards the 
LRTNF.
6.13. The Neutron bomb debacle
The neutron bomb (or enhanced radiation weapon, ERW) had been discussed 
in NATO circles since the beginning of the seventies.29 But no official U.S. 
decision to apply the technology to battlefield weapons was taken until 
November 1976, when President Ford reportedly approved development of
27 sec Haftendom, 1985, op.cit.. p.265
28 Gaithoff, 1983, op.cit. p.202. Thomson, 1984, op.cit. p.605
29 see Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit. p.161; Risse-Kappen, 1985, op.cit.. p.13. For an
overview see Wolf Richter, Neutronenwaffe - "Perversion des Denkens?" Zur 
Kontroverse um atomare Gefechtsfeldwaffen in Europa und ihre Bedeutung für die 
NATO-Strateyie. (München: Bemard und Graefe, 1982) and Volker Matthee, Die 
Neutronenwaffe zwischen Bündnis und Innenpolitik. Eine Studie über die 
Verknüpfung nationaler und allianzimemcr Willensbildungsprozesse. (Herford und 
Bonn: Mittler, 1985)
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enhanced radiation weapons.-» The subject became controversial in June 1977, 
when Walter Pincus of the Washington Post publicised the Carter 
administration's apparent decision to go ahead with ERW production." These 
weapons are designed to produce far more radiation, far less blast and heat 
than other tactical nuclear weapons, so that they kill attacking soldiers without 
severe damage to their surroundings." The public discussion in the Federal 
Republic was initiated by an article by Egon Bahr, then Party Secretary of the 
Social Democratic Party, which he titled, ’Ts mankind going mad?"" He 
considered a weapon that discriminates between living creatures and property 
as a "sign of perverse thinking".*
The opposition against the neutron bomb within the SPD intensified in 
November 1977 and Schmidt, himself in favour of the neutron bomb15, had his 
hands full to keep the left wing of his own party from openly opposing 
deployment.^ Whether Helmut Schmidt was in favour of the neutron bomb in
30 Walter Pincus in Washington Post. August 16, 1977, p.A6
31 Walter Pincus "Neutron Bomber Warhead Buried in ERDA Budget", in Washington
Post. June 6, 1977, p. 1
32 Leslie H. Gelb, "Reagan orders produi ion of 2 types of neutron arms for stockpiling
in the U.S." see NYT. August 9, 1981, p.l. For a discussion of the details of the of 
the neutron weapon’s military characteristics see chapter 4.2.2
33 Egon Bahr "Ist die Menschheit dabei, verrückt zu werden?" in Vorwärts. Nr.29, July
21, 1977, p.4
34 ibid
33 The reasons for Schmidt’s suppon of the neutron bomb are not clear. See for example 
Theo Sommer, who worked in the Ministry of Defence under Helmut Schmidt and 
who advocates for the neutron bomb because of its quality as a bargaining chip. See 
Theo Sommer, "The Neutron Bomb: Nuclear War without Tears?" in 
SurvivaKVol. 19, No.6, Nov./Dec. 1977) pp.263-266, here p.266
36 The opposition to the deployment of neutron bombs grew stronger within the SPD 
during the preparations for the November 1977 party congress. The party executive 
planned to take a resolution which would allow the government to decide on this 
issue without restrictions. However, the SPD’s left wing tabled a resolution calling 
for the prohibition of any deployment of ERW on German soil. Thereupon the 
party executive changed the text of its own resolution considerably and asked the 
government to create political and strategic prerequisites within the framework of 
security and disarmament so that storing the neutron weapon on the territory of the 
Federal Republic would be rendered unnecessary. Parteitag der 
Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 15. bis 19. November 1977, Protokoll 
der Verhandlungen. Anlagen. The CDU/CSU Bundestag group voted in February
1978 to support the production of ERW and their deployment in Europe, see FBIS 
Western Europe, February 22,1978
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order to use it as a bargaining chip in future arms control negotiations or for 
military reasons cannot be clarified.
In September 1977, the German government had produced a positive 
assessment of the neutron bomb, although without taking a decision on a 
possible deployment on German territoryP
But the Carter administration did not want the full and sole responsibility for 
deploying the neutron bomb in Europe. It hoped that, in particular, the West 
German government would share that onus. In effect, Washington wanted the 
Bonn government to ask the United States to proceed with the bomb or at least 
to commit itself in advance to accepting its deployment on German territory.•”
After internal disputes in the German government between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministry, the Federal Security Council^9 took a 
decision on the neutron bomb issue on January 20, 1978.40 The German 
government's position on the neutron bomb was, as mentioned above, identical 
with its policy line on the TNF:
- non-participation in production decision;
- incorporation of the neutron bomb in arms negotiations;
- readiness to deploy if arms control does not obviate deployment;
37 see Georg Leber’s speech in the Bundestag, September 8, 1977, PIPr 8/39. p.3006-
3012, here p.3011; see also answer by the Parliamentarian Undersecretary of State 
von Billow, September 20,1977 to the question by the MP Mertes, German 
Bundestag, Drucksache 8/1014. October 14,1977, pp.39-41
38 Talbott, 1979, op.cit. p. 150
39 The Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat) is a pure cabinet committee
without any organisational basis. It is chaired by the Chancellor or the Minister of 
Defence. It includes the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the Interior, for Defence 
and for Economy and Finance. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and, from
1978, the Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control 
at the Foreign Ministry, Dr. Ruth, later also joined the Federal Security Council. 
Certain tasks, such as the expon of armaments, are delegated to the council and 
serve as test cases for important decisions on security and defence issues. See 
Helga Haftendom, "Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland", Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Die Beilage zum 
Wochenblatt Das Parlament. B43/83, (October 29, 1983), pp.3-15, here p.4 and 
Haftendom, 1985, op.cit. p.271
«> Ruehl, 1979, op.cit.. p.147
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- non-singularity«
On March 14,1978, the Federal Security Council finally decided in favour of the 
neutron bomb's deployment on the soil of the German Federal R e p u b lic .«
Following this decision of the Federal Security Council, West German 
diplomats were able to work out an agreement with their NATO allies in 
February and March 1978 on a procedure for handling the U.S. insistence on 
public European acceptance of the deployment of the neutron bomb prior to a 
production decision by the United States.
The procedures agreed, first, that the United States had to make its production 
decision public, and second, on a proviso that deployment would take place 
only if an appropriate arms control agreement with the Warsaw Pact were not 
achieved within two years. The NATO allies would then immediately declare 
their intention to accept deployment on these conditions.«
However, President Carter found this procedure politically unacceptable. 
Misunderstanding over the details of the procedures between him and his 
diplomats might have contributed to the decision to cancel the ERW production 
as well as Carter's moral and political sensitivities concerning these weapons 
that ’"kill people but leave buildings intact'"«. In March his Deputy Secretary of 
State, Warren Christopher, was dispatched to NATO capitals to explain Carter's 
decision. Schmidt was reportedly so surprised by the news that he asked 
Christopher to reconfirm the message. Schmidt then advised Christopher that 
the Federal Republic was in fact prepared to support ERW deployment. Even 
Foreign Minister Genscher was sent to Washington to change Carter's mind, 
but he failed. On April 7, 1978, Carter announced a modified decision for 
modernising certain tactical nuclear systems, including the development of
41 See the governmental declaration of Chancellor Schmidt April 13, 1978, published in
Bulletin. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesreperung. No.34, April 14, 1978. 
pp.321-326, here p.324
42 see Rühl, 1979, op.ciL. p.148. The 14th of March is also mentioned in Helmut Kohl's
speech in the German Bundestag, on April 13, 1978, PlPr 8/83. pp.6504-6511, here 
p.6509
43 see Rühl, 1979, op.ciL (ref. chap.4,41), p.148
44 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle. Memoirs of the National Security Adviser
1977-1981 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p.304
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ERW components, with his ultimate ERW production decision dependent on 
Soviet restraint in military programmes.«5
By withdrawing American support for the neutron bomb Carter precipitated a 
"political disaster for the alliance, and, ultimately, for himself."«* The plain fact 
that a U.S. President withdrew approval for a decision was treated by members 
of the strategic community as a catastrophe of extensive dimensions. The 
reaction of those strategists who were dose to Schmidt is somewhat 
comprehensible because Schmidt felt cheated, since he fought hard in his own 
party for approval of the decision. Lothar Ruhl talks about "traumatic effects” 
and a "dangerous event" for the Alliance.«7 Also K.-Peter Stratmann of the 
Ebenhausen Institute, otherwise noted for a sober and neutral style, uses the 
language of psychiatry and speaks of "traumatic controversy" in the context of 
the neutron bomb.««
The effect of this debacle on the evolution of the LRTNF decision and in 
particular, on U.S. decisiveness over deployment at the beginning of the 
eighties cannot be overestimated. Whenever in this context the talk is about the 
necessity of keeping unity and unanimity in the Alliance and of the 
psychological reasons for the Dual-Track decision, the neutron bomb is the 
cause.
Thus the neutron bomb debacle is regarded as the issue which also induced the 
Carter administration to change its policy towards the cruise missile:
"The period of American reluctance and foot-dragging on the cruise missile 
issue ended with the denouement of the neutron bomb affair in April 1978. 
Thereafter, a policy process was set in motion inside the US government that 
sharply shifted the U.S. stance on cruise missiles and more generally on 
LRTNF."«»
45 see Carter, 1982, op.cit. p.225-229. Thomson, 1984, op.cit.. p.606. Riihl, 1979,
op.ciL. p. 148. Gelb, 1981, op.cit. p.L+30. "Carter von Genscher nicht umgesümmt 
Die Neutronenwaffe wird vorerst nicht produziert". Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung. April 6,1978. Vance, 1983, op.cit.. p.67-69.
46 Thomson, 1984, op.cit. p.606
47 Ruehl, 1980, op.cit. p.104
«* Stratmann, 1981, op.cit. p.18
«» Thomson, 1984, op.cit. p.605. See also Schwartz: "It would be difficult to overstate 
the effect that Carter’s decision had in Europe." op.cit. p.223
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After the European reaction to the neutron debacle, the United States was 
challenged to give proof that its leadership in NATO was still untouchable.
From April 1978, the date of Carter's announcement to defer production of the 
neutron bomb, the interagency meetings between the National Security 
Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency in the White House changed decisively. The issue assumed a 
predominantly political character. All members agreed that another political 
fiasco had to be avoided and that the new policy expressed in the LRTNF plan 
would succeed. Kaplan comments on the psychological effects of the neutron 
bomb fiasco:
"The tough questions were dropped because those who had been asking them 
came to think there might be no answers. Without answers, there might be no 
deployment. And without deployment, America’s ’leadership role’ in NATO 
would decay - and that had to be prevented above all else."50
6.1 A. Presidential Review Memorandum 38
Although the Defense Department pursued modernisation through its 
leadership in the High Level Group, there was no interagency consensus on this 
policy. From October 1977 to April 1978 many counter arguments were 
considered by the State I>epartment and the National Security Council. SALT II 
had top priority during this period and one of the most important tasks was to 
convince the allies of the merit of the negotiations. It has to be emphasised 
again that the shift of the U.S. Department towards deployment was consistent 
with the arms control policy, because since May 1977 it was clear that the SALT 
protocol would only exclude deployment of GLCM and SLCM for a period of 
three years, but not their development and testing. U.S. Defense Secretary 
Brown had approved their full scale development in February 1977.
After the neutron bomb debacle in April 1978 President Carter issued the 
Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM 38), coordinated by the National 
Security Council. PRM 38, "Long Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms 
Control”, called for a review of pros and cons, options and alternatives in 
respect of LRTNF deployment. It was an interagency study, with the State 
Department providing PRM with a historical overview; the Defense
50 Kaplan, 1979, op.cit.. p.57
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Department, coordinated by McGiffert and the Office of International Security 
Affairs, giving the military rationale for a LRTNF deployment; and finally, the 
CIA providing data on the increasing threat of Soviet LRTNF. The Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency was asked to examine the effects on arms 
control and the opportunities for negotiations on the matter. Its paper, 
completed in August 1978, defined the crucial issue: whether to base new 
nuclear weapons in West Germany that were designed to put a part of the 
Soviet Union at risk.5' The paper also discussed British and French reservations 
concerning deployments in West Germany, German insistence on non­
singularity, and anticipated tension between, on the one hand, the plan for a 
visible presence of the weapons to reassure Europeans of the U.S. nuclear 
commitment to their defence, and on the other hand, the greater survivability of 
sea-based systems.
PRM 38 integrated "the idea of negotiations with the deployment of additional 
hardware along the lines suggested by the Germans"52, and presented a military 
rationale for this additional hardware along the lines the British had suggested, 
referring to M ulle/s proposal that the missiles should be land-deployed 
instead of sea-deployed. PRM 38 was a real compromise between the right and 
the left and offered two options to the U.S. administration: either to support the 
HLG consensus on "evolutionary upward adjustment" and to determine the 
hardware that would be involved in such an adjustment, or to seek to sidestep 
the issue by offering the allies "political solutions" such as assigning more U.S. 
strategic forces to SAC EUR.5 J In the August and September meetings of the 
Cabinet-level Special Coordinating Committee (SCC), which is the leading 
Committee of the National Security Council and was then chaired by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski5*, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, it was 
decided to follow the NSC's recommendation of the first option with its 
hardware solution.55 This hardware solution was "to be incorporated into an
si Sigal, 1984, op.cit.. p.58
52 ifeii, P-59
¡3 Thomson, 1984, op.cit.. p.606
5* The Security Coordinating Committee consists of the President, the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA and the Security Adviser of
the President.
55 Garthoff, 1983, op.cit.. p.202
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'integrated' approach which would anticipate LRTNF deployments and 
negotiations over LRTNF limits in SALT
Shortly after Schmidt's speech the first of several interagency meetings took 
place in the White House. These meetings were chaired by David Aaron, 
Brzezinski's deputy at the National Security Council. Other members were 
Leslie Gelb, David McGiffert, Lieut. Gen. W.Y. Smith of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Spurgeon Keeny of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and their 
staffs. Together they constituted what was nicknamed the "mini SCC" because 
all their bosses were members of the SCC. Except for Gelb, all members of the 
group considered the cruise missile with a range of 2,500 kms a valuable option. 
Kaplan reports that Gelb maintained his scepticism about the need for a long- 
range cruise missile and that he pointed out that this kind of weapons would 
also be interpreted as an attempt to decouple the U.S. defence from that of 
NATO. Leslie Gelb hoped that Schmidt would change his mind on realising 
these potential implications. Schmidt did renounce the need for strict parity in 
all categories of weapons but he "stood firm on the demand for something in 
Europe to counter the SS-20."57 Gelb soon came to accept this fact and 
supported the new missiles.
6.13. The Euro-American Workshop
There was also a group of academics who campaigned for the cruise missile. 
Chaired by Albert Wohlstetter, the Euro-American workshop consisted of 
academics, consultants and analysts based at the London Institute for Strategic 
Studies, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Ebenhausen (Munich), 
the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, the European-American 
Institute for Security Research in Los Angeles and Stanford University, who 
had strong connections with a small, influential, trans-atlantic community of 
official and semi-official defence intellectuals.5® The "minimal consensus" of
56 Thomson, 1984, op.cit.. p.606/607. On July 31, 1978 a bilateral German-American
meeting took place in which the Germans again insisted on the integrated approach 
for a hardware solution and arms control, see Risse-Kappen, 1985, op.cit.. p.29
57 Kaplan, 1979, op.cit.. p.57
58 ibid.. p.vii and biographical data of Uwe Nerlich in Uwe Nerlich and Falk Bomsdorf
(eds.), Sowjetische Macht und westliche Verhandlungspolitik im Wandel 
militärischer Kräfteverhältnisse. (Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag, 1982) p.626
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military strategists from two continents with quite different security interests 
was that they were interested in the potential offered by cruise missile 
technology.
Consequently, the cruise missile with its brand-new technology was in the 
centre of the workshop's attention, and it is logical that its members did not 
appreciate seeing the cruise missiles' potential options cut by a limitation of 
their range. The U.S. members of the workshop were Albert Wohlstetter 
(RAND-Corporation, Stanford University), Henry Rowen (former President of 
the RAND Corporation) and Richard Burt (then Assistant Director of the ESS, 
and subsequently U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic).55 The Europeans 
were represented by Johan J. Holst, a researcher at Norway's most prestigious 
defence research institute and later Norway's Secretary of Defence, Uwe 
Nerlich from the Ebenhausen Institute, Laurence Martin, Gen. Peter Tandecki, 
who was German military delegate to NATO's High Level Group and 
subsequently a General in the Military Committee, Lothar Riihl, and Walther 
Stiitzle, then head of the planning staff of the Ministry of Defence (later Director 
ofSIPRI).«
Between 1975 and September 1978 the workshop met 9 times and, apart from 
publications in professional journals, it published three books with the support 
of the Thyssen Foundation and the Defence Nuclear Agency. 61 The workshop 
cannot be interpreted as campaigning for the development of long-range 
theatre nuclear weapons, since U.S. members, like Wohlstetter and Schlesinger, 
were chiefly interested in non-nuclear missiles.«2 However, the European part 
can only be conceived as promoting LRTNF for European purposes. The
39 The membership of the workshop cannot be indicated precisely
to Kaplan, 1979, op.cit.. p.55
61 While Fred Kaplan gives considerable weight to the influence of the Euro-American
workshop on the LRTNF decision, Risse-Kappen accuses him of overestimating the 
influence. See Risse-Kappen, 1985, op.cit.. p.98. Helmut Schmidt confirmed in an 
interview with Risse-Kappen that the Euro-American workshop did not play an 
important role.
62 "These people had seen new technologies developing that could revolutionize NATO
defences. Wohlstetter was chiefly interested, as was the then Defense Secretary 
Schlesinger, in nonnuclear cruise missiles, which, thanks to their long and 
astonishing accuracy, could destroy targets that only nuclear weapons would have 
reliably destroyed in the past. Thus, escalation to nuclear war could more easily be 
avoided." Kaplan, 1979, op.cit.. p.55
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members of the workshop represented an indispensable link between the 
politicians and the U.S. armament industry in convincing the politicians of the 
essential need for newly elaborated military options. The workshop did not 
directly influence government decisions. Rather, it influenced government 
decisions through consulting politicians and distributing internal papers ("for 
personal information only").« Accordingly, the workshop defines itself as "part 
of a systematic and continuous effort at joint assessment of emerging issues 
before governmental positions are crystallized and hardened".« Walther 
Stiitzle, during this period director of the German Ministry's planning office 
and a key adviser to Schmidt having part in writing Schmidt's speeches, 
"played an active role in discussions at the workshop's conferences."**
6.1.6. The HLG's final report
After the settlement of PRM-38, the SCC directed the Department of Defense to 
list the military options and proposals. The paper, which the High Level Group 
received in October 1978, examined five weapon systems:
1. Pershing II: Extended Range which was a new version of the 
Pershing 1A missile
2. GLCM: The ground-launched cruise missile, to be produced by General 
Dynamics, would be transported around NATO Europe on board 
transporter erector launchers, which should carry four missiles. Each 
launcher would be accompanied by launch-control vehicles, security 
personnel, and various other support elements. It has a range of 2,500 
kms with an accuracy of 80 metres.
3. MRBM: In response to the search for military options for LRTNF 
deployment, the air force had developed plans for a new medium- 
range ballistic missile, called "Longbow", with a range of 2,400 kms. 
Longbow would use technology already developed for Minuteman HI. 
But the production of Longbow was not yet sufficiently advanced for 
deployment in the eighties.
63 Michael Gumbert and Reimar Stuckenbrock, "Die herrschende Sicherheitspolitik in
der Sackgasse: Warum Nuklearrüstung als Politikersatz scheitern muß", in Albrecht 
et.al. (eds.), 1983, op.cit. pp. 10-53, here p.22-26
64 Holst / Nerlich (eds.), 1977, op.cit. p. vii
65 Kaplan, 1979, op.cit. p.55
173
4. SLCM: The sea-launched cruise missile was considered for deployment 
on submarines assigned to the NATO area. Its advantages are 
survivability and deployment flexibility. However, the cost of 
providing dedicated platforms seemed likely to make the SLCM option 
too expensive.
5. FB-111H: The FB-111H was a variant of the FB-111A bombers assigned 
to the Strategic Air Command and based in the United States. The FB- 
111H would presumably be based in Europe and would have 
somewhat longer ranges and higher payloads.66
On accession to the office, Defence Minister Hans Apel, who succeeded Defence 
Minister Leber in February 1978, inherited from his predecessor a TNF policy 
which was already, in its essentials, fully formulated. Apel did not agree with 
the concepts of escalation control and intra-war deterrence:
"Militärstrategen beider Bündnissysteme haben die Vorstellung, daß ein 
atomarer Schlagabtausch auf beiden Seiten Besinnung - und damit die 
Einstellung der Kampfhandlungen - auslösen könnte. Ich stehe solchen 
Überlegungen skeptisch gegenüber."07
In October 1978, at the NPG meeting in Brussels at which the extension of the 
Pershing II's range and its modernisation were finally opted for, Defence 
Minister Apel emphatically demonstrated his obvious disagreement with the 
proposals to modernise the TNF. Apel refused to commit himself to the general 
line which had been drawn by military experts. He wanted to maintain the 
primacy of politics and anticipated the explosive political power inherent in 
several details of the decision. The traditional NATO deficit in political 
discussion among the ministers and the NPG's mechanical approval of 
compromises which had been designed by the ministers' military experts 
roused Apel's criticism. However, his objection did not change the NPG's
66 see Schwartz, 1983, op.cit.. p.226 and U.S. House of Representatives Report,
Modernization, 1980, op.cit.. pp.20-24
67 "Military strategists in both pacts have the idea that a nuclear fight could bring both
sides back to their senses - and thus to a termination of the hostüities. I am sceptical 
about such considerations." Hans Apel, "Freunde tritt man nicht vors Schienbein." 
Der Spiegel. (No.29, 1981) p.33-41, here p.39. These remarks are qualified when 
he concedes on the same page that options have to be credible in order to deter.
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course regarding the LRTNF decision; the only consequences were that General 
Secretary Luns felt insulted.6«
In October 1978 Brzezinski travelled to Bonn, London and Paris to sound out 
views at the political level. Brzezinski's position was essentially that the U.S. 
government did not see a military requirement for the LRTNF, but was quite 
prepared "to proceed with one if the Europeans wanted."«*
The policy shift of the U.S. administration was expressed prominently in the 
Guadeloupe summit meeting between the British Premier Callaghan, the 
French President Giscard d'Estaing, U.S. President Carter and Schmidt on 
January 5 and 6, 1979 in the Caribbean. This meeting was initiated by 
Chancellor Schmidt, who had proposed it to Security Adviser Brzezinski when 
he visited Europe in October 1978. The purpose was to prevent another neutron 
bomb-type debacle, to involve the U.S. President in the decision at an early 
stage and to secure the participation of the most important allies.70 This meeting 
is believed to have been one of the crudal steps in the decision-making process, 
in which the four leaders dedded on modernisation. The sequence and content 
of the European leaders' answers to Carter's proposal to deploy U.S. missiles in 
Europe is again subject to various interpretations. According to Schmidt's own 
version, he was the last to answer because he represented a non-nudear power:
"So Jimmy Callaghan answered first and said, This SS-20 problem must not be 
permitted to continue, but before you deploy American Euiostrategic weapons
- the name Pershing did not come up; the type of weapon was not really 
discussed, nor the name - before you do that, I would propose that you 
negotiate the weapon with the Russians. Then came Giscard, who said, I think 
Callaghan is right, but the Russians will never negotiate seriously unless they 
are presented with the threat that if negotiations fail, the United States will 
unilaterally proceed and deploy their missiles. And I was the last one to reply,
68 "Bundeskanzler Schmidt hat am Dienstag versucht, den über Verteidigungsminister
Hans Apel erbosten Generalsekretär der NATO, Josef Luns, zu besänftigen." in 
"’Mißverständnisse* mit Luns bereinigt". Süddeutsche Zeitung. (October 25, 1978). 
"Bundesverteidigungsminsiter Hans Apel hat bei einer Diskussion in der NATO- 
Ministerrunde den Generalsekretär des nordatlantischen Bündnisses ’angemacht’, 
wie man es in Barmbek nennt, schier, als sei Josef Luns führungsschwach." in 
"Barmbeker O-Ton in Brüssel", Die Welt (October 25, 1978). "Primat der Politik 
auch in der NATO.", Süddeutsche Zeitung. (October 25, 1978). "Apel will die 
Führung nicht den Experten überlassen", Frankfurter Rundschau. (November 11, 
1978).
69 According to GarthofF, it was on this occasion that Brzezinski became fully aware of
the issue for the first time, see Garthoff, 1983, op.cit. p.202
70 Haftendem, 1985, op.dt.. p. 272
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and I said, I buy the combined solution of Callaghan and Giscard. And in the 
end this is what Carter bought."7'
After Guadeloupe, the LRTNF could no longer be stopped.
As a result of subsequent discussions in November 1978 and February 1979, the 
HLG suggested a mix of land-based systems. It was argued that sea-based 
systems were too similar to the Poseidon missiles. Leber rejected this option, 
according to Riihl because he was concerned that sea-deployed weapons 
intended for employment in the European theatre which would be controlled 
by external U.S. forces could paralyse the requested flexibility.72
In April 1979 the HLG submitted its final report to the NPG. It pressed the 
following resolution:
- The deployment package should consist of land-based cruise and 
ballistic missiles. It was felt that the Pershing IIXR should be chosen 
over Longbow as the ballistic leg of the new LRTNF for two reasons: 
first, because Longbow would have needed more time for development 
than Pershing to be operational; secondly, because there was hope that 
the political provocation to the Soviet Union could be minimised by 
claiming that Pershing n  XR was merely the upgrading of an existing 
system.
- The total number of missiles deployed should be greater than 200 in 
order to have a substantial effect, but less than 600 in order to avoid the 
impression that numerical balance with the SS-20 was being pursued. 
The argument was that a Eurostrategic balance would have a 
decoupling effect because thus the impression would be created that a 
war could be fought solely with European forces and without the 
support of the U.S. strategic forces. This would have provoked 
decoupling effects.
- Deployment should be shared among as many NATO allies as possible. 
This would ensure that West Germany would not be singled out to host
71 Interview with Schmidt, op .ci t.. p.92 and p. 114. For a further description by another 
witness see Brzezinski, 1983, op.cit. p. 290. See also the interpretation of
Hoffmann that Schmidt was surprised by Carter’s move, Hoffmann, op.cit.. p.495
72 Riihl, 1987, op.cit. pp. 159
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the new LRTNF, a situation that West German political leaders, wary of 
damaging detente with the East, insisted on avoiding.
- A final decision on LRTNF deployments should be made by December 
1979. This would be necessary in order to avoid complications that 
might arise during the election campaigns both in West Germany and 
the United States and to provide enough time to prepare for 
deployment when the system was ready in 19837*
After considering the report, the NPG directed the HLG to come up with a 
specific deployment package.
62. Predominance of German positions
This chapter argues that on important issues the Federal Government 
succeeded to a considerable extent to shape the decision and have its interests 
considered.
62.1. Non-singularity
The Federal Republic qualified its position regarding modernisation with a 
number of conditions aimed at not jeopardising the political gains Bonn had 
achieved in terms of relations with the East. Thus, the Bonn Government's 
overall goal was "political burden sharing":
- NATO should decide on new systems on the basis of a unanimous 
decision: no negative votes and no abstentions;
- the plan for LRTNF deployment plans must include, at the least, one
non-nuclear European state in addition to the Federal Republic; this 
criterion was termed the non-singularity principle?*;
- the Federal Republic had no intention of becoming a nuclear state or of
playing any leadership role in questions of nuclear strategy. In this
73 see Schwartz, 1983, op.cit. p.227
74 Since Adenauer’s time, successive governments in Bonn had adhered to the principle
of non-singularity to ensure that changes in NATO defence or arms control policies 
did not single out West German forces or territory for special treatment relative to 
other non-nuclear states. See Sharp, 1984, op.cit. p.98
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respect, German officials stressed that it was the responsibility of the 
United States to take the lead in nuclear decisions within the alliance;
- any systems capable of striking Soviet territory and based in the Federal 
Republic would remain exclusively under American control with 
Germany providing only financial support and operating facilities. 
Unlike the arrangements for Pershing 1A, there would be neither dual* 
key arrangement for the new Pershing II missiles nor for the ground- 
launched cruise missile.75
Considering the nuclear status of France and Britain, the non-nuclear policies of 
Norway and Denmark, and current domestic problems in other member 
countries, the German participation criteria clearly focused attention on the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. It was basically the German insistence on non­
singularity and on an unanimous decision which made the Belgian and Dutch 
governments give in to the deployment of the missiles on their soil. In summer 
1979, the Federal Republic even had made special efforts to convince the Dutch, 
Belgian and Luxembourg governments to deploy some missiles on their soil.76 
Opposition to the LRTNF modernisation programme was most effective and 
widespread in the Netherlands. While in the end the Dutch government failed 
in its attempts to reduce or postpone the programme, it prevailed with its 
added reservation that the Netherlands would not agree to participate in 
deploying the new systems for two years.77 The Belgian government also took a 
reserved position, although not as extreme as the Dutch, since it announced its 
confirmation of the decision's application for Belgian territory in 6 months only 
if there were no serious progress in arms control talks. The smaller countries 
were annoyed with the Federal Republic because it had first instigated the need 
for modernisation and then imposed its own conditions.7*
Richard Burt explicitly praises the Federal Government for its commitment in 
this question:
75 U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit.. p.26/27
7tf According to Aviation Week and Space Technology of September 3, 1979, quoted in 
Elliot, op.cit.. p. 19. Elliot also mentions that the support of the then SPD party 
leader Willy Brandt was influential in Italy as well as in Germany, p.30. See Elliot,
1981. op.cit.. p. 19.
77 U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit.. p.61
78 U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit. p.27
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"One of the really positive things, by the way, about the theater nuclear force - 
from a political standpoint - is that once the Germans were convinced we were 
prepared to support this deployment they played an unprecedented role in 
working with the governments of these smaller countries to bring them along. 
That is true burden sharing."79
Jane Sharp criticises this policy of the Federal Government because of its 
negative arms control effects:
"Though wholly understandable, given West Germany’s unique political status 
and geographical position on the forward edge of the alliance, this insistence 
on non-singularity has generated considerable tension, as, for example, when 
officials of the Schmidt government organized visits to other West European 
capitals to pressure reluctant governments to accept the ground-launched cruise 
missile components of the December 1979 NATO INF package. Thus German 
sensitivity to singular treatment complicates efforts towards East-West arms 
control and provides fertile ground for Soviet exploitation of intra-NATO 
strains. ”w
Thus, in the question of participation of other non-nuclear states the Federal 
Government managed, in the face of considerable obstacles, to ensure that the 
Netherlands and Belgium voted affirmatively and accepted a deployment 
admittance, whereas Italy seemed to have committed itself to deployment 
without raising problems.*'
However,in contradiction to the German principle of non-singularity, the 
Federal Republic was the only country to deploy the Pershing n, due to its 
explicit mission of hitting the Soviet Union and its range of 1,800 km, which 
necessitated deployment as far "forward" as possible. The Pershing II was in the 
focus of criticism. With its high speed of 8-14 minutes, its accuracy and 
penetration capability it was supposed to be a first-strike weapon. The Federal 
Government certainly did not reckon with the extensive public debate sparked 
in West Germany and the Soviet Union's vehement reaction, and saw the 
Pershing II and the GLCM as a weapon-package rather than as two
79 "Discussion" in Thompson, 1980, op.cit.. p.235
so Sharp, 1984, op.cit. p.99
si "As others showed some hesitation, the Italians took pride in the fact that they could 
stand up and be counted on this one. It was a decision that fitted well with an 
increasing desire to play an active role in world affairs. A bella figura indeed!" see 
Elliot, 1981, op.cit.. p.28
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qualitatively different systems.42 Helmut Schmidt and Hans Apel later 
conceded on that the Federal Republic's singularity in being the only country to 
deploy the Pershing n  was a "political error” in regard to the Soviet Union.«
6.2.2. The land-based option
Many researchers and politicians in the Federal Republic who opposed the 
armament programme interpreted the final land deployment of the missiles as 
a defeat of Chancellor Schmidt on the important issue of the basing mode of the 
missiles. Schmidt had allegedly tried hard to push through a sea deployment of 
the missiles. Schmidt's defeat was again perceived as a concrete expression of 
U.S. hegemony in NATO:
"Der Plan (sea deployment, S.P.) hätte Bündnis- und entspannungspolitische 
Vorteile. Er ist so plausible, daß er in Bonn bedeutsame Befürworter fand. 
Doch widerspricht er amerikanischen Interessen. Washington möchte nicht in 
die Situation kommen, daß die Sowjets ein solches ’Europa’ U-Boot mit 
’taktischen’ Waffen für ein Strategisches der USA halten und auf Grund einer 
’Fehlperzeption’ den Atomkrieg zwischen den Supermächten 
auslösen...Deutlicher lassen sich atomare Klassenunterschiede nicht 
demonstrieren. "w
82 The results of the HLG have been discussed regularly in the Federal Security Council
since Autumn 1977. These meetings were prepared by interdepartmental 
discussions and coordination of the secretaries of state. Several times Ministers and 
the Federal Security Council met intensively and discussed the HLG’s proposals. 
Thus the German acceptance of the Pershing n, cannot be explained in terms of 
lack of information. See Haftendom, 1985, op.cit.. p.271 and Risse-Kappen, 1985, 
op.cit.. p. 30
83 See Helmut Schmidt, Rede auf dem Bundesdeleperten-Konferenz und 
Außenordentlicher Parteitag der SPD. Köln, November 18-19, 1983, Protokoll 
p.98-118, here p.107. Hans Apel, "Wir sind nicht der 51. Staat der USA", interview 
with Der Spiegel. No.44, October, 31,1983
84 "The plan (sea deployment, S.P.) would have advantages for the Alliance and for
detente. It is so plausible that it has found important supporters in Bonn. But it 
contradicts U.S. interests. Washington does not want to get into a situation in which 
the Soviets would confuse such a ’European’ submarine with tactical weapons with 
a U.S. strategic submarine and thus trigger a nuclear war between the superpowers 
because of a ’misperception’. There is no clearer way of demonstrating nuclear 
class differences.” (Emphasis in the text). Christian Potyka, "Doppelstrategie mit 
Raketen", Süddeutsche Zeitung. November 16, 1979, p.4. See also Mohssem 
Massarrat: "Die US-Militär-Strategen erkannten offenbar, daß sich mit der 
Stationierung der neuen Mittelstreckenraketen der USA die Möglichkeit eröffnen 
würde, erstens, die erste Runde eines atomaren Schlagabtauschs mit der 
Sowjetunion vom eigenen Territorium auf Europa zu verlagern und zweitens mit 
Hilfe der landgestützten Version dieser Waffen die vorwärtsschreitende 
westeuropäische Supermacht, vor allem aber die Bundesrepublik, in Schranken zu 
verweisen und bei der Stange zu halten, weil diese dichtbesiedelte Region sich in
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Opponents of the LRTNF decision objected bitterly against the land-basing of 
the missiles since ground-launched missiles represent attractive military targets 
for the opponent and thus provoke preemptive strikes. Helmut Schmidt's 
strong opposition against land deployment of nuclear missiles was mainly 
deduced from a statement he had given in 1961 when he did not yet hold 
governmental responsibility:
"Static, land-based missiles belong in Alaska, Labrador, Greenland, or even in 
the deserts of Libya and the Middle East • but emphatically not in thickly- 
populated regions. They act as magnets to the enemy’s nuclear missiles. 
Anything that attracts enemy fire is unwelcome to states with a high population 
density or a small area."*5
A 1982 quotation suggested that Schmidt had not revised his attitude 
completely.
"Think of a situation where an American Administration puts 5,000 nuclear 
rockets into Oregon and makes plans for adding some hundreds that could hit 
the Soviet Union and thereby make Oregon a great target area for Soviet 
missiles."*6
However, there are indications that Schmidt's primary reason for opposing the 
land-based option was a different and politically motivated one: his eagerness 
to prevail on as many allies as possible to participate in the missiles' 
deployment.
eine atomare Zielscheibe der Sowjetunion verwandelt und so auch indirekt zur 
Geisel der USA wird. So scheinen die ursprünglichen Absichten des Kanzlers sich 
nunmehr in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt zu haben." ("Obviously the U.S. military 
strategists understood that by the deployment of the new intermediate-range 
missiles the United States gained the option, first, that the first round of a nuclear 
fight with the Soviet Union would be transferred from its own territory to Europe 
and, secondly, that by means of the land-deployed version of these missiles it 
would put the advancing Western European superpower, and most of all the Federal 
Republic, in its place, but would also back it up, because this densely populated 
area would be turned into a nuclear target for the Soviet Union. Thus, the original 
intentions of the Chancellor seem to have been turned into their opposite.") 
Massarrat, 1984, op.cit.. pp.37-38. Rudolf Augstein compares the situation with 
that of a chess player who all of a sudden has to take over the game of his opponent 
because the chess board has been turned over. Rudolf Augstein, Per Spiegel. 
No.22, 1981, p.32. See also Perdelwitz/Bremer, 1981, op.cit. p.311. See also 
Alfred Mechtersheimer, "Atomarer Selbstmord auf Umwegen", interview in Stern. 
March 26.1981
85 This passage was quoted very often because it was so obviously in contradiction to 
land deployment of the missiles. Schmidt, 1962, op.cit. pp. 89-90
86 "Excerpts From Schmidt Interview on Key Issues", NYT. January 3,1982
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The reasons given for the High Level Group's final rejection of the sea-based 
option vary. The most important rationale was officially the symbolism and 
reassurance for some allies which are associated with nuclear capabilities based 
on the European continent:
"(P)referring land to sea-basing combined both military and political factors, 
namely, the perception that the deterrent effect of land-based missiles would be 
higher. Missiles based on European territory would be physically and 
unambiguously identified with European defence; they ’couple’ Europe and 
the United States in an unmistakable fashion. A Soviet leader would be left in 
no doubt that a nuclear attack on Europe would be met by a nuclear response 
by the Alliance; Soviet territory would not be a sanctuary."*7
The other arguments discussed in the High Level Group were:
- Land-based missiles are more effective, because they permit deliberate
escalation and selective use. What is involved is the greater accuracy of 
land-based missiles as opposed to sea-based missiles, plus the fact that 
the latter are characterised by communication problems.**
- As regards sea-based systems, in the long term, only, at most, one half or
one third of them can be kept operational. In order to keep a certain 
amount of systems operational, twice or even three times as many 
systems would have to be provided.*5
- Sea-basing would create problems of command and control. With 
ground-launched cruise missiles the battery commander is an 
American. The situation would be more complex with SLCM. If there 
were allied ships under control of U.S. units, unresolvable problems 
similar to those of the Multilateral Force would arise.
- A number of problems concerning participation would also have arisen.
The Norwegians, in particular, opposed sea-basing for fear that NATO 
submarines would seek the protection of Norwegian inland waters for 
their operations and thus expose Norway to Soviet retaliation.90
87 Cartwright/Critehley, 1985, op.cit. p. 17, see also Treverton, 1981, op.cit. p.39
** Cartwright/Critehley, 1985, op.cit.. p. 17
»  Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit.. p.444. A West German Foreign Ministry paper is even more 
pessimistic and estimates that only a quarter would be kept operational, which 
would necessitate three to four times more systems than actually needed for 
employment. See Auswärtiges Amt, Internes Arpumentationspapier des 
Auswärtigen Amtes zur See-ZLandstatiomerung der LRTNF vom 22.Mai 1981. p.3. 
made available to me by Thomas Risse-Kappen
90 Treverton, 1981, op.cit.. p.13
182
- Deployment of missiles on existing platforms for the sea-basing would
have led to operational complications. The production of new platforms 
would have raised the costs considerably. 91
- Since the Pershing was supposed to target the Soviet Union, range
deficiencies would have anyhow prohibited the deployment of 
Pershing at sea. If the cruise missile had been deployed at sea, the 
Federal Republic, because it was the only country to deploy the 
Pershing, would have been left in a singular position - the only country 
to have land-based missiles.
- On a political level, the policymakers were anxious that the need for
continuous port calls of the missiles carrying ships could cause political 
protest. It was assumed that protests over land-based missiles would 
dissipate after deployment.
- Arms control negotiations are believed also to have played a role in this
question because sea-based cruise missiles are supposed to complicate 
arms control negotiations more than land-based missiles, which is true 
for the necessary verification procedures of any arms control 
agreement. 92
- With a range of 2,500 kms, deployment of these SLCM stationed on
submarines could have been considered only on the seas close to 
Europe. This limitation of a deployment area for the submarines would 
have invited the Soviet Union to intensify its Anti-Submarine-Warfare 
(ASW).w
- If the force consisted of U.S. ships only, they would be regarded as an
adjunct of U.S. strategic forces. Since sea-launched missiles can be 
regarded as strategic weapons, they are in danger to be included in 
arms control negotiations on strategic weapons, such as SALT and 
START, and thus would be counted against the subceilings of the U.S. 
strategic arsenal. In contrast to them, ground-launched IN F are clearly 
non-strategic weapons, for which at this time there did not yet exist an 
arms control forum.
Since new ships had to be built for sea deployment of the missiles, it can be 
assumed with some justification that the cost factor was also an important
w Holst, 1983, op.cit. p.516
92 For the last three horizontal dashes see Cartwright/Critchley, 1985, op.cit. p. 17
93 Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit.. p.443
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motive for the European rejection of the sea-deployed cruise missile.5* Thus the 
Europeans seem to have rejected the sea-based option themselves.55
Several sources report unanimously that Schmidt tried to leave open the option 
of the sea-based cruise missile.56 In an interview Schmidt stated that the 
Americans refrained from getting too involved in these discussions. He aimed 
to include the Danes and the Norwegians in participating by hosting port calls 
by SLCM carrrying ships and proposed to deploy the cruise missile on herring 
trawerls. Since his proposal would have necessitated the denomination of 
several ports, from Portugal via Britain to West Germany, as locations for the 
ships, his European colleagues rejected Schmidt's idea.57
Thomson confirms Schmidt's description:
" Chancellor Schmidt ruminated about the possibility of including the SLCM 
in the deployment program, in the hope that the Danes and Norwegians would 
participate in the program by hosting port calls by SLCM carrying ships. 
However, this idea was clearly a non-starter and was quickly dropped by die 
German government"54
The West German Ministry of Foreign Affairs also rejected sea deployment with 
the hint that national participation could not be achieved by land deployment. 
After mentioning almost all the reasons for land deployment which have been
94 "Cost was also crucial; sea-based systems would be more expensive, either directly if 
new submarines (or fast surface craft) were built as launch platforms, or indirectly 
if existing attack submarines were converted to the cruise missile role.” Treverton,
1981, op.cit. p.13. The paper of the Ministry of Affairs estimates 1.5 to 2 times 
more costs for sea-basing than for land-basing. Auswärtiges Amt 1981, op.cit. p.3
55 Josef Joffe assumes that the anticipated high expenditures caused the Europeans to
reject the sea-base option themselves. See Josef Joffe, "Von der Nachrüstung zur 
Null-Rüstung. Die Geschichte des Doppelbeschlußes. Innenpolitik war wichtiger 
als Militärstrategie," in Die Zeit November 27,1981a, pp. 17
56 Risse-Kappen, 1985, op.cit.. p. 39 and Sharp, 1984, op.cit. p.120. Hoffmann reports
statements Helmut Schmidt made during an interview that even as late as spring
1980 Schmidt requested the HLG ami the Special Consultative Group, the 
successor of the Special Group, to examine in how far at least part of the cruise 
missile deployment package could be deployed at sea. Interview with Helmut 
Schmidt in Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit. p.445
57 Interview with Helmut Schmidt in Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit. p.446 and p.444. See also
Helmut Schmidt in an interview with Risse-Kappen, June 11,1985.
98 Thomson, 1984, op.cit. p.610
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discussed above, the Ministry of Foreign Ministry points out the possible arms 
control problems if the missiles were sea-deployed:
"Würde sich die NATO entscheiden, statt land-gestützter Raketen in Zukunft 
nur seegestützte Marschflugkörper einzuführen, würde damit die 
Geschäftsgrundlage für den Rüstungskontrollbeschluß von Dezember 
entfallen... Mit der Aufgabe der Landstationierung und der damit verbundenen 
unmittelbaren politischen und territorialen Beteiligung der europäischen 
Bündnispartner würden die Europäer ihren erheblichen Einfluß auf die 
künftige Gestaltung der amerikanischen Rüstungskontrollpolitik einbüßen."99
With the cruise missiles' deployment on surface ships a secure deployment of 
the missiles would not have been achieved anyway, since they can easily be 
monitored by the Soviets with aircraft, satellites and vessels. In comparison to 
cruise missiles based on surface ships, ground-launched missiles possess an 
even higher survivability, owing to their deployment in hardened shelters. A 
secure deployment of the missiles would not have been achieved.
Schmidt's intervention was passed to the HLG. Had this been an intervention of 
high priority for Schmidt, he already would have put it forward at the 
Guadeloupe summit, as he had done in the case of the German sine qua non 
principle of non-singularity.'00 Risse-Kappen confirms this interpretation:
"The proposal was promptly rejected by other allied governments and then 
dropped by the West German government too, not least of all since it did not 
factor in the five essentials formulated at the Guadeloupe summit."'0'
Thus, it was the Federal Republic's European allies who pushed for land 
deployment, and not the American allies. Norway in particular, have been 
anxious about losing its status as a nation which does not allow the deployment 
of nuclear weapons in peacetime, had it been forced to offer its territorial waters
99 "If NATO decided to introduce only sea- instead of land-deployed cruise missiles in
the future, the basis for the NATO Dual-Track decision would be removed. With 
the renunciation of land deployment in which the European allies were directly 
involved politically and territorially, the Europeans would lose their considerable 
influence on the ftiture characteristics of U.S. arms control policy." Auswärtiges 
Amt, 1981, op.cit. emphasis in the text, p.4. For the political reasons for land 
deployment see also Helmut F. Dräcker, Warum die Friedensbewegung scheitern 
mußte. Gedanken zu den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen 1980-1984. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Sendler Verlag, 1985), pp.98
100 Helmut Schmidt brings up this point himself in his interview with Risse-Kappen.
101 Risse-Kappen, 1988, op.cit.. p.46
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for the operations of the ships equipped with cruise missiles. The same may 
have been true of Denmark. Britain is also reported to have objected to sea 
deployment.'02 Thus, the Federal Republic was the only nation which 
advocated sea deployment on surface ships, and there is evidence that Helmut 
Schmidt was the only one who represented these ideas among his military 
experts.
Hence, on the one hand, sea-based cruise missiles would have involved at least 
to take into consideration Norwegian and Danish participation. On the other 
hand, range deficiencies would have prohibited the deployment of Pershing at 
sea. But precisely the necessity of Pershing's land deployment and the existence 
of sea-based cruise missiles would have left the Federal Republic in the singular 
role of being the only country to deploy land-based missiles. Thus, Chancellor 
Schmidt had to weigh an avoidance of a general "singularity" by the 
participation of other allies in the weapons programme against a particular 
"singularity" in terms of land-basing deployment. Consequently, Schmidt must 
have preferred the land-based solution after it turned out that Norway and 
Portugal rejected any deployment and that the Federal Republic was the only 
country to deploy the Pershing n.
623. Insistence on link to Arms Control
On April 6,1979 the "Special Group" on Arms Control and Related Matters was 
constituted by NATO to work out an arms control proposal to accompany the 
missile deployment decision which later comprised the second track of the 
NATO Dual-Track d e c i s i o n . ' ^  There is no doubt among the researchers that the 
establishment of the Special Group was mostly a result of the initiatives of 
German politicians in cooperation with the Dutch g o v ern m en t.T h e  Special 
Group consisted of arms control specialists from all Alliance countries except
102 British Defence Minister Fred Mulley in his reply to Defense Secretary Harold 
Brown wrote of the need for new land-based deployments in Europe that would be 
more visible than the Poseidon and more capable than the aging F -lll. See Barry, 
1983 opjaL, p. 17
103 see Garthoff, 1983, op.cit. p.204
¡04 Dr. Ruth of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acted on behalf of the German 
government. See Risse-Kappen, 1985, op.cit. p.36, and Schwartz, 1983, op.cit. p. 
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France and was chaired by the Director of Political and Military Affairs of the 
U.S. State Department, Leslie Gelb (later Reginald Bartholomew).
The fact that the Special Group was not established until April 1979, when the 
main decision concerning the deployment programme had already been taken 
in the High Level Group, meant that weight would no longer be given to the 
destabilising implications of the weapon programme (in particular those of the 
Pershing ID or to arms control problems such as the verification of limitations 
on numbers of the small, dual-capable cruise missiles.'®5
This chronology arouses suspicion with regard to NATO's seriousness about 
arms control results:
"Deciding on arms control negotiations essentially as a potential device to 
mobilize support for a deployment program was almost bound to give arms 
control considerations a secondary role."'06
On September 28,1979 the High Level Group and the Special Group met for the 
first and only time. The report of the two groups then had to be converted into a 
document that NATO had to agree to in December. A series of interagency 
meetings involving the National Security Council, the State Department, the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Defense Department 
combined the two reports into what became known as the "Integrated Decision 
Document".'07
The Special Group established a number of guidelines, the most important 
being:
1. the work of the High Level Group constituted the basic point of 
reference for the Special Group;
Z arms control negotiations would be neither realistic nor possible 
without an agreed modernisation plan and a decision to implement the 
plan;
3. LRTNF negotiations should be conducted within the SALT II 
framework;
105 For the arms control problems of cruise missile see Bittorf, 1986, op.ciL 
m  Garthoff, 1983, op.cit.. p.205 
107 Schwartz, 1983, op.cit. p.232
187
4. the negotiations should ensure equality in terms of ceilings and 
rights.70*
On a West German initiative, the principle was integrated that future 
limitations of U.S. intermediate systems would be accompanied by 
"appropriate" limitations of the Soviet weapons. But the term "appropriate" 
allows various interpretations. This implies that the precise level of SS-20 that 
the Alliance could live with had not been established, nor had the 
corresponding numbers of NATO LRTNF then required been determined.'09
The most decisive guideline was the so-called non-renunciation clause, which 
stated that arms control would be neither realistic nor possible without an 
agreed modernisation plan and a decision to implement the plan and that 
"LRTNF arms control was a complement to, not a substitute for LRTNF 
modernization".^0
This implies that the NATO organ which was due to draft arms control 
proposals excluded the "zero-option", which was proposed by U.S. President 
Reagan in November 1981. He announced that the U.S. and NATO were 
prepared to cancel deployment of Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe if 
the Soviets agreed to dismantle their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.'^ Reagan's 
proposal was the basis for the INF treaty of 1987. Thus the Special Group with 
its non-renunciation clause did not prevail.
The inability or unwillingness to elaborate a consistent and concrete approach 
to arms control on the part of the Federal Republic can be seen in the following 
timetable of events:
By March 1978 the High Level Group had agreed on LRTNF modernisation. 
Only in February 1979 (one year later) did the Federal Government for the first 
time formulate its official attitude towards the INF issue provoked by an
¡os ibiiL pp.231-232
109 see U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit. p.31
no Schwartz, 1983, op.cit. p.232. Thomson reports that it was the most important prin­
ciple from the U.S. perspective. Thomson, 1984, op.cit. p.609. For a discussion of 
the guidelines see Cartwright/Critchley, 1985, op.cit. p.20
in U.S. Policy Information and Texts, The INF Talks: A Chronology. September 24, 
1987
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interpellation of all parties of the Bundestag.*« In parallel with this public 
debate, Department 220 of the Foreign Ministry and Section FiiS-in of the 
Ministry of Defence were instructed to develop an approach to incorporate the 
INF systems into arms control."* Thus, the formulation of the government 
position was tackled one year after the consensus in the High Level Group to 
modernise the weapons. The Federal Republic failed to design an applicable 
and consistent concept of arms control for the INF negotiations."*
112 Answer of the Federal Government to the parliamentary questions by the SPD/FDP
and CDU/CSU on February 16,1979, Bundesdrucksache 8/2587, pp.20-23
113 see Risse-Kappen, 1985, op.cit.. p.34
U4 Haftendom explains this delayed reaction by the Federal Government in terms of the 
different arms control concepts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the one hand, 
and the Ministry of Defence and the Office of the Federal Chancellery on the other. 
The difference is mainly explained by the Foreign Ministry’s much more 
pronounced orientation towards a close alliance with the United States and towards 
consideration of U.S. interests. Haftendom describes the quarrels between 
Genscher and Apel/Schmidt in the Federal Security Council with Genscher being 
the keeper of the grail of American interests and flexible response strategy, while 
Schmidt and Apel are reported to have discussed alternatives and handed in options 
for negotiations. Thus the conflict is explained as having erupted between the 
coalition partners. See Haftendom, 1985, op.cit.. p.271 and Haftendom, 1986, 
op.cit. p.30. By indiscretion two secret documents were made public in spring 
1982, which confirmed this perception of the policy line. The Foreign Ministry 
pleaded for a close connection with the United States, while a secret study of the 
Office of the Federal Chancellery advocated distancing from the United States. See 
Eberwein/ Kelleher, 1983. op.cit. p. 121. Analogous to this perception of the 
Foreign Office’s narrower approach to arms control, several experts blame the 
government members of the Liberal party, above all, for the failure of the arms 
control negotiations. Butterwege, for example, holds the Foreign Ministry mainly 
responsible for the stalemate in the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reductions) 
talks on conventional forces in Europe. See Christoph Butterwege and Heinz-Gerd 
Hofschen, Sozialdemokratie und Frieden. (Heilbronn: 1984) p.341. Albrecht cites a 
long statement by a member of the Liberal party, Runge, in which Runge blames 
Genscher for the stalemate in Vienna, for the agreement of the Federal Republic to 
deploy the neutron bomb on German soil and for an irresponsible, humble attitude 
towards the United States. He also blames Genscher for cancelling Schmidt’s plan 
to arrange a moratorium on the deployment of Eurostrategic weapons by a cabinet 
decision. He characterises Genscher as "unconditionally anti-Soviet". See Albrecht 
1982, op.cit.. pp. 163-168
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In contrast to common perception, the Federal Republic, as a NATO ally, 
participated actively in the Nuclear Planning Group, which during its first 
years established the Provisional and Political Guidelines for the first and 
follow-on use. The schedule for the modernisation of theatre nuclear forces was 
an unavoidable result of the NPG's search for military means to implement 
flexible response. As a materialisation of the NPG's plan to modernise the TNF 
in the direction of greater selectivity and flexibility, the NATO allies were 
offered the advanced cruise missile technology and the neutron bomb. The 
German delegation in particular showed considerable interest in the new 
technology of the "cruise missile" which was a result of the U.S. elaborations on 
limited nuclear strategic options. When it became clear during the SALT 
negotiations that the cruise missile was also intended to play the role of a 
bargaining counter, German politicians used the consultations in context of the 
SALT negotiations to intervene in favour of maintaining the cruise missile 
option, in particular, the ground-launched version. Since in SALT-I German 
politicians had also pushed exclusion of the FBS from the negotiations, the 
conclusion is warranted that German strategic experts envisaged deployment of 
U.S. long-range theatre nuclear weapons for employment in the European 
theatre as being indispensable for securing German defence interests. The U.S. 
administration, which was reluctant to yield to these German requests and to 
redeploy LRTNF in Europe, after the neutron bomb debacle decided to use the 
LRTNF deployment decision as a means of demonstrating effective U.S. 
leadership in NATO. Pressure from the U.S. Defense Department to deploy 
new LRTNF in Europe also played a role in the shift of the U.S. administration's 
TNF policy, although the Head of the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Harold 
Brown, first had to be convinced of the LRTNF s merit.
The final plan of the deployment decision within the HLG incorporated, to a 
considerable extent, German political principles. The Federal Republic 
prevailed in its most important guideline of non-singularity in nuclear 
decisions and succeeded in increasing the number of participants in the 
deployment programme. Also the land deployment of all missiles, which was 
perceived as an important defeat for Schmidt's attempt to push through their 
sea-basing, should be regarded as an inevitable result of the attempt to avoid 
the Federal Republic being the only country to deploy the missiles on land. The 
second track of the NATO Dual-Track decision, i.e. the offer of arms control to
Conclusion
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the Soviet Union, is also due to pressure exerted on the part of German 
politicians. However, the lack of concrete arms control proposals suggests that 
German politicians regarded the second track predominantly as a means to 
forestall public criticism on the deployment decision. Hence, the deployment 
track of the 1979 NATO decision is to a considerable extent the result of 
pressure exerted by German politicians in NATO and in their consultations 
with the United States. It seems that the Federal Republic's room for manoeuver 
within NATO and in relation with its U.S. ally is greater than generally 
assumed."5
In order to determine whose interpretation prevails in NATO, it is necessary to 
shift the focus of attention to the weapons' employment options.
" 5 Official statements suggest a similar interpretation. When Schmidt was asked about 
his assessment of West Germany’s room for manoeuver within NATO he 
answered: "Es wäre ein Irrtum zu meinen, die europäischen Bündnispartner der 
Vereignigten Staaten von Amerika hätten keinen politischen Spielraum." 
(Translation: "It would be an error to believe the European allies of the United 
States have no room for political maneuver.") in Per Spiegel. (No.6, February 4, 
1980) p.32. Bahr responded in the same way when confronted with the argument 
that die Federal Republic has to deploy what the United States produces: "Aber wir 
hatten doch praktisch einen Einfluß auf diese Produktionsentscheidung. Die 
Amerikaner wollten die Pershing II nur produzieren, wenn die Europäer im Prinzip 
bereit wären, sie auch zu stationieren. Die amerikanische Produktionsentscheidung 
ist gekoppelt gewesen an die Zusage der Europäer, die Mittelstreckenraketen auch 
zu stationieren."(Translation: "But we did have an influence on this decision in 
favour of production. The Americans only wanted to produce the Pershing II if the 
Europeans were in principle ready to deploy them. The Americans’ decision on 
production was coupled with the Europeans’ promise to deploy these medium range 
weapons.") see Egon Bahr, Was wird aus den Deutschen? Fragen und Antworten. 
(Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1982), p.157. These results were backed 
up by Alex A. Vardamis, who argues that West Germany would no longer be 
completely dependent on the United States and that it had become a world power in 
its own right. See Alex A. Vardamis, "German-American Military Fissures", 
Foreign Policy. (Spring 1979) pp.87-106.
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Section III: The Solution of the LRTNF modernisation: its possible employment 
options
This section should provide an answer to the question of whose interpretation 
of flexible response dominated in the request for intermediate-range, land- 
based and, therefore highly vulnerable nuclear- tipped ballistic and cruise 
missiles: the German or the U.S. interpretation. To clarify this problem different 
employment options will be discussed. The assumption that the LRTNF can be 
regarded as spearheads of a U.S. first strike strategy will be disproved. The 
Schlesinger doctrine with its implied revision of TNF shall be analysed with 
regard to what extent the weapons have originated in U.S. defence 
programmes. The German first use concept is presented in an illustrative way 
by an analyst of Ebenhausen. His analysis will serve to clarify the employment 
options of the LRTNF in German doctrines. The section will, however, begin 
with elaborating the compatible elements in the U.S. and German doctrines.
7. Compatible strategic doctrines and rationales
The chapter will start with a brief discussion about the role that the SS-20 
played in respect to the evolution in the development of the LRTNF decision. It 
will be argued that the compromise can be presented as a mutual U.S. and 
German acceptance of providing means for escalation control. The ambiguous 
data of the Pershing n, in particular concerning the number to be deployed, its 
range and the question whether it is able to attack new targets, seemed to have 
helped that U.S. and German strategic experts were able to compromise on the 
LRTNF, since the ambiguous data impeded a clear determination of the 
LRTNFs employment options. Finally it will be argued that the traditional 
distinction between U.S. "war-fighters” and German "deterrers" is no longer 
helpful for analytical purposes.
7.1. Key Justification for the LRTNF Decision: the SS-20
The official rationale for the NATO-Dual Track decision is the Warsaw Pact's 
implementation of programmes to modernise and expand its long-range theatre 
nuclear forces:
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"In particular, they (the Soviet Union, S.P.) have deployed the SS-20 missile, 
which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing 
greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple 
warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than 
other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre role. During this period, 
while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long-Range 
Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static."*
In September 1974 the Soviet Union conducted its first test flight with a SS-20. 
From 1976 onwards the Soviet Union deployed the middle-range SS-20 ballistic 
missile2. Until a freeze in 1984, the number of SS-20 was steadily increased to 
417 deployed and 356 non-deployed SS-20 missiles. Thus, the Soviet Union had 
produced 826 missiles, which all are slated for destruction now as a result of the 
INF treaty.* The SS-20 is a ballistic missile with a range between 4,000-4,500 kms 
(Soviet indications) and 5,000 kms (U.S. range estimate). The solid-fueled SS-20 
missile possesses up to three warheads and scores higher on readiness than the 
SS-4 and SS-5. It is mobile and therefore less vulnerable, and consequently "a 
capable war-fighting" weapon.*
However, researchers differed in their interpretation of the significance of these 
improvements. A debate arose whether the Soviet Union had gained a new 
military option, i.e. the capability for a selective employment plan (SEP), with 
the SS-20. But critics cannot foresee circumstances in which the Soviet Union 
might employ its nuclear forces to a limited use to signal escalation against 
Europe. In view of its technical deficiencies, the SS-20's capability of 
implementing selective employment plans has been doubted, since a selective 
use of nuclear weapons necessitates missiles with relatively small warheads 
and a high accuracy. However, due to the combination of the SS-20 warheads' 
yield of 150 to 500 kilotons, and its accuracy of 400 metres, it could not avoid 
collateral damage.5 According to military logic, too heavy collateral damage
1 Communique in Cartwright/Critchley, 1985, op.cit.. p.151
2 Riihl, 1987, op.cit.. p. 123
3 INF Treaty, 1987, op.cit.. p.3
< Sverre Lodgaard, "Long-range Theater Nuclear forces" in SIPRI Yearbook 1983. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (London: Taylor and Francis, 
1983), pp.3-25, here p. 10
5 In comparison with the SS-20, the Pershing n  has a yield of approximately 5-50 
kilotons and an accuracy of 20-45m CEP; see Cochran et.al., 1984, op.cit. pp.294- 
295. For the data of the SS-20 see also Sigal, 1984, op.cit.. p.39
193
provokes retaliation from the attacked, a reaction, which, if a war started, 
would have to be avoided and is incompatible with the objective of escalation 
control.
The question whether the Soviet Union gained escalation dominance with its 
SS-20 deployment6 will not be discussed here in detail, because the analysis of 
the evolution of the LRINF deployment demonstrates that NATO developed a 
rationale for the deployment of weapons independently of the SS-20. There are 
important members of the strategic community such as Simon Lunn, Deputy 
Secretary of the North Atlantic Assembly, who supported the validity of this 
approach:
"Initially, NATO’s modernization decision arose from the political judgment 
that NATO’s strategy of flexible response required systems based on European 
territory and capable of striking the Soviet Union, and thus the 
military / technical judgment that existing assets (F-ll Is and Poseidon reentry 
vehicles) were no longer adequate. The SS-20 made NATO’s situation worse 
(how much worse is debatable) but modernization requirements were not 
directly related to the number of SS-20 deployments."7
Also Johan Holst, then Director of the Nors Utenrikspolitisk Institute, confirms 
this evaluation:
"Der Beschluß beruht auf einer zweifachen Begründung, einer Anzahl von 
militärischen und einer Anzahl von politischen Erwägungen. Die militärische 
Begründung war im großen und ganzen unabhängig von der Tatsache der 
Aufrüstung mit der SS-20 Rakete."4
West German politicians in particular used the argument of the SS-20 as a 
legitimation for the deployment of U.S. weapons on their soil. In fact several 
analysts criticised the politicians for their stress on the SS-20, because that
6 See on this question the discussion between Dieter Senghaas and Lothar Rühl in
Sicherheit und Frieden. Vol.5, No.4,1087, pp.266-271
7 Simon Lunn, "At issue: nuclear modernization in Europe" in The Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists. Vol.38 (August/September 1982) pp. 17-23, p.19. For another discussion 
of this question see Peter Seidel, Die Diskussion um den Doppelbeschluß. Eine 
Zwischenbilanz. (München: Bernhard und Graefe, 1982), pp.70-82.
8 "The decision is based on a twofold rationale, a number of military and a number of
political considerations. On the whole the military rationale was independent of the 
build-up with the SS-20, focusing instead on requirements for counterstrikes over 
long distances against Soviet forces of the second and third wave and their 
accompanying infrastructure." Johan Jorgen Holst, "Nukleare Mittelstreckenwaffen 
und das politische Gleichgewicht in Europa”, Europa-Archiv. (Vol.38, No. 17,
1983), pp.507-516, here p.507
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evoked the impression that it would be possible to avoid the deployment of «ill 
new Pershing II and cruise missiles.® Comparisons of the force ratio between 
the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the area of intermediate-range missiles played a 
major role in the debate on the NATO Dual-Track decision until 1981. After
1981 the focus of attention shifted to the strategic implications involved in the 
decision. The complexity and difficulty of the issue is expressed in the 
astonishing range of figures expressing the force ratio between the Warsaw Pact 
and NATO: they range from nearly 1:1, estimated by the IISS*0 to the ratio of 
3.5:1 estimated by the German White Papers" up to Reagan's estimate with the 
worst case- figure of 6:1."
Without providing an assessment of the force ratios, only a few indications will 
be given to demonstrate the limits of significance of any force ratios, especially 
those concerning the intermediate-range theatre nuclear forces:
- weapons of a comparable group, range and yield can have very different 
qualities. These qualities are expressed by accuracy, penetrability, 
reliability, mobility, reloading capability, survivability, capability to 
penetrate the enemy's defence, targeting options, doctrines, exchange 
scenarios and the endurance of C^I facilities (command, control, 
communication)"
9 See Treverton, 1983, op.cit.. p.96; Cartwright and Critchley, 1985, op.cit.. p.8-10;
Christoph Bertram, The Implications of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 
Foreign Affairs. (Winter 1981/82), pp.305-326, here p.318
10 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1979-1980.
(London: ESS, 1980), pp. 114-117
"  Weißbuch 1979, op.cit.. pp. 105-109
12 See the Reagan speech of November 18, 1981 in Michael Getier, "U.S. Marshalling
Detailed Figures to back views of Soviet Strength" in International Herald Tribune. 
(November 23, 1981). Milton Leitenberg has made a compilation of the results of 
the most important force comparisons, see Leitenberg, 1986, op.cit.. p.206. For a 
general criticism of Warsaw Pact-NATO force ratios, see Andreas von Biilow, 
"Problematik eines Kräftevergleichs zwischen NATO und Warschauer Pakt", in 
Soldat und Technik. (No.6,1979), pp.289-293
13 For the problem of force comparisons see Dieter S. Lutz, Weltkrieg wider willen? Die
Nuklearwaffen in und fur Europa. (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981) pp.58-72 
; Hubertus Hoffmann, Atomkrieg-Atomfricden. Technik. Strategie. Abrüstung. 
(München: Bernard und Graefe, 1980), p.140 ; Karl-Peter Stratmann, "Das 
’eurostrategische’ Kräfteverhältnis. Zweifelhafte Bewertungen als Folge der 
Anwendung unterschiedlicher Kriterien" in Europa-Archiv. (Vol.36, No.13, 1981a) 
pp.387-398
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- geostrategic differences between the Soviet Union and the United States
cannot be neglected. As opposed to the United States, the Soviet Union 
is encircled by the United States's allies. Therefore the Soviet Union 
insists on defining as "strategic" all weapons which are able to reach its 
territory, thus including all Eurostrategic weapons and the U.S. 
Forward Based Systems'* based on European soil. The Americans 
refuse this definition. On the other hand, a Soviet short-range missile 
represents a strategic threat to the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
difficulties of defining 'strategic7, 'Eurostrategic' and 'tactical' weapons 
in arms control negotiations result from these geostrategic asymmetries.
- The official allocation of 'strategic' systems to 'theatre' missions also
causes problems. U.S. central strategic systems clearly overlap in target 
coverage with the nuclear systems based in Europe. Likewise, a number 
of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are known to be 
targeted against Western Europe. In this context the categorisation of 
the submarine-launched Poseidon missiles created the most significant 
problems, with a total of 400 missiles. On the one hand the Poseidon 
were already included in the SALT n  aggregates, which means that 
they are defined as having basically "strategic missions", while on the 
other hand the Poseidon are assigned to SACEUR and designed for 
targets in the European theatre, and thus have to be grouped with 
"Eurostrategic" or "tactical" weapons.'5
- One side can gain new military options by a technological development
which the other side cannot match. An example of the importance of a 
new technological development is the U.S. introduction of warheads 
with several independently targetable warheads, the so-called Multiple 
Individually-targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV).'6 Thus the U.S. military 
planners gained what they call a "new military option" and a further 
complication of arms control, because from that time on the traditional 
approach "one missile - one warhead" was no longer valid.
- There is no agreement whatsoever whether the British and French 
arsenals should be included in the compilations of the nuclear weapons.
14 A detailed discussion of the U.S. FBS is given in chapter 5.2.
'5 For technical details of the Poseidon see Cochran, 1984, op.cit.. pp. 136-137. See also 
U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit.p.48
16 The United States introduced the MIRV in 1970, the Soviet Union in 1975, see Lutz, 
1981.QB.flL, P-31
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- The characteristics of several systems make their precise categorisation
difficult. For example, the ranges of aircraft vary substantially 
according to their mission and payload. The matter is further 
complicated by the fact that they can be used for conventional and 
nuclear missions, and are thus dual-capable.
- The Soviet Union is also surrounded by its Asian antagonists. Therefore
a considerable portion of the Soviet forces, such as for example, the 
SS-20, are deployed in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. Yet in a 
moment of crisis they could be transported to the European part of the 
Soviet Union. The same applies to the long-range strike aircraft such as 
the FB-111 based in the United States, which could be dispatched to 
Europe in a matter of hours during a crisis.
In May and June 1976 the NPG, the DPC and the North Atlantic Council 
reacted publicly for the first time to the SS-20 by stating "their concern at the 
sustained growth in the Warsaw Pact countries' military power, on land, on sea 
and in the air beyond levels apparently justified for defensive purposes"*7 and 
"at the resulting effect on the strategic balance between East and West, 
particularly in regard to Europe."*® In December 1976 NATO's Defence 
Ministers for the first time officially commented concretely on the SS-20.*9 In 
view of NATO's alleged irritation over the SS-20, Garthoff finds it "remarkable" 
that no real analysis of the Soviet purposes in deploying the SS-20 was 
undertaken by any kind of NATO body.20
Public attention outside the immediate NATO sphere was drawn to the SS-20 in 
September 1976, when Fred Dde, at that time Director of the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, compared the SS-20 to "'a dark cloud towering over 
Europe and Asia'."2'  But Ode's speech had been not authorised by the State
*7 see Communique of the North Atlantic Council, May 20-21, 1976, in NATO, 
Communiques Vol.II, op.cit.. p.l 1
18 see Communique of the NPG, June 14,1976, in ibid. p. 19
19 Communique of the DPC, December 7-8,1976 in ibid. p.24
20 Raymond Garthoff was deputy director of political-military affairs in the Department
of State, 1983, op.cit.. p. 201. See also "The Soviet SS-20 Decision” in Survival. 
(Vol.25, No.3, May/June 1983a) pp. 110-119 and "Moscow’s Less-Than-Ominous 
Reasons for Deploying SS-20’s" in NYT. May 13, 1983, p.30
21 quoted in Thomson, 1984, op.cit.. p.602.
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Department, which did not circulate the text.22 The State Department's 
reservations were caused by the Ford administration's attempt to achieve a 
follow-up agreement to SALT I with the Soviets.
However, it has to be conceded that, although the SS-20 did not cause the 
LRTNF modernisation and deployment decision, the Soviet missiles' 
continuous build-up certainly stimulated the whole process in NATO and 
convinced inexperienced politicians who were unsure about whether or not to 
support the deployment track of the NATO 1979 decision.
72. LRTNF as a means for Escalation Control
Several analysts view the attainment of parity by the superpowers in the 
strategic area under the aspect of the resulting loss of U.S. escalation 
dominance. It will be argued that German strategic experts contemplated to 
compensate this loss by making deliberate escalation with its Erst use proviso 
more credible. The implications of an acceptance of flexible options include 
certain assumptions such as that escalation can be controlled. The instruments 
of escalation control are limited selective options accomplished by weapons 
which combine effectiveness with selectivity and flexibility. The discussions 
within the Nuclear Planning Group will be recalled in order to demonstrate the 
cooperation between the United States and the European elaboration of 
selective employment plans. Finally the parallels between deliberate escalation 
and escalation control shall be clarified.
72.1. Compensation of the loss o f escalation dominance
The arms race between the superpowers has always been characterised in terms 
of competing military options rather than by a purely numerical arms race. The 
superpowers' military competition is expressed in a race for escalation 
dominance.25
22 See U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit.. p. 16
23 By a comprehensive increase of its nuclear arsenal the Soviet Union obviously
accepted this race for escalation dominance and colluded in its advance.
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The party which possesses escalation dominance can exclude the other party 
from exercising influence on the choice between escalation and non-escalation. 
Herman Kahn was the first to introduce the term escalation dominance to the 
strategic debate:
"This is a capacity, other things being equal, to enable the side possessing it to 
enjoy marked advantages in a given region of the escalation ladder...It depends 
on the net effect of the competing capabilities on the rung being occupied, the 
estimate by each side of what would happen if the confrontation moved to 
other rungs, and the means each side has to shift the confrontation to these 
other rungs."24
In his excellent criticism of these escalation concepts, Lawrence Freedman 
concludes that success through escalation dominance depends on a favourable 
asymmetry of capabilities.23 The idea is that this favourable asymmetry might 
be turned into a bargaining advantage. Escalation dominance occurs for that 
party which does not have to expect any unbearable damage by escalating to a 
certain level and which at the same time can expect to inflict considerable 
military damage on the opponent. Thus, this party could expect that the 
opponent would have to be interested in avoiding strikes at this specific level of 
escalation.26
As an example of a successful application of escalation dominance, strategic 
analysts tend to invoke the Cuba Crisis. According to their interpretation, the 
conflict was decided in favour of the United States, because the Western
24 Herman Kahn, On Metaphors and Scenarios. (London: Pall Mall Press,
1965), p.290
25 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London and Basingstoke:
Macmillan Press, 1981), p.218
26 "Wer die Eskalationsdominanz besitzt, kann die andere Seite von dem Einfluß auf die
Wahl zwischen Eskalation und nicht-Eskalation ausschließen. Eskalationsdominanz 
entsteht dadurch, daß die betreffende Seite bei einem Übergang auf die 
Eskalationsebene keinen unannehmbaren Schaden zu befürchten hätte und zugleich 
wesentliche militärische Vorteile erwarten dürfte mit der Konsequenz, daß die 
andere Seite einen Schlagabtausch auf der Eskalationsebene unbedingt zu 
vermeiden suchen muß." ("He who possesses escalation dominance, is able to 
exclude the other side from influencing the choice between escalation and no 
escalation. Escalation dominance is achieved when the respective party would have 
to fear no unacceptable damage and, in addition, could expect important military 
advantages which therefore would induce the other side under all circumstances to 
avoid a clash on the escalation level.") Gerhard Wettig, "Die militärischen 
Optionen in Europa", in Erhard Fomdran / Gert Krell, Kernwaffen im Ost-West- 
Vcrgleich. Zur Beurteilung militärischer Potentiale und Fähigkeiten. (Baden- 
Baden: Nomos, 1984) p.l 17-155, here p.123
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superpower chose a geographical area as the battlefield where it was 
conventionally superior: the Caribbean Sea. From the outset of the conflict a 
tactical success for the Soviet Union was excluded by the U.S. geostrategic 
advantages and its enormous military superiority in this area. While the United 
States won the conventional battle, its nuclear supremacy would have enabled 
it to fight a limited nuclear war against military targets in the Soviet Union and 
simultaneously to keep in reserve enough strategic weapons to destroy Soviet 
cities. Riihl characterises the situation of 1962: "Die USA hatten sich 
Eskalationsdominanz in der Krise verschafft und konnten der Soviet Union den 
Einsatz vorschreiben.”27
The official justification for the NATO Dual-Track decision, the Soviet SS-20, 
was perceived as an instrument to secure Soviet escalation dominance and thus 
as a considerable provocation for NATO.2*
This loss of U.S. escalation dominance through the superpowers' attainment of 
parity in the strategic area is much deplored in both the U.S. and the German 
strategic community. According to Stratmann, this loss of escalation dominance 
undermined the German security concept which emphasised especially flexible 
response's principle of deliberate escalation:
"Außerdem gelang es der deutschen Politik mit aktiver Unterstützung der 
britischen Regierung, in der Formulierung jenes strategischen Kompromisses, 
zu dem die die allianzintemen Verhandlungen schließlich führten, mit dem 
Konzept der ’vorbedachten Eskalation* genügend Ansatzpunkte zu bewahren, 
um auch die neue Doktrin der ’flexible response’ im wesentlichen als nukleare 
Abschreckungsstrategie im Sinne ihrer Vorgängerin rlamHlrn zu können. 
Dadurch blieb verdeckt, daß das ursprüngliche deutsche Sicherheitskonzept 
durch den Verlust seiner materiellen Grundlage, der eindeutigen 
Eskalationsdominanz der USA grundsätzlich in Frage gestellt worden war."29
27 "ln the crisis, the United States had gained escalation dominance and could determine
the stakes for the Soviet Union." Lothar Ruehl "Der Nutzen Militärischer Macht in 
Europa" in Kaiser und Kreis, 1977, op.cit.. p.224. "Aus der Eskalationsdominanz 
folgt auch die Fähigkeit, einen bewaffneten Konflikt zum eigenen relativen Vorteil 
zu beenden, also dem Gegner die Bedingungen der Kriegsbeendigung 
vorzuschreiben." ("From escalation dominance follows the ability to terminate an 
armed conflict on terms as advantageous as possible to one’s own interests, and 
thus to dictate to the opponent the conditions for termination of war.") Riihl, 1987, 
op.cit.. p.63
28 This is the implied assumption of Rühl’s 1987 book, see ibid
29 Emphasis in the text. "Moreover, German policy, with the help of the British
government, succeeded in formulating that strategic compromise at which the 
allies’ negotiations finally arrived, to keep a sufficient number of starting points
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According to German analysts this loss of escalation dominance was planned to 
be compensated by making deliberate escalation with its first use proviso more 
credible.
72.2. Assumptions implied in the acceptance of flexible options
The Germans' acceptance of flexible response and the establishing of graded 
options for implementing the strategy also implied the acceptance of the 
following assumptions and principles:
- the acceptance of a selective use, which means that the weapons have to
be "tailored", "surgical", "flexible", "discriminate" and "targeted";
- the assumption that political and military means are proportional to each
other - in the doctrines of limited nuclear options every possible case 
has to be covered;
- the idea that even in the most cataclysmic circumstances massive 
destruction can be prevented by means of controlled, flexible, selective 
and limited use of nuclear weapons is called "escalation control"; 
escalation control allows the denial of the opponent's military plans 
and simultaneous avoidance of indiscriminate punishment and 
retaliation strikes;
- the idea that a nuclear war can be controlled and terminated after it has
broken out and that this pause can be used as an incentive to start 
negotiations with the opponent, the so-called concept of intra-war 
deterrence The idea is that the prospect of "terminating the conflict at 
the lowest possible level consistent with NATO objectives"*0 should still 
be offered;
- the assumption that escalation control grows into escalation dominance
which allows the successful termination of war hostilities on favourable 
terms."
within this concept of ’deliberate escalation’ in order to present the new doctrine of 
’flexible response’ on the whole as nuclear deterrence strategy, just as its 
predecessor. Thereby it was concealed that the initial German security concept had 
been fundamentally endangered because it had lost its material basis, namely the 
unequivocal U.S. escalation dominance". Stratmann, 1981, op.cit. p. 16
Legge, 1983, op.cit, p.41
31 See Senghaas, 1984, op.cit. p. 108. Based on an article of Davis, 1975/76, op.cit and 
Eckhard Liibkemeier, PD 59 und LRTNF - Modemisierung: Militflrstrate gische
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The rational behaviour of political leaders is the premise underlying the 
concept that escalation can be controlled. It is the idea that there are limits to the 
losses political leaders will accept in order to achieve their objectives and that 
these leaders, aware of the destruction they can inflict upon each other, will be 
under strong pressure not to trigger such a catastrophe.*2
Therefore, in short, the controlled use of nuclear weapons would have two 
specific objectives:
1. to stop the aggression and to create a break in the military activities to 
allow time for diplomatic negotiations, so that deterrence would then, 
according to this concept, be restored; and
2. to change the opponent's perception that he might gain a quick and easy 
victory.**
Instruments of escalation control are limited selective nuclear options 
accomplished by weapons which combine effectiveness with selectivity and 
flexibility.
During the seventies, the U.S. and West German doctrines were reconciled in 
their joint elaboration of Selective Employment Plans (SEP) in the Nuclear 
Planning Group. The NPG's final approval of the use of Theatre Nuclear Strike 
Forces in a selective and limited release and their first employment in the 
subsequent NATO exercises can be regarded as the beginning of NATO's 
establishment for Selective Employment Plans (SEPs) for the limited use of 
TNF* Apart from the fact that Schmidt participated in the draft of the TNSF 
employment plans, German acceptance and activity in the elaboration of SEPs 
during the seventies is expressed in the European request for "clean" and 
accurate nuclear warheads. Further manifestations of this process are the 
German approval of first use by targeting military objects. Accordingly, the
Implikationen der Erweiterten Abschreckung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
(Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, September 1981)
*2 Davis, 1975/76, op.cit. p.7
** ibid. pp.6-7
34 Rühl, 1987, op.cit.. p.140 and Legge, 1983, op.cit.. p.25
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concept of graded options, escalation control and thus intra-war deterrence 
were also key requests for the guidelines of the German TNF posture.*5
Ulrich Weisser, who worked in the Planning Staff of the Ministry of Defence 
and in the chancellery under Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl, describes the 
LRTNFs role in the context of these escalation concepts as follows:
"Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland würde möglicherweise im Kriegsfall der 
frühe Einsatz von Nuklearwaffen, die auch die Sowjetunion erreichen können, 
gelegen kommen, um durch ein weiterreichendes Nuklearsignal das Risiko 
weiterer Kampfhandlungen für den Warschauer Pakt zu erhöhen, um ihn so zur 
Einkehr und zur Umkehr zu bewegen - kurzum: die Abschreckung 
wiederherzustellen."*6
Weisser expresses the hope that the LRTNF might reestablish deterrence after it 
failed, in a way that they establish "intra-war deterrence".
723. Parallels between Deliberate Escalation and Escalation control
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, NATO's first use concept, 
incorporated in the principle of deliberate escalation, is supposed
"to put more at risk for the Warsaw Pact nations than they would initially 
expect, should cause them to reconsider their actions by altering their 
assessment of an early victory, and thus bring about a rapid termination and 
settlement of the conflict on acceptable terms."*7
Thus, it is obvious that the aims to be achieved by escalation control and 
deliberate escalation are identical: both are aimed at breaking the military and 
political will of the enemy even after the war breaks out. Deliberate escalation 
and escalation control are distinguished by deliberate escalation's claim to 
result precisely in a "quick-linkage" or "coupling." Thus, an implementation of
35 Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit.. p.161 and Rühl, 1979, op.cit.. p.140
*« "In the event of war, the Federal Republic would probably prefer an early 
employment of nuclear weapons possessing a range capable of striking the Soviet 
Union, in order to increase the risk of further hostilities for the Warsaw Pact with 
this larger-scale (far-reaching) nuclear signal so that it would be induced to stop 
and turn back and thereby in short, to reestablish deterrence. Ulrich Weisser, 
Strategie im Umbruch. Europas Sicherheit und die Supermächte. (Herford: Busse 
Seewald, 1987) p.52. Emphasis by S.P..
37 Emphasis by S.P., U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld, Annual__Defense__Department Report. Fiscal Year 1977.
(Washington D.C., January 27,1976) p.79
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the principle of deliberate escalation is the means for "coupling" the European 
defence with U.S. strategic retaliation.** While it is obvious that by the LRTNF 
deployment flexible response gained an emphasis as an escalatory strategy, and 
not as a war-fighting one, the question arises why the United States deployed 
these weapons at all. Emst-Christoph Meier explains why it was possible for 
the United States to compromise on this:
"Dieses Eskalationskonzept (Vorbedachte Eskalation, S.P.) soll durch eine 
Reihe von Eskalationsschritten den Europäern garantieren, daß die USA keinen 
auf Europa begrenzten Konflikt führen können, indem sowjetisches und damit 
auch amerikanisches Territorium in einem europäischen Konflikt ausgespart 
bliebe. Doch dasselbe Eskalationskonzept ermöglicht andererseits den USA die 
Hoffnung, daß der Konflikt auf unteren Ebenen des Eskalationsspektrums 
gehalten werden und beendet werden könnte, ohne daß die USA auf 
strategische Systeme zurückgreifen müssen. Jede Streitkräfteoption unterhalb 
des strategischen Schlagabtauschs, von den konventionellen Streitkräften bis 
hin zu den eurostrategischen Systemen, bedeutet für die USA eine 
Möglichkeit, die Unversehrtheit amerikanischen Territoriums noch etwas 
länger zu gewährleisten."*9
Lothar Rühl confirms that the rationale behind the LRTNF was precisely tQ 
avert an escalation on to the strategic level of war:
"Doch gerade in dieser Alternative: den strategischen Kemwaffeneinsatz einer 
allgemeinen nuklearen Erwiderung als Antwort auf einen Angriff gegen 
Westeuropa durch regionale Abschreckungsmittel ausreichender Zielwirkung 
und Eindringfähigkeit gegen sowjetisches Gebiet zumindest zu verzögern, 
wenn nicht sogar den USA zu ersparen und in Reserve zu halten, lag die 
Begründung für eine LRTNF-Modemisierung."40
38 There seems to be a consensus in the strategic community that the notion of
"coupling" is rather artificial and that doubts are warranted whether the U.S. 
president "would be more likely to press the button marked ’GLCM (or MRBM) in 
central Europe’ than he would be to press ’Poseidon’." Gregory F.Treverton, 
"Nuclear Weapons and the ’Gray Area’", Foreign Affairs. (Vol.57, No.5, 1979) 
pp. 1075-1089, p. 1079. See also Legge, 1983, op.cit.. p. 36. For other sources 
concerning the discussion on "coupling" see also Meier, 1986, op.cit..pp.453-457
39 "This escalation concept (deliberate escalation, S.P.) was meant to guarantee through
a number of steps of escalation that the U.S. could not fight a war which would be 
confined to Europe, sparing Soviet as well as U.S. territory. But this same 
escalation concept on the other side enables the U.S. to hope that the conflict could 
be kept on the lower levels of the escalation spectrum and be terminated without 
the U.S. having to fall back on strategic systems. Every option of the military forces 
below the strategic fight, from conventional forces up to Eurostrategic systems, for 
the U.S. contains the possibility to ensure the intactness of American territory a 
little longer." Meier, 1986, op.cit.. p.277
40 "However, precisely this alternative was the rationale for the LRTNF modernisation:
to delay, if not to spare, the U.S. the employment of strategic nuclear weapons in a 
general nuclear response to an attack against Western Europe. The intention was to 
keep the strategic forces in reserve and instead, to provide regional means of
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With these statements the difference between deliberate escalation and 
escalation control is reduced to one of belief or disbelief: it depends on the 
belief how the Soviet Union interprets an attack with LRTNFs, i.e. whether it 
reacts with retaliatory strikes against U.S. territory, as always officially 
announced by the Soviet Union, or whether in the test case of war it prefers to 
cease hostilities for its own sake.*' However, the obvious difference between the 
two concepts is that per definition deliberate escalation implies the first use 
proviso, escalation control does not.
72.4 Dual role o f LRTNF
The lack of a definition of the LRTNF's role is due to their "dual role”: their 
tactical as well as their strategic mission.*2 On the one hand they were theatre 
nuclear weapons and thus assigned to tactical roles, on the other hand they 
were targeted against the Soviet Union and thus gained strategic character from 
a Soviet point of view. Helmut Schmidt in particular was strongly opposed to 
calling them INF:
"The Americans prefer to call them theater weapons. Why tell the Germans 
that they aie living in a war theater, a ridiculous misnomer, without any 
psychological feeling for the situation, purely fueling the pacifists?"4*
Helmut Schmidt preferred the expression "Eurostrategic" weapons.44 It was also 
the influence of the Federal Republic which caused them to be renamed as 
"Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces" (INF) in the late seventies. Thus, any 
indication of their role was quite cunningly avoided.45
deterrence with sufficient efficiency and penetration capability against Soviet 
territory." Rühl, 1987, op.cit. p. 173
41 The Soviet Union repeatedly announced to retaliate against U.S. territory after an
attack of any scale, see Senghaas, 1984a, op.cit.. p. 13
42 Jochen Denso, Schale ohne Kern- auch die Nachrüstung kann das Dilemma der
NATO nicht lösen. (Koblenz: Bernhard und Gräfe, 1983, p.15 and K.-Peter 
Stratmann, Moderniesierung und Dislozierung Nuklearer Waffen in Europa: 
Mögliche Funktionen vereinbarter Beschränkungen bei der Stabilisierung der 
Abschreckung.(Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik SWP, SWP-AP 
2337, September 1982), p.22,
43 Interview with Helmut Schmidt, 1984, op.cit.. p.92
44 Brauch reports of 1982 Schmidt interview, Brauch, 1983, op.cit.. pp. 12-14
45 Walther Stützle points out the German influence on that issue in Stützle, 1983,
0pi£iL,p.ll2
According to the Department of Defense Report to Congress, the role of longer- 
range theatre nuclear forces is integral to U.S. strategic systems:
"The longer range systems are integrated in targeting with the central strategic 
forces, many of which are programmed against theater targets. Thus, should 
their weapons be released, our theater nuclear forces would probably be used 
in conjunction with regular ground, tactical air, naval, and in many cases 
strategic forces."'*5
Uwe Nerlich confirms the LRTNF's role as "implementing limited employment 
options, including those that effectively link SIOP - and NOP capabilities."47 
However, he concedes that it might be very difficult to design such options and 
to agree on a doctrine on how and under what circumstances to utilise such 
options.4* In using the term "limited employment option", Nerlich stresses the 
strategic role of LRTNF.
U.S. sources suspected that Pershing II and other medium-range weapons 
would be allocated to strategic missions and incorporated in the newly 
programmed SIOP-6.49 They argued that since the Pershing II could not carry 
out any tactical mission that could not previously have been accomplished by 
U.S. weapons, the highly accurate and speedy missile could be a valuable 
adjunct to central strategic forces.5®
This interpretation of the LRTNF as linking SIOP and NOP and thus supporting 
the U.S. strategic weapons in their mission is the equivalent to the weapons' 
function of "coupling" or implementing "extended deterrence." The extension of 
U.S. nuclear power to guarantee the security of Europe, called selectively 
"coupling" or "extending deterrence", "nuclear guarantee" and "umbrella", was 
supposed to be strengthened or reestablished by weapons which blur the 
distinction between U.S. strategic and NATO theatre nuclear forces:
46 U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Annnal l> f m w
Department Report. Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington D.C., January 25,1979) p. 82
47 Nerlich, 1980, op.cit.. p. 102
4» ibid
49 William Arkin, "Pershing II and U.S. nuclear strategy", The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists. (June/July, 1983a) p.12-13
50 Lewis, 1980, op.cit. p.47.
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"This makes it more credible that any large-scale conflict in Europe which 
involves theatre nuclear weapons will escalate to a level where US strategic 
forces become involved and that limited uses of US strategic forces would be 
made to cover any gap in NATO forces, because of the limited levels of 
escalation involved."57
This idea corresponds to the "quick-linkage" concept of the German doctrine 
which regards the TNF's role within "deliberate escalation" as a factor to 
escalate to the strategic level as quickly as possible.
72.5. Compatibility through ambiguous Pershing II data
The U.S. and German politicians' agreement on a common hardware package is 
also a result of the fact that the Pershing II revealed such an extent of 
ambiguous data that each national interpretation again was allowed to envisage 
employment options of the Pershing according to their national first-use and 
follow-on concepts.
A valid analysis of the new weapons' role is impeded since the question of 
whether the new LRTNF have been deployed in order to cover new targets has 
never been sufficiently answered. Walter Slocombe, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Carter administration, 
confirmed that the inclusion of new targets was not the main issue on which the 
IN F modernisation was based:
"’It is not a question of reaching additional targets...I want to be quite clear.
The requirement for TNF modernization is not principally an issue of hitting 
new targets.”’52
However, this statement did not exclude LRTNF employment against 
additional targets. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
for the Fiscal Year 1983 answers this question unambiguously by explicitly 
praising the Pershing-II and GLCM for allowing "targeting of previously 
untargeted hard targets."5* Major General Niles J. Fulwyler, Director of the
a  Cordesman, 1982, op.cit.. p.3
52 quoted in U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 1980, op.cit-. p.33
53 U.S. Congress. Arms Control and Disarmament Act (ACDA), Fiscal Year 1983 Arms
Control Impact Statements. (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., March 1982) p. 157. In 
the ACDA statement for the Fiscal Year 1985 this sentence is changed in such a 
way that the weapon systems are said to allow for "better coverage of some hard 
targets." U.S. Congress. Arms Control and Disarmament Act (ACDA), Fiscal Year
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Army Nuclear and Chemical Directorate, too is quoted by Arkin: he stated that 
Pershing II would cover critical targets in the Western Military District of the 
Soviet Union which the United States could not target before.54 In any case it is 
a fact that, for the United States, an important factor in the choice of the 
weapons was certainly their capability to strike hardened targets located behind 
enemy lines and Soviet second-echelon forces.55
The decisively most debatable data of the Pershing was its range: The crucial 
point is the distance of 2,000 kilometres between the south of the Federal 
Republic and Moscow. According to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General S. Brown, the most important command, control and 
communications centres of the Soviet government and armed forces are 
dispersed and hardened within a 128 kms (80 miles) radius of Moscow.5« Since 
the Pershing's officially indicated range is only 1,800 kms, the missile allegedly 
is not able to reach Moscow.
However, the Pershing's range is quite easily varied in both directions: shorter 
and longer. Obviously, the intermediate-range Pershing II can be turned into a 
shorter-range Pershing without too many technological problems, simply by 
removing one stage.57 An extension of the range to 1,800 kms does not seem to 
create a problem either. According to SIPRI, the range of any ballistic missile 
can be significantly increased by using fuel with a higher energy content per 
unit.54
Even after the withdrawal of the missiles the secret of the Pershing's range will 
not be revealed. The INF treaty does not list the ranges of the weapons
1985 Arms Control Impact Statements. (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., March
1984), p.113
54 Arkin, 1983a, op.cit.. p. 12
55 At the fourth conference of the "German-American Roundtable" this capability is the
first to be is mentioned. Fourth German-American Roundtable on NATO: NATO 
Modernisation and European Security. A Conference Report, Held in Bonn, FRG, 
December, 12-13, 1980, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy 
Analysis, 1981) p.7
56 Desmond Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled". Adelphi Papers, No. 169, (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p.44
57 "Soviets say Pershings Block Pact".Washington Post (July 24,1987) p.l
5* Sverre Lodgaard and Frank Blackaby, "Nuclear Weapons" in SIPRI Yearbook, 1984, 
op.cit.. pp.23-49, here p.35
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concerned and merely states: "The range capability of a GLBM not listed in 
Article HI of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which 
it has been tested."59 Since the range of the Pershing n  was not clarified it was 
left open whether the missiles would be employed for targeting into the depth 
of the Soviet Union, or just for targeting Moscow with its military and political 
leadership and command and control systems or, not even to strike the Soviet 
Union at all, but would merely be employed to target the other Warsaw Pact 
nations. As will be seen later, these range differences allowed the envisagement 
of very different options for the employment of the Pershing.»
Another troubling question arose in the context of the official number of 
Pershing ITs to be deployed in Europe. The NATO- Communique of 1979 
seemed to have avoided any precise specification of the number of Pershing II 
and speaks of "108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing U.S. 
Pershing I-A, and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all with single 
warheads."" There was no mentioning of missiles and reloading capabilities, 
but Lothar Ruhl confirmed that there was a consensus among NATO's Foreign 
and Defence Ministers to deploy "572 missiles for 572 warheads".«
In 1982 however, William Arkin, when studying the House Armed Services 
Committee procurement plan of the FY 1983, discovered the figure of 384 
planned Pershing II missiles. The Army generals obviously interpreted NATO's 
Communique literally and counted launchers instead of missiles.« Arkin, 
searching for the reason why 384 missiles had been ordered, detected the 
reloading capability of the Pershing II that had been held secret. Major General 
James Maloney, Chief of Army Research and Development, according to Arkin, 
told the House Armed Services Committee that "'after a missile is fired it takes 
about (deleted) to be moved out of that area to go to another area to set up'".*
59 A "GLBM" is a Ground-launched Ballistic Missile, according to the treaty. INF
Treaty, 1987, op.cit, p.6
60 Such an ambiguity of range is to a certain degree applicable to all ballistic missiles.
61 Communique, in Cartwright/Critchley, 1985, op.cit.. p. 152
62 ”572 Flugkörper fur 572 Gefechtsköpfe" Ruehl, 1980, op.cit.. p.99
63 "Das falsche Spiel mit den Raketen", in Per Stem. (Vol.35, No.42, October 1982)
pp.274-277
6* Arkin, 1983a, op.cit. p. 12
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Thus, the figure at stake doubled from 186 to 372 missiles, dose to the 384 Arkin 
searched for. In October 1982, Arkin launched his results in the German 
magazine "Stem"«, which prompted Defence Minister Manfred Womer and 
Chancellor Kohl to visit Washington in late November 1982 and to declare that 
they were strongly opposed to the reloading plans. In November 1982, Womer 
and Kohl received a clear message that the United States would not deploy 
reloads.*5
According to the data given in the INF Treaty, the West German government 
had succeeded in turning down the U.S. plans to reload the Pershing's missiles. 
The number of deployed and non-deployed Pershing missiles is indicated with 
247 missiles. Thus 139 missiles additional to the announced 108 Pershing n  
missiles turned up. The number of 139 extra missiles can be regarded as being 
within the limits of the number of necessary spare missiles/7
As already pointed out in the discussion of the High Level Group, the intended 
objective of the LRTNF's modernisation was to prevent the impression that 
NATO was building up a war-fighting capability on an Eurostrategic level. 
Therefore, the Germans could not accept the reloading capability of the 
Pershing and thus the doubling of the number of the systems to be deployed on 
German soil. On the other hand, it is possible that military men, who preferred 
war-fighting concepts, did not object to the deployment programme because of 
their knowledge about the Pershing's reloading capability.
73. Conclusion: Blurring of Traditional Categories
This proximity of the U.S. and German national strategies is derived from the 
fact, as explained above, that any deterrence theory inevitably implies the 
anticipation of a war as well as the preparation to fight it. Thus, the cherished 
distinction between politicians who are more concerned with deterrence or
65 "Das falsche Spiel mit den Raketen", in Per Stem. (Vol. 35, No.42, October 1982)
pp.274-277
66 Lodgaard, 1984, op.cit. p.35
& See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base
for the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Rangc and Shorter- 
Rangc Missiles. December 8,1987.
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those who stress the war-fighting aspect of deterrence is hardly explanatory any 
more.« This also applies to the distinction commonly made between European 
strategic analysts, who are more concerned with deterrence, and the U.S. 
defence experts, who regard nuclear weapons as a means to fight the war.«»
The fact that German strategic analysts and politicians approved the principles 
inherent in escalation control, contributes to the phenomenon that U.S. and 
German attitudes are not that distinct from each other any more. The 
categorisation of U.S. analysts as being "war-fighters" is based on their 
preference for battlefield scenarios in Europe. German analysts tend to give the 
impression that above all they are concerned with deterrence and should 
deterrence fail, with the termination of war. However, as will be demonstrated 
at the end of the analysis, precisely these German analysts and politicians 
campaigned for the idea of a limited nuclear war with the inclusion of Soviet 
territory and also demanded the hardware enabling them to fight this war. 
Thus, any criticism has to be distributed equally between both nations' analysts. 
However, the criticism of the peace movement concentrated on the United 
States; this was due to its status as a superpower and its claims to be a leading 
power in the world. In view of the assurances of German politicians that, 
whatever they would do in the nuclear field, they would either be concerned to 
strengthen the FRG's coupling to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or try to achieve 
some success in arms control, the peace movement was induced to identify the
66 For example, it is perfectly justified to present convincingly Helmut Schmidt as the
war-fighter and Franz-Josef Strauß as the true deterrer. See the Strauß supporter
Thomas Enders, 1984, op.cit.
69 One example of a typical characterisation of the German and U.S. attitude towards 
deterrence in the self-image of the strategic community: "Der grundlegende 
Unterschied im strategischen Denken der Amerikaner und der europäischen 
Bündnispartner läßt sich vielleicht auf folgende Formel bringen: die Amerikaner 
neigen dazu, stark in den Kategorien der technologischen Fiihrbarkeit und 
Begrenzbarkeit eines nuklearen Krieges auf militärische Ziele zu denken, und 
halten die nukleare Drohung deshalb für glaubwürdig; für die Europäer jedoch kann 
eine glaubwürdige Abschreckungsdrohung nicht direkt und massiv genug gegen die 
Sowjetunion gerichtet sein." ("The basic difference in the strategic dunking 
between the U.S. and its European allies might be reduced to the following 
formula: Americans tend to think very much in terms of the technological 
possibility of fighting and limiting a nuclear war and therefore consider the nuclear 
threat to be credible; for the Europeans, however, a credible threat of deterrence 
cannot be directed against the Soviet Union in too direct and massive a way ." 
Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, William R. Van Geave, "Die Theorie der Abschreckung", 
in Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, (ed.) Sicherheitspolitik: Analysen zur politischen und 
militärischen Sicherheit (Bad Honnef-Erpel: Osang Verlag, September 1978 
(3. Edition)) p.131-149, here p. 135
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U.S. as the main promoters of these scenarios of a limited war in Europe and 
therefore did not criticise German politicians in any sense. This debate on a 
limited war in Europe was rather more a reaction to the sabre-rattling remarks 
of the Reagan administration as well as to the internationally tense situation 
than an accurate analysis of the underlying strategies.
Public statements of German politicians on the necessity to get used to the 
notion of limited war in Europe further undermine this impression of the 
innocent German deterrers. Without saying precisely which geographical area 
he had thought of, the deputy spokesman of the Federal government, Lothar 
Rühl, defended the notion of a "limited war” as an acceptable option for the 
Federal Republic. During the same period in which Reagan's provocative 
statement caused an uproar in Europe, he assured the public that a selective 
employment of tactical weapons would neither destroy the Federal Republic at 
once nor completely; it would be worthwhile to try and maintain as much 
territory as possible. Rühl explained to the German public that flexible response 
would not aim at immediately leaping into an all-out nuclear war, but to take a 
pause and to limit the use of nuclear weapons with respect to geography, time 
and number. He concedes that these considerations are difficult to comprehend 
for a European, and in particular for a German. According to him, it is still 
worthwhile because of the plausible threat to escalate:
"’die Zerstörung von Land und Leuten so weit zu begrenzen, wie es überhaupt 
möglich ist, um die biologische Substanz der betroffenen Völker und damit 
ihre Fähigkeiten zum Überleben in der Geschichte überhaupt zu erhalten.’"7^
These remarks by the ex-spokesman of the Social Democratic government 
resemble the conclusions of Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, who, in their 
famous article "Victory is possible", recommend a combination of an intelligent 
offensive strategy with homeland defence, in order "to reduce U.S. casualties to 
approximately 20 million, which should render U.S. strategic threats more 
credible", and which would be a "level compatible with national survival and 
recovery."77
70 "’to limit the destruction of the territory and the people to the utmost extent in order 
to maintain the biological substance of the nations concerned and thus their ability 
to maintain their own survival in history.’" Extracts from an interview of the
government’s spokesman Lothar Rühl with the Norddeutsche Rundfunk in a radio 
broadcast programme "Streitkräfte und Strategien’", published in Frankfurter 
Rundschau. (September 15,1981), p.2
71 Gray/Payne, 1980, op.cit.. p.25
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These remarks correspond to Rühl's general attitude towards war. When he 
reflects on the utility of military force in Europe, he recapitulates :
"Der Krieg an sich ist nicht sinnlos, wie die Beispiele Vietnam und Indien, 
aber auch der Krieg im Nahen Osten zeigen. Sinnlos ist nur der Krieg, der 
weder eine Entscheidung bringt noch Zeit gewinnt, oder der Krieg, der einen 
unverhältnismäßigen Preis für den gewünschten Erfolg verlangt"72
72 "War as such is not without purpose, as has been demonstrated by the examples of 
Vietnam and India as well as by the war in the Middle East Only then is a war 
futile if it neither provides a decision nor a gain of time, or when a war demands a 
disproportionately high price in order to obtain the desired success.", Riihl in Kaiser 
et.al., 1977, op.cit.. p. 264
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8. The LRTNF decision as a result of US. doctrines
8.1. Pershing II and Cruise Missile: spearheads of a first strike strategy?
The argument that Pershing II and cruise missiles are first strike weapons and 
thus an indispensable element of a new U.S. strategy to fight and win a nuclear 
war with the Soviet Union from European soil, played a central role in the 
peace movement.7 In particular the Pershing n, possessing an accurate low- 
yield warhead, short pre-attack warning time and high penetration capability 
seemed to be the perfect means to implement the U.S. first strike strategy by 
destroying Soviet strategic forces and Command, Control, Communications 
and Intelligence systems from Central Europe. Therefore, the peace movement2, 
at least partly, regarded them as spearheads of a new war-fighting strategy and 
the first available elements of a U.S. partly-disarming or even completely 
disarming first strike capability.* Without this argument it would not have been 
possible to mobilise so many supporters against the nuclear weapons.4
8.1.1. The Political Background
The alleged "paranoid conclusions" of the German peace movement were 
justified for many by Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne's legendary 1980 article 
"Victory is Possible" which is famed for its notion of nuclear victory. The 
authors recommend a combination of counteroffensive targeting, civil defence, 
and ballistic missile and air defence.5
7 Senghaas, 1984a, op.cit.. p.l
2 For a very detailed analysis of the German peace movement see, Ulrike C. Wasmuht,
Friedensbewegungen der 80er Jahre. Zur Analyse ihrer strukturellen und aktuellen 
Entstehungsbedingungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinigten 
Staaten von Amerika. (Gießen: Focus-Verlag, 1987), here p.l 16
3 A first strike is defined as "a preemptive disarming nuclear strike aimed at eliminating
as completely as possible the entire strategic potential of the adversary." Kaiser 
et.al., 1982, op.cit.. p.l 158. For a detailed discussion of the "counterforce" and 
"first strike" strategy, see chapter 2.2.1.
4 Senghaas, 1984a, op.cit. p.l
5 Gray/Payne, 1980, op.cit. p.25
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During the summer of 1982 public discussion was fuelled by press leaks of 
Pentagon plans to fight a protracted nuclear war in Europe. The New York 
Times published extracts from a Pentagon defence guide on a 5 year overall 
plan in which it was announced that "the armed forces are ordered to prepare 
for nuclear counterattacks against the Soviet Union 'over a protracted period 
The future nuclear war strategy would be based on "decapitation, meaning 
strikes at Soviet political and military leadership and communications lines."7 
These "decapitation" strikes were the concrete realisation of the peace 
movement's dreaded visions.
The peace movement's conjured up scenarios of a disarming first strike, to be 
accomplished by the newly deployed U.S. missiles, in combination with the 
Reagan administration's bellicose statements and offensive defence plans, 
which were responsible for an internationally tense situation in the early 
eighties.9 These apprehensions of the peace movement did not result from an 
analysis of the U.S. strategic intentions but from conclusions drawn from the 
weapons' technical capabilities and the end of detente in the beginning of the 
eighties.
Another scenario which played an important role in the discussion of the peace 
movement was the notion of a limited war. For a considerable part of the peace 
movement it was a revelation that U.S. strategy had always implied the 
possibility of limited and selective use of nuclear weapons, even exclusively on 
the European theatre. Also new, and certainly not only to the peace movement, 
was the idea that the termination of such a war could give rise to a "winner".9
At the beginning of the eighties, the Iranian revolution caused a deterioration of 
the international situation which fed Western anxieties that the Strait of 
Hormuz could be blocked in time of crisis. This situation provided an excellent 
background for all kinds of war scenarios involving the superpowers which did 
not overly strain belief. One famous war scenario runs as follows: Khomeini
6 "Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy For Fighting a Long Nuclear War", NYT. May 30,
1982, p.l
7 ibid. p.2
* Gumbert / Stuckenbrock, 1983, op.cit.. p. 10
9 see Wasmuht, 1987, op.cit.. pp.118-119
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dies, the Tudeh party controls the situation and calls for help from the Soviet 
Union. Since the Soviet Union possesses an easy approach to the Gulf through 
Afghanistan, Soviet forces within a few could arrive days at the Strait of 
Hormuz, the Achilles heel of Japan, Western Europe and the United States.70 
The fear of Soviet control over the —in respect to the West-indispensable oil 
sources found its military expression in the so-called "Brown Doctrine" of U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, which declared that the United States will 
choose "the terrain and the tactics where the war with the Soviets about oil will 
take place."77 With this threat of a geographical extension of a war with the 
Soviet Union, wherever it might break out, Western Europe was directly 
coupled to areas of crisis such as the Near and Middle East. In such a crisis 
scenario, the Persing II is seen as a means to intimidate the Soviet Union:
"Sie (die Pershing 2, S.P.) ist das Produkt des schimärischen und doch auf 
einmal allzu greifbaren Wunsches, der anderen Supermacht einen begrenzten 
atomaren Einsatz weit glaubhafter als bisher androhen zu können."72
This criticism took on a concrete form when President Reagan confirmed that a 
nuclear war limited to Europe was not beyond phantasy and that he could 
envisage a situation "where you could have the exchange of tactical (nuclear) 
weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major 
powers to pushing the button"7-*. Also Reagan's idea of a joke during a voice test 
in August 1984 provoked anxiety in Europe that Reagan did not take war- 
prevention too seriously:
"My fellow Americans, I’m pleased to tell you today that I’ve signed 
legislation that would outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five 
minutes."74
70 For this scenario see Bittorf, 1981, op.cit. p.84-92
n "Brown Warns That a Persian Gulf War Could Spread", in NYT. February 15, 1980, 
p.A3. With the Brown doctrine emerged the term "Horizontal escalation", i.e. a 
"deterrence policy to inhibit a state exploiting temporary or regional advantage by 
making it clear it will suffer costs elsewhere, and that it should not think itself 
immune outside the local arena of conflict" Michael Sheenan and James H. Wyllie, 
The Economist Pocket guide to Defence. (Oxford and London: Backwell and The 
Economist, 1986), p. 116
72 "It (the Pershing n, S.P.) is a product of the chimerical, but suddenly very tangible,
wish to threaten the other superpower with a limited nuclear employment much
more plausibly than before." Bittorf, 1981, op.cit. p.69
13 The Times. November 6,1981, p.l
74 Per Spiegel. (Vol.38, No.34,August 20,1984),p.77
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8.1.2. Characteristics o f First Strike Weapons
The question as to whether and to what extent the new missiles show the 
characteristics of first strike weapons was a feasible approach to indicating the 
role and function of the Persing n  and cruise missiles. One must distinguish 
between the build-up of a comprehensive first strike capability and a single 
weapon system with first strike characteristics.
Peace researchers and the peace movement searched for the missiles' origin in 
U.S. strategy and debated
1. whether the Pentagon planned to build-up a decapitation or disarming 
first strike capability and
2. whether the missiles exhibited characteristics of first strike weapons.
Even proponents of the LRTNF deployment acknowledged that the 
Pershing H's ability to reach Soviet command centres and intercontinental 
ballistic missiles in an interval of a few minutes might make it easily perceived 
by the Soviets as a first strike weapon.75
The cruise missile was treated like a stepchild in the analysis of the new 
weapons' role because it needed several hours to reach targets in the Soviet 
Union. At first sight the cruise missile does not seem to fulfil the requirement 
for weapons assigned to a counterforce strategy because it is ineffective against 
time-urgent targets such as the silos of intercontinental missiles. However, the 
employment of the cruise missile would be useful in certain situations: First, it 
could be used against reloadable silos. Its second and more decisive capacity 
would be to compensate the effects of "fratricide”. In case one target is cross- 
targeted by several warheads, fratricide describes the phenomenon where one 
nuclear explosion destroys other incoming warheads; this is caused by the 
effects of the electromagnetic radiation from a nuclear explosion, called 
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)7*:
"Say, for instance, that the first warhead explodes too far away to cause 
damage. But it kicks up debris and ionizes the atmosphere so that the next
75 Denso, 1983, op.cit.. p. 134
76 For an explanation of the EMP see the Glossary
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warhead is destroyed by flying objects or has its fuzing circuit burned out by a 
tremendously high electromagnetic pulse generated in the circuitry."'7
After the fratricide effects have been diffused, cruise missiles with their slow 
and deep flight have a much higher realistic chance than ballistic and speedy 
weapons to hit the Soviet ICBMs, which are themselves blocked for a while in 
their silos by the effect of the EMP.'*
Mechtersheimer stipulates four technical prerequisites for missiles which are 
supposed to have a first strike capability:
1. high accuracy and high explosive power, in order to destroy the missile 
silos and C3l systems
2. a "necessary" range,
3. high penetration capability against ABM systems, and
4. a sufficient number, calculated with a view to multiple covering of the 
most important targets.
All four prerequisites have to be fulfilled in order that we can speak of a first 
strike capability. While comparing the new missiles' characteristics with these 
criteria, Mechtersheimer, Director of the Stamberg Peace Research Institute and 
member of the Bundestag, concludes:
"Unter den vorgesehenen Stationierungsbedingungen handelt es sich bei der 
Persing II um keine Erstschlagwaffe."79
The Pershing fails to meet two criteria:
¡7 Aldridge, 1983, op.cit.. p.61.
18 Roben C. Aldridge, Erstschlag! Die Strategie des Pentagon fur den Atomkrieg.
(München: Werkhaus-Veriag, 1984) pp.320-321. The German edition is followed 
by a chapter, "Euromissiles" which analyses the Pershing II and ground-launched 
cruise missiles* role in the first strike strategy. The fact that it is not contained in 
the original U.S. edition is a further indication of the subsequent overemphasis 
given to Eurostrategic weapons in these first strike scenarios.
19 "In consideration of the planned deployment modus, the Pershing II is not a first
strike weapon." Alfred Mechtersheimer, "1st die Pershing II eine Erstschlagwaffe 
oder nicht?" in Mediatus. Special Issue, (February 1984a), p.5
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1. with a range of 1,800 kms the missile is only able to hit 10% of the Soviet 
land-based strategic forces20 and
2. the number of 108 missiles is not even sufficient to destroy those ICBMs 
which are deployed west of the Urals.27
Mechtersheimer concedes that any weapon which is potentially usable within a 
first strike strategy could be called a "first strike weapon". In view of rapid 
technological development this label could be applied to any new weapon. 
However, an inflationary use of this term would blur the decisive difference 
between an available and unavailable first strike capability.
Dieter S. Lutz, Deputy Director of the Institute for Security and Peace Research 
in Hamburg, completes the list of criteria for first strike weapons with the 
missiles' short warning time. In accordance with the majority of the peace 
researchers, he concludes that the new missiles do not produce a first strike 
capability.22
Lutz, however, suspects that, in view of the new developments in nuclear 
technology, the new missiles have to be perceived as part of a future first strike 
capability. Suspicion is warranted that the LRTNF can be used as first strike 
weapons in a partly disarming first strike strategy. Thus, Lutz concludes, they 
may contribute to the threat of an "unintended world war"2-*.
20 Arkin, 1983a, op.cit.. p. 12
21 Mechtersheimer, 1984, op.cit.. p.5
22 Dieter S. Lutz, "Genfer Perspektiven-ein Weltkrieg wider Willen" in Frankfurter
Rundschau (August 22, 1983) p. 12. While stressing the small number of 572 
systems in particular, Gert Krell and Hans-Joachim Schmidt reach the same 
conclusion. Krell /  Schmidt, 1982, op.cit.. p.43
23 "Sieht man es allerdings im Verbund der qualitativen und quantitativen 
Entwicklungen der USA und ihrer NATO-Partner im nuklear- und 
raketentechnologischen Bereich insgesamt, so muß es als Teil einer sich heute 
schon abzeichnenden künftigen Erstschlagsfähigkeit begriffen werden. Darüber 
hinaus ist zu befürchten, daß die ’Nachrüstungswaffen’ als Erstschlagpotential 
bereits im Sinne eines Teilentwaffnungsschlages Verwendung finden können und 
somit zur Gefahr eines ’Weltkriegs wider Willen’ beitragen." ("However, if one 
sees it in an overall context of qualitative as well as quantitative developments in 
the field of nuclear and missile technology within the U.S. and its NATO partners,
one has to understand it as part of a future first strike capability which is in the
offing. Moreover, one has to fear that the LRTNF will already be used as first use
potential in the sense of a partly disarming strike and thereby can contribute toward
an ’unintended world war’.") Lutz, 1983, op.cit.. p. 12
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By assuming that "good old deterrence"2* had been abandoned and by its 
interpretation of a supposedly new U.S. doctrine on fighting and winning a 
nuclear war, the peace movement revealed a rather restricted perspective on 
nuclear history. Some peace researchers had contributed to this shortsighted 
perception of U.S. strategy by omitting to point out the link between these new 
developments and the evolution of the U.S. strategy. Thus, an overemphasis of 
the new weapons' importance was inevitable. For example, Alfred 
Mechtersheimer speaks of a "collapse of deterrence" and concludes:
"Die Abschreckung wird auf einer vollkommen neuen Grundlage aufgebaut: 
nämlich der Fähigkeit, einen Nuklearkrieg zu gewinnen! Das ist die neue, 
besonders für Europa und die Bundesrepublik gefährliche Strategie der 
Kriegsführungs-Abschreckung. "2S
In his famous book First Strike! The Pentagon's Strategy for Nuclear War. 
Robert C. Aldridge, a Polaris and Trident missile design engineer at Lockheed, 
argued strongly in favour of the view that the United States had been rapidly 
approaching a disarming first strike capability which "certainly doesn't project 
into the latter 1980s because that is when today's emerging technologies will 
start becoming operational."*0 This strategy would be implemented by weapons 
with a high accuracy and penetration capability such as the Trident submarine, 
the MX, penetrating bombers and cruise missiles as well as by intensifying anti­
submarine and satellite warfare.
Furthermore, some German peace researchers analysed the role of the new 
LRTNF in the context of a U.S. policy of pursuing the strategy of a disarming 
first strike. Ulrich Albrecht, who basically sees the new weapons' origin in the 
U.S. Military Industrial Complex, noted the beginning of a new epoch enabling 
the superpowers to knock each other down with one disarming first strike.
8.1.3. The scenario o f a disarming first strike
24 Senghaas, 1984a, op.cit.. p.l
25 "Deterrence is built up on a completely new basis: that is, the capability of winning a
nuclear war! This is the new strategy of war-fighting deterrence which is 
particularly dangerous for Europe and the Federal Republic." Alfred 
Mechtersheimer, Zeitbombe NATO. Auswirioingen der neuen Strategien. (Köln: 
Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1984) p.14, emphasis in the text
Aldridge, 1983, op.cit.. p.40
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With the highest accuracy of all the nuclear weapons available, the Pershing II 
is supposed to play the most important part in this scenario:
"Offenbar steht die Welt davor, ins sogenannte ’Erstschlagzeitalter’ 
einzutreten. Damit ist die die Strategen faszinierende Möglichkeit gemeint, 
durch einen großen, die Gegenseite entwaffnenden Schlag Herr der politischen 
Situation zu werden...Offenbar bewegen wir uns auf dieses 
’Erstschlagzeitalter’ zu. Die Rakete Pershing II ist der Pionier der Generation 
von Waffen, die dieses Zeitalter ermöglichen. Sie ist jene Punktwaffe, die die 
Silos feindlicher Raketen entweder zerstört oder aber mit ihrer Explosionskraft 
verschüttet ”27
However, it can not be denied that also this kind of wishful thinking comprises 
U.S. strategic thinking, as the ambitious SDI project suggests.
Encouraged by John Steinbruner's analysis that the Soviet Union only needed 
to hit 50 to 100 weapons in order to knock out the U.S. strategic nuclear forces2*, 
Karl D. Bredthauer, editor of the authoritative periodical Blätter für deutsche 
und internationale Politik, affirmed:
"Mit einer einsatzbereiten Zahl ’punktzielgenauer’ Atomraketen in der 
Größenordnung von 100 wäre also technisch - zunächst rein rechnerisch 
gesehen - ein ’Enthauptungsschlag’ von ’chirurgischer’ Präzision 
durchführbar... Wenn die Pershing Ü-Rakete für diese Mission in Frage 
kommt, wird die neue Situation bei fristgemäßer Dislozierung der 
vorgesehenen 108 Abschußgestelle - unabhängig von der Frage der 
Nachladbarkeit dieser Abschußgestelle und von der Rolle der übrigen fast 
9.000 strategischen Atomwaffen - 1985/1986 ein treten. "29
27 "Obviously the world is about to enter into the so-called ’first strike age ’. This refers
to the possibility of dominating the political situation by a big strike which disarms 
the opponent, which fascinates the strategists...Obviously we arc moving towards 
this ’first strike age*. The Pershing II is the pioneer of a generation of weapons 
which render this age possible. It is the accurate weapon which either destroys the 
opponents’ silos or buries them with its explosive power." Albrecht, 1982, op.cit.. 
p. 17. The same reproach can be applied to Guha’s book, 1980, op.cit.
28 John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation", Foreign Policy. No.45, (Winter
1981/82) p. 16-28
29 "With 108 operational and accurate nuclear missiles it would be technically feasible -
primarily from a purely arithmetical point of view - to execute a decapitation strike 
of surgical precision...If Pershing U proves suitable for this mission and the 
deployment deadline of the planned 108 launchers will be met, - disregarding the 
question of their reloading capability or the role of the remaining almost 9,000 
strategic nuclear weapons this new situation will arise in 1985/1986." Karl D. 
Bredthauer, "’Enthauptung* als ’Grundlage’ der Nuklearstrategie", in Frankfurter 
Hefte. (Vol.39, No.7,1984) p.13-22, here p. 19
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Several peace researchers — although they did not deny the Reagan 
administration's obvious political ambition to knock down the Soviet Union ~ 
doubted the technical capability of the U.S. armament industry to implement 
these plans.-*0
Even Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne - although with evident regret - had to 
concede the limits to these scenarios of nuclear victory:
"(I)t would not be in the interest of the United States actually to implement an 
offensive nuclear strategy no matter how frightening in Soviet perspective, if 
the U.S. homeland were totally naked to Soviet retaliation."3t
As a remedy to this dilemma, Gray, in accordance with an influential camp of 
U.S. strategic analysts, recommends "both counterforce action and active and 
passive defenses"**, an idea which took shape in Reagan's Strategic Defense 
Initiative. To many, however, the exotic space-based systems upon which the 
plan depends are simply unlikely to function, at least in this century. Until SDI 
functions and guarantees that a Soviet missile could not find its way to the 
United States, any kind of attempt to develop a disarming first strike capability 
in order to knock down the Soviet Union is absolutely suicidal and condemned 
to fail. Another way of arguing against the hypothesis of the U.S. intention is to 
recall the technically unperfected state of the Pershing H
Pershing called for six test flights to be conducted at the White Sands Missile 
Range in 1977 and 1978. Only five missiles were flown. According to the Army 
the Pershing had achieved its objectives because the fifth test shot hit within
30 Reimar Stuckenbrock complained that the debate was dominated by speculations
concerning the weapons’ technical capabilities instead of an analysis of political 
objectives. Reimar Stuckenbrock, "Die Fata Morgana des Enthauptungsschlages: 
eine Gefahr, die nicht existiert", in: Frankfurter Hefte. (Vol.39, No.7, 1984) p.22- 
31. For a Soviet view see an interview of Karl D. Bredthauer with the Deputy 
Director of the U.S. Institute in Moscow, Prof. Radomir Bodganow, "Worin besteht 
die Gefahr für Europa und wie kann man die abwenden? Einschätzungen aus 
amerikanischer Sicht. Radomir Bogdanow und Daniel Ellsberg im Gespräch mit 
Karl D. Bredthauer," in Blätter für internationale Politik. Vol.28, No.6, (1983) pp. 
776-795
31 Gray and Payne, 1980, op.cit.. p.24
32 Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: the Case for a Theory of Victory" in Steven E.
Miller (ed.), Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1984) p.23-57, here p.53
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25 m of the desired impact point." Aldridge has a different estimate of the 
success of the test flights: 4 of 5 tests were failures, the successful missile could 
only hit its target because an aluminium reflector of 2 m was used as an 
approach radar M
The compression of the schedule for the Pershing's technical development, 
particularly considering its defidendes, suggests that the main U.S. dedsion- 
makers wanted to avoid the risk of a possible postponement of the Pershing's 
deployment in Europe from the outset of the deasion in order to pursue full 
scale development.
In December 1978 the DASRC recommended Full-Scale Engineering and 
Development of the Pershing n. The Pershing's deployment should begin 56 or
57 months from the awarding of the contract to Martin Marietta in February 
1979, i.e. in December 1983. However, this meant an 18-month compression of 
the normal Defense Department full development cyde. The schedule of the 
first deployment of the Pershing II at the end of full scale development could 
only mean that initial production and final development were overlapping.-” 
The ignorance in regard to the failure of the test flights corresponds to the 
general hustle of the Pershing's developm ents 28 Pershing II flights were 
planned between April 1982 and August 1983. This implied an already tight 
schedule because 4 months previous to the actual deployment corrections could 
no longer be incorporated in a deployment schedule for December 1983. The 
number of test flights was reduced to 18 and the first test flight was postponed 
from April to July 1982, i.e. one month after the production decision of June
1982.
33 F. Clifton Berry Jr., "Pershing II. First Step in NATO Theatre Nuclear Force
Modernization?", International Defense Review. (No.8, 1979),pp.l303-1308, here 
p. 1305
34 Aldridge, 1984, op.rit.. p.30
35 Berry, 1979, op.dt,. p. 1304
36 For the Army’s clever dealing with U.S. Secretary of Defense see also Strobe Talbott,
Raketenschach, Ein Bericht, der offenleyt. wie persönliche Konflikte und 
Machtkämpfe im Weißen Haus die amerikanische Politik beeinflussen und so die 
gefährliche Krise in den amerikanisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen auspelöst haben. 
(München, Zurich: Piper, 1984), p.263
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On July 22, 1982 the first Pershing II was launched from Cape Canaveral. 17 
seconds later it exploded. In November 1982 the second missile missed its 
target by 6,5 kilometres although once again aluminium was used as an 
approach radar. In December 1982, as a result of these failures, Congress held 
back the money for the production, but again, in spite of protest from members 
of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, released the funds in May
1983. Only one of the test flights No. 13,14,15, and 16 was successful. Flights 17 
and 18 started under easier conditions and finally succeeded.*7
The deployment of a technically unperfected weapon, just to keep the schedule, 
can only be explained by political motives. The interpretation that the U.S. and 
West German politicians decided to deploy on schedule in order to avoid 
giving the impression that the peace movement had even partially succeeded, 
no longer sounds exotic in view of the Pershing's inefficiency.*® Most of all, the 
Pershing's technical inefficiency reveals how far away the United States still is 
from achieving an effective disarming first strike capability. Thus, the argument 
that the Pershing II and cruise missile are indispensable elements of a U.S. first 
strike strategy has been disproved. The U.S. administration's motives for 
developing the Pershing n  and cruise missile cannot be explained in terms of 
the pursuit of this strategy.
37 Aldridge, 1984, op.cit. pp.301-302 and Cochran, 1984, op.cit.. p.295
38 For this interpretation see Ulrich Simon: "Daß ein niichtem-rationales Abwägen der
politisch-militärischen Vor-und Nachteile des INF-Programms heute praktisch 
nicht mehr möglich ist, verdanken wir hingegen weitgehend der emotionalen 
Aufladung der Thematik durch die ’Friedensbewegung’, deren Wirken so gesehen 
unselig war. An einer Durchführung des INF-Programms führt heute kein Weg 
mehr vorbei, wie immer man den militärischen Nutzen dieser Waffen 
veranschlagen will." ("That today a sober and rational evaluation of the political- 
military advantages and disadvantages of the INF programme is practically no 
longer possible, is due to the emotional climate surrounding the subject which was 
created by the ’peace movement’, whose effect, in this respect, was counter­
productive.") Ulrich Simon, "Nukleare Mittelstreckenwaffen und Erweiterte 
Abschreckung. Politisch-psychologische Hintergründe und militärischer 
Stellenwert des NATO-Rüstungsprogramms", Politische Vierteliahresschrift. 
(Vol.26, No.3,1985) p.227-246
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82. Scklesinger's Doctrine of Limited Nuclear Options
Since the Pershing n  and the Cruise Missile are U.S. weapons, their origin in the 
strategic planning of the Pentagon has to be identified. The question arises 
whether and to what extent the Pershing II and the Cruise Missile were a result 
of an emphasis on counterforce options and limited nuclear options within U.S. 
strategic policy.
The weapons' origin is identified very differently by various analyses which 
deal with the history of the NATO Dual-Track decision. Their results may be 
correlated with the views of the camp with which they can be associated. While 
proponents of the missile programme like Hubertus Hoffmann and Lothar Riihl 
stress the weapons' evolution in the Nuclear Planning Group and honour the 
Federal Republic's role as a successful proponent*9, peace researchers 
associated with the peace movement tend to emphasise the needs of the U.S. 
counterforce strategy for this kind of weapons. Peace researchers also included 
the U.S. Military-Industrial Complex in their analyses as creating an artificial 
need for any kind of new weapons and military technology
The assumption that the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile are an 
indispensable element of Schlesinger's counterforce doctrine will be analysed in 
this chapter. The answer to the question whether the Pershing II and GLCM 
were induced by the change in the U.S. strategy is twofold: The comprehensive 
revision of nuclear war planning and the resulting emphasis on flexibility and 
selectivity certainly influenced and subsequently incorporated the employment 
plans for the TNF in Europe.*7 Thus, the characteristics of low yield and 
accuracy are definitely required by the U.S. counterforce strategy. But 
Schlesinger did not have any Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) in 
mind.*2 The extension of the range, as will be seen later, was an answer to 
requests from West Germany and SACEUR, but not from requests generated
39 Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit.. and Riihl, 1987, op.cit.
40 For this approach, see Albrecht, 1982, op.cit.
41 Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit. p. 110
42 see also Rühl, 1987, op.cit.. p.99. For a detailed criticism of the counterforce strategy
see Gert Krell, "Rüstungswettlauf: Verteidigung oder Eigendynamik? Zur Kritik 
der amerikanischen Nuklearstrategie." in Friedensanalvsen. Für Theorie und Praxis
2. Schwerpunkt: Rüstung. (Frankfun am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981) p.54-85
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through Schlesinger's counterforce doctrine. The rejection of the argument that 
the long-range TNF were basically not induced by the U.S. defence programme 
requires detailed analysis, since there were good reasons for this argument 
playing such an important role in the peace movement's analyses. Since later on 
the basic elements of the Schlesinger doctrine will be related to the German first 
use concept, a detailed description cannot be avoided. The doctrine is better 
known under the term "counterforce” doctrine. The use of this term stresses the 
targets of Schlesinger's revised SIOP. In this context the term "Limited Nuclear 
Options" will be applied, since the focus of attention will be the doctrine's 
overall characteristics and premises.
Statements as the following by Helga Haftendom might have induced the 
interpretation that in view of the 1975 Defense Budget's request for an 
Advanced Cruise Missile and a more accurate warhead for the Pershing all 
technological elements of the LRTNF originated in the U.S. Defense Program«:
"Schlesinger’s Absicht war es, die Bedeutung der in Europa stationierten 
Kernwaffen herunterzustufen. Mit dem Beschluß zur Modernisierung der seit 
1969 in der Bundesrepublik stationierten Pershing-Raketen und der 
Entscheidung für die Entwicklung von fortgeschrittenen Marschflugkörpern 
(ACM), mit dem die vorhandenen TNF ’sicherer’ gemacht werden sollten, 
wurde jedoch gleichzeitig die waffentechnische Grundlage für den NATO- 
Doppelbeschluß gelegt."*
An analysis of the intentions of Schlesinger's counterforce doctrine cannot 
avoid contradictions and ambiguities: even analysts from the strategic 
community pointed out that "(t)he words Schlesinger u sed ... were often 
confusing, even to their authors."45 Cordesman identified the continuing debate 
inside the Pentagon as to precisely how the U.S. would implement the doctrine 
and the technical uncertainties affecting U.S. forces as a reason for this.
43 Haftendom’s indication that the 1975 Defence Budget requested an examination of
the extension of the Pershing’s range does not correspond to the original text in the 
defence budget. Haftendom, 1985, op.cit.. p.250
44 "It was Schlesinger’s intention to reduce the importance of the TNF in Europe.
However, a technological foundation for the NATO Dual-Track decision was laid 
with the decision to modernise the Pershing, which has been deployed in the 
Federal Republic since 1969, and the decision for the development of the advanced 
cruise missile (ACM) which was assigned to make the existing TNF more secure." 
ibid. For the same assumption, see Jürgen Maier,"Der Atomkrieg rückt näher", in: 
Die Grünen, Schlachtfeld Europa (Stuttgart: Die Grünen, 1981)
45 Cordesman, 1982, op.cit.. p.14
226
The Nixon administration pursued a strategy of greater flexibility in the use of 
strategic weapons, since it was argued that otherwise an aggressor could be 
tempted to make limited use of nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis. 
Flexibility would make the probability of nuclear response more credible.*5
On January 10, 1974 Schlesinger, at a luncheon with the Overseas Writers 
Association in Washington, spellt out the main element of the new concept 
while confirming that a "change in the strategies of the United States with 
regard to the hypothetical employment of central strategic forces”*7 had taken 
place. This "change" refers to the U.S. targeting strategy; in order to avoid for 
the President of the United States to have only the option "to target Soviet dties 
initially and massively" in the event of a possible recourse to strategic 
weapons/* it was publicly admitted for the first time since McNamara's Ann 
Arbor speech, that the change in U.S. targeting strategy implied military targets 
as well: "Military targets are, of course, one of the possible target sets."*9 In his 
annual report to Congress Schlesinger is even more explicit on the counterforce 
aspect involved in U.S. strategic planning: ’I t is true that in addition to 
retaliatory targeting against urban and industrial centers, our war plans have 
always included military targets."30
Two reasons which might have played a role in this renewed emphasis on 
counterforce options were vehemently publicised.57 To Schlesinger, a radical 
change in declaratory policy and a vigorous public debate seemed the most 
promising way to achieve the advanced strategic programmes and the 
relatively small changes in action policy. The second reason was certainly to
82.1. Description o f the counterforce doctrine
46 For the evolution of the Nixon administration’s "Limited Strategic Options", see ibid.
pp. 14 and Ball, 1975, op.cit.
47 "Flexible Strategic Options and Deterrence. Excerpts from the Press Conference of
U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, 10 January 1974", in Survival. 
(Vol. 16, No.2, March/April 1974) pp.86-90, here page 86
48 ibid. p.87
49 ibid. p.87
so U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1975, op.cit. 1974, p.4
Schlesinger utilised several occasions provided by hearings and interviews as well as
his Defense Reports to explain the new doctrine to the public.
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signal to the Soviet Union that, in spite of detente and SALT, the United States 
was willing to continue the arms race.52
In a briefing, Schlesinger explained the difference between present and 
previous U.S. options:
"(W)e had a number of options that had been built into our war plans, but all of 
these options were at a very high level which would have caused major 
fatalities in the Soviet Union. So we had options, but all of them that had been 
specified in the SIOP were at a fairly high level... In practice, we had a very 
limited number of massive options. What we are trying to do now is to broaden 
the spectrum and particularly to provide some options at the lower end of the 
spectrum.”5*
Schlesinger stressed that the change in U.S. strategy did not imply an increase 
in the number of strategic forces, but rather an improvement in missile accuracy 
and a change in targeting programmes. Thus, this new strategy would not be 
affected by SALT and its main intention would be to bring the U.S. into a 
position in which "the Soviets fully understand ... if they insist on racing - that 
we are prepared to match them."5* Although Schlesinger concedes that it is not 
possible for either the United States or the Soviet Union to achieve a disarming 
first strike, he is worried about the increasing invulnerability of both 
superpowers' second strike forces and concludes:
"Consequently, the range of circumstances in which an all-out strike against an 
opponent’s cities can be contemplated has narrowed considerably and one 
wishes to have alternatives for employment of strategic forces other than what 
would be, for the party initiating, a suicidal strike against the cities of the other 
side."55
The implementation of the new doctrine of "Limited Nuclear Options" (LNO), 
with its request for flexibility and selectivity, included a need for new 
intelligence, targeting, C3l and damage assessment capabilities and for an
52 Ball, 1975, op.cit.. p.47
53 U.S. Congress Senate, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks. Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 93rd Congress, Secret Hearing held on September 
11, 1974, Sanitized and Made Public on January 10, 1975 (Washington D.C.: 
U.S.G.P.O., 1975,) p.37, subsequently quoted as: U.S. Congress Senate, Briefing on 
Counterforce Attacks, 1975
54 Press Conference with Schlesinger, op.cit. p.86
55 ibid, p.87
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increased accuracy of the warheads as well as the ability to retarget them 
rapidly.36
The strategic Research & Development programmes which were demanded in 
the context of the new strategy were also meant as "hedges against the 
unknown outcome of SALT II".57 Whether the level of strategic arms would 
decrease or increase would depend on the behaviour of the Soviet Union. 
However, the United States would prefer a balance in such a way that "strategic 
equivalence can be achieved at the lowest cost and least destabilizing level of 
forces."»
In line with the common feature in the statements of U.S. defence policy to 
legitimise its arms build-up by reference to alleged Soviet military capabilities, 
Schlesinger also argued that the U.S. might have to face a limited Soviet nuclear 
attack, to which it might not have a response of equal rank. The main task of 
U.S. strategy would be to compensate for the effect of self-deterrence which 
would occur when the United States would fail to match Soviet capabilities:
"If our only option were to be able to launch massive strikes against the Soviet 
urban industrial base, the Soviets in these hypothetical circumstances - and I 
continue to stress that they are hypothetical - might believe that the United 
States would be self-deterred and that, therefore, they could with relatively low 
risk selectively attack the interior of the United States. If the United States 
possesses the ability to respond in kind, then the Soviet planner is faced with 
the prospect that the United States would respond and leave him in a no gain 
situation and, therefore, he would continue to be deterred."59
Whereas Schlesinger considered the risk of a massive Soviet surprise attack on 
U.S. forces to be "close to zero under existing conditions"«, he thought the only 
way a nuclear war would be likely to be initiated is through miscalculation on 
the part of the Soviet leadership. If there was a risk that the Soviets might 
consider worth running, Schlesinger would locate it "principally" in Europe."
56 Cordesman, 1982, op.cit.. p. 15. Cordesman called the doctrine Limited Strike
Options.
57 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1975, op.cit.. 1974, p.6
”  ibid
59 U.S. Congress Senate, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, op.cit.. 1975, p.9
«  U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1975, op.cit.. 1974, p.38
61 U.S. Congress Senate, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, op.ciL. 1975, p.41
229
This threat assessment served as a further legitimation of the counterforce 
strategy. Schlesinger argued that he acted with special regard to his European 
allies since the United States' coupling with Europe would be reestablished by 
enhancing the credibility of the U.S. strategic commitment to Europe:
"To the extent that we have changed our targeting doctrine, we have recoupled 
U.S. strategic forces with the security of Western Europe."42
Thus, the test which the flexibility doctrine would have to meet, would be 
conducted in those parts of the world where the United States perceived a 
conventional imbalance with the Warsaw Pact, e.g. in Europe.
82.2. Basic features o f the limited nuclear options
Basic elements of Schlesinger's doctrine are the concepts of controlled escalation 
and thus of intra-war deterrence. The Soviet Union should be given an 
incentive to be rational because "into the wartime period"«* the United States 
will need to reserve its strategic forces for attacking Soviet cities. Thus, even 
after the outbreak of a war, the aggressor would still be deterred from targeting 
the cities of the United States and Europe.
As mentioned above, a basic element of these concepts of controlled escalation 
is the assumption of the opponents' rational behaviour. Schlesinger suggested 
that "if we were to maintain continued communications with the Soviet leaders 
during the war, and if we were to describe precisely and meticulously the 
limited nature of our actions... political leaders will be under powerful pressure 
to continue to be sensible."«
62 ibid. pp.41. For confirmation that these doctrinal changes were aimed mainly at
decreasing European apprehensions, see James Schlesinger, "The Eagle and the 
Bear" in Foreign Affairs (Vol.63, No.5,1985), pp. 937-961
63 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1975, op.cit. 1974, p.5
« U.S. Congress Senate, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session on U.S. and Soviet 
Strategic doctrine and Military Policies, (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., March 4, 
1974), p. 13, subsequently quoted as: U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Strategic Policies, 1974
230
However, Schlesinger also had to concede that no guarantee could be given that 
escalation control works: "We can give no assurance that a small exchange 
would not escalate to a higher level."«
Even if counterforce limited nuclear options cannot guarantee the avoidance of 
an apocalypse, they can at least ensure that the war will be terminated under 
conditions which are favourable to the United States: "(W)e will be in a position 
to assure the termination of hostilities under conditions which are relatively 
favorable to us."« An explanation of what "favorable conditions" meant for the 
United States is not given.
Above all, Schlesinger, in addition to his efforts to develop more credible 
nuclear strategic options, stressed the necessity of achieving a high nuclear 
threshold by strengthening conventional forces.*7 His strategy emphasised the 
necessity of fighting a war with conventional weapons as long as possible and 
within flexible response of stressing the element of "direct defence" much more 
strongly than "the threat of escalation".«
His advocacy of a high nuclear threshold was unambiguous:
"In the interest of minimizing possible wartime destruction in NATO Europe, it 
is highly desirable to maintain a high nuclear threshold and use nuclear 
weapons only if absolutely necessary (e.g., in response to WP use of nuclear 
weapons or to prevent major loss of NATO territory or forces if conventional 
defense fails.)"*»
This willingness is expressed practically in the number of days for which the 
United States plans to fight a war conventionally. While McNamara planned for
60 days, Schlesinger planned to prolong the holding operation to 90 days.70
65 U.S. Congress Senate, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, op.cit.. 1975, p.37
66 ibid. p.4
67 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1975, op.cit.. 1974, p.8
68 Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in
Europe. A Report to the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 
93-365, (Washington D.C., April 1, 1975) p. 12, subsequently quoted as: TNF- 
Report, 1975
69 ibid
70 U.S. Congress Senate, U.S. Forces in Europe. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign
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If direct defence were to fail and in case the use of nuclear weapons were 
inevitable, Schlesinger planned to place at the military planners' disposal 
nuclear weapons designed:
1. to prevent the enemy from achieving his immediate military objective 
while threatening other high-value enemy targets;
2. to signal to the enemy that the attack was limited and that its purpose 
was to terminate the war immediately;
3. to gain control over the future conduct of the war until the negotiations 
started; and
4. to rule out opportunities for future low-cost, low risk initiatives by the 
enemy.7'
These objectives necessitated nuclear weapons which would be able to strike 
"meaningful targets with a sufficient accuracy-yield combination to destroy 
only the intended target and to avoid widespread collateral damage."72
Meaningful targets included military installations such as silos and airfields. 
Schlesinger confirmed that ”(w)e already have a long list of such possible 
targets...To the extent necessary, we are retargeting our forces accordingly."7*
While Schlesinger's new strategy did not imply new hardware in the shape of 
great new strategic weapons systems and expenditure, he planned to 
supplement the SIOP with a range of preplanned limited nuclear options, the 
necessary real-time retargeting capabilities and command and control 
support.7* This concept necessitated nuclear weapons which guarantee an
Relations, 93rd Congress, (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., July 25 and 27, 1973) 
p.80, subsequently quoted as: U.S. Congress Senate, U.S. Forces in Europe, 1973. 
See also K.-Peter Stratmann, Die Sicherheit des NATO-Abschnitts Mitteleuropa als 
Strategisches Problem. Untersuchungen zur Glaubwürdigkeit der gegenwärtigen 
NATO-"Posture". (München/Ebenhausen: Dissertation 1978), p.285
71 Davis, 1975/76, op.ciL. p.7
72 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1975, op.cit. 1974, p.5
73 iMd, p.39
74 For a helpful analysis of Schlesinger’s doctrine see also Benjamin S. Lambeth,
Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategic Policy. Rand Repon, 
R-2034-DDRE (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, December 1976), 
pp.24-33
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optimal combination of damage limitation, destructive power and flexibility. 
These are nuclear weapons with low yield and high accuracy, penetration 
capability and survivability.
823. The Role o f the TNF in Scklesinger's Doctrine
These doctrinal developments were of high importance for the European allies 
because Schlesinger's proposals also included a revision of the TNF posture. In 
response to the amendment by Senator Sam Nunn, which called for a 
coordinated NATO nuclear posture75, Schlesinger provided an extensive public 
presentation of U.S. nuclear policy with his report on the TNF. The general 
background to the U.S. strategy was explained in this report as well as the way 
in which theatre nuclear doctrine had evolved within that strategy. It also went 
into considerable detail concerning the weaponry.
The following two roles are foreseen for the TNF:
1. as a response to a theatrewide, preemptive nuclear attack by the 
Warsaw pact and
2. as a response to an overwhelming WP conventional attack.7«
If the WP, according to its strategy, began with theatrewide nuclear strikes 
against NATO nuclear and military forces, a primary purpose of the NATO 
TNF would be to provide a credible retaliatory response and "thereby to deter 
them".77
However, Schlesinger's overall concept of the use of TNF assigns them an 
explicit military role far beyond their role as a retaliatory and deterrent threat: 
apart from their task of changing the assessment of WP political leaders 
regarding early victory, the TNF must reverse the tactical situation in order to 
create a situation "conducive to negotiations in which NATO has some tactical 
advantages.”7» This is the new element of Schlesinger's counterforce strategy
75 see chapter 4.2.1. for the background to Schlesinger’s TNF revision.
76 TNF-Report, 1975, op.cit. p. 13
77 ibid,p.l3
7* ibid, p. 14
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which envisages the same dual and alternate role for the IN F McNamara had 
achieved for strategic weapons within the scope of flexible response: a war- 
fighting and a retaliation function.
The TNF are supposed to function militarily as a complement to conventional 
forces in combined conventional-nuclear battlefield operations. They should be 
able to destroy targets such as "front line and second echelon WP armored units 
and their immediate tactical support—surface-to-surface missiles and rockets, 
artillery and tactical air capabilities."79 Deep interdiction strikes accomplished 
by TNF are requested as well: "(W)e should continue to develop selective, 
carefully controlled options that will permit us...to engage, if necessary, in a 
highly discriminating interdiction campaign against enemy lines of 
communication or forces behind the FEBA."<°
Thus, NATO TNF must fulfil two functions which can hardly be accomplished 
simultaneously. On the one hand, their task is to control escalation and to 
establish intra-war deterrence, which allows only a very limited use of TNF:
"Efforts would be made to control escalation in such desperate circumstances 
by a combination of clearly perceivable limits on the NATO nuclear responses 
and the threat of more extensive strikes with theatre and strategic forces if the 
WP chooses to escalate."®7
On the other hand, they are supposed to change the tactical situation 
dramatically; this necessitates their extensive and massive use. The ambiguity 
of the INFs' role is expressed prominently in Schlesinger's elaboration of 
NATO's first use concept when he demands that the TNF should be delivered 
in a limited way and at the same time massively and with a shock effect
"First use should be clearly limited and defensive in nature, so as to reduce the 
risks of escalation. However, the attack should be delivered with sufficient 
shock and decisiveness to forcibly change the perceptions of WP leaders and 
create a situation conducive to negotiations."82
It is not easy to see how these incompatible requirements in relation to the IN F 
would be reconciled in the event of a war, except that the term "limited" refers
79 ibid. p. 14
so FEBA: Forward Edge of the Battle Area. ibid. p.27
« ibid. p. 14
« ibid. p. 15
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to the U.S. Army's concept of packages which are "limited" in respect to a 
specific area and time span.
While discussing the TNFs' role in terms of response to an overwhelming WP 
conventional attack, Schlesinger reveals his reluctance to use nuclear weapons 
first, because it implies the danger of uncontrolled escalation:
"The first use of theater nuclear forces, even in very limited ways, carries grave 
risks of escalation and should be considered only when the consequences of 
conventional defeat would be even more serious. If the alternative is, for 
example, major loss of NATO territory or forces, NATO political leaders may 
choose to accept the risks of first use."w
Should NATO evaluate the use of nuclear weapons as unavoidable, the TNF are 
a means to postpone or even suspend the employment of strategic weapons:
"(S)hould deterrence fail, our theater nuclear capabilities provide a source of 
limited and controlled options other than the early use of U.S. and allied 
strategic forces."®*
Yet Schlesinger does not deny the risks and unpredictabilities involved in the 
employment of TNF, nor does he hide his general doubt as to whether use of 
TNF would result in any military advantage:
"While it is essential to theorize about the nature of tactical nuclear warfare, 
we must acknowledge that as a practical matter, the initiation of a nuclear 
engagement would involve many uncertainties...What is more, it is not clear 
under what conditions the United States and its allies would possess a 
comparative military advantage in a tactical nuclear exchange."*5
While nuclear retaliatory strikes against urban-industrial targets or rear-based 
forces in Eastern Europe or the USSR are regarded as "probably less stable in a 
crisis and a less credible deterrent"*5 since they would provoke Soviet 
retaliation, deep interdiction strikes against Eastern European countries are 
explicitly recommended. These are necessary in order to support nuclear 
attacks on WP units and to counter WP interdiction attacks and to diminish the
83 ibid. p. 15
»4 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report Fiscal Year 1976. 
(Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., February 5, 1975), p.III-2, subsequently quoted as:
U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1976, op.cit.. 1975
«  Department of Defense, FY 1975, op.cit.. p.82
86 TNF-Report, 1975, op.cit. p.15
235
Eastern European countries' willingness to cooperate with the Soviets, "thus 
weakening WP solidarity."®7
With reference to recommendations for "selective, carefully controlled 
options"*®, Schlesinger demonstrates much more optimism concerning military 
advantage than when he theorises about tactical nuclear warfare generally:
"Both options are designed to minimize the incentives for the enemy to reply at 
all or to respond with uncontrolled attacks."®9
The use of strategic forces would be envisaged as a theatre forces support, e.g. 
to strike Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in a general nuclear war. Thus, a 
coupling between the U.S. strategic forces and the TNF is guaranteed:
"U.S. strategic forces continue to be coupled to deterrence of attacks on 
Europe, both through the threat of escalation of any conflict to general nuclear 
war and the provision of operational plans for limited use, as necessary, of 
strategic forces in support of theater conflict."9®
The report did not address questions about either precise size or combinations 
of systems in the stockpile. However, future tasks of the Pershing 1A are 
mentioned. The nuclear Pershing 1A is earmarked for attacks on fixed targets 
and would compensate for the relative ineffectiveness of the Poseidon 
warheads.9'
It was obvious that Schlesinger transferred flexible response's principles of 
selectivity, flexibility and its requests for an increase of limited options to the 
TNF. Thus, the military requirements for the TNFs are partly the same as for 
strategic weapons:
1. Requirements for low collateral damage. According to this logic, 
reduction of collateral damage would make it more credible to the




9i The exact text runs as follows: "Since these RVs (Reentry Vehicles, S.P.) are 
relatively ineffective against hard targets, other systems are required, such as 
Pershing with its higher yield and tactical aircraft with a higher yield capability and 
greater accuracy." ibid. p. 18
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Warsaw Pact that NATO would use nuclear weapons. A low level of 
collateral damage would reduce civilian casualties and "perhaps" help 
to control escalation.« Thus, a low nuclear yield of the nuclear weapons 
combined with the highest possible accuracy would be necessary in 
order to guarantee the destruction of the target.
2. Requirements for prolonged nuclear war. Schlesinger's war scenario 
necessitates most of all the survivability of the TNF, since if the TNF 
were preemptively attacked by the Warsaw Pact, NATO would not be 
able to continue the war. The ambitious goal that the TNF would still 
operate effectively and without error in the environment of a 
conventional and nuclear war implies technological challenges to the 
U.S. armament industry. The objective of survivability necessitates the 
improvement of communication capabilities for command and control 
of nuclear forces and improvements in command, control and planning 
for combined conventional-nuclear operations.«
Schlesinger's strategy received President Nixon's approval in January and was 
issued in the document fielded as NSDM-242 (National Security Decision 
Memorandum).4*
In correspondence to his objectives, Schlesinger's first act upon becoming 
Secretary of Defense in July 1973 was to approve research on a more accurate 
missile guidance system, at first without Congressional authorisation.95 
Survivability was to be improved by including an "automatic reference system", 
which made it possible to fire the Pershing from unsurveyed firing positions, 
which did not have to be preselected any more. A "sequential launch adapter"
92 Various improvements for reduced collateral damage are suggested, e.g. reduced
yield, special warhead effects such as enhanced radiation (neutron weapon), 
improved delivery systems accuracy, ibid. p.21
93 ibid. p.29
«The NSDM-242 authorised the Secretary of Defense to draw up the Nuclear Weapons 
Employment Policy (NUWEP), implementing the counterforce strategy by setting 
out the planning assumptions, attack options, targeting objectives, and damage 
levels. NSDM-242 and NUWEP provided the framework for the new SIOP, already 
No.5, formally approved in December 1975. Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic forces. 
How would they be used?" in: Miller, 1984, op.cit.. p.219
95 Ball, 1975, op.ciL. p.22. Within these modifications of the U.S. strategy, for example, 
the Department of Defense developed a new type of MIRV: the manoeuverable 
reentry vehicle (MARV), planned for the Trident missile-submarine programme 
and the Minuteman ICBM. ibid.. p.23
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increased the firing response time in its Quick Reaction Role and permitted a 
Pershing commander to count down and launch up to three missiles in rapid 
succession.9* "The latest available technology"«? to upgrade the Pershing 
referred to the research programmes on low-yielded warheads and a new 
guidance system for a smaller and more accurate Pershing 1A.9®
Thus, in addition to the development of the warhead's accuracy«, 
improvements on the Pershing's serviceability, mobility and pre-launch 
survivability were announced in the 1974 DoD report; nothing however was 
said about an extension of the Pershing's range. As regards the ALCM, the DoD 
report could already announce that it would be made available for initial 
deployment in the late 1970s. The development of the Navy SLCM for both 
strategic and tactical variants was disclosed as well.'00 The DoD report FY 1976 
explicitly mentions the problem of fratricide, which undermines the efficiency 
of the ICBM's. Compensation for the effects of fratricide might become a major 
task for the cruise missiles.'0'
An extension of the Pershing lA 's range is not taken into consideration by 
Schlesinger because TNF strikes against Soviet territory are considered as too 
escalatory, and should therefore be avoided. Strikes of this kind would be 
openly contradictory to the role the TNF play within the concept of escalation 
control:
96 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1975, op.cit.. 1974, p. 114. Explanation
given from Christopher Paine, "Pershing II: the Army’s strategic weapon", The 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. (October 1980), pp.25-31, here p.25
97 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1975, op.cit.. 1974, p 114
98 Michael Getler, "Pentagon Considers Putting Mini-Warheads in Missiles" in Herald
Tribune. January 26-27,1974, p.2, full text quoted in Ball, 1975, op.cit.. p.24
99 See also "U.S. To Renounce ’Mini’Atom Arms", in NYT. May 24,1974, p.7
¡oo U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1975, op.cit. 1974, p.65
loi "Our own capability against ICBMs is modest - partly because our missiles lack the
proper combination of warhead yield and accuracy and partly because of the 
complications introduced by the phenomenon known as a fratricide." U.S.
Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1976, op.cit.. 1975
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"Theater nuclear forces, because they do not pose a major threat to the Soviet 
homeland, constitute a retaliatory capability which carries a perceptively lower 
risk of escalation than the use of strategic nuclear forces.".702
Thus the specific characteristic of the LRTNF, namely their range for hitting the 
Soviet Union, was incompatible with the requirements of the U.S. counterforce 
limited nuclear options doctrine. U.S. interpretation of flexible response and its 
implementation aimed at putting emphasis on conventional forces in 
combination with battlefield nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. 
The Eurostrategic level was certainly not at the focus of their attention. That 
does not mean that Schlesinger opposed the LRTNF deployment in Europe due 
to his demonstrated belief in escalation control and intra-war deterrence.70*
83. LRTNF for follow-on use
There is no doubt that U.S. planners welcomed the LRTNF as a means to 
execute counterforce options especially with the Pershing H's capability to 
destroy hardened and mobile targets. Still, counterforce targeting does not 
imply any fixation to a geographical area which is to be targeted or to a specific 
moment for the launching of the weapons. A discussion of U.S. criticism about 
the LRTNF's vulnerable deployment mode will demonstrate that U.S. planners 
contemplated LRTNF for a follow-on use.
83.1. Counterforce targeting
The reasons for U.S. planners to support the weapons programme was certainly 
based on the Pershing H's and GLCM's counterforce characteristics and in 
particular on the Pershing's capability to hit time urgent targets due to its short 
flight-time.70* The GLCM's advantage was its greater range, since the GLCM 
could be deployed farther to the rear and thus gain an increased pre-launch 
survivability. The targeting plans, as published in official U.S. documents, 
reveal that specially the Pershing II is envisaged for employment against
702 ibid, p. 12
¡03 See "Schlesinger Criticises U.S. Allies on Missiles", International Herald Tribune. 
May 26,1981
104 U.S. Department of Defense (Caspar W. Weinberger). Annual Defense Department 
Report. Fiscal Year 1984. (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1983), p.232/233, 
subsequendy quota as: U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1984, op.cit.. 1983
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hardened critical fixed theatre targets, such as "earth covered concrete shelters 
('hangarettes') and concrete revetments to protect aircraft on airbases."'05 The 
FY 1985 ACDA statement stresses above all the recent hardening of command, 
control and communications sites in Eastern Europe. According to ACDA, the 
target list for NATO's LRTNF deployment includes
"fixed IRBM/MRBM sites; naval bases; nuclear and chemical storage sites; 
airbases; command, control, and communications centers; headquarters 
complexes; fixed surface-to-air missile sites; munitions and petroleum storage 
areas and transfer facilities; ground forces installations; choke points; troop 
concentrations; and bridges."706
While Soviet strategic forces (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) are not 
mentioned in the comprehensive list as potential targets, troop concentrations 
and C^I systems are explicitly included.707
Another important option for U.S. planners was certainly the Pershing's 
capability for "interdiction strikes" and so-called "second-echelon" targeting. 
The WP's "troop concentrations" create a special problem for NATO's defence 
planning. The Soviets organise their forces into three echelons belonging to 
different strategic levels, arrayed West to East into the Western Military District 
of the Soviet Union. The first echelon's function is to penetrate NATO's general 
positions even at the cost of attrition afterwards. The second and third echelons, 
moving west behind the first, have the task of continuing the offensive by 
exploiting the penetrations and rapidly fanning out into the NATO rear areas to 
bring about the collapse of NATO's defence. NATO plans to thwart the Warsaw 
Pact's "Blitzkrieg"70® plans envisaging a timely insertion of the two echelons 
while continuing the offensive momentum. By destroying, disrupting and 
delaying the arrival of the second and third echelons, NATO can easily destroy
105 ACDA Statement Fiscal Year 1985, op.cit.. p. 107
106 U.S. Congress, Arms Control and Disarmament Act (ACDA). Fiscal Year 1982 
Arms Control Impact Statements. (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O..February 1981), 
p.212, subsequently quoted as; ACDA Statement Fiscal Year 1982
707 Except for mentioning biological and chemical sites and dams/locks, the ACDA list 
is identical with the target list of the Pershing II, given by the former Secretary of 




the WP's requisite tuning and pace of the offensive.'09 In order to stop these WP 
offensive ground forces, several simultaneous actions must be taken. Among 
these operational actions are two of special interest in this context: attacking the 
mobile follow-on forces and interdicting key lines of communication to delay 
and disrupt the ground attack."0
The aim of interdiction is to delay and disrupt a Warsaw Pact follow-on which 
could reinforce the Central Battle or which would use the breakthrough 
successes. Two concepts are envisaged by NATO for achieving the delay, 
disruption and destruction of follow-on forces: the first is to target fixed 
military objects. There are 100 fixed key installations (bridges, railheads and 
choke points) which, if successfully damaged, would result in an accumulation 
of forces for a period of hours or days. These forces could then be attacked in 
place by aircraft or missiles. Cotter describes the success of the operation with 
the words: "In this case, what were mobile forces have now become fixed 
targets.""'
The second concept envisages a direct attack on follow-on forces. The 
Pershing's flexibility in its target selection procedures demonstrates the 
technical capability to hit mobile targets as well.
In case of an emergency, the U.S. Army Europe (USAEUR) headquarters would 
order each Pershing battalion to send two of its firing batteries equipped with 
nuclear warheads out into the field. Then the officers of the Pershing brigade 
would select targets for these additional units from a "top-secret list of targets in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union""2 . The targets would be transmitted to 
all 3 Pershing battalions. Potential targets for Pershing II missiles would have 
been selected beforehand because the missiles' guidance system requires the 
preparation of computerised maps of all possible targets. These detailed
109 Kenneth Watman, "Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) and Emerging Technologies", 
Military Technology. (No.2,1986), pp.28-35, pp.29
"° Donald R.Cotter, "New Conventional Force Technology and the NATO-Warsaw 
Pact Balance: Pan II". Adelphi Papers, No. 198 (London: The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, Summer 1985), p.28
'"  Cotter, 1985, op.cit. p.30. Of the existing 1,600 fighter bombers in Western Europe, 
only one third are able to conduct deep interdiction strikes, see Heinz 
Magenheimer, Die Verteidigung Westeuropas. Doktrin. Kräftestand. 
Einsatzplanung - Eine Bestandsaufnahme aus Sicht der NATO (Koblenz: Bernard
& Gräfe, 1986), p.112
"2 Charles, 1987, op.cit.. p.81
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topological maps, provided by the Defense Mapping Agency in digital data 
form, are used in order to produce small cartridges containing computer- 
readable maps of particular target areas.77*
In a 1977 Senate Hearing, the Pershing's capability of retargeting and attacking 
shifting targets was explicitly stressed by General Lennon when he compared 
the GLCM, SLCM and Pershing EL "Shifting targets" are those described by 
Cotter as moving forces which become a fixed target when getting stuck and 
accumulating at a chokepoint:
"Pershing II has two elements that are very important One, it is closer to the 
battle and, therefore, it is easier to get the information to the Pershing unit It is 
faster to get to it to start retargeting. It has a very short response time and a 
time of flight, so it is quite useful in attacking the shifting targets on the 
battlefield."77*
Thus, the missiles might be capable of hitting the WP echelons which advance 
at a rate of perhaps 60-70 miles per 24-hour period.775 It seems that these 
interdiction operations of either hitting the third and second echelons directly 
or attacking them after they have become fixed targets provided the main 
rationale for the LRTNF:
"(S)ie (die militärische Begründung S.P.) konzentrierte sich vielmehr auf die 
Erfordernisse für Gegenschläge über große Entfernungen gegen sowjetische 
Streitkräfte der zweiten und dritten Welle sowie die damit zusammenhängende 
Infrastruktur."770
The question arises, however, whether these follow-on forces will be targeted in 
the Soviet Union or on Eastern European territory.
It might be possible that these weapons will not be used against Soviet territory. 
It is technically possible - as pointed out earlier - to reduce the missiles' ranges, 
so that the United States can also target them against Eastern Europe. Since
77* ibid
77< U.S. Senate Hearings, Authorization for Military Procurement, 1977, op.cit.. p. 6448
775 For these data see Watman, 1986, op.cit.. p.29
¡16 "The decision is based on a twofold rationale, a number of military and a number of 
political considerations. Above all, the military rationale was independent of the 
build-up with the SS-20; rather, it focused on requirements for counterstrikes over 
long distances against Soviet forces of the second and third wave and their related 
infrastructure." Holst, 1983, op.cit.. p.507
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most potential Soviet targets are already covered by U.S. based longer-range 
ICBMs, Walter Pincus of the Washington Post estimates that 70% of the 
weapons are targeted against Eastern Europe:
"Despite the newer missile’s longer range, however, defense experts say 70 % 
of its planned targets will be in Eastern Europe, partly because most potential 
Soviet targets already are covered by U.S.-based, longer-range ICBMs."777
83.2. Criticism ofLTRNF
While the need to modernise NATO's TNF was unanimously supported by the 
U.S. strategic community, the actual decision to deploy 108 Pershing IIXR and 
464 ground launched cruise missiles was strongly criticised by many analysts. 
Most of the criticism stressed the LRTNFs vulnerability, which indicates that 
many U.S. analysts would have liked to envisage the Pershing II and the GLCM 
for a follow-on use. In general, the decision was criticised under three aspects:
1. its lack of a coherent doctrine
2. the inadequacy and insufficiency of its response in regard to size and 
constituent elements, and
3. foremost the vulnerability of the land-deployed LRTNF
As already shown in detail, there is hardly any optimal solution to flexible 
response's TNF dilemma. The Pershing II and GLCM were also criticised for 
hardly providing any help in making the TNF posture more feasible and 
credible. According to several analysts the "coupling” effect, which is presumed 
by the Europeans to be implemented, does not work. Morton Halperin, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Johnson administration, concluded:
"Therefore, the only good argument for a theater long-range deployment is 
that the United States is already committed to it and should not back away."77®
This discontent is equally shared by conventionalists and minimal deterrers 
such as Halperin as well as by nuclear war-fighters. Several authors suspect 
that the use of selective employment plans as a form of nuclear bargaining
777 Walter Pincus, "Pershings Packed to Go", The Washington Post. (October 16,1983) 
p.A21. See also Buteux, 1983a, op.cit. p. 89
77S Morton H. Halperin, "NATO and the TNF Controversy" in Orbis. (Vol.26, No.l, 
Spring 1982) p. 105-116, here p. 110
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during a war would lead to a massive Soviet military counter response against 
NATO's TNF."9
Some analysts regarded the LRTNF modernisation as a totally inefficient means 
of compensation for the supposedly dangerous imbalance between NATO and 
WP forces. Richard Burt, National Security Affairs correspondent at the New 
York Times, in particular, criticised NATO's decision to focus on only one 
element of the TNF potential and for neglecting the Soviet build-up in this area 
in the seventies. Burt complained:
"Moscow’s nuclear modernization program is not centered around a single 
system but consists of several new weapons, including the SS-21, SS-22, and 
the SS-23 battlefield nuclear suppcnt missiles, the Backfire medium-range 
bomber, and the Su-19 Fencer attack aircraft...(A) comprehensive approach to 
theater nuclear modernization must be taken in replacing the alliance’s 
increasingly obsolete nuclear posture rather than taking the piecemeal and ad 
hoc steps now underway."'20
The total number (572) of long-range intermediate range missiles was criticised 
as well. In 1978, as the decision was actually being shaped in the HLG, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff proposed to deploy more than 1,000-3,000 nuclear warheads in 
order to facilitate the execution of a theatre-level SIOP without relying on U.S. 
strategic forces for help in their annual strategic planning document.'2'  This 
high number of warheads was refused by the HLG because it would have given 
rise to the suspicion that NATO planned to build up an independent TNF war 
fighting arsenal. Then it could have been argued that the employment of 
U.S.strategic forces would be no longer necessary, an effect which NATO 
wished to avoid. Also SACELJR General Haig disagreed with this small number 
of just 572 systems and called the decision "only political expediency and 
tokenism”.'22
Robert A. Moore, Ex-Deputy Undersecretary for research and technique, 
requests two and three times more weapons than the 572 contemplated
119 See for example Makins, 1981, op.cit. p. 160
¡20 Richard R. Burt, "Washington and the Atlantic Alliance: The Hidden Crisis." in 
Thompson, (ed.), 1980, op.ciL. pp.109-121, here p.l 18 and p.120
121 Smith, 1984, op.cit.. he indicates the number of 1,000-2,000. See for the figure of 
1,000-3,000 Cordesman, 1982, op.cit. p.37
'22 General Haig, SACEUR, Atlantic News. September 12,1979
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systems.72* NATO would lack an equivalent to the SS-20; therefore Moore 
proposes the development of a mobile ballistic missile with a range of 4,000 
kilometres. He believes that it was wrong to decide against the Mobile Middle 
Range Ballistic Missile (MMRBM) in the competition with the Pershing n, 
because the MMRBM was offered in a version which had MIRV warheads and 
a longer range.
The most comprehensive criticism made by a war-fighter has been formulated 
by Donald R. Cotter who was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic 
Energy) from 1973-1978. Cotter is even called one of the mental fathers of this 
armament programme, since he drafted the programme on behalf of the 
HLG.72< He considers the LRTNF programme, agreed upon by NATO in 1979, 
at best as a "modest start".725 He discovers a clear rationale for the TNF which is 
"to hold at risk" the echeloned Warsaw Pact forces and disrupt their precision 
time table of multiple-axes advance. Thus the WP forces would be prey to 
modernised precision-guided conventional forces.72« However, Cotter argues, 
such a strategy necessitates a larger inventory of long-range TNF than actually 
planned, a better survivability of all nuclear forces and an improved command 
and control system. Therefore, a key component of Cotter's concept is a theatre 
information system which provides for constant surveillance and target 
acquisition of WP deployments. The required greater number of LRTNF could 
be provided by a MIRV warhead as a supplement to the basic Pershing n 
model, which might be made available "by the mid to late 1980s."727
William van Cleave, ex-General Adviser of the Committee of the Present 
Danger and advocate of a TNF battlefield capability, criticised the 
modernisation programme for its insufficient number, its vulnerability and the 
Pershing's old technology:
123 Robert A. Moore, ’Taktisches Kernwaffenpotential. Gedanken zum Undenkbaren",
Internationale Wehrevue. (No.4,1981), p.401-408, here p.407
124 Donald R. Cotter, James H. Hansen, Kirk Me Connel, Pro Pace 1983. Beiträge und
Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik. Das nukleare Kräfteverhältnis in Europa. Stand. 
Entwicklungen. Folgerungen. Deutsche Ausgabe des United States Strategie 
Institute, Washington D.C., (Bonn: Deutsches Strategieforum, July 1983) p.5
725 Donald R. Cotter, "NATO Theater Nuclear Forces: An Enveloping Military 




"Pershing IIs merely replace a very old system in small numbers with a new 
system with very old technology and the same small numbers....I don’t regard 
these moves as modernization whatsoever."728
Justin "Galen" criticises the same aspect of the Pershing E's shortcomings and 
stresses that the improvements were made to a system which "is more than ten 
years old, which has very slow reaction time, which requires excessive 
manning, which is large and vulnerable, (and) which is comparatively easy to 
target.”729 As a particular disadvantage, Galen stresses that, unlike the cruise 
missile, the Pershing cannot be fired in a contaminated environment because 
their crews would have to expose themselves to radioactivity during the initial 
set-up.7*0
8 3 .3. Intolerable degree of vulnerability
It seems to be more or less commonplace within the strategic community to 
complain about the vulnerability of land-deployed systems in general and the 
new LRTNF's vulnerability in particular.7*7
Before conclusions will be drawn from the fact that especially the 
invulnerability of the LRTNF was criticised by U.S. analysts, we have to point 
out a persistent dilemma of NATO's posture. In its overall context, a 
compromise always has to be found between three almost incompatible 
requirements: political control, invulnerability (security from enemy attack) and
128 William van Cleave in a discussion, in Thompson, (ed.) 1980, op.cit.. p.226
729 Justin Galen (pen name of former senior Department of Defense civilian official), 
"NATO’s Theater Nuclear Dilemma: A new Set of Crucial Choices" Armed forces 
Journal International. (January 1979) p. 16-23, here p.23
¡30 ibid. p.21
i3i Charles Burton Marshall, who points out that the Pershing IIs will be an easy target, 
if they are distributed among only fifteen locations; Marshall, discussion in 
Thompson, 1980, op.cit.. p.226. Galen, 1979, op.cit.. p.23. Thomas L.McNaugher 
and Theodore M. Parker, "Modernizing NATO’s Long-Range Theater Nuclear 
forces: An Assessment". RAND P-6486, (Santa Monica, California: Rand 
Corporation, October 1980). Provoked by the LRTNF’s vulnerability, they argue on 
the basis of the pressures on Soviet decision makers that a surprise attack should be 
attempted, p. 15. Gregory Treverton argues that apart from all the advantages of sea- 
basing, such as mobility, the next generation of SLBM will be more accurate than 
current systems. Treverton, 1981, op.cit.. p.l3.See also Cordesman 1982, op.cit.. 
p.45 and Sigal, 1984, op.cit.. p.39
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operational flexibility. It is only possible to satisfy two of these goals while at 
the same time having to ignore the third.
If invulnerability and operational flexibility were the most important goals in a 
first logical possibility, any kind of political control would go down the drain 
since, in this case, most of the details of weapon deployments, targeting for 
battlefield strikes, and timing of the weapons' use would be unknown to the 
political authorities. The Alliance would arrive "at an extreme form of the 
'integrated battlefield'.""2
For example, to ensure political control as well as to guarantee invulnerability, 
the weapons would have to be hidden in a few well-concealed, dispersed sites 
and asked to maintain radio silence. As a result, however, operational flexibility 
would be lost.
Vulnerability would be increased if NATO opted for political control and 
operational flexibility. This option would involve a high level of 
communication in order to keep everyone informed of nuclear weapon 
deployments, of their status, movements and plans. The communications traffic 
would probably be detected by the Warsaw Pact, thus increasing the danger 
that the weapons would be discovered and preemptively destroyed or caught. 
Encryptions, dedicated radio nets and other measures introduced in order to 
increase security would handicap operational flexibility."*
In the case of the LRTNF, NATO obviously opted for
1) operational flexibility in order to employ them quickly, if necessary,
2) and for political control in the sense that political leaders would still 
have control over the details of the weapons' deployment
3) at the expense of invulnerability
The LRTNF's vulnerability which induces the so-called coercion of "using-or- 
losing" certainly denies them a political control in the sense of determining the 
moment when the weapons should be launched. Again it has to be considered 
what kind of arguments the German analysts had to weigh against each other: 
if for first use only short-range and battlefield weapons were at the disposal of
"2 Charles, 1987, op.cit.. p. 107
133 ibid
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SACEUR due to the independent U.S. command system in Europe, German 
politicians would probably have only a slight chance for political control upon 
their release. This would imply the threat of "wrong" first use. If LRTNF were 
deployed in Europe, German politicians could hope that, if first use would 
prove necessary, the "preferred" first use would be executed. In summary, in 
the case of the LRTNF, German politicians apparently acted according to the 
following priority: the highest degree of operational flexibility, limited political 
control and neglect of invulnerability.7**
By pointing out details of the missiles' deployment status, Charles Daniel gives 
evidence of their high degree of vulnerability in spite of their praised mobility.
Pershing missiles are grouped into battalions of thirty-six missiles apiece; each 
battalion consists of four batteries. At any time, one battery from each battalion 
(a quarter of all Pershing missiles in Europe) is on Combat Alert Status (CAS) at 
a fixed location with warheads mated to the missiles and ready to fire within 
fifteen minutes. The other three batteries are, without warheads on their 
missiles, either in field training, in practice for maintenance procedures or on 
pre-alert status.7*5 Traditional U.S. Army procedures call for at least one and 
probably two firing batteries to be out in the field at all times. The Combat Alert 
site is fixed and easily identified. In times of tension, the Army may put 
additional Pershing batteries in field training, directing them to stay hidden 
and ready to fire missiles with a minimum delay. An emergency action message 
to the battalion headquarters will order the dispersal of Pershing firing 
batteries. Normally, a battery moves in four convoys: three convoys will consist 
of firing platoons of three Pershing missiles apiece, and the headquarters for the 
unit, the Platoon Control Central, will make up the fourth.7*«
The three platoons of a single battery are deployed to field positions at 
prepared secret sites near several German villages. Charles supposes that,
134 Although the argument is qualified by the fact that long-range TNF are less 
vulnerable to preemption than short-range nuclear systems because they can be 
based further back in NATO-Europe.
7*5 Walter Pincus, "Pershing ITs ¡Deployed Faster than Expected", Washington Post 
(October 8,1984) p.31
136 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 6-11. The Pershing II Firing Battery. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p.2-1, mentioned in 
Charles, 1987, op.cit.. p.66
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although these firing sites are secret, they will be quite easily found, surveyed 
and reconnoitered by the Soviets. One possibility to avoid the sites being 
discovered would be to launch a single missile from an external firing point, at 
least 5 kilometres distant from the other missiles, so that attention would be 
distracted from the actual position of the remaining missiles. Efforts to restrict 
the use of radios cannot be made because keeping nuclear weapons ready for 
prompt use will demand frequent communication between all military men 
responsible for coordinating these operations. Surprisingly enough for a lay 
person, the means for communications on the battlefield will be a high 
frequency radio, one whose transmission can be picked up by the Warsaw Pact 
listening post. Even if these communications were encrypted, such 
transmissions often reveal a lot about what is going on and at the very least 
betray the location of the source. Thus, the WP will be able to sense a NATO 
nuclear strike coming and may even discover the location of the missiles. By 
using antennas that send a radio signal in a specific direction, the platoons are 
able at least to reduce the probability that the Warsaw Pact will pick up their 
radio transmissions and deduce their locations.7*7
It is not only the high probability that the WP will deduce the Pershing 
platoons' location through their radio transmissions that worries the military. 
Soviet spies or aerial reconnaissance may easily detect the Pershings' heavy 
convoys.7*4
The Pershing vehicles give an impression of being fragile since the missiles are 
only covered with an awning. A mere 5 psi peak overpressure is sufficient to 
destroy the unarmoured Pershing vehicles totally, and even lesser blast waves 
might render the Pershing inoperative.7*9 Their vulnerability is also increased 
by the fact that Pershing missiles are transported in the midst of public traffic 
instead of in restricted military areas.
137 FM 6-11, p.3-7 and p.2-2; in ibid. p.83 and p.101
7*« Denso, 1983, op.cit.. p. 133
139 Dr. Joachim Wernicke / Ingrid Schöll, Die Stationierung von Pershing II - und SS-22 
Raketen. Dokumentation im Auftrag von Prof. Pr. Ulrich K. Preuß.
PnMttßbcvQllmfchtigcr__dS£__Fraktion__Dis__Grünen im Bundestag im
Qrganstreitverfahren gegen die Bundesregierung betr. die Stationierung von 
Pershing Q-Raketen und Cruise Missiles in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
(Berlin/Bonn: Die Grünen im Bundestag, Juli 1984), p.29
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As opposed to the Pershing, the cruise missiles are deployed on hardened 
shelters which would survive a conventional a t t a c k .E v e n  so the GLCM has 
been criticised for its vulnerable deployment mode, since hard shelters on air 
bases do not sufficiently reduce the systems' vulnerability to pre-emptive 
attack, The cruise missiles transportation vehicles are at least equipped with a 
shield for the missiles' carriages.
After having described these technical deficiencies in detail, the Wernicke 
report concludes that the question of why, in the case of the Pershing, even 
simple measures such as a deployment in hardened or at least fortified shelters, 
or the development of a Hard Mobile Launcher similar to those destined for the 
newly planned Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (SICBM)«2 have been 
renounced, remains open.'«
While advocates of first use and land-deployed LRTNF point out the necessity 
of improving their survivability, no-first use analysts use the vulnerability as an 
argument to abolish the category of land-deployed LRTNF. They argue that in 
contrast to what applies to the category of short-range TNF — sea-deployed or 
air-deployed cruise missile could fully compensate for the renunciation of the 
options for which land-deployed LTRNF are contemplated. Johan Holst is a 
representative of this school of thought. Holst advocates a no-first use policy for 
NATO.'* Whereas he criticised the Pershing 1A Quick Reaction Alert systems 
and the GLCM's logistic support on the grounds of vulnerability, in 1983 he 
tentatively suggested reopening the High Level Group's discussion on sea 
deployment of the cruise missiles. A renunciation of Pershing within the INF
140 Charles, 1987, op.cit.. p.66 
i*i Cordesman, 1982, op.cit.. p.39
142 See the artist’s drawing of a Boeing/Goodyear design for the USAF’s Small 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile in Air Force Magazine. May 1984, p.79
143 "Es ist klärungsbedürftig, warum bei den Pershing Ü-Raketen selbst auf vorhandenen
einfachen Maßnahmen der Unterbringung in verbunkerten oder zumindest 
befestigten Unterständen sowie einer seitlichen Panzerabdeckung der 
Transportfahrzeuge verzichtet wurde.” ibid p.26
144 Johan Jorgen Holst, "Strength with clarity", Time. June 29,1984
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negotiations and a freeze on all INF deployments is seriously examined by 
him.7«
Holst's opposition to the new weapons and the resulting no-first policy was a 
condusion he drew from the unattractive prospect that first use would provoke 
a prolonged nudear war on the battlefield in E u r o p e .T h u s ,  opposition to 
land-deployed LRTNF can be combined with support for a strong war-fighting 
capability as well as with pleading for the TNF's pure deterrent function.
First use accomplished with LRTNF in particular is viewed by some analysts as 
too escalatory, e.g. by two RAND analysts:
"A LRTNF strike into the Soviet Union would do nothing to degrade the 
Soviet Union’s mobile SS-20 force, and hence would leave untouched 
Moscow’s capability to retaliate against Western Europe...Moreover, such a 
strike would be perceived as raising the risk of Soviet counterattack on U.S. 
territory."7*7
In contrast to the LRTNF's employment in a first use concept, they can see the 
value of these missiles as a second strike force targeted against Pact bases, troop 
concentrations and military support facilities.
As a war-fighter and no-first use campaigner, Fred Ode, who was a RAND 
analyst and Under-secretary of state in the Reagan administration, also lacks 
enthusiasm for the LRTNF programme. Strobe Talbott describes Dde's role in 
the U.S. administration in the INF negotiations in Geneva as ambivalent. On the 
one hand, Ode agreed that Pershing might confuse the WP's attack plans, on the 
other hand, he warned against that in spite of the Pershing H's and cruise 
missiles' mobility, these weapons were far too vulnerable and would only serve 
as a target. In line with his criticism of the LRTNF, Dde supported Nitze's "walk 
in the woods", which involved renouncing the Pershing n.7<i
145 Holst, 1983, op.cit.. For a similar line of reasoning see G. Philip Hughes, "Cutting
the Gordian Knot: A Theater-Nuclear Force for Deterrence in Europe", Orbis. 
(Vol.22, No.2,1978) p.309-332, here p.332
146 Holst, 1984, op.cit.
147 McNaugher / Parker, 1980, op.cit.. pp. 13
¡48 Talbott, 1984, op.cit.. p.82 and 226
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In an article he wrote in 1980, Ikle campaigned for nuclear weapons which 
would be militarily meaningful; he demands the modernisation of NATO's 
nuclear forces so that they could serve as a second strike capability. These 
modernised weapons should be able to destroy military targets and at the same 
time survive a Soviet attack:
"NATO’s emphasis on ’first use’ has undoubtedly contributed to the neglect of 
a nuclear second-strike capability. The modernization of NATO’s nuclear 
forces should serve, first and foremost, to improve such a second strike 
capability. Expenditures for new nuclear systems that could not survive a 
Soviet nuclear strike would be a wasteful diversion of NATO’s defence 
budgets.”7*9
This attitude definitely implies a refusal of the Pershing n  and GLCM, although 
he does not explicitly express his opposition.
The countervailing approach of U.S. nuclear strategy, (as expressed in PD 59 
and U.S. Defense Secretary Brown's countervailing strategy), is mainly 
concerned with the possibility of a protracted war, involving nuclear weapons 
after an initial large-scale exchange. Christopher J. Makins, a British 
commentator on international affairs, points out that the Pershing II and 
ground-launched cruise missile are "scarcely compatible with the strict logic of 
countervailing."750 The new LRTNFs are vulnerable to an extent which renders 
them useless in a conflict:
"Although there can be no certainty that existing models of pre-launch 
survivability of TNF are highly reliable, it is by no means improbable that the 
effective mobility of systems such as the GLCM and Pershing II may turn out 
to be comparatively limited, not least because of their basing and training 
posture. And even at the best of times, such systems, being, theoretically at 
least, highly visible, merely create an incentive to the enemy to increase his 
efforts, conventional, unconventional and ultimately nuclear, to catch them."757
As a remedy, he proposes RV SLBMs and a dedicated SLBM force.
It appears that several U.S. war fighters seem to think that the benefit of land- 
based, highly accurate systems cannot compensate for their considerable
149 Ikle, 1980, op.cit.. p.22. This attitude towards no-first use was visible in Ikle’s 
doctrine as early as 1973, see Fred Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the 
Century?" Foreign Affairs. (January 1973) pp. 267-285
iso Makins, 1981, op.cit.. p. 162
757 ibid. pp.161-162
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disadvantage in being vulnerable to Soviet preemption. Instead of theatre 
nuclear forces for implementing NATO's first use, many U.S. analysts prefer a 
second strike capability with long-range theatre nuclear weapons. However, in 
this case they should not be land-deployed.
Conclusion
The assumption that the Pershing II and the cruise missile are indispensable 
elements of a U.S. first strike strategy cannot be upheld. While both systems 
possess the characteristics of first strike weapons, there is no evidence that the 
United States needed these improved LRTNF systems in order to pursue a 
strategy of first strike or decapitation. Quite the contrary: Schlesinger's 1975 
TNF revision put an emphasis on short-range, battlefield TNF. Since TNF 
strikes on Soviet territory are regarded as too escalatory according to his 
doctrine, long-range TNF were incompatible with the requirements of 
Schlesinger's U.S. doctrine of limited nuclear options. There is no doubt that 
U.S. planners welcomed the Pershing II and GLCM as a means for counterforce 
targeting such as against hardened, shifting or even mobile targets. The 
LRTNFs contemplated employment in follow-on strikes according to U.S. 
plans can be deduced from the extensive criticism the new weapons' 
vulnerability experienced by U.S. analysts. The next chapter will demonstrate 
that in German doctrines LRTNF are intended for implementing first, and not 
follow-on use.
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After having demonstrated the LRTNFs' role for implementing the German first 
use concept in this chapter, the predominance of these doctrines in shaping the 
LRTNF decision will be focused on. Whereby we will arrive at the conclusion 
that the LRTNF modernisation was most of all a result of German doctrines.
9.1. Implementation of First Use Concept
In the beginning we will explain why Schlesinger's counterforce doctrine could 
not offer a solution to the German apprehensions about first use's foundation 
which had become fragile by the erosion of U.S. escalation dominance.
This chapter comprises a detailed analysis of K.-P. Stratmann's theory of 
controlled nuclear-strategic war, which incorporates the most comprehensive 
and coherent theoretical background to the German strategic views and can 
therefore be regarded as "ideal typical" for the German first use concept. The 
consensus between the German strategic experts cannot be narrowed to 
Stratmann's sophisticated concept, although it is incorporated in the German 
plea for selective employment options with a strategic character to be launched 
from European territory. Since Stratmann explicitly states that his concept roots 
in U.S. deterrence theories, these will be outlined in this context as well. We will 
demonstrate to what extent the first use concept was also pursued on the 
governmental level, and then proceed to clarify the Pershings' and cruise 
missiles' employment options within these German doctrines.
9.1.1. Riihl's Discussion of the Schlesinger Doctrine
The compatibility of the U.S. and German strategic principles is expressed 
through the German approval of Schlesinger's counterforce doctrine. Among 
German strategic experts there obviously was consensus to welcome the new 
strategic implications. In a Senate Hearing U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger 
confirmed:
9. The LRTNF as a result of German doctrines
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"The reaction in Europe to change in targeting doctrine has been uniformly 
welcoming, even joyous, because they recognize that this means U.S. strategic 
forces are still credibly part of the overall deterrent for Europe."'
The acceptance of the counterforce doctrine's basic premise that nuclear 
weapons have to be usable in order to deter, did not create any difficulties for 
Defence Minister Leber, Foreign Affairs Minister Genscher, Chancellor Schmidt 
or the military elite.2 In particular Defence Minister Leber welcomed the 
introduction of selective options.*
While the German experts involved seemed to agree on the general principles 
of the counterforce doctrine, Lothar Riihl gives an explanation why 
improvements made merely on the strategic level are no sufficient measure 
according to the German interpretation of flexible response.
As an effect of the Schlesinger doctrine, Riihl expected that the TNF would lose 
their role as a means for strategic escalation/ He argues that if the United States 
envisages concepts of intra-war deterrence, the longer-range TNF are reduced 
to being a means of tactical war-fighting. If these changes should occur, Riihl 
predicts two possible results which are dependent on the target planning of the 
strategic weapons:
1) Deterrence will be stabilised, if the U.S. external forces first attack 
military objects on Soviet territory.
2) If the United States plans to attack the Eastern European deployment 
zone, a decoupling of the geographically limited war-theatre would be 
the result. In this scenario, the TNF would be reduced to the status of 
war-fighting weapons. In this case Riihl can only see a strengthening of 
deterrence if the Eastern European deployment zone would be attacked 
in the follow-on use, i.e. after execution of first use with U.S. strategic
'  U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, 1974, op.cit.. p.8
2 Hubertus Hoffmann in an interview with Harald Wust, General Inspector of the 
Bundeswehr from 1976-1978 in Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit.. p.219
* J. Schlesinger, "Sustaining the American-German Relationship in a time of Strategical 
and Attitudinal Change" (Manuscript), Speech presented for the Conference on 
German-American Relations and the role of the Federal Republic in Europe. 
Wilson Center, Washington D.C. September 22/23,1983, p. 10, mentioned in ibid. 
p. 140
4 Since the text was written in 1977, Riihl was probably thinking of the FBS in the form 
of fighter bombers.
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weapons, even if only selectively and in a geographically and politically 
limited manner.5
Thus, Rühl explained in what way the German experts' enthusiasm for the 
Schlesinger doctrine was limited: although the counterforce doctrine can be 
interpreted as an enhancement of the credibility of any use of strategic forces, 
there is no guarantee that the United States will employ its strategic forces for 
first use. The Germans' second apprehension referred to the target area of the 
U.S. strategic weapons. They suspected that these strategic weapons would be 
targeted not against Soviet territory but against European and non-Soviet 
territory . Rühl points out that Schlesinger, after his dismissal in 1975, 
supplemented his doctrine with the request that Europeans be assured that the 
United States were ready to use strategic weapons first. Rühl compares this U.S. 
declaratory statement with Schlesinger's simultaneous exhortation to the 
Europeans to build up a powerful conventional capability to avoid having to 
resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Rühl comments: "Damit war der Kreis der 
Ambivalenz der westlichen Abschreckung wieder geschlossen."*5
Rene Herrmann of the Ebenhausen Institute identifies an acknowledgment on 
the part of United States to renounce its role as a sanctuarium in the 
counterforce doctrine. Herrmann argues that the credibility of the threat of 
escalation would thereby be enhanced.7 While obviously realising that 
Schlesinger's counterforce doctrine could jeopardise detente, Herrmann stresses 
that cooperative elements have to be maintained in the extreme situation of a 
thermonuclear war for the goal of limitation and termination of war. Rühl 
expresses his approval of the principle of limiting the damage by putting 
forward the argument that the Soviet Union should be given an incentive to 
terminate the war rather than to attack the United States:
"Dem nuklear angegriffenen Gegner muß dabei noch ein zwingendes vitales
Interesse an der Begrenzung des nuklearen Schlagabtauschs und eine Option
5 Rühl, 1977, op.cit. p.255
6 "Thus, the circle of ambivalence of Western deterrence was once again
completed, "ibid. p.256
7 Rene Herrmann, Zur Rede Verteidigungsminister Schlesingers am 10. Januar 1974.
(Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP-AP 2025, January 1974), 
pp. 18-19
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auf Einstellung der Kriegshandlungen zu auch für ihn tragbaren Bedingungen 
erhalten werden."*
In view of the advantages offered by the Schlesinger doctrine Rühl seems to 
take into account the German apprehensions that limited and selective 
counterforce strikes by U.S. strategic forces in the event of a"wrong" U.S. 
targeting could result in a limited war on European territory : counterforce is 
welcomed as a new means available to the United States for the purpose of 
regaining escalation dominance, and thus as an instrument to dominate the 
conditions for termination of war:
"Die von Schlesinger geforderte Optionsvielfalt soll der eigenen politischen 
Führung Druckmittel auf den Gegner zur Durchsetzung der eigenen 
Bedingungen, also ein zusätzliches Instrument für die Eskalationsdominanz 
geben, die dem Gegner den Einsatz der Machtmittel und die Definition des 
Verhältnisses von Risiko und vitalem Interesse vorschreibt, damit aber auch 
die politischen Bedingungen zur Beilegung der Krise auferlegen kann. Diese 
Doktrin setzt voraus, daß in Zukunft Drohung mit Kernwaffen möglich ist und 
also "nukleare Erpressung" als Mittel der Politik versucht werden könnte."9
9.1.2. Governmental Level
Defence Minister Leber's 1975/76 White Paper acknowledges- although in an 
experienced, vague language— the U.S. preference for a high nuclear threshold:
"Es ist gemeinsames Interesse der Amerikaner und der Europäer, die 
Nuklearschwelle nicht zu senken.70
8 "The opponent who has been attacked with nuclear means must be left with a coercive
vital interest in a limitation of the nuclear exchange and with an option to terminate 
war hostilities under conditions which are also acceptable to him." Riihl, 1987, 
op.cit. p. 104. For the Schlesinger remarks concerning damage limitations see 
Davis, 1975/76, op.cit.. p.7
9 "The variety of options demanded by Schlesinger are supposed to give leverage to
one’s own political leadership in order to be able to impose one’s own conditions, 
i.e. to give an additional means for escalation dominance with which one can both 
prescribe the opponent’s employment of his means of power and define the 
relationship between risk and vital interest. In this manner, the political conditions 
for the termination of the crisis are imposed on the opponent This doctrine 
presupposes that the threat to employ nuclear weapons is possible and that ’nuclear 
blackmailing* as a means of policy could therefore be attempted in the future." 
Ruehl, 1977, op.cit. p.261
i° "It is in the joint interest of the Americans and Europeans not to lower the nuclear 
threshold." Weißbuch, 1975/76, op.cit. p.50
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On a similar level of imprecision is the statement that the tactical first use of 
nuclear weapons has to occur "as late as possible, but as early as necessary."“ 
More help for an interpretation of these obscure words is provided by the 
White Papers' subsequent explanation:
"(D)as heißt, daß die Doktrin der Vomeverteidigung Geltung behält, die
konventionellen Kräfte des Verteidigers nicht erschöpft sind und die
Unkalkulierbarkeit für den Angreifer erhalten bleibt."'2
While the Germans prefer the use of nuclear weapons' before conventional 
defence collapses, the U.S. would be prepared to accept some losses of German 
territory and wait until NATO had been conventionally defeated.'3 The German 
concept implies the idea that after the Warsaw Pact's occupation of NATO 
territory the threat of escalation with nuclear weapons would not serve to press 
for the Warsaw Pact's withdrawal from NATO territory. After deterrence failed, 
negotiations would have to be held in a military situation, in which the allies 
would not yet depend on the use of nuclear weapons as their only means to 
avoid defeat or a dangerous withdrawal. This understanding corresponds to 
the notion of the political utilisation of controlled escalation, which argues that 
negotiations — conducted under mutual nuclear threat -- would hardly be an 
appropriate means to induce the withdrawal of a successful attacker who 
would still be able to continue his offensive. Under these conditions 
negotiations could only result in a termination of hostilities on the demarcation 
line of the battlefield.'4
"  ibid. p.21
'2 ”(T)his means that the doctrine of forward defence is still valid, that the defender’s 
conventional forces are not exhausted and that incalculability is still maintained for 
the attacker." ibid. p.21
13 see chapter 3.4.1.
'< "(D)iesem Zweck, den Krieg möglichst schnell abzubrechen, sollten die taktischen 
Atomwaffen als Eskalationsträger und als Demonstrationswaffen zur Warnung 
eines Angreifers, seine Aggression fortzusetzen, dienen. Wenn dies aber der 
erklärte Bündniszweck für den Kriegsfall in Europa, also nach einem Versagen der 
Abschreckung, ist, dann müßte die Verhandlung in einer militärischen Lage geführt 
werden, in der die Verbündeten zur Stützung ihrer Verteidigung noch nicht auf den 
Einsatz dieser nuklearen Waffen als einziges Mittel gegen eine Niederlage oder 
einen gefährlichen Rückzug angewiesen wären. Diese Einsicht ist unlöslich mit 
dem Prinzip der politischen Nutzung des kontrollierten Eskalationsvorganges 
verbunden, denn Verhandlungen unter gegenseitiger nuklearer Bedrohung können 
schwerlich den Rückzug des erfolgreichen, zu weiterem Angriff fähigen Angreifers 
zum Gegenstand haben, sondern lediglich ein Ende der Feindseligkeiten auf den 
Demarkationslinien des Kriegsschauplatzes." (’Tactical nuclear weapons being 
carriers of escalation as well as demonstrative weapons should serve to this
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The conflict over first use between the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany is further expressed in an even more vague principle than the two 
poles of late versus early use of nuclear weapons: the Germans principally 
prefer a "political" use of nuclear weapons75, while for the United States they 
only make sense for a "military" use. The political use is intended to promote 
communication with the attacker, to change his intentions, to prevail upon him 
to give up his offensive and to induce him to withdraw. While an employment 
of nuclear weapons is interpreted by laymen as a collapse of diplomacy and 
communication with the enemy, a political use of nuclear weapons would be 
intended precisely to reestablish communication:
"Er (first use, S.P.) sollte, wann immer er erfolgt, nur selektiv und dosiert sein.
Er hat stets die möglichen Folgeeinsätze mitzubedenken. Eine gleichzeitig zu 
veröffentlichende politische Erklärung muß Zielsetzung und Sinn des Einsatzes 
erläutern. Die politische Bedeutung des Ersteinsatzes von Atomwaffen ist 
daher größer als seine mögliche militärische Wirkung auf das eigentliche 
Kampf geschehen. "7tf
In spite of the Germans' refusal of a military use of nuclear weapons, their 
doctrine foresees that selective first use of nuclear weapons —although 
militarily not decisive- should be targeted against military objects.77 This
purpose, i.e. to terminate war as quickly as possible, in order to warn off the 
attacker to discontinue his aggression. If this, however, is the explicit purpose of 
the alliance for the event of war in Europe, i.e. after failure of deterrence, then 
negotiations would have to be conducted in a military situation in which the allies 
would not yet have to depend on the employment of these nuclear weapons as their 
sole means against defeat or a dangerous withdrawal. This insight is insolubly 
connected with the principle of the political use of controlled escalation because 
negotiations under mutual nuclear threat can hardly have as their central issue the 
withdrawal of the successful attacker who is able to continue his aggression but 
they can merely aim at terminating hostilities along the line of demarcation of the 
battlefield.") Rühl, 1974, op.cit.. p. 123
is "Ersteinsätze nuklearer Waffen sollen weniger eine militärische Entscheidung 
herbeiführen, als vielmehr eine politische Wirkung erzielen." ("First use of nuclear 
weapons is not so much intended to lead to a military decision, as to have a political 
effect.") Weißbuch, 1975/76, op.cit. p.21
16 "It (first use) should, if accomplished, only be selective and measured. The potential 
follow-on strikes have to be considered as well. A political declaration, which is to 
be issued simultaneously, has to explain the aim and the purpose of first use. 
Therefore, the political meaning of first use of nuclear weapons is greater than its 
potential military effect on the actual combat" Ulrich De Maiziere, Führen - im 
Frieden. 20 Jahre Dienst für Bundeswehr und Staat (München: Bernard & Graefe, 
1974), p.206. Until mid 1972 de Maiziere served as Inspector General of the 
Bundeswehr and, with four stars, he was West Germany's highest ranking soldier.
77 Weißbuch, 1975/76, op.cit.. p.22
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German rope-dance between the political and military use of the TNF is also 
expressed in the 1973/74 White Paper, which states that sufficient TNF have to 
be available in order "to deter effectively or to defend".'*
It has to be stressed again that there are also several U.S. analysts, although they 
are certainly in the minority, who supported deployment of LRTNF for the first 
use concepts
9.1.3. Theory o f controlled nuclear-strategic war
Karl Peter Stratmann, a researcher in Ebenhausen since 1967, presented the 
most coherent and comprehensive German interpretation of flexible response in 
his 1981 book "NATO in der Krise?". This analysis is the most sophisticated 
explanation of why, from a German point of view, NATO should deploy land- 
based intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missiles on European soil.
In 1974 Stratmann still belonged to a group of authors who campaigned for the 
mininukes for German defence.20 This proposal is clearly aimed at enhancing
is Weißbuch, 1973/74, op.cit.. p. 16, emphasis by S.P.
¡9 See for example Alton Frye, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: No Exit from 
Ambivalence", Survival. (Vol.22, No.3, May/June 1980), p.98-106
20 In 1974 an Ebenhausen project group, whose participants included Graf 
Kielmannsegg, Ex-Commander in Chief of Central Europe, presented a model of 
"limited response". Assuming it would be impossible to defend Europe with a 
massive employment of TNF and futile to build up a conventional defence in the 
Federal Republic, the group advocated the employment of mininukes exclusively 
on the German battlefield. As long as the enemy refrains from detonating nuclear 
weapons on NATO’s territory, NATO should keep to the same restriction. The 
combination of conventional weapons and a very limited employment of weapons 
could - according to the authors - preserve the Federal Republic from the greatest 
danger: a WTO "Blitzkrieg" and, thus, a fait accompli on German territory. Since 
the Ebenhausen concept necessitates a very early employment of the mininukes, 
their command and control system would have to be altered by a predelegation to 
SACEUR. Hans Breithaupt, Dieter Kalix, J.A. Graf Kielmannsegg, K. Peter 
Stratmann, Zur Problematik einer Verteidigungsoption für Mitteleuropa in den 
Achtziger Jahren. Zusammenfassung (Ebenhausen: Stiftung für Wissenschaft und 
Politik, SWP-S 2023/Z, Mai 1974), p.43 and 45. The German Ebenhausen proposal 
revealed considerable similarities to the 1973 proposal of their U.S. colleagues 
from the Los Alamos laboratory. In the Federal Republic this position was 
supported and advocated by General Karl Schnell, until 1977 Commander in Chief 
of Central Europe (CINCENT) and later on State Secretary in the Ministry of 
Defence. General Schnell advocated a change in the nuclear weapons’ time 
consuming command structure by authorising local commands to decide on their 
employment. Die Welt November 16,1976, p.3 Thus this group might have hoped
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the political control for the Federal Republic, since it implies the advice to 
predelegate the mininukes' employment to SACEUR. As early as 1977 he had 
already advocated the German first use concept which called for long-range 
TNF. In the European-American workshop's book "Beyond Nuclear 
Deterrence", Stratmann opposes the idea of a war limited to Western and 
Central Europe. He argued that such a war would destroy the Federal Republic 
as well as its neighbours. Above all, it would be militarily unsuccessful for 
NATO.2' He and Rene Herrmann recommend a deemphasis of "geographical 
constraints" in order to influence the Warsaw Pact's risk assessment, since 
"(t)his improves the chances for war termination under conditions which are 
acceptable for NATO."22 In 1978 Stratmann submitted his dissertation, which is 
to a large extent identical with his 1981 book. While obviously fully 
acknowledging the divergences between the European and American views 
concerning the TNF posture, he opposes the notion within the strategic 
community that these interests are incompatible. In order to secure NATO's 
capability to act effectively in time of crisis, he offers as a solution the concept of 
a nuclear strike with a signal effect intended for communication with the 
opponent on a strategic level.
Stratmann starts from the premise that NATO could easily live with a military 
posture limited to the mere threat of nuclear escalation, as long as the United 
States possessed strategic superiority and detente seemed to render a war in 
Europe impossible or at least very improbable. The deterioration of the political 
situation in the late seventies and the resulting danger of a superpower clash in 
South Asia, the Near East or Africa posed the question of how NATO could 
stand up against the spread of an armed conflict to Europe.2* His strategic- 
political "Glass Bead Game"24 is meant to offer a solution to the dilemma of the 
Federal Republic's destiny of being the battlefield of a future war between the
to enhance German influence on first use. The proposal can be interpreted as a 
counterreaction to the U.S. Army plans of Selective Employment Packages and 
thus as an attempt to counteract U.S. plans of employing TNF massively in first 
use.
21 K.- Peter Stratmann and Rene Herrmann, "Limited options, Escalation, and the
Central Region" in Holst/Nerlich, 1977, op.cit. p.239-254
22 MsL p.254
23 "wie die NATO sich bei Übergreifen eines bewaffneten Konflikts auf Europa
militärisch behaupten könnte." Stratmann, 1981, op.cit. p.233
24 Christian Potyka, "Zwischen zwei Alpträumen. Europäische Zweifel an der US-
Strategie der atomaren Abschreckung" Süddeutsche Zeitung. May 23/24,1981, p.8
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superpowers. According to his analysis, NATO does not need a new strategy, 
but rather an adequate means with which to implement this strategy.25
His basic assumption is that the deterioration of U.S. strategic superiority 
caused an erosion of NATO's escalation dominance. Escalation dominance is 
the military capability to determine the scope of action by having advantages 
on higher levels of feasible force.2*5 During the long-standing period of U.S. 
strategic superiority, the United States could assume its ability to transform this 
strategic advantage into controlled escalation steps and these again, within a 
limited war situation, "into superior possibilities of pressure".27 This way of 
strategic thinking favoured the development of "cooperatively oriented" 
concepts of nuclear war-fighting, war limitation and war termination and 
psychological models of "nuclear bargaining" and "competition in risk taking."28 
By referring to Thornton Read, Stratmann explained why he applied the term 
"bargaining” to a nuclear war:
"... (B)oth sides prefer a battle in which punishment is low to one in which it is 
high. Thus, although the contestants have incompatible interests in the 
territorial aspect of war, they have some degree of common interest in the 
punitive aspect This common interest makes bargaining possible and provides 
a motive both for limiting violence of combat and for terminating the war in a 
negotiated settlement reflecting limited political aims."29
25 Stratmann, 1981, op.cit. p.233
26 "Eskalationsdominanz bedeutet die militärische Fähigkeit, durch Vorteile auf den
höheren Stufen anwendbarer Gewalt den gegnerischen Handlungsspielraum 
bestimmen zu können." ("Escalation dominance means the military capability to 
determine the opponent’s scope of action through advantages on higher levels of 
feasible force.") ibid. p. 14, see also the discussion in 7.2.1.
27 "Die damalige Erwartung, die Abschreckung auf strategischer Ebene aufgrund der
eigenen Überlegenheit stabil halten und den potentiellen strategischen Vorteil der 
USA in einem denkbaren ’general nuclear war’ in Form kontrollierter nuklearer 
Eskalationsschritte in überlegene Druckmöglichkeiten im begrenzten Krieg 
umsetzen zu können, hat die Entwicklung und nachwirkende Bedeutung 
’kooperativ’ ausgerichteter Konzepte zur nuklearen Kriegführung, 
Kriegsbegrenzung und -beendigung begünstigt" (" The expectation then , to 
stabilise deterrence on a strategic level and to transform a potential strategic 
advantage of the U.S. in a conceivable ’general nuclear war’ in the form of 
different stages in a controlled nuclear escalation into superior pressuring methods 
has favoured the development and lingering significance of ’cooperative concepts’ 
for nuclear war- fighting, war- limitation and war- termination.") ibid. p.204
28 ibid. p.204
29 Thornton Read, "Limited Strategic War and Tactical Nuclear War", in Knorr / Read,
1962, op.cit. pp.67-116, pp.81/82
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The "competition of risk taking" is to be translated into "escalation" and 
constitutes a central term in Kahn's analysis "On Escalation." For an explanation 
he uses the famous analogy of the "chicken game", which is played by two 
drivers on a road with a white line down the middle:
"Both cars straddle the white line and drive toward each other at top speed. The 
first driver to lose his nerve and swerve into his own lane is ’chicken’ - an 
object of contempt and scorn-and he loses the game."30
Stratmann adopted this notion that nuclear strikes have to be seen primarily 
under the aspect of their signal value, as a means of communication with the 
opponent's political leadership.
These escalation concepts are based on the premise of the adversaries' joint 
interest in avoiding escalation into a general nuclear war even after the 
outbreak of a war. Stratmann argues that U.S. strategic superiority with its 
resulting escalation dominance gave reason to believe that NATO would 
bargain successfully with the Soviet Union during wartime negotiations. 
Stratmann concludes that, while NATO's concept of deliberate escalation (with 
its first use proviso) was built on a concrete basis during the period of U.S. 
strategic dominance, NATO's current posture lacks such a support.3' It seems 
that Stratmann wants to reestablish the conditions of the period of U.S. strategic 
superiority, which is supposed to have expired as a result of SALT'S 
codification of strategic parity between the superpowers.
Stratmann's analysis of the current NATO posture concludes that NATO forces 
do not correspond to the requirements of flexible response. He argues that 
although NATO's inefficiency and strategic dilemma could not be concealed 
from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets had considerable apprehensions that NATO 
could make the threat of first use a reality by setting first use into motion in the 
event of a war. Stratmann criticises the fact that, in contrast to unwarranted 
Soviet apprehensions, NATO's concept of nuclear escalation experienced a 
constant devaluation in Western strategic debate. With some justification the 
Soviets seemed to assume that the United States would hardly tolerate a defeat 
in Europe and would prefer to take on the risk of nuclear escalation rather than 
retreat. In contrast to this tendency in U.S. and European public debate, the
30 Kahn, 1965, op.cit.. p. 10
31 Stratmann, 1981, op.cit. p.205
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Soviets still seemed to start from the premise of the existence of a U.S. 
"coupling" to the European defence. In his explanation why this "coupling" 
cannot be taken for granted, Stratmann reveals a sober perception of European- 
U.S. relations:
"Im Kontrast zu dieser (sowjetischen S.P.) Einschätzung herrscht in der 
amerikanischen Sicherheitsdebatte die Tendenz vor, die militärische Präsenz 
und die Bündnisverpflichtungen der USA in Europa in den traditionellen 
Kategorien einer globalen Strategie der Vorfeldverteidigung zu sehen. 
Westeuropa wäre im Kriegsfall für die meisten Amerikaner ein 
vorgeschobenes Kriegstheater, auf dem zur Unterstützung der Verbündeten ein 
starkes amerikanisches Expeditionskorps operieren würde. Im Vordergrund 
steht das Interesse, die Eskalation des regionalen Konflikts in einen die 
Existenz der USA gefährdenden strategischen Kemwaffenkrieg zu verhindern.
Der Nachweis dieser Fähigkeit ist sicherlich eine wesentliche Voraussetzung 
für die Bereitschaft der amerikanischen Bevölkerung, das Engagement der 
USA in der Verteidigung Europas politisch mitzutragen. Die Möglichkeit des 
’decoupling’ wird deswegen nicht ausgeschlossen."-®
Any scenarios of fighting a geographically limited nuclear war, with 
unrestricted intensity however, are unacceptable for Stratmann. As a basic 
solution for avoiding such a battlefield war, he advocates a very low nuclear 
threshold. While a high nuclear threshold would merely offer NATO the choice 
between escalating to dramatic strikes on a strategic level or simply 
capitulating, a low nuclear threshold could prevent such a predicament:
"Das zeitliche Hinausschieben des Ersteinsatzes würde also mit dem Risiko der 
später um so rascheren nuklearen Eskalation zum allgemeinen nuklearen Krieg 
erkauft, während ein frühzeitiges, aber wesentlich begrenzteres nukleares 
Engagement diese Gefahr unter Umständen erheblich geringer halten 
könnten."**
As already pointed out, the concept of deliberate escalation assumes the 
termination of war on terms which are acceptable for NATO. While analysing
*2 "In contrast to this (Soviet S.P.) evaluation, the tendency to consider the U.S. military 
presence and U.S. allied obligations in Europe in terms of the traditional categories 
of a global strategy of forward defence dominates the American security debate. 
For most Americans in the event of war, West Europe would be a forward theatre 
of war, where a strong American expeditionary force would operate in order to 
support the allies. In the foreground there is an interest to avoid the escalation of a 
regional conflict into a strategic nuclear war which threatens the USA’s existence. 
The evidence of this capacity is certainly an important assumption in relation to the 
readiness of the American population, politically to support U.S. engagement in 
Europe’s defence. Therefore, the possibility of a ’decoupling’ is not excluded." 
ibid. p.230
33 "The postponement of first use would be dearly bought with the risk of an even 
quicker nuclear escalation to a general nuclear war, while an early, but much more 
limited nuclear engagement, might reduce this threat considerably." ibid. p.69/70
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the implications of these scenarios, which assume a termination of war on terms 
favourable for NATO, Stratmann comes to the conclusion that they imply the 
expectation that the Warsaw Pact would posses a much lower risk readiness 
than NATO. This assumption is illogical, Stratmann argues, because it is based 
on the idea that the Warsaw Pact might attack Europe with such limited war 
aims and such a low risk readiness that, after a nuclear reaction of NATO, the 
Warsaw Pact would rather stop its aggression or even withdraw than respond 
with nuclear weapons itself. Stratmann quotes ex-SACEUR Goodpaster in order 
to demonstrate that to expect the Soviet Union's withdrawal presupposes a 
feeling of moral inferiority on the part of the Warsaw Pact being the aggressor:
"’I am sometimes asked whether a deterrent or if the deterrent has failed - say, 
at the time you have to use limited or selective tactical nuclear weapons. My 
own feeling is that there are still heavy forces that work on the other fellow at 
the time. It is he who is aggressive. He has come across the Iron Curtain. If his 
forces leading the attack have been destroyed and if he has taken heavy losses, 
then he has to consider the burden. The burden here is on him to make a 
decision as to whether to escalate."**
Stratmann assumes that in the event of war the Warsaw Pact would naturally 
consider NATO as the immoral attacker. He denies that the Soviet strategy 
envisages any kind of "experimental" aggression. The expectation of the 
Warsaw Pact's withdrawal would only be warranted under the assumption that 
either the Warsaw Pact did not calculate its risk and hoped for a "cheap success" 
(the case of miscalculation) or that the Warsaw Pact and NATO started a low 
intensity conflict which escalated accidentally (this is called inadvertent 
escalation).** This premise of the Warsaw Pact's lower political risk readiness 
serves as a justification for the expectation that a war could be limited to Europe 
and be terminated on conditions favourable to NATO. Stratmann doubts this 
essential premise and refuses to make an assessment as to which of the 
adversaries would be the first to surrender or to collapse in the event of war. 
After these critical remarks on the basic assumptions of NATO's concept of 
deliberate escalation, he puts forward —obviously rhetorically— the following 
question in his dissertation: "Entwertet dieses Untersuchungsergebnis das fiir 
die NATO-Strategie wesentliche Konzept der vorbedachten (nuklearen)
34 quoted in ibid. p.206, see also Andrew Goodpaster, "NATO Strategy and




Eskalation?"3« The reader, inclined to expect a definite "no", is told that the 
utility of politically controlled selective strikes is beyond question for the 
escalation system:
"Der politische Nutzen nuklearer Flexibilität steht für die NATO deswegen - 
unabhängig von der Bereitschaft des WP, im Ernstfall auf die vorgeschlagenen 
Begrenzungen einzugehen - außer Frage."37
The aim to be achieved by controlled nuclear strikes is a termination of war 
which still gives NATO an opportunity to influence the results. This purpose 
becomes quite clear when he complains about war termination under the 
condition of the loss of escalation dominance by strategic nuclear parity:
"Die besondere Schwierigkeit der Kriegsbeendigung unter den Bedingungen 
nuklearer Parität liegt darin, daß ein einmal erreichter Waffenstillstand 
wahrscheinlich durch die erneut einsetzende Wirkung nuklearer Abschreckung 
sofort eingefroren würde. Die zu diesem Zeitpunkt eingetretenen politischen 
und territorialen Veränderungen wären dann kaum mehr rückgängig zu 
machen."38
The unreserved reestablishment of the status quo ante has to be kept untouched 
because NATO's existence would otherwise be at stake:
"Der WP könnte nicht darauf rechnen, die mit seinem Angriff angestrebten, 
vorgeblich begrenzten Ziele in einer politischen Lösung bestätigt zu 
bekommen; denn dies käme der Zustimmung der westlichen Allianz zu ihrer 
Selbstauflösung gleich."39
As will be seen later, the Pershing and cruise missiles are the means to 
implement these selective strikes. The motive of the Germans to request the 
LRTNF is often assumed to be an attempt to strengthen "coupling". However, 
the crucial question - how the Warsaw Pact reacts to these selective nuclear
36 "Do these results devalue NATO’s essential strategic concept of deliberate (nuclear)
escalation?" Stratmann, 1978, op.cit.. p.275
37 "Therefore, the political utility of nuclear flexibility for NATO is beyond question -
independently of the WP’s readiness to accept the proposed limitations in case of 
emergency." ibid, p.275
m "Under the conditions of nuclear parity the particular difficulty is that once achieved, 
an armistice would be frozen immediately by the reestablisment of deterrence. At 
this point the territorial and political changes of the war could hardly be restored." 
Stratmann, 1981, op.cit.. p.220
39 "The WP could not assume that the supposedly limited aims it pursued, would be 
confirmed in a political situation, because this would be tantamount to the Alliance 
approving of its own dissolution." Stratmann, 1978, op.cit. p.284
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strikes - is not answered adequately by Stratmann. If it were true that the 
selective strikes would result in a "coupling" by involving the United States in 
the war, one would expect convincing arguments from Stratmann for his 
expectation that the Soviet Union would react by retaliating against the U.S. 
homeland and not perhaps in a different way. Instead, he does not seem to 
exclude the possibility that, even despite Soviet strategic thinking, NATO's 
nuclear first use would result in negotiations and induce the Warsaw Pact tQ 
discontinue the hostilities: but at the same time he arrives at the conclusion that 
the Warsaw Pact could not start negotiations about an armistice from a weak 
position and therefore would not renounce counter-demonstrations:
"Allerdings könnte sich die WP-Führung voraussichtlich ohne eine nukleare 
Gegendemonstration nicht auf Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen einlassen. Ihr 
durch den Angriffsentschluß dramatisch gesteigertes politisches Engagement 
zwänge sie wahrscheinlich, die psychologischen und taktischen Vorteile, die 
die NATO durch ihren Ersteinsatz erlangt hätte, durch eine eigene nukleare 
Reaktion zu neutralisieren, um die Verhandlungen aus einer starken Position 
beginnen zu können."*0
His opposition to NATO's intensification of battlefield options and any 
scenarios of selective nuclear strikes within a war-fighting strategy leads him to 
adopt concepts which were generated by U.S. strategic theorists in the sixties. 
On the basis of game theory, system analysis and behaviour theories, Thomas 
Schelling and Thornton Read developed and advocated a strategy for 
conducting a controlled nuclear-strategic war. Consequently, they opposed any 
geographically limited battlefield options. An indispensable premise of these 
theories of deterrence is the opponents' rational behaviour and their 
calculating, value maximising strategy with respect to decision making so that 
in case of a crisis the opponents are still able to communicate and to agree on 
the rules by which the war should be fought. "Escalation" and "deescalation" are 
means of "war-bargaining". Thus, these concepts regard nuclear weapons as a 
means of communication and diplomacy rather than as military instruments.*7
*° "The WP leadership probably would not agree to armistice negotiations without a 
nuclear counterdemonstration. By its political commitment, stimulated by the 
decision to attack, the WP would probably be forced to neutralise via its own 
nuclear reaction the psychological and tactical advantages which NATO had 
achieved by accomplishment of first use, in order to be able to begin the 
negotiations from a strong position." ibid. p.276
41 See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence. (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1966). Schelling, 1960, op.cit.. Read, 1962, op.cit.. Kahn, 1965, 
op.cit.
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Since in the "fog of the battle" the opponent might easily feel deceived, it is 
impossible to keep these rules by means of selective nuclear strikes in a 
battlefield war. A "drastic simplification" of communication by qualitatively 
limited strikes is needed. The limitations have to be "distinctive, finite, discrete, 
simple, natural and obvious."« Since in warfare "the dialogue between 
adversaries is often confined to the restrictive language of action and a 
dictionary of common perceptions and precedents",« these tadt negotiations 
are expressed in terms of such benchmarks as the status quo ante, "rivers and 
coastlines and parallels of latitude, mountain ridges and ancient boundaries."44
Since a theatre nuclear war does not offer this kind of dear dividing lines, the 
condusion suggests itself that only the sanctuaries of both superpowers reflect 
these easily perceivable and natural benchmarks.45 The solution to the dilemma 
of flexible response, offered by Stratmann in reference to Read is that of a 
"limited coerdve punishment"4«5 on a strategic level of war-fighting which 
allows to communicate more easily:
"Limited strategic retaliation is a simpler operation conceptually than tactical 
nuclear warfare. It should be easier to coordinate with the enemy...if the 
punitive action is not mixed up in the complexities of a ground war."47
The acceptance of Stratmann's concept is not a matter of belief or disbelief and 
is meant as a solution to an unresolvable strategic dilemma. The possibility of 
the continuation of a war after the accomplishment of first use is taken fully 
into account by Stratmann, according to the concept of "coupling". However, he 
fails to discuss why it is not much more probable to expect that the Warsaw 
Pact contrary to its rethoric would react on a higher rather than on a lower 
level: the Warsaw Pact could just as well choose to retaliate against the Federal 
Republic with battlefield weapons, which is predsely what Stratmann hopes to
42 Schelling, 1966, op.cit.. p. 138
4* ibid. p. 141
44 ibid p. 141
45 Stratmann, 1981, op.cit. p.221
^  Schelling, 1966, op.cit. p. 172
47 Read, 1962, op.cit. p. 95
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avoid.** The actual employment of his concept might result in a catastrophe 
provoked by NATO's first use in order to deny the Soviet Union any limited 
political success.
Stratmann admits that Soviet restraint following NATO first use is quite 
improbable:
"Wird die nukleare Schwelle - in welcher Form auch immer - erst einmal 
überschritten, so verändert dies voraussichtlich die politische und militärische 
Wahrnehmung des Konflikts auf beiden Seiten in entscheidener Weise. 
...Vielleicht sähe er (der WP, S.P.) sich selbst dann zu einer nuklearen 
Reaktion gedrängt, wenn er beabsichtigte, seinen Angriff einzustellen. Ein 
Verzicht auf eine ’response in kind* nach der nuklearen Demonstration der 
NATO könnte den Eindruck hervorrufen, als sei die sowjetische Führung 
bereit, über Waffenstillstands- und Friedensbedingungen aus einer Position 
relativer Unterlegenheit zu verhandeln."*9
Although this Statement is made in the context of an evaluation of NATO's so- 
called "demonstration" strikes which — as distinct from strategic bargaining 
strikes— do not convey a substantial amount of communication to the Soviets, it 
reveals Stratmann's general disbelief in a Soviet surrender after implementation 
of NATO first use. This is the basic idea of deliberate escalation within flexible 
response. Thus, one of the main German strategic theorists offers a concept of 
initiating very early in a conflict, i.e. before the conventional defence collapses, 
a strategic limited and selective nuclear war in the name of enhancing the 
credibility of deterrence.
9.1.4. Pershing's Employment options in the German first concept
In a 1982 draft paper Stratmann elucidates his strategic concept by assigning 
special roles to certain types of weapons. He advocates the nuclear Pershing II 
and would be ready to sacrifice the ground-launched cruise missiles in arms 
control agreements.
48 Harald Glaser and Hans Horch: Neue Waffen, alte Ordnung. Ziele und Hintergründe
der "Nach"riistung (Stuttgart: Alektor Verlag, 1983) p.22/23
49 "Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, regardless in whatever form, the opponents’
political and military perception will probably have changed dramatically. Maybe it 
(the W.P..S.P.) would feel pushed to a nuclear counterreaction, even if it had 
intended to suspend the attacks. Not to ’respond in kind’ after NATO’s nuclear 
demonstration could create the impression that the Soviet leadership would be 
ready to negotiate on peace and armistice conditions from a position of relative 
inferiority." Stratmann, 1981, op.cit. pp.92-93
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After having stressed the essential role of NATO's first use and the TNF's main 
role of implementing the concept of deliberate escalation, Stratmann suggests 
TNF employments against selected military targets in Central Europe, Eastern 
Europe or in the Western part of the Soviet Union. Although accomplished with 
TNF, first and follow-on strikes against Soviet territory would posses strategic 
character since they imply a high level of escalation. Thus, the TNF would 
demonstrate that a war could escalate into a strategic war and thereby play a 
key role in convincing the Soviet Union of the coupling effect.50
According to the conception that regards nuclear weapons as a means of 
communication, NATO's selective use should enable the opponent to identify 
the strike's starting point, its prospective termination, the number and quality 
of the delivery systems and weapons used and eventually, the category of 
targets and the geographical area NATO intends to target. Therefore, instead of 
attacking in a series of single strikes over a long period of time, these selective 
options have to be executed in one condensed strike. A short flight time of the 
delivery system would be welcome when targets required long-range weapon 
systems. Therefore, ballistic missiles seem to be much more appropriate 
systems for this combination of requirements than fighter bombers and cruise 
missiles. Because of their lack of penetration capability, fighter bombers are an 
inadequate means to fulfill this function. Their high failure rate would result in 
multiple coverage of one target; collateral damage would thus be enormous. 
Simultaneously employed conventional missiles would be indistinguishable 
from these fighter bombers.
For the same reasons, cruise missiles are rejected as a means for selective 
strikes, i.e. since they share "the sketchy unclear signature of aircraft."57 
Stratmann concludes from his analysis:
"Optimal erscheinen demgegenüber ballistische Mittelstreckensysteme mit
Einfachsprengkopf, deren hohe Zuverlässigkeit und Eindringfähigkeit einen
Verzicht auf Meriifachabdeckung erlaubt"52
50 Stratmann, 1982, op.cit. p.22/23
57 "Da Marschflugkörper die skizzierte unklare Signatur von Flugzeugen teilen, sind 
auch sie für begrenzte strategische Einsätze wenig geeignet" ibid. p.63
52 "In contrast, intermediate-range ballistic systems with a single warhead, whose high
reliability and penetration capability allows to renounce multiple target coverage,
seem to be optimal." ibid. p.63
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The interdiction tasks can be fulfilled much better by conventional cruise 
missiles. However, a simultaneous deployment of land-deployed nuclear and 
conventional cruise missiles is not to be recommended since the Soviet Union 
could misinterpret the conventional attack as a nuclear one. Because of their 
long range (2,500 kms) the cruise missiles pose the problem that, independently 
of their real target, the Soviet Union will perceive them as a strategic threat. For 
these reasons Stratmann considers nuclear GLCM as counterproductive for 
implementing the first use concept, and assigns to them the role of bargaining 
counters for arms control. If, however, exclusively conventional cruise missiles 
were deployed in the Federal Republic, due to their accuracy, greater range and 
effective munition they would be the appropriate means for taking over nuclear 
weapons' battlefield and interdiction missions."
Nuclear cruise missiles should be deployed on submarines, ships and rear 
deployed aircraft, but not on ground. Qualitatively and quantitatively 
unlimited, these cruise missiles could be coordinated with the U.S. strategic 
forces and take over the task of covering several targets of NATO's preplanned 
strikes. Thus, even if deployed in a very high number, these cruise missiles 
would not arouse any suspicion in the Soviet Union of the intention to 
regionalise a nuclear war in Europe by the build-up of a nuclear strike force 
which could manage a European defence without the support of the U.S. 
strategic forces.
Due to their clearly identifiable maximal range and by the choice of their 
deployment area, land-deployed intermediate-range ballistic missiles could 
signal to the Soviet Union which targets would not be threatened. Thus, 
ballistic missiles contribute considerably to the transparency of the LRTNF 
programme's intentions and allow a "clear structure and proportioning of the 
potential."*
It has to be conceded that Stratmann' analysis was published in 1981, when all 
decisions concerning the character of the LRTNF deployment had already been 
made. Thus, his advocation of the Pershing II can be interpreted as a 
subsequent legitimation of the NATO-Dual Track decision. However, it should
53 ibid. pp.68-69
* "Eine klare Gliederung und Proportionierung des Potentials", ibid. p. 70. Stratmann 
does not take into consideration that the Pershing’s range could be easily increased 
by using fuel with a higher or lower energy content per unit, see chapter 7.2.S.
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be borne in mind that the main features of his strategic concept had been put 
forth in his dissertation as early as 1978.
Lothar Rühl, as State Secretary always committed to taking arms control into 
consideration, does not explicitly demand deployment of the Pershing n  and 
GLCM. The value he assigns to the Pershing II is expressed in his comment on 
the results of the "Walk in the Woods", when the U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze 
agreed on the renunciation of the Pershing H. Rühl objects to the contemplated 
renunciation of the Pershing n, because the result would not only mean a 
reduction in the modernisation programme, but also a change in the character 
of the NATO Dual-Track decision."
Whether strategic or tactical, the Germans prefer a "political" use of the nuclear 
weapons. Stratmann admits that the distinction between a "political" and 
"military" use of nuclear weapons is a rather artificial one:
"Aus den genannten Gründen können sich die selektiven Einsatzoptionen der 
NATO nicht allein den Erfordernissen der nuklearen Demonstration von 
Eskalationsbereitschaft in Form sorgfältig dosierter ’Signale’ ausrichten. Sie 
müssen auch operativen Gesichtspunkten Rechnung tragen. Eine klare 
Unterscheidung zwischen politischen und militärischen Optionen ist deswegen 
nicht möglich."**
Lothar Rühl cannot see a problem in distinguishing between political and 
military requirements. First as well as follow-on strikes have to comprise both 
elements: the political signal effect and operative aspects for guaranteeing 
NATO's capability to fight the war:
"Wesentlich dabei ist, daß der geplante Ersteinsatz geeignet ist, die 
beabsichtigte politische Signalwirkung mit operativen Erfordernissen zu 
verbinden und daß der NATO danach für ihre Eskalationsfähigkeit und die 
Fähigkeit zur Verteidigung die notwendigen Mittel, die Einsatzflexibilität und 
also die Optionsvielfalt erhalten bleiben."57
55 Riihl, 1987, op.cit.. p.301
56 "For the above-mentioned reasons the selective employment options of NATO are
not merely determined in line with the requirements of nuclear demonstration of 
readiness to escalate in the form of deliberately dosed "signals". They also have to 
take operative aspects into consideration. Therefore a clear distinction between 
political and military options is not possible.", emphasis in the text, Stratmann, 
1982, op.cit. p. 49
57 "It is essential that the contemplated first use is suitable to combine die intended
political signal effect with operative requirements and that NATO afterwards 
maintains the necessary means for its ability to escalate and to defend. It further has 
to maintain employment flexibility and the variety of options which are necessary 
for a continuation of the operations." Riihl, 1987, op.cit. p. 104
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The incompatibility between a purely political and exclusively military use also 
applies to the LRTNF: it is not possible to employ the LRTNF in an operative, 
"war-decisive" manner and at the same time as a means for deliberate 
escalation. Stratmann stresses this point explicitly:
"Da die Kontrollierbarkeit nuklearer Eskalation vor allem von den 
Risikowahmehmungen und dem Konfliktverhalten der sowjetischen Führung 
bestimmt würde, kann das landgestützte TNF-Dispositiv der NATO in Europa 
nicht zugleich potentiell kriegsentscheidende operative Fähigkeiten aufweisen 
und als Mittel vorbedachter Eskalation dienen."5*
The build-up of a "war-dedsive" potential would provoke the Soviet Union to 
preempt. Consequently, some military objects are exduded as targets from all 
NATO nudear weapons employments: Stratmann is opposed to any targeting 
of the C3l systems. These C^I systems have to be spared as targets because after 
their destruction the Soviet Union would no longer be able to evaluate the 
situation, to control its forces and thus to communicate with NATO about 
termination of war.59 In the context of his general criticism of the Reagan 
administration, (i.e. that this administration is dominated by the intention to 
confront the Soviet Union with the threat of a defeat00), he voices his 
apprehension that the United States might plan to smash and interdict the WP 
offensive forces with TNF strikes. He argues that this kind of strikes would 
most likely be chosen by the U.S. president because they can be executed 
without targeting Soviet territory:
"Da diese Optionen zur Zerschlagung und Abriegelung der Offensivstreitkräfte 
des Warschauer Pakts keine ’strategischen’ Einsätze der USA gegen die 
UdSSR erforderten, ist es sogar wahrscheinlich, daß sich der amerikanische 
Präsident im Fall eines großangelegten sowjetischen Angriffs in Europa für sie 
entschiede. Trotzdem bleibt eine derartige Doktrin aus politischen und 
strategischen Gründen für das TNF-Dispositiv der NATO ungegeignet."67
58 "Since the controllability of nuclear escalation is mostly determined by the Soviet
leadership’s risk perception and conflict behavior, the land-deployed TNF potential 
of NATO in Europe cannot simultaneously feature potentially war-derisive 
operational features and serve as a means for deliberate escalation." Stratmann, 
1982, op.cit.. p.43, emphasis in the text
59 ibid. p.60/61
60 "die Führung der UdSSR in ihrer Wahrnehmung mit dem Risiko einer Niederlage zu
konfrontieren", ibid. p.38
61 "Since these options for destruction and interdiction of the WP’s offensive forces do
not necessitate U.S ’strategic’ employments against the Soviet Union, it is even
probable that the American President, in the case of a full-scale Soviet offensive in
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Accordingly, Stratmann criticises proposals for a build-up of a denial capability 
in Europe below the strategic threshold, which envisages tactical employments 
on the battlefield or strikes against the Soviet echelons deep inside WP territory 
over an extended geographical area. The military value of interdiction strikes is 
not denied by Stratmann; however, the TNF, contemplated for these kind of 
options would have to be deployed in the United States or at sea. Thus, he does 
not consider the U.S. capability of smashing these Soviet forces on non-Soviet 
territory on a level below strategic options as a geostrategic advantage.
However, Stratmann also agrees that selective employment cannot merely be 
characterised in terms of the requirements of a nuclear demonstration in the 
form of an escalation in deliberately dosed "signals." If employments must be 
intensified, they should be targeted against objects of military value. He 
envisages a complementary combination of both aspects. He concedes, 
however:
"Allerdings ist unverkennbar, daß der Versuch, politische und operative 
Kriterien miteinander zu vereinbaren, um so mehr der Quadratur des Kreises 
gleichen muß, je stärker Zielsetzung und Wirkung selektiver nuklearer 
Einsatzoptionen durch militärische Sachzwänge dominiert werden."«2
Stratmann does not indicate what kind of military objects he would preferably 
target. That he approves of targeting nuclear missile depots can only be 
deduced from his criticism of the scenario of a war limited to Europe which also 
spares the Soviet Union as a sanctuary, because the Soviet Union's land- 
deployed nuclear forces which threaten Westem-Europe "could not be 
attacked".«3
9.15. LRTNF as a means f or first- and follow- on use
Among the German strategic experts there is consensus to demand land- 
deployed and most of all long-range theatre nuclear forces. However, while 
Stratmann clearly envisages the Pershing as a means to execute first use within
Europe, would opt for them. Nevertheless, for political and strategic reasons, such a 
doctrine remains inappropriate for NATO’s TNF potential." ibid. p.39
62 "However, it is evident that the attempt to reconcile political and operative criteria is 
bound to resemble the quadrature of the circle, the more strongly the intention and 




deliberate escalation, his colleagues Lothar Rühl and Uwe Nerlich contemplate 
the LRTNF also as a means for escalation control. Accordingly, there is strong 
dissent between Stratmann and Rühl/Nerlich in regard to the targets question.
In contrast to K.-P. Stratmann, Lothar Rühl and Uwe Nerlich advocate targeting 
the W Fs offensive forces and part of the C^I systems with the longer-range 
land-deployed theatre nuclear forces. In order to accomplish these tasks, 
Nerlich considers a sufficient survivability level for the long-range TNF to be 
indispensable. He demands:
"Reducing vulnerability of long-range TNFs is indeed of utmost importance if 
the alliance is successfully to discourage Soviet preemption, control escalatory 
process up to a point, hold second- and third-echelon forces at risk, and retain a 
retaliatory force that deprives Soviet continental forces of their ultimate 
weapon status.”6*
However, at the same time he can see another advantage of the LRNTF in a pre­
deterrence concept: namely that it could serve as a means for a blackmailing 
effect on the Soviet Union while being targeted by LRTNF. By striking NATO's 
LRTNF preemptively in a war, the Soviet Union would have to take the 
destruction of Europe into account; this would be counterproductive to its war 
aims. Therefore, it is possible that the Soviet Union would prefer to accept the 
risk that the LRTNF could be launched against Soviet territory, rather than to 
try for escalation.« This "blackmailing concept”, however, presupposes that 
LRTNF are deployed in such a way that the Soviet Union can count on a chance 
to destroy the LRTNF preemptively. These statements suggest that Nerlich 
favours vulnerable LRTNF for first use as well as invulnerable LRTNF for 
follow-on use in case first use should fail. But in accordance with German first 
use he demands:
"However, the most crucial issue is whether to deploy new long-range theatre 
nuclear forces in Western Europe that can be targeted against Soviet territory.
This would blur the crucial Soviet dividing line between a European-theatre 
war, which spares Soviet territory as a sanctuary, and intercontinental war."«
64 Nerlich, 1980, op.cit.. p.120
65 Uwe Nerlich, "Die Stationierung landgestützter Mittelstreckenwaffen in Europa. Zur
Begründung der Einführung landgestützer LRTNF", Europäische Wehrkunde 
(Vol.30, No.8,1981) p.337-341
66 Nerlich, op.cit.. 1980, p.120
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Accordingly, Uwe Nerlich does not show any modesty in his requests for the 
weapons systems appropriate to enhance West Europe's security. He asks for a 
combination of land and sea-deployed systems, long-range conventional and 
nuclear capabilities, a mixture of U.S. and non-U.S. forces and of ballistic 
missiles (Pershing n  and a mobile ballistic missile - MMRBM) and GLCM in 
Central Europe and at the flanks, ALCM for theatre-wide operations and dual- 
capable aircraft. These requests were made by Nerlich at a Euro-American 
workshop in September 1978.67
Lothar Rühl points out that the main reason for the modernisation of the 
longer-range TNF was NATO's inability to provide sufficient conventional 
means to accomplish interdiction strikes against the Soviet deployment area:
"Weitreichende Mittel zum Gegenschlag auf das Aufmarschgebiet des 
Angreifers sind unerläßlich, wenn die Heranführung der Reserven aus der 
westlichen UdSSR abgeriegelt oder wenigstens verzögert werden soll. Aus 
dieser Notwendigkeit und der technischen Unmöglichkeit, dafür in 
ausreichendem Maße zielwirksame konventionelle Waffen einzusetzen, ergab 
sich in den 70er Jahren die Begründung für die vorgesehene Modernisierung 
der TNF-Systeme der NATO in Europa mit einer Verstärkung der Komponente 
größerer Reichweite."08
After confirming that NATO had gained the capability to attack hardened 
military targets in Eastern Europe and in the Western districts of the Soviet 
Union, Lothar Rühl stresses the advantage of NATO's capability to destroy part 
of the Soviet military establishment:
"Die nachweisbare, kalkulierbare Abwälzung des Risikos auf den sowjetischen 
Militärapparat als Steuerungsinstrument und zugleich Träger eines Angriffs 
gegen Westeuropa soll in einer Spannungskrise das sowjetische Risiko- 
Erfolgs-Kalkül gegen einen Rückgriff auf militärische Gewalt wegen zu hoher
67 This article was made public in 1983. Uwe Nerlich, "Warum Mittelstreckenwaffen?
Optionen der NATO: Erfordernisse und Beschränkungen" in Pro Pace. Deutsches 
Strategie-Forum. Streit um den Frieden. Bemerkungen und Meinungen zum 
Doppelbeschluß der NATO. . (Bonn: Verlag Mittler & Sohn, 1983) pp.7-15, here 
p.14
68 "Longer range means to conduct a counter-attack against the aggressor’s 
concentration area are indispensable, if the follow-on forces in the Western Soviet 
Union are to be interdicted or at least delayed. This necessity and the technical 
incapability of employing effective conventional weapons in sufficient numbers 
comprised the rationale for the contemplated modernisation of TNF systems in the 
seventies emphasising the element of extended range." Rühl,1987, op.cit.. p. 108
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operativer und strategischer Risiken bestimmen und damit gegen den 
Entschluß zum Krieg."09
The question of the Pershing's range is again of considerable significance in the 
context of the LRTNFs target planning against Soviet C3l systems, since first 
echelon command-control-communications centres of the Soviet government 
and armed forces7” at national level are dispersed and hardened within an 80- 
mile (128 km) radius of Moscow.77 In a very advanced forward deployment 
mode the Pershing would have the range to reach this Moscow belt; however, 
according to a German governmental statement, the forward deployment 
which would be necessary to hit the belt would not be considered because of 
the resulting increased vulnerability.72
While the White Paper denies the Pershing II's capability to reach Moscow, it 
implicitly admits that the missiles are able to hit one tenth of the Soviet ICBMs.:
"The 108 Pershing II missiles would not be able to inflict a first strike, due to 
their limited range and limited numbers. They would not even reach Moscow 
and threaten barely a tenth of the 1,300 Soviet intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. Moreover, very important command and control centres of the Soviet 
C^-network designed with options of redundancy anyhow, are beyond their 
range."7*
69 "The demonstrable and calculable shift of the risk onto the Soviet military apparatus
as a control instrument and as the agent of an attack against Western Europe is 
designed to influence the Soviet risk-success calculation so that the Soviet military 
apparatus does not resort to military force in view of running operative and 
strategic risks which are too high, and thus decides against going to war." ibid. 
p. 109/110. For confirmation see also another quotation: "This strategy (flexible 
response, S.P.) requires adequate instruments for its implementation, that is, LRINF 
systems capable of striking part of the European USSR in order to hold at risk part 
of the Soviet military establishment” Lothar Ruehl, "INF: Threat or Protection?" in 
NATO’s Sixteen Nations. (Vol.28, No.8, December 1983-January 1984) pp. 18-24, 
here p.20
70 Decapitation strikes, as discussed in the Pentagon in the early eighties, involve both,
the knocking out of the political and the military leadership, (see chapter 8.1.1.)
71 see Chapter 7.2.5.
72 Prof. Dr. Joch Abr. Frowein and Prof. Dr. Lerche, Prozeßbevollmächtigte der
Bundesregierung in einem Antrag vom 20. März 1984 an das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Zweiter Senat, betr. Organstreitverfahren der Fraktion 
Die Grünen im Deutschen Bundestag, Az.2 BvE 13/83, S.27 und 28, quoted in 
Wemicke / Schöll, 1984, op.cit.. p.103
73 White Paper, 1983, op.cit. p.77
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However, while contending the Pershing's incapability as a first strike weapon, 
German Defence Minister Wömer involuntarily confirmed the Pershing II's 
range capacity to destroy even a third of the Soviet C3l systems and a tenth of 
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles:
"Die Sowjets wissen ganz genau, daß die Pershing II als Erstschlagwaffe völlig 
untauglich ist. Sie erreicht noch nicht einmal ein Drittel ihrer Führungszentren, 
noch nicht einmal ein Zehntel ihrer Interkontinentalraketen..."7*
92. Predominance o f German views in the hardware decision
This final chapter wishes to demonstrate that these German concepts 
dominated the shaping of the hardware decision. We will show how the 
Germans succeeded in imposing their policy line on the modernisation of the 
INF, above all in respect to extending its range. It will also be demonstrated 
that particularly land deployment of the missiles was an indispensable element 
of the German first use concept. This section, however, does not intend to argue 
that these German guidelines prevailed against the declared U.S. position. 
Rather, evidence will be given that these two essential elements in the LRTNF 
modernisation, i.e. the extension of range and land deployment, reflect a 
dominance of German guidelines as well as the vulnerable deployment mode of 
the LRTNF.
92.1. The prevalence o f the Pershing's extended range
In the mid-50s, there was a debate between the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army 
over the development of both Medium-Range Ballistic missiles and Anti- 
ballistic Missiles. The Secretary of Defense made the decision that the Army 
should have shorter-range systems and the Air Force longer-range systems to 
support ground combat in Europe.75 A subsequent Army request to extend the
74 "The Soviets know precisely that the Pershing II is an inadequate means for a first 
strike. It does not even reach one third of its Command Centres, nor even a tenth of 
its intercontinental ballistic missiles." Defence Minister Manfred Wömer on 
German TV, October 11, 1983, printed in Presse- und Informationsamt der 
Bundesregierung, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik. October 1983, p.52, quoted in 
Wemicke / Schöll, 1984, op.cit.. p.95
75 U.S. Senate Hearings, Authorization for Military Procurement, 1977, op.cit.. 
pp.6430-6431
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range of the Pershing was turned down.7« Obviously, the Army pursued its 
long-term goal of continuing to compete with the Air Force and Navy on 
controlling strategic missiles77.
The producer of Pershing 1 and Pershing 1 A7*, the Martin Marietta Corporation 
in Orlando, was awarded a six-month contract for studies on alternative ways 
of satisfying the need for a more credible theatre nuclear interdiction capability, 
as early as February 1969. The study concluded that an upgraded Pershing type 
missile with a precision guided reentry vehicle would be the most cost effective 
solution.79 In May 1971, the Army Missile Command awarded Marietta a 
contract for the preliminary design effort on the guidance system. The Army 
also requested a project entitled "radar area correlation" in the Army's FY 1972 
research budget. Finally, five years after the improvement of the Pershing 1A 
actually began, Pershing II appeared in the Army's FY 1975 budget for the first 
time. Congress supported the development of the guidance system, but 
reduced the $11 million request for the reentry vehicle to $2 million. Well in 
advance of the Congressional appropriation for that year, i.e. in April 1974, the 
Army awarded Marietta a contract to conduct advanced development of a 
much more accurate version of the Pershing, to be called Pershing H When, in 
the context of the U.S. Defense Secretary's report on the Fiscal Year 1975, the 
Pershing II programme was first presented to Congress, no mention was made 
of an increase in the existing 400-mile range. Thus, at this stage, the range of the 
Pershing n  was to remain the same as that of the earlier missile.
It was not until August 1978 that the State Department's and Secretary of 
Defense Brown's resistance to a longer range for the Pershing was overridden. 
Every year since 1970 SHAPE planners have requested the development of a 
theatre nuclear missile with a range of at least 1,000 nautical miles, the 
equivalent of 1,835 kms. The U.S. Army amended this requirement for
76 Lcitcnbcrg, 1978, op.cit.. p.l 1
77 "Ever since 1956, when then Secretary of Defense Charles ’Engine Charlie’ Wilson
restricted the Army’s offensive nuclear role to short-range systems, the service has 
never quite been reconciled to being excluded from strategic offensive warfare.", 
Paine, 1980, op.cit.. p.25
78 The major innovation from the Pershing 1 to the Pershing 1A was the incorporation
of the ability to fire from unsurveyed firing positions. The missile was kept 
unchanged. Cochran, 1984, op.cit.. p.291
79 Paine, 1980, op.cit.
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Pershing n. 90 After a formal requirement on the part of the U.S.Army in 
December 1978, the Defense System Aquisition Review Council (DSARC) 
recommended Full-Scale Engineering and Development of the Pershing EL*'
Since 1977, the Carter administration had revealed its irresolution in making a 
decision on the range of the TNFs listed for modernisation. U.S. Defense 
Secretary Brown remained steady in his position that the assignment of 
Poseidon submarines would be sufficient to meet European anxieties 
concerning the Soviet SS-20. At a Senate Hearing in March 1977 Col. Larry H. 
Hunt, Pershing project manager, stressed several times that a conscious 
decision had been taken to limit the Pershing's range to 400 miles in order to 
avoid a range capable of targeting the Soviet Union:
"I want to point out that although a significant extension of range is feasible, 
well beyond the 400 nautical miles, by using higher thrust propellants, a 
conscious decision was made to retain the 400-mile range...rDhe limitation of 
Pershing's range to the Eastern European area provides a highly important 
measure of discrete control on the process of nuclear escalation in the event 
NATO is required to resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to defend 
against a Warsaw Pact a t ta c k ." “
This voluntary restriction of the Pershing's range was apparently also meant to 
exclude any disturbances of the SALT negotiations, which were of the highest 
priority to the Carter administration.
90 Berry, 1979, op.cit.. p. 1303. U.S. House of Representatives Report, Modernization, 
1980, op.cit.. p.2. For the technological development of the Pershing II see also 
Moore, 1981, op.cit
81 Berry, 1979, op.cit. p. 1303. The Department of Defense distinguishes 7 phases for a
Nuclear Weapons development: (1) Weapons conception; (2) Programme on 
Feasibility; (3) Development Engineering or full Development; (4) Production 
Engineering; (5) First production Evaluation; (6) Quantity production and (7) 
Retirement In February 1979, Marietta was awarded the full scale development 
contract of about 360 million dollars. This means that the prototype had to be 
transmitted for series production, a signal that this type of weapon had finally been 
accepted. This contract was signed exactly 10 months before the NATO Dual- 
Track decision was approved by the NATO ministerial meeting in December 1979. 
This full scale development contract and the U.S. Army’s announcement fed the 
German public’s suspicion that the Europeans have to deploy what has been 
produced in the United States and for which it is in search of customers. However, 
the engineering development decision is only the prelude to a production decision 
which, in the case of Pershing II Extended Range, was only given in June 1982 
(although it is certainly not easy to cancel a weapons programme which has already 
entered the engineering phase). See also chapter 8.1.3.
82 Emphasis by S.P. U.S. Senate Hearings, Authorization for Military Procurement,
1977, op.cit. p.6420 and 6425
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In August 1978, as a result of the neutron bomb debacle and the HLG 
consensus, Brown changed his policy and approved production of the 
Pershing II Extended Range®*; the Department of Defense's report to Congress 
on the Fiscal Year 1980 mentions for the first time the missile's extended 
range.**
The Nuclear Planning Group had ignored Brown's reluctance to approve the 
extension of the missile's range by stating already at the April 1978 meeting that 
more LRTNF were required. The NPG's announcement of April 1978 was 
backed by the HLG recommendation of February and March 1978 in Los 
Alamos that a reinforcement of the longer-range TNF was necessary.
In contrast to the U.S. administration, as early as 1975/76 the German 
authorised experts started to discuss modernisation of the longer-range TNF. 
Hubertus Hoffmann points out that both the Ford and the Carter 
administration decided to restrict the range without consulting the German 
politicians.®5 Kurt Lauk regards the U.S. "refusal" to extend the Pershing's 
range, although this would be easily accomplished technically, as consistent 
with their scepticism concerning the use of weapons for a penetration of the 
Soviet Union:
"Die amerikanische Weigerung, die Reichweite der auch in der 
Bundesrepublik stationierten ’Pershing’ Rakete zu erhöhen - technisch wäre 
dies leicht möglich - fügt sich hier lückenlos ein."®0
These statements by German researchers suggest that German politicians 
attempted to convince the U.S. administration to extend the Pershing's range 
during 1977 and the first half of 1978, but that the United States declined to 
yield to these German requests. There is no other evidence for this assumption. 
It is, however, a fact that Brown's sudden approval of the extension of range 
demonstrates a considerable change in the conscious policy of the U.S.
83 Aviation Week & Sj2agg.Iechnology, (October 23,1978) p.23 
®* U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1980, op.cit. 1979, p.86 
®5 Hoffmann, 1986, op.cit. p.412 and 416/417
M "The U.S. refusal to extend the range of the ’Pershing’ missile - technically this 
would be easily possible - which is deployed in the Federal Republic belongs in this 
context." Emphasis by S.P., Kurt J. Lauk, Die nuklearen Optionen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1979), p.134
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administration, which had previously insisted to maintain the shorter range of 
the Pershing.
92.2. Land deployment versus sea deployment
NATO's decision to deploy the LRTNF on European soil instead of at sea 
provoked considerable public dispute. However, according to the decision 
makers, important political motives prevented the LRTNF's deployment at 
sea.*7 In addition, serious military reasons were advanced, especially by the 
German strategic experts, although from a purely military view point, that there 
are strong arguments in favour of sea-basing: mobility and thus relative 
invulnerability to preemptive destruction. However, if the Germans were 
seeking weapons to implement their first use model in an optimal way, the land 
deployment made perfect sense.M
The German first use concept requires that the LRTNF must be able to exploit 
their accuracy and vulnerability which is caused by the land deployment. The 
vulnerability of land-deployed systems, so the argument goes, would give the 
Soviet Union an incentive to try and destroy the missiles preemptively, before 
they themselves would be targeted. Thus after the failure of deterrence, 
following the military guideline "use-or-lose-them", the missiles would be 
launched very early in a conflict to prevent their destruction.
Since the weapons were supposed to target Soviet territory, the Pershing n  
could not be sea-deployed because of range deficiencies. But, there were also 
important technical reasons for a land deployment.
A selective and flexible, politically controlled employment of nuclear weapons 
necessitates the greatest possible accuracy of the missiles as well as a 
functioning and flexible communication and coordination. Missiles launched 
from submarines and surface ships do not reach an accuracy comparable to that 
of a land-based missile. There are still technical difficulties in specifying the 
exact location of a launcher at sea, which is indispensable for the missiles' 
computer if it is to hit its target accurately.
87 see chapter 6.2.2.
m For an elaboration of this argument see Lübkemeier, 1981, op.cit
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In 1981, SIPRI evaluated the U.S Loran-C radio navigation system's precision as 
being capable of determining a submarine's location within a radius of 15 
metres. In order to improve this radius, the U.S. global positioning system is 
evolving into the NAVSTAR system which, since the mid-1980s, has consisted 
of 18 satellites positioned in three rings of altitudes of 20,000 kilometres.*9
Even today, the position of the submarines, given by an inertial navigation 
system, has to be finally determined by a surface navigation system. The 
resulting necessity for the submarines to surface enhances Soviet chances of 
detecting them. Sound navigation ranging systems (Sonar techniques) for the 
submarines' precise positioning are still in the process of development. The 
requirement of an accurate targeting of mobile systems is almost excluded with 
sea-launched missiles. But a future solution to this problem will be offered by 
the cooperation between the satellite navigation system and the cruise missiles' 
radio navigator computer. Thus, precise targeting of mobile systems with sea- 
launched missiles will obviate land deployment in the future. However, for the 
time being a submarine can only be vaguely located to the extent that mobile 
targets cannot be targeted at all and fixed targets only with limited accuracy.90
Submarine navigation is the most unresolvable technical problem in the East 
and the West. In order to receive long wave transmissions, submarines have to 
be positioned quite close to the surface, thus increasing their vulnerability. 
Therefore, under the circumstances of war, communication with submarines is 
difficult, if not impossible.97
The successful accomplishment of selective and flexible nuclear strikes is 
dependent on precise information about the military and political situation. 
Even targeting mobile systems is almost impossible without a guaranteed 
functioning communication, because in a more extended battlefield area the Air 
Force and the Army would have to coordinate their operations. The military 
need to integrate complex decisions and information from the political 
leadership and several subordinate command levels without loss of time
99 SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and 
Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1981 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1981) p.23
90 Commander Jörg Owen, Maritime Aspekte der Sicherheit. Military Fellow, (Institut
für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, IFSH Hamburg 1988), unpublished
manuscript, p. 137/138
97 Auswärtiges Amt, 1981, op.cit.. p.3
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excludes any sea deployment of the delivery systems launched against mobile 
targets.92 For all kinds of selective employment options, Uwe Nerlich considers 
land-deployed LRTNF as the only adequate means:
"Unter den derzeitigen Bedingungen aber kommen für selektive Einsätze
ausschließlich landgestützte LRTNF in Betracht."«
In order to successfully implement the German first use concept, Stratmann 
discovers another indispensable advantage of land deployment: consistent with 
his demand that nuclear strikes have to imply understandable limitations for 
the Soviet Union, he welcomes the fact that land-deployed LRTNF are verifiable 
for the Soviet Union. Thus, information on type, size and deployment area 
would be available and NATO could communicate the limitations of its 
intentions to the Soviet Union.9* In perfect accordance with this argument is the 
German refusal of the U.S. offer to assign more Poseidons to NATO: from all 
surrounding sea-areas, the Poseidon's range would be sufficient to cover the 
whole Soviet territory; in addition, the Poseidon's MIRV system could 
contribute to Soviet misunderstandings concerning NATO's intentions.95
Stratmann's colleague Uwe Nerlich regards land deployment as an advantage 
because of its ability to enhance Soviet capability of calculating the risk. As 
already pointed out, Nerlich welcomes the possibility that Soviet risk 
assessment would be considerably complicated if faced with the difficult 
decision whether to destroy those weapons capable of reaching the Soviet 
Union immediately or whether to start its offensive without preempting them 
and thus running the risk that those weapons would soon be targeted against 
its own territory. Nerlich argues that the difficulty in deciding whether or not to 
destroy Europe while merely preempting these missiles would paralyse Soviet 
capability to act and thus enhance deterrence.
Land deployment was welcomed by German strategic analysts because it 
promised to enhance the probability of the implementation of the German first
92 Stratmann, 1982, op.cit. p.55
93 "Under the current conditions, however, only land-deployed LRTNF can be
considered for selective employment options." Nerlich, 1981, op.cit.. p.338
94 This argument is implied in his advocation of ballistic missiles with their clearly
identifiable maximum range. Stratmann, 1982, op.cit. p.66
95 ibid.
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use concept. It was argued that the United States would be much more willing 
to launch weapons to strike Soviet territory if these weapons by their launching 
location signal that they do not have "strategic intentions". While sea-deployed 
systems would not automatically be assigned to the European theatre, a 
deployment of these escalatory, "quasi strategic", namely Eurostrategic, LRTNF 
could be a signal to the Soviet Union that their employment would be restricted 
to a regional conflict scenario:
'Tails die USA annähmen, daß die Unterscheidbarkeit zwischen strategischen 
und euiostrategischen Bereichen für die UdSSR nicht mehr gewährleistet wäre, 
könnte sich dies vermindernd auf ihre Bereitschaft auswirken, ihr 
eurostrategisches Potential rechtzeitig einzusetzen. "w
Kissinger, in his bold style, reaffirms this evaluation by commenting on the 
LRTNF s land deployment:
"Wenn wir Mittelstreckenwaffen für einen amerikanischen Konflikt mit den 
Sowjets wollen, dann können wir die besser auf See stationieren. Für 
amerikanische Zwecke brauchen wir sie nicht nach Europa zu schleppen."97
The internal discussion paper circulated by the German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in 1981 strongly advocates land deployment because of its strategic- 
operational advantages:
- high reliability and precision,
- survivability and mobility,
- high employment readiness, and
- secured communication.
The paper indicates the overall intention of enhancing the credibility of 
deterrence by achieving these military advantages:
"Sie machen damit auch die Optionen der Allianz zu selektiven 
Reaktionsmöglichkeiten, die nach Ort, Zeit und Wirkung politisch
96 "If the United States assumed that the difference between strategic and Eurostrategic
areas would no longer be guaranteed for the Soviet Union, this could impair U.S. 
readiness to use its Eurostrategic potential in time." Liibkemeier, 1981, op.cit.. p.68
97 "If we want intermediate-range nuclear weapons to serve an American conflict with
the Soviets, then we would prefer to deploy them at sea. For American purposes we 
do not have to drag them to Europe." Henry Kissinger, Welt am Sonntag (October 
1,1982) p.4
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kontrollierbar sein müssen, glaubhaft, und verringern dadurch die Gefahr einer 
sowjetischen Fehleinschätzung."*«
As in the case of land deployment of the LRTNFs, the political arguments for 
non-singularity were supplemented by military explanations: the deployment 
of land-based LRTNF in several NATO countries instead of in the Federal 
Republic alone was supposed to increase the Soviets' difficulties in achieving a 
precise risk assessment in the event of an offensive. The calculation was not 
very sophisticated: if all LRTNF were planned to be preempted in a disarming 
strike, several NATO countries would have to be destroyed and escalation 
would be unbearably increased."
923. Vulnerability
The unavoidable byproduct of land deployment, the vulnerability of the 
missiles, is not only compatible with the German first use concept, it even 
supports its implementation. The so-called "use-or-lose" effect, which is caused 
by the vulnerable deployment mode of the LRTNF, also guarantees that the 
United States can not misuse the LRTNF as war-fighting weapons, because 
weapons assigned for fighting a battle and for military-operational denial 
strikes must be capable of surviving war hostilities for a specific period of time 
which is contemplated for a prolonged war.
In the face of the potential danger that the United States would be involved in a 
strategic war because of the land deployment of the LRTNF, the question arises 
why the United States agreed to this vulnerable basing mode of missiles which 
possess a range sufficient to reach the Soviet Union.
First of all, it has to be considered that the Pershing Els' and GLCMs' 
survivability has been increased in comparison to that of the aircraft which are 
deployed in Europe as part of the U.S. FBS programme. Strategic analysts who 
campaign for the TNFs "denial’’ function viewed the increasing vulnerability of
98 "Thus, they also increase the credibility of the allied selective options, which have to 
be under political control in regard to geographical area, time and effect, and will
thereby reduce the danger of a false assessment on the part of the Soviets."
Auswärtiges Amt, 1981, op.cit.. p.2
99 Nerlich, 1981, op.cit.. p.338
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these fighter bombers as the main reason for new LRTNF.'00 Thus, even this 
group of analysts preferred land-deployed LRTNF since their survivability was 
increased to the same level as that of the aircraft. Richard Burt explicitly 
welcomes the ground- and sea-deployed cruise missile as a means to 
compensate for the aircraft which is deployed as Quick Reaction Alert aircraft:
"In the European theater, longer-range cruise missiles may offer attractive 
alternatives to aircraft in the performance of some deep-strike interdiction 
missions. Armed with either nuclear or non-nuclear warheads, these systems - 
deployed on land or in European coastal waters - could provide an effective 
substitute to vulnerable, and, some argue, provocative, Quick Reaction Alert 
(QRA) aircraft now deployed in such countries as West Germany."'0'
Secondly, the LRTNF's vulnerability was neither conceded nor discussed in 
German and U.S. governmental statements. Instead, it was pointed out that the 
missiles' mobility was provided for by their transportation on vehicles:102
"Sie sind beweglich und damit im Vergleich zu Flugzeugen und verbunkenen 
Raketen weit weniger verwundbar."'03
According to Lothar Rühl the Pershing Hs' and GLCMs' vulnerability cannot be 
discussed seriously. For him, the question is sufficiently answered with the 
weapons' dispersed deployment mode in an alarm situation. Therefore a Soviet 
preemptive strike would only be successful in the absence of a prior crisis, 
which would be a rather unlikely case.'0*
Critics of the weapons programme argued that the Pershing H's vulnerability 
would provoke the Soviet Union to launch preemptive strikes. This danger 
would necessitate the weapons' use at a very early stage of war in order to
m  Michael Higgins and Christopher J. Makins, "Theater Nuclear Forces and ’Gray 
Area’ Arms Control" in Richard Burt,(ed), Arms Control and Defense Postures in 
the 1980s. (Boulder/Colorado: Westview Press; London, England: Croom Helm, 
1982) p.75-96, here 80.
'°' Richard Burt, 'Technological Change and Arms Control: The Cruise Missile Case" 
in Holst/Nerlich, 1977, op.cit p. 179-191 p. 183
102 See for example, ACDA Statement Fiscal Year 1985, op.cit.. p. 107 and 110
¡03 "They are mobile and in comparison to aircraft and hardened silos much less 
vulnerable." Auswärtiges Amt, Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 1981, op.cit. 
p.72. See response to a question of the MP Dr.Bard, The Green Party, by 
Parliamentary State Secretary Würzbach, Bundesdrucksache 10/64 (May 13, 1983) 
p.40 quoted in Wernicke / Schöll, 1984, p. 103
¡04 Rühl, 1987, op.cit.. p.323
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avoid their loss. Mutually imposed time pressure to anticipate the opponent's 
reaction would result in a situation in which it could no longer be determined 
which party first launched their weapons. Thus, the Pershing II would 
contribute to the abolition of the nuclear threshold even before the crisis would 
escalate, either by being employed or simply by its existence; a conventional 
war would no longer seem likely.'05
Daniel Charles, a journalist, confirms that during the seventies there existed a 
doctrine voiced by "NATO nuclear planners" which deliberately envisaged 
vulnerability of nuclear weapons and did not abolish these vulnerabilities by 
following precisely the same logic which had been criticised so vehemently by 
the opponents of the NATO Dual-Track decision. Since such a preemptive 
nuclear attack would raise the prospect of a strategic war, these NATO planners 
argued that the Soviet Union would prefer to refrain from any attack, and that 
deterrence would thus be strengthened.'0* Such a strategy to deliberately force 
NATO to be a victim of its own operational imperatives in wartime is fully 
consistent with the principles of flexible response. Daniel Charles criticises this 
doctrine:
"Indeed, no strategy of deterrence based on the probable breakdown of control 
over nuclear forces followed by their suicidal use has any hope of political 
acceptance in any nation of the Alliance. Such an abdication of political 
responsibility on the pan of NATO’s leadership cannot command political 
support, nor does it deserve any."'07
But at the same time he concedes that political control will diminish the 
probability that NATO will implement first use.
Charles' contention is confirmed by the affirmation of Mr. Walsh, then DoD 
Deputy Director, Strategic and Space Systems, during a Senate Hearing:
"Mr. Smith: Aren’t you faced with a Hobson’s choice here in which the very 
survivability of the sea-based weapon is exactly what our allies may find 
bothersome, because if our weapon is vulnerable and if our troops manning it 
are vulnerable, it may be an indication of our will to use ist?
105 Wernicke, 1984, op.cit. p.41/42
106 Charles refers to the Journalist John Barry who provided him with this information.
Qiarles, 1987, op.cit. p. 156




The fact is that the LRTNFs land deployment and their deficiencies combined 
with the omissions in regard to their security, contribute to a high level of 
vulnerability of the LRTNF, in particular the Pershing H This vulnerability 
might necessitate the missiles' early employment in a war and thereby 
contribute to a considerable escalation of the situation since this would mean 
crossing the nuclear threshold. Such an early escalation can be regarded as a 
direct expression of the German first use model. Johan Jorgen Holst confirms 
that the HLG did not discuss the possibilities of reducing the LRTNFs 
vulnerability.709
The decision on upgrading the Pershing's range to that of strategic weapons in 
1978 is the second essential element which corresponds to an optimal 
implementation of the German first use concept. Statements by German 
researchers suggest that German politicians attempted to convince the U.S. 
administration to extend the Pershing's range during 1977 and the first half of
1978 while the United States declined to yield to these German requests. The 
Defense Secretary's sudden approval of the extension of the range demonstrates 
considerable change in the conscious policy of the U.S. to restrict the shorter 
range of the Pershing. The argument here does not suggest that the German 
representatives' and politicians' guidelines prevailed despite the opposition of 
U.S. decision makers.
As regards range, however, it seems that U.S. Defense Minister Brown's final 
approval of range extension was a joint result of the cooperation between 
SACEUR, the U.S. Army and German strategic experts. In short, it appears that 
the decision to deploy long-range land-deployed TNF in Europe incorporates 
predominantly German, and not U.S. guidelines.
108 U.S. Senate Hearings, Authorization for Military Procurement, 1977, op.cit. p.6439
¡09 As the vulnerable points, Holst stresses the weapon sites, the alert procedures and the 
combined system of transportation and start Holst, 1983, op.cit. pp.516
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The thesis demonstrates that, contrary to the widely accepted interpretation, 
not only the arms control track, but also the deployment track of NATO's 1979 
decision was initiated mainly by German politicians. The assumption that the 
Germans yielded to the United States in acceptance of the deployment track as 
an act of "burden-sharing" within the alliance can be ruled out simply by 
considering the extent of the activity and engagement of the German politicians 
in requesting the U.S. administration to agree to the deployment of LRTNF on 
European soil. They participated in this decision, sometimes in conflict, 
sometimes in cooperation with, but they always followed their independent 
national interpretation of the flexible response strategy.
The existence of an independent German interpretation of NATO's strategy is a 
consequence of the different geography of the German respectively European 
allies and the United States. According to their respective geography they stress 
two different functions inherent in nuclear deterrence: the Europeans and the 
Germans in particular prefer the punishment function of deterrence, while the 
United States emphasises its denial function. The result are two different 
interpretations of flexible response which lead to incompatible perceptions of 
the role of nuclear weapons which again culminate in two, incompatible first 
use concepts: the United States prefers first use as late as possible, on a theatre 
level and to be executed with military effectiveness, while the Germans 
contemplate first use as early as possible, on the strategic level and as a means 
to signal the Soviet Union to cease hostilities. NATO's decision to modernise 
the long-range TNF was intended to reconcile these different interpretations of 
flexible response.
10.1. Germany's role in the evolution o f the LRTNF decision in the NPG and 
SALT
On strategic issues, the Germans were more active than commonly assumed. 
The German delegates in the Nuclear Planning Group participated actively by 
drafting several reports in cooperation with their British and U.S. allies aiming 
at an elaboration of options for implementing flexible response. The extent of 
leeway in the NPG is indicated by several conflicts, which the German 
politicians risked and in which they even prevailed.
10. Summaru and Conclusions
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The strategy of flexible response was continuously elaborated by the NPG's 
elaboration of selective employment plans for Theatre Nuclear Forces. German 
participation always accompanied these discussions and elaborations of the 
development of the strategy of flexible response. The provision of the material 
basis for these selective employment options necessitated a modernisation of 
nuclear weapons along the lines of increased penetration capability, accuracy, 
survivability, reliability and low yield warheads which do not produce much 
collateral damage. Then detailed plans for using these weapons had to be 
developed. By requesting the development of nuclear weapons with a small 
and clean warhead, i.e. the neutron warhead, in combination with low collateral 
damage, the Germans, in accordance with their European allies, even 
stimulated this process elaborating the plans for the selective use of nuclear 
weapons. While the original German doctrine envisages first use with purely 
political intentions, the process of elaborating selective employment options 
necessarily led to the Euroepan acceptance of first use's military implications.
While U.S. and European politicians still debated over the content of SALT n, in 
the NPG and HLG the NATO allies' elaboration of selective employment plans 
produced an agreement on modernisation plans for longer-range theatre 
nuclear weapons to be deployed in Europe. The reluctance of the U.S. 
administration to approve the HLG's plan, in particular the opposition of U.S. 
Defense Secretary Brown, was finally overridden by the U.S. politicians' desire 
to reestablish U.S. leadership, which had been doubted by the Europeans after 
the neutron bomb debacle.
Parallel to the German participation in the elaboration of Selective Employment 
Plans for TNF in the NPG, German politicians lobbied to maintain and 
consolidate the option of European-based long-range U.S. theatre nuclear 
weapons in the context of SALT. Their interest focused on the newly produced 
cruise missile. They were concerned that these LRTNF deployed on European 
soil could be sacrificed by the United States to achieve SALT agreements. In 
SALT I the Germans requested that the United States exclude the FBS from the 
negotiations; in SALT II they pressed for a preservation of the long-range 
ground- and sea-launched cruise missile.
The cruise missile was welcomed by the Europeans in a conventional role, as a 
replacement for aging fighter bombers, as well as in a nuclear role in which the
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missile would penetrate Soviet territory much more reliably than the FBS 
aircraft. However, after the withdrawal of the Thor, Jupiter, and Mace B 
missiles in the sixties, the Carter administration was more than reluctant to 
yield to these European requests to redeploy modem LRTNF in Europe. 
Consensus in all departments of the Carter administration was interest in the 
air-launched cruise missile for its strategic bombers and therefore willing to 
comply with Soviet requests to ban the ground- and sea- launched cruise 
missile. While a protocol to SALT II eventually banned deployment of ground- 
and sea-launched cruise missiles for a period of three years, however, it still 
allowed their development and testing. In the first case, the result was exactly 
what the Germans wanted, in the second case, German doctrines were also 
upheld.
102. Germany and the implementation of the 1979 decision
In the HLG's shaping of the deployment decision a predominance of German 
doctrines is evident with respect to the political as well as to the military 
aspects.
Politically the Germans prevailed in the question of the participation of other 
NATO allies in the deployment programme and in the second of the two tracks, 
they enforced the parallel arms control offer to the Soviet Union. The case of 
land deployment is more ambiguous than the other issues. In public the 
eventual land deployment of the LRTNF was generally perceived as a defeat for 
Helmut Schmidt by missile opponents. It was well-known that Schmidt 
attempted, at least, to deploy the weapons at sea. This attempt was interpreted 
as Schmidt's intention to protect the Federal Republic from the greatest evil by 
trying to prevent turning the country into a large target area for Soviet missiles. 
However, Schmidt's proposal to deploy the missiles on herring trawlers was 
primarily meant to enlarge the participation of coastal nations such as Norway 
and Portugal. While Schmidt failed with his plan, since Norway and Portugal 
rejected it, the eventual participation of the Netherlands and Belgium may be 
ascribed explicitly to the active role of the Federal Republic When Schmidt 
realised that his plan to increase the number of participants by the missiles's sea 
deployment would not work, he quickly dropped the idea.
However, the result of this failure, the eventual land deployment of the 
systems, cannot be interpreted as a defeat of the German doctrine. First, because
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land deployment protected the Federal Republic in a political sense from 
having a unique role as the only country to deploy land-based systems and 
from the consequence of deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union. The 
Federal Republic was the only country to deploy the Pershing II (which 
requires deployment as far forward as possible, due to its task of hitting the 
Soviet Union while having a range of only 1,800 kms.) Therefore, almost all 
NATO allies were excluded from deploying the Pershing. (Considering their 
geographical positions Norway and Denmark could have deployed the 
Pershing n, but preferred to maintain their denuclearised status; Italy might 
have been excluded because it had already deployed GLCM.) Thus, land 
deployment of the cruise missile was the only way to avoid German singularity 
in land-basing nuclear weapons - certainly an extremely unattractive prospect 
in both military and political terms. This might have been one reason why the 
German delegation did not pursue sea-basing.
However, the land deployment also possessed another, much more important 
military dimension. Both U.S. and German strategic experts involved in the 
decision, welcomed land deployment as a means for implementing selective 
employment options effectively, since missiles launched from land hit their 
targets with greater accuracy than those deployed at sea. However, it is striking 
that the vulnerability of the missiles which is caused by their exposed land 
deployment was criticised heavily in the U.S. strategic community, while the 
German strategic experts hardly discussed the problem. These incompatible 
positions towards vulnerability reflect the difference of roles which the U.S. and 
German assign to the LRTNF: while the U.S. prefers to maintain the missiles as 
long as possible for follow-on use, the German strategic experts envisage the 
missiles' role in first use or, in case of its failure for second use. In this context 
their vulnerability is welcomed by the Germans as a trigger for first use along 
the lines of "use or lose them".
Statements by German researchers suggest that German politdans tried to 
convince the U.S. adminstration of the necessity to extend the Pershing's range. 
During 1977 and the first half of 1978 the U.S. administration maintained its 
position of keeping the Pershing's range limited to that of the Peshing 1A 
model. It seems that U.S. Defense Secretary Brown's final approval of the 
extension of the Pershing's range which followed soon after the neutron bomb, 
was a result of joint requests from SACEUR, the U.S. Army and German 
politicians. Thus German politicians are responsible for these two preeminent
293
characteristics of the 1979 deployment decision, namely the missiles' 
unnecessarily vulnerable land deployment and their long range.
Land-deployed LRTNF were regarded by German strategic experts and 
politicians as implementing the German first use concept in an optimal way. 
The targeting of the Soviet Union within NATO first use at an early stage in the 
war, i.e. before a possible collapse of conventional defences, is regarded by the 
German strategic experts as the best means for preventing a battlefield nuclear 
war as well as a long and protracted conventional war on German territory. 
These nuclear strikes within a first use concept are supposed to signal to the 
Soviet Union very early in the conflict that NATO is willing to prevent a 
political defeat for the Alliance by taking a high risk and escalating the war. 
These risky escalating strikes are justified by the underlying idea of "coupling", 
which assumes that the involvement of Soviet territory would be followed by a 
Soviet retaliation against the United States. Thus, deterrence is supposed to be 
reestablished.
Those strategic experts who campaign for this first use concept do not discuss 
realistic expectations of Soviet behaviour accomplishment of NATO's first use 
against Soviet territory. They neither provide evidence to support the 
assumption that the Soviet Union would retaliate against the United States and 
thus risk its own complete destruction nor do they provide arguments for the 
expectation of the Soviets' withdrawal after first use. Only Lothar Riihl states 
explicitly that the LRTNF s were deployed precisely in order to obviate the use 
of U.S. strategic weapons. Thus it was possible to reconcile the different 
German and U.S. requirements for a modernisation of long-range theatre 
nuclear weapons in both nations' aim at achieving the means for escalation 
control.
The fact that the German strategic experts do not discuss the issue and thus fail 
to provide arguments in favour of the crucial premise of the German first use 
concept - the functioning of either coupling or deliberate escalation - suggests 
the theoretical inconsistency in the first use concept. While on a declaratory 
level always stating that a limited war would never and under no 
circumstances be tolerated, on an operational level German strategic experts 
aim at the early termination of war precisely by means of a limited nuclear war, 
including but not limited to German territory. Even if the German 
interpretation of flexible response prevails, as in the case of the 1979 land
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deployment of LRTNF, the strategic dilemma is not solved for the Federal 
Republic. Since no outcome of a conflict can guarantee safety from the 
unbearable destruction of Germany, the Federal Republic's strategic dilemma is 
inherently unresolvable.
103. The 1979 NATO decision as Background to the INF treaty
The results of the present analysis will now be incorporated in an attempt to 
explain the background of the INF treaty. As has been demonstrated above, the 
LRTNF deployment cannot be interpreted as being a result of U.S. plans to use 
them as an indispensable element of a counterforce and first strike strategy, or 
to fight and win a nuclear war in Europe.
However, these U.S. counterforce plans were contemplated only with respect to 
strategic weapons and did not envisage the incorporation of weapons such as 
the Pershing II and the cruise missile which would have required discussions 
with the allies concerning their release which might have been launched 
without any political control.
On another level, these strategic war-fighting plans themselves seem to have 
been put on ice, until the accomplishment of SDI can secure that these plans do 
not end in death for the United States after a retaliatory strike by the Soviet 
Union; or to put it another way: one can state that the recognition of SDI's 
insufficiencies and long lead time for development and deployment have 
furthered the tendency in U.S. strategy to fight and decide a war preferably 
with conventional means, thus reducing the cost of an INF treaty. In the U.S. 
strategic community, the assessment now seems to prevail that effective nuclear 
crisis management is difficult to accomplish and that there is no feasible 
effective control of nuclear weapons' escalating impact. Most of all, the analyses 
dreading "nuclear winter" denied the possibility of controlled implementation 
of a follow-on use, caused an awareness of the uncontrolled dangers of nuclear 
weapons. 1
1 Recent studies underline the potentially disastrous effects of a nuclear conflict, like the 
July 1987 MIT analysis which calculates that a limited Soviet attack on key 
industries, in particular those of the energy sector with only 1-2% of its arsenal, 
could bomb the United States back to medieval life conditions. Frankfurter 
Rundschau. July 22,1987
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New technological developments enable the military to offer a remedy for this 
problem by replacing nuclear weapons with highly-explosive precision-guided, 
more accurate conventional weapons. This trend is also confirmed by the 
increased emphasis on systems with dual capability.2 Conventional weapons 
improve the control of escalation in a war and thus guarantee that the conflict 
will be geographically limited. This tendency toward "conventionalisation" is 
clearly recognisable in the development of U.S. strategy and is expressed in the 
ALB doctrine of the U.S. Army and the maritime strategy of the U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps, as well as in the concept of air superiority of the U.S. Air Force. 
These concepts do not, however, renounce the use of nuclear weapons which 
will play, on an operational level, an important part in future war scenarios. 
The ALB concept explicitly favours the "integrated battlefield" with an 
employment of nuclear, chemical, electronic and conventional weapons. In 
particular NATO's approval of the FOFA concept in 1984 can be interpreted as 
a first step towards the incorporation of the U.S. Army's ALB doctrine into 
NATO strategy.
The 1988 U.S. Commission report, "Discriminate Deterrence," providing an 
"integrated long-term strategy", highlights the way in which the nuclear and 
conventional components would be synthesised in the future to implement 
these underlying intentions of U.S. strategy. The report proposes "a capability 
for counterforce operations deep into enemy territory"*. At the same time "(t)he 
Alliance still needs an ability to use nuclear weapons effectively and 
discriminately."< The report finally admits the collapse of extended deterrence, 
and states the future role of nuclear weapons as mainly an instrument for 
denying success to invading Soviet forces. For the implementation of these 
plans the U.S. has to assert its conventionalised strategy within NATO.
In these kinds of U.S. scenarios weapons such as the Pershing n  and the 
ground-launched cruise missile are an anachronism. Due to their ability to hit 
the Soviet Union in combination with their exclusively nuclear warhead, U.S. 
analysts consider them as too escalatory for war-fighting concepts. Another
2 The Defense Department is developing a new non-nuclear cruise missile with greater 
accuracy and range. Pentagon talks about a CEP near zero. Inside the Pentagon. 
September 25,1987.
* Discriminate Deterrence, 1988, op.cit. p. 2
4 ibid. p.30
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factor is that, although the U.S. clearly dominates the release procedures, it still 
would have to deal with its European allies, who in case of the real event of war 
might prefer not to test how the Soviet Union reacts to these escalatory strikes. 
Most of all the missiles' dear first use implication, generated by their 
vulnerability and the resulting necessity to use them very early, fits neither with 
concepts of controlled war-fighting nor with the idea of holding them as a 
reserve for second strikes in a prolonged conventional-nuclear war.
Concepts of nuclear strikes on a Eurostrategic level as preferred by German 
strategic experts are not always in the interest of the United States. At the 
October 1986 Gleneagles Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting, where the 
1969 "Provisional Political Guidelines" were made more specific by the "General 
Political Guidelines" on the first and follow-on use of nuclear weapons, it seems 
that the German guidelines predominated and will be kept in the foreseeable 
future. The NPG agreed that "(i)nitial use of nuclear weapons...would be made 
mainly on the territory of the aggressor, including the Soviet Union."5 Although 
the NPG recommendations are not binding, there was an element of obligation 
to follow the German-first use guidelines due to the "use or lose" nature of the 
ground-based weapons. There are many more TNFs left which would be able to 
carry out such strikes, but they do not force an urgent action to such extent as 
ground-lauched TNF do. Thus, U.S. interests in maintaining a wider option on 
first use, and, if so, only on a battlefield level, prevailed de facto. After the 
scrapping of Pershing II and the GLCM, has been accomplished, the realisation 
of the U.S. interpretation of flexible response (no-first use, follow-on use 
starting out at the battlefield level) will meet with fewer obstacles within NATO 
in the event of war.
There is no doubt that the option of threatening key Soviet military targets with 
fast and accurate missiles was certainly tempting to U.S. military men. But in 
the foreseeable future technical improvements in satellite navigation will 
obviate the need for cruise missiles to be deployed on land in order to secure 
sufficient accuracy. In the future, cruise missiles based at sea will also provide 
the accuracy to reliably target even mobile follow-on forces of the Warsaw Pact.
The fact that in the early eighties the Reagan administration deployed missiles 
which were not even technically operational, although several key officials
5 Lothar Riihl, 1987a, op.cit. p. 19
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within the administration«5 expressed considerable doubts, has to be seen in a 
political - psychological context. With the rise of the peace movement and the 
unexpected public uproar over the missiles' deployment, European leaders 
preferred to withdraw from their recent commitment to deploy the weapons on 
their soil in fear of losing votes in elections. The same people who had asked for 
the LRTNF now requested the United States to start arms control negotiations 
and to delay the deployment in order to appease the public. The United States 
defied these plans for postponement, since it was not willing to yield to 
contradictory European requests a second time and to slow down a process of 
production and deployment shortly after having started it. Thus the peace 
movement contributed to the decisiveness with which the weapons were 
deployed by the United States. In this context Schlesinger7 s statement seems to 
have been warranted when he accused European leaders of "hypocrisy for 
letting the missile plan be portrayed as a U.S. initiative and perhaps a plan to 
reduce the nuclear risk to the United States."7
In 1987 Reagan decided to crown his term of office with an arms control 
agreement. U.S. analysts certainly did not suffer too much when they had to 
sacrifice the Pershing II and GLCM, particularly in view of the loophole in the 
treaty which allows deployment of long-range theatre nuclear weapons on sea 
and in air. Thus it would be surprising if the United States were not to exploit 
this loophole extensively. However, the conclusions of this work warn against a 
quick accusation of the U.S. for already trying to undermine the INF treaty. One 
has to examine which of the U.S. allies supports these plans behind the scenes. 
Lothar Rühl, who retired from his office as State Secretary at the end of 1988, 
drafted a paper for Defence Minister Wömer as early as March 1988, i.e. three 
months after the INF treaty, in which he recommends that air-launched cruise 
missile and fighter bombers equipped with air-to-surface stand-off weapons be 
considered:
"Es handelt sich dabei nicht um einen Ersatz für die land-gestützten LRINF- 
Systeme oder um eine Kompensation, die das INF-Abkommen aushöhlen, 
umgehen und also neutralisieren soll, sondern um die Nutzung der von diesem 
Abkommen freigelassenen Möglichkeiten, flexible und selektive
6 Strobe Talbott convincingly describes the doubts of some influential politicians over 
the necessity of the weapons programme, see Talbott, 1984, op.cit.
7 "Schlesinger Criticizes U.S. Allies on Missiles", International Herald Tribune. May 
26,1981
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Nuklearoptionen fur die Eskalation mit regionalen Nuklearstreitkraften 
bercitzuhalten."*
Although not optimal, air launched LRTNF are still the second best solution for 
the German interpretation of flexible response since these weapons still are for 
use against the USSR.
In light of the fact that West-Germany is a non-nuclear NATO ally, the Federal 
Republic's strategic policy sofar has been interpreted to a too large extent only 
with reference to U.S. hegemonic policy. If this view is not going to be qualified 
in the future, those political forces in the Federal Republic which disagree with 
the status quo of security policy will continue to address their policy requests to 
the wrong party, i.e. the United States, and spare their own government, i.e. the 
Federal Republic, from justified criticism. This is not only counterproductive in 
a political sense, but even to a certain extent ridiculous. German politicians 
preferred to evade a public discussion about the issue and distracted the public 
on the level of bean counting of the missiles, since an analysis of the 
contradictions and dilemmas inherent in flexible response would have called 
the strategy's merit considerably into question.
8 "This is not to be regarded as a replacement for land-deployed LRINF systems or a 
compensation which modernises, circumvents and thus neutralises the INF treaty, 
but as an exploitation of the opportunities opened up by this treaty permitting the 
choice of flexible and selective nuclear options for escalation with regional nuclear 
forces.” Lothar Rühl to Defence Minister Wömer,.Internal Study, Stabilität und 
konstruktive Beziehungen in Europa. Entwurf eines Konzepts für eine strategisch 




ABM Anti Ballistic Missile
ACDA Anns Control and Disarmament Agency
ACE Allied Command Europe
ADM Atomic Demolition Mines
AFCENT Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe
ALB Airland Battle
ALCM Air Launched Cruise Missile
ASW Anti Submarine Warfare
C3l Command Control Communications and Intelligence
CDU Christian Democratic Union, West Germany
CENTAG Central Army Group, Central Europe
CEP Circular Error Probable
CFE Conference on (armed) Forces Europe
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINCHAN Commander-in-Chief Channel and Southern North Sea
CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief Pacific
CMF Conceptual Military Framework
CNAD Conference on National Armament Directors
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSU Christian Social Union, West Germany
DCA Dual Capable Aircraft
DDR&E Directorate Defense Research and Engineering
DEW Directed Energy Weapons
DoD Department of Defense
DPC Defense Planning Committee
DSARC Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
EMP Electro Magnetic Pulse
ERW Enhanced Radiation Weapon
ET Emerging Technologies
EWP Emergency War Plan
FBS Forward Based Systems
FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area
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FM Field Manual
FOFA Follow-on Forces Attack
FRG Federal Republic Germany
FY Fiscal Year
GDR German Democratic Republic
GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missil
GPG General Political Guidelines
GSP General Strike Plan
HLG High Level Group
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IISS International Institute for Strate
INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Foi
IOC Initial Operational Capability
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Mi
JCAE Joint Congressional Atomic Ene
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSOP Joint Strategic Operations Plan
JSTPS Joint Strategic Target Planning Í
LNO Limited Nuclear Option (also SI
LRTNF Long Range Theater Nuclear Fc
LTDP Long Range Defense Program
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction
MARV Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle




MLF Multi Lateral Force
MMRBM Mobile Medium Range Ballistic
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile
NAA North Atlantic Assembly
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisa
NCA National Command Authorities
NDAC Nuclear Defense Affairs Comm
NOP Nuclear Operations Plan
NORTHAG Northern Army Group
NPG Nuclear Planning Group
NSC National Security Council
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NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum
NSTL National Strategic Target List
NTPR National Targeting Policy Review
NUWEP Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy
NWRS Nuclear Weapons Requirement Study
NYT New York Times
OTA Office of Technology Assessment
PAL Permissive Action Link
PD Presidential Directive
PGM Precision Guided Munitions (also Missiles)
PIT Political Implications
POC Program of Cooperation
PPG Provisional Political Guidelines
PRM Presidential Review Memorandum
PSG Political Study Group
PSP Priority Strike Plan
PTP Possibility to Penetrate
QRA Quick Reaction Alert
RUSI Royal United Strategic Institute
RV Re-entry Vehicle
SAC Strategic Air Command
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCC Special Coordinating Committee
SCG Special Consultative Group
SDÌ Strategic Defense Initiative
SEP Selective Employment Plan
SG Special Group
SHAPE Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers Europe
SICBM Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM Sea Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM Sea Launched Cruise Missile
SNO Selective Nuclear Option (also LNO)
SNF Strategic Nuclear Forces
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany
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SRTNF Short Range Tactical (Theater) Nuclear Forces (below 500km)
SRTNW Short Range Tactical (Theater) Nuclear Weapon (below 500km)
SSBN Submersible Ballistic Nuclear
START Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
TACWP Tactical Working Party
TNF Tactical (Theater) Nuclear Forces
TNW Tactical (Theater) Nuclear Weapons
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
TSP Tactical Strike Plan
USAF United States Air Force
USAREUR US Armed Forces Europe
WP Warsaw Pact
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organisation
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Glossary!
ADM. Atomic Demolition Munitions. Manually emplaced mines 
producing nuclear explosions used to create land barriers in the path of 
enemy forces.
Ballistic missile. Missile which follows a ballistic trajectory (part of which 
is outside the Earth's atmosphere) when thrust is terminated.
Bargaining chip. Actual or projected weapons system the purpose of 
which is to gain some form of concession in arms control negotiations.
CEP. Circular error probability. A measure of missile accuracy: the radius 
of a circle, centered on the target, within which 50 percent of the 
weapons aimed at the target are expected to fall.
Collateral Damage. Unintended damage to civilian facilities (population 
centres, roads, bridges, railroads, dams, etc.) or casualties to civilian 
personnel incurred as a consequence of a nuclear strike against a 
different, usually military, target.
Conventional weapons. Weapons not having mass destruction effects.
Counterforce. A nuclear strategy in which the attack missiles are aimed at 
the opponent's military forces.
Countervailing. Another name for counterforce used in Presidential 
Directive Number 59 (PD-59) to connote a limited nuclear exchange as 
opposed to a disarming first strike.
i This Glossary is based on the following sources:
World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1982. (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 1982; Donald M. Snow, Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World. American 
Policy in the 1980s. (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1981); Aldridge, 
1983, op.cit.: Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces, 1977, op.cit.: U.S.
Department of Defense, Dictionary, 1974, op.cit.
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Countervalue. A nuclear strategy in which the attack missiles are aimed at 
the opponent's value targets- cities and industrial areas.
Cruise missile. Missile which can fly at very low altitudes (and can be 
programmed to follow the contours of the terrain) to minimise radar 
detection. It can be air-, ground- or sea-launched and carry a 
conventional or a nuclear warhead.
Damage limitation. Defensive planning to minimise the physical damage 
incurred as a result of nuclear exchange.
Deterrence. A nuclear strategy whereby a potential aggressor is "deterred" 
from attacking because of the massive and unacceptable retaliation that 
will follow.
EMP. ElectroMagnetic Pulse. A high voltage generated in missile and 
reentry vehicle circuitry when travelling through the environment of a 
nuclear explosion.
EP. Earth Penetrator. A device that mechanically buries a nuclear warhead 
in the ground before detonation. It could be used to create physical 
barriers to enemy military operations, to destroy hardened enemy 
targets, or to conduct nuclear strikes that require the confinement of 
nuclear effects to the ground.
Fall-out. Particles contaminated with radioactive material as well as 
radioactive nuclides, descending to the Earth's surface following a 
nuclear explosion.
FBS. Forward-based systems - American nuclear weapons capabilities 
stationed in Europe capable of attacking targets in the Soviet Union.
First strike capability. The capacity to launch a preemptive strike against 
an enemy and in the process destroy the enemy's second strike forces.
First strike strategy. The intention to fire one's nuclear weapons before 
absorbing a similar attack.
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Fission. Process whereby the nucleus of a heavy atom splits into lighter 
nuclei releasing substantial amounts of energy. At present the most 
important fissionable materials are uranium-235 and plutonium-239.
Fractricide. The destructive effect, from debris, EMP, etc., of a nuclear 
explosion on subsequently incoming warheads.
Fusion. Process whereby light atoms, especially those of the isotopes of 
hydrogen-deuterium and tritium-combine to form a heavy atom with 
the release of very substantial amounts of energy.
Honest John. A short-range, unguided, truck-mounted rocket intended to 
deliver a nuclear weapon against enemy combat forces. Being phased 
out of the U.S. inventory.
ICBM. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. A land-based missile capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons in an intercontinental range (in excess of 
5,500 km).
Interdict. To isolate, or seal off an area by any means; to deny the use of a 
route or approach.
IRBM. Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. A land-based missile capable 
of delivering nuclear weapons to ranges between 2,400 and 5,500 km.
Lance. A newer short-range inertically-guided tactical missile, mounted on 
a tracked vehicle or trailer, capable of delivering a nuclear weapon 
against enemy combat forces.
Launcher. Equipment which launches a missile. ICBM launchers are land- 
based launchers which can be either fixed or mobile. SLBM launchers 
are missile tubes on submarines.
LRTNF. Long-Range theatre nuclear forces: IN F with a range between
1,000 and 5,500 kms.
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MARV. Manoeuvrable reentry vehicle. Reentry vehicle whose flight can be 
adjusted so that it may evade ballistic missile defences and/or acquire 
increased accuracy.
MBFR. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks. Negotiations 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact representatives concerning troop 
reductions in Europe.
Medium-range nuclear weapons. Soviet designation for long-range theatre 
nuclear weapons.
Mt. Megaton. Measure of the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon 
equivalent to one million metric tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT) high 
explosive.
MIRV. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles. Two or more 
reentry vehicles carried by a single missile and capable of attacking 
different, separate targets.
NAVSTAR. The U.S. global positioning system of satellites being at 
present developed.
NCA. National Command Authority. The U.S. national political 
decisionmakers responsible for commanding the use of U.S. nuclear 
forces. The group comprises the President, the Secretary of Defense, 
and their designated successors.
Nike-Hercules. A ground-launched anti-aircraft missile system capable of 
using nuclear or conventional explosives.
NOP. Nuclear Operations Plan. The plan is developed by the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), for the execution of nuclear 
strikes with the nuclear weapons under his command.
PAL. Permissive Action Link. A coded device attached to nuclear 
weapons deployed abroad that impedes the unauthorised arming or 
firing of the weapon.
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PGM. Precision Guided Munition. A bomb or missile capable of being 
guided during the terminal phase of its trajectory with a 50 percent or 
greater probability of making a direct hit on its intended target.
POC. Program of cooperation. The United States deploys and controls the 
warheads of those delivery systems which are owned and operated by 
the European allies. Such custody is also referred to as "dual-key 
system".
Poseidon. The second generation of U.S. SLBM-carrying submarines. 
Successor to Polaris.
PSP. Priority Strike Program. A plan that provides for the delivery of 
nuclear strikes against the highest priority targets in the NOP.
QRA. Quick Reaction Alert. A condition in which specified numbers of 
aircraft and Pershing missiles are readied to deliver designated nuclear 
strikes on very short notice.
RADAG. Radar Area Correlator Guidance. A guidance system that 
compares a radar image of terrain along the reentry vehicle's flight path 
with an image of the target area stored in an onboard computer and 
that makes corrections in the reentry vehicle flight to establish 
correspondence between the two images and thereby to accurately 
strike the target with the vehicle.
RV. Reentry vehicle. Portion of a strategic ballistic missile designed to 
carry a nuclear warhead and to reenter the Earth's atmosphere in the 
terminal phase of the trajectory.
SALT. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Negotiations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States, initiated in 1969, which seek to limit the 
strategic nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive, on both sides.
Second-strike capability. Ability to survive a nuclear attack and launch a 
retaliatory strike large enough to inflict intolerable damage on the 
opponent.
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Sergeant. A truck-mounted, short-range tactical missile capable of 
delivering a nuclear weapon against enemy combat forces. Being 
phased out of the U.S. Inventory.
SIOP. Single Integrated Operational Plan. The U.S. plan for the 
coordinated delivery of nuclear strikes by strategic nuclear forces.
Strategic Triad. The combination of land-based intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, intercontinental bombers and cruise missiles, and submarine- 
launched ballistic missiles: land, air and sea. Both the U.S. and USSR 
operate with a strategic triad of nuclear weapons.
Theatre nuclear Weapons. Nuclear weapons of a range less than 5,500 
kms. Often divided into long-range: over 1,000 kms (e.g. so-called 
Eurostrategic weapons), medium-range, and short-range: up to 200 kms 
(also referred to as battlefield nuclear weapons).
Time Urgent Target. ICBM silos which would have to be destroyed before 
they launch their missiles.
TSP. Tactical Strike Program. A plan for conducting nuclear strikes against 
targets in the NOP other than PSP targets.
Warhead. That part of a missile, torpedo, rocket or other munition which 
contains the explosive or other material intended to inflict damage.
Yield. Released nuclear explosive energy expressed as the equivalent of 
the energy produced by a given number of metric tons of 
trinitrotoluene (TNT) high explosive.
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Chronologu of executives involved in the NATO-Dual Track Decision!
September 15, 1949: Election of Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor of the 
Federal Republic.
June 7, 1955: Theodor Blank became the Federal Republic's first Minister 
of Defence.
October 21, 1955: Franz Josef Strauß became Head of the newly created 
Ministry of "Atomic Affairs".
October 16, 1956: Franz Josef Strauß took over the office of Minister of 
Defence.
January 20,1961: President Kennedy was inaugurated as U.S. President.
January 21, 1961: Robert Strange McNamara was appointed Secretary of 
Defense in the cabinet of Kennedy.
October 30, 1961: Minister of Foreign Affairs Heinrich von Brentano was 
succeeded by Gerhard Schroder.
December 11,1962: Franz Josef Strauß left the Adenauer cabinet as a result 
of the "Spiegel-Affair".
January 9, 1963: Kai-Uwe von Hassel succeeded Strauß as Minister of 
Defence.
October 16, 1963: Ludwig Erhard succeeded Adenauer as Chancellor of 
the Federal Republic.
1 The dates of the U.S. Secretaries and Presidents are taken from Robert Sobel, (ed.) 
Biographical Directory of the United States Executive Branch 1774-1977. 
(Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1977) and Congress and the Nation. Volume 
V 1977-1980. A Review of Government and Politics (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1981) and Datenhandbuch, 1984, op.cit.
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December 1, 1966: after the election Kurt Georg Kiesinger became 
Chancellor of the Grand Coalition, Willy Brandt obtained the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Schröder left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
superseded von Hassel as Minister of Defence.
November 22,1963: President Kennedy's assassination; Lyndon B. Johnson 
was sworn in as President of the United States.
January 18, 1968: Clark McAdams Clifford was appointed Secretary of 
Defense in the cabinet of President Johnson.
February 29,1968: McNamara left his office as U.S. Secretary of Defense.
January 20, 1969: President Nixon was elected President and succeeded 
Johnson. Also Clifford's end of tenure as Johnson's Secretary of 
Defense. In the new cabinet of Nixon Melvin R. Laird became Secretary 
of Defense.
September 28, 1969: Election for the 6th Bundestag, the new government 
was a coalition of the Liberal Party and the Social Democrats.
October 20,1969: Opening session of the 6th Bundestag, election of Brandt 
as Chancellor, Walter Scheel took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Helmut Schmidt entered upon the Ministry of Defence.
July 7, 1972: Schmidt was succeeded by Georg Leber as Minister of 
Defence. Leber obtained the office until February 1978.
January 29, 1973: Elliot Lee Richardson's appointment as Secretary of 
Defense was confirmed by the U.S. Senate after Laird's resignation; he 
served only three months as Secretary of Defense.
July 2, 1973: James Rodney Schlesinger was sworn into office as Secretary 
of Defense.
August 4,1973: Henry Alfred Kissinger was nominated Secretary of State, 
(from 1969-1974 he was assistant to President Richard Nixon on 
national security affairs).
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May 16, 1974: Hans-Dietrich Genscher became the Head of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.
August 9, 1974: Richard Nixon resigned from the presidency; President 
Gerald Rudolph Ford was sworn in.
November 20, 1975: Schlesinger resigned his post; Donald Rumsfeld took 
office as Secretary of Defense.
January 20,1977: in the presidential elections President Ford was defeated; 
as a result Henry Kissinger left his office as Secretary of State and 
Donald Rumsfeld his as Secretary of Defense. Two days later Jimmy 
Carter was inaugurated as President of the United States. He 
nominated Harold Brown as Secretary of Defense. Cyrus Roberts Vance 
was selected to be Secretary of State in the Carter cabinet.
February 2, 1978: Hans Apel entered the Ministry of Defence and 
succeeded Leber.
April 21, 1980: Secretary of State resigned in protest against the abortive 
U.S. attempt to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran.
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